Class _ UlJi QQfc. 

Book L XJ^_ 

Copyright }f 

COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



" Of all the dispositions and habits zvhicli lead to po- 
litical prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable 
supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of 
patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars 
of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of 
men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the 
pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A vol- 
ume could not trace all tlieir connections with private and 
public felicity. Let us with caution indulge tJie supposi- 
tion that morality can be maintained without religion. 
Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined 
education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and ex- 
perience both forbid us to expect that national morality 
can prevail in exclusion of religious principle" 

— George Washington 

"Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter : Fear 
God, and keep his commandments : for this is the whole 
duty of man." 

— Holy Scripture 



INSTITUTES 

OF 

MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



BY 

LYMAN B. TEFFT, D. D. 



9 





Philadelphia 

American baptist publication Society 

1420 Chestnut Street 



i THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, 

Two Copies Received 

APR 8 1903 

^ Copyright E.ntry 

GLASS XXc. No. 

COPY B. 1 



Copyright 1899 by 
Lyman B Tefft 



jfrom tbe ipresa of tbe 
Hmerican ^Baptist JpubUcatton Society 



PREFACE 



This treatise owes its origin to a deep recoil from 
that science and philosophy of morals which makes no 
recognition, or only incidental recognition, of God. The 
attempt to divorce moral science from sacred Scripture, 
theology, and religion, has given us a science with no 
principle of unity, a philosophy without ultimate truth 
or final cause, and a code of morals without obligation 
— a solar system with no central sun or bond of gravita- 
tion. Till a better philosophy shall prevail, practical 
morals must decay. 

Because the supreme Moral Ruler of the universe 
must needs be the central fact in any true system of 
moral science, this treatise gives briefly the grounds of a 
rational belief in the divine existence. 

Because the primary conceptions and ultimate truths 
with which moral science has to do are the intuitions of 
the moral faculty, it has seemed needful to discuss 
somewhat carefully the action and functions of con- 
science. 

Right and wrong in conduct, and all moral character 
or moral distinctions, postulate a real power of choice 
between moral alternatives ; therefore there must needs 
be a discussion of the true doctrine of the will. 

Among the sources of moral science the holy Scrip- 
tures stand chief and cannot be ignored without infinite 
loss — therefore a brief outline argument is given show- 



vi 



PREFACE 



ing the historic trustworthiness and the inspiration of the 
Scriptures. 

The Divine Will is counted the ultimate rule of right ; 
but not will conceived as unrelated to the nature of 
man, fickle or arbitrary in the bad sense, — for there is no 
such divine will, — but the Divine Will as expressed in 
man's moral nature, and in the nature of matter, and in 
the constitution of the universe. A change in the 
Divine Will would involve a corresponding change in 
the whole creation. 

It is taught that the distinction of right and wrong is 
grounded in the nature of God, in the nature of man, 
and in the nature of things — in the primal facts and 
verities of real existence. 

The second part, which treats of practical morals, is 
not designed to be merely a manual of duties. It 
undertakes to show the application of moral principles 
to the chief forms of conduct, and to ground duties in 
ultimate truth. 

To adapt this treatise to classroom use, each num- 
bered paragraph is made to contain one distinct thought 
more or less amplified as seemed needful. 

With the revival of Bible study in schools of the 
higher grades, the author believes that there is more 
than ever before a place and a demand for the study of 
moral philosophy, and such a study as shall recognize 
not only man's social and civic relationships, but also the 
full breadth and scope of his nature and destiny. If 
this work shall stimulate and help the reverent study of 
right and duty the author will be content. 

L. B. T. 

Richmond, January, 1899. 



INTRODUCTION 



All philosophy, science, or thought, presupposes a 
certain basis or starting point of accepted truth. Knowl- 
edge is grounded in postulates, truths accepted without 
proof, incapable of proof and needing none. They 
need no proof because no healthy mind can disbelieve 
them. They are incapable of proof because there is 
nothing more fundamental and certain upon which to 
establish them. From the nature of the case there 
must be somewhere a beginning of knowledge. In 
physics and in metaphysics the beginning is the same. 

First postulate. The testimony of consciousness is 
final and conclusive. 

In this postulate it is understood that the conscious- 
ness is the consciousness of a sane mind. In propor- 
tion as mind becomes unbalanced and diseased, all men- 
tal processes become chimerical. In the application of 
this principle care must be taken that the real dictum of 
consciousness be rightly apprehended, that an inference 
be not mistaken for the direct testimony of conscious- 
ness. For example, consciousness affirms as a fact that 
we see and hear, but consciousness is silent touching the 
process of seeing and hearing. 

Second postulate. The knowledge which comes to us 
through our perceptive faculties is real knowledge. 

This signifies the reality of the non-ego, the world of 
matter and of things, and the reality of our knowledge 

vii 



Vlll 



INTRODUCTION 



of the qualities of matter. This does not mean, how- 
ever, that our knowledge of matter is complete or that 
our senses give us at all the ground of the qualities 
which they reveal. So far as our knowledge extends, it 
is real ; it is not a mere subjective modification with no 
corresponding objective reality. It gives a solid basis 
for thought and action in working out our destiny for 
time and for eternity. 

Third postulate. Our normal and necessary mental 
processes are valid. 

This signifies that mental processes valid in human 
thought are also valid in the mind of God, and corre- 
spond to the realities of actual existence. The intui- 
tions of the mind are the direct beholding of that which 
is real and true. For example, the conception of time 
is the idea of a reality. The affirmation that every 
change must have a cause adequate to produce the 
change, represents a universal and necessary fact in the 
universe, as true to the mind of God as to the mind of 
man. That which is logical in thought is that which 
corresponds to the realities of actual existence. 



AXIOMATIC PRINCIPLES 



First. The validity of moral distinctions, as grounded 
in the nature of God, and in the nature of all beings 
made in the likeness of God. Moral distinctions are 
necessary concepts of the human mind, co-ordinate with 
ideas of time, of space, and of causation. 

Second. The freedom of the will, as a faculty which 
originates moral choices and determines the moral atti- 
tudes of spiritual beings. This is axiomatic as being an 
ultimate testimony of consciousness. 

Third. The reality of moral obligation, of good and 
ill desert, of sin and guilt. This is axiomatic as being 
the affirmation of conscience, the faculty of moral in- 
tuitions. 

Fourth. The duty of obedience to the supreme au- 
thority, to the being whom the intellect certifies as the 
supreme being. This is axiomatic as being the primary 
and the primal dictum of conscience. 

These postulates and axiomatic principles furnish a 
foundation for moral science as sure as the basis of math- 
ematics. Pure mathematics has this advantage — dealing 
with conceptions only, it maintains the same certainty to 
the end. Moral science must deal with facts as they 
exist, and these facts may be more or less perfectly 
apprehended. 



ix 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

Chapter Analysis xiii-xxvii 

Part I. Principles 1-266 

I. Definitions and Principles 3 

II. Concerning the Existence of God 19 

III. Concerning the Sources of Moral Philosophy . 30 

IV. Concerning the Supreme Ruler 50 

V. Concerning Man ; Sensibilities, Conscience ... 61 

VI. Concerning the Power of Choice 90 

VII. Concerning Right 115 

VIII. Concerning the Revelation of the Rule of 

Right 148 

IX. Concerning the Grounds of Obligation . . . .158 

X. Concerning the Requisites for Moral Respon- 

sibility 164 

XI. Concerning Righteousness 171 

XII. Concerning Moral Depravity 185 

XIII. Concerning Society 196 

XIV. Concerning Self-love 231 

XV. Concerning Freedom of Conscience 237 

xi 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XVI. Concerning Property 244 

XVII. Concerning Ethical Principles of the Chris- 
tian Religion 252 

Part II. Practical Ethics 267-372 

XVIII. Concerning Duties toward God 269 

XIX. Concerning Duties Having Respect to One's 

Self 296 

XX. Concerning Duties toward Men 301 

XXI. Concerning Duties toward the Government . . 334 

XXII. Concerning Rights 342 

XXIII. Concerning Casuistry 362 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



Introduction. — Postulates; The Testimony of Consciousness 
Final and Conclusive; Our Knowledge Real; Our Normal and 
Necessary Mental Processes Valid. 

Axiomatic Principles. — The Validity of Moral Principles; 
The Freedom of the Will; The Reality of Moral Obligation; The 
Duty of Obedience to the Supreme Authority. 



PART I. — PRINCIPLES 
CHAPTER I 

DEFINITIONS 

I. Definition of Moral Philosophy; 2. Distinction in Terms — 
Ethics; 3. Moral Science; 4. Moral Philosophy; 5. Moral Philoso- 
phy and Other Sciences — Mathematics; 6. Natural Science; 7. 
Psychology; 8. Will and Conscience to be Investigated; 9. Con- 
trary Opinions; 10. Theology; 11. The Sciences not Separate; 
12. A Moral Philosophy without God or Conscience; 13. Obliga- 
tion the Primary Idea in Moral Philosophy; 14. Obligation Implies 
Two Parties; 15. Obligation to Self not a Reality; 16. What Two 
Parties; 17. A Triangle of Relationships; 18. Two Classes of Obli- 
gations; 19. Law; 20. Law as a Rule of Conduct; 21. Law as Uni- 
formity of Operation ; 22. Moral Philosophy and Law as Uniformity 
of Operation; 23. Law as a Fixed Order of Sequence; 24. Natural 
Law in Moral Science; 25. Law as Signifying a Force; 26. Law as 



xiv 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



the Moral Law; 27. The Revelation of the Moral Law Multiform; 
28. Scope of the Moral Law; 29. Man's Relationship to Things; 
30. The Use of Things Indirectly Right or Wrong; 31. Righteous- 
ness and Hygiene; 32. Excessive Exaltation of Nature; 33. Criti- 
cisms; 34. Dr. Hickok' s Definition; 35. Herbert Spencer's Defi- 
nition; 36. Professor Haven's Definitions; 37. Dr. Wayland' s Point 
of Departure; 38. Moral Law not an Order of Sequence; 39. 
A Suggestive Defect. 

CHAPTER II 

CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 

40. The Moral Standard, a Being with Moral Attributes; 41. 
Unity of Moral Obligation; 42. Obligation not Possible except 
toward Moral Beings ; 43. God' s Existence a Question for Moral 
Science; 44. First Proof of God's Existence — the Universe as it 
Is; 45. Illustrative Marks of Intelligence; 46. Intelligence not in 
Matter; 47. The Impress of whose Intelligence; 48. Second Proof 
— the Origin of Life; 49. The Argument from the Life of Man; 
50. The Third Proof — the Moral Faculty in Man; 51. Apart from 
God, Conscience False; 52. Fourth Proof — God's Manifestation of 
Himself; 53. Is Belief in the Existence of God an Intuition; 54. 
Criticism of the Argument from Direct Intuition; 55. Resume of 
Proofs; 56. Note — Animal Instincts. 

CHAPTER III 

CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

57. The Importance of this Inquiry; 58. Intuition the First 
Source of Moral Science; 59. Illustrative Rational Intuitions; 60. 
Moral Intuitions; 61. The Denial of Moral Intuitions; 62. The 
Second Source of Moral Science — the Holy Scriptures; 63. The 
Claims of Holy Scripture; 64. The Scriptures not to be Ignored; 
65. The Scriptures not a Source of Theology Only; 66. First Step 
of Argument — the Bible Trustworthy History; 67. Second Step — 
the Character of the Writers ; 68. Third Step — the Mental Charac- 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



XV 



teristics of the Writers; 69. Fourth Step — Harmony of Testimony; 
70. The Harmony of Organic Unity; 71. Significance of Concur- 
rent Testimony; 72. Fifth Step — Concurrent Secular Records; 73. 
First Preliminary Conclusion — the Scriptures Good History; 74. 
Sixth Step — the Claims Made by the Scriptures Themselves; 75. 
Seventh Step — Miracles; 76. Eighth Step — Prophecy; 77. Second 
Preliminary Conclusion — Inspiration; 78. Ninth Step — Explains 
the Life of the Race; 79. Tenth Step — the Origin of the Christian 
Religion; 80. Eleventh Step — the Scriptures a Mirror of Man's 
Inward Life; 81. Twelfth Step — the Moral Code; 82. Thirteenth 
Step — the Influence of the Sacred Scriptures; 83. Final Conclu- 
sion ; 84. Characteristics of this Second Source of Moral Philoso- 
phy; 85. Third Source of Moral Science — the Normal Action of 
the Human Faculties; 86. Normal Activities Right; 87. Distinc- 
tion Between Moral Action and Action Instinctive or Auto- 
matic; 88. Fourth Source of Moral Science — the Study of Con- 
sequences; 89. Illustrations in the Spiritual Realm; 90. Illustra- 
tions in Man's Physical Life; 91. Fifth Source of Moral Philos- 
ophy — History. 



CHAPTER IV 

CONCERNING THE SUPREME RULER 

92. Our Conception of the Supreme Ruler Important; 93. The 
Divine Being a Person; 94. Origin of the Idea of Personality; 95. 
Contents of the Idea of Personality ; 96. Conception of the Divine 
Personality; 97. Man Made in the Divine Likeness; 98. The Per- 
sonality of God in Scripture; 99. Consequences of the Personality 
of God; 100. The Absoluteness of the Supreme Ruler; 101. Limi- 
tations of the Divine Absoluteness; 102. Consequences of the 
Divine Absoluteness; 103. Objections to the Divine Absoluteness; 
104. God a Holy Being; 105. Man's Nature Responsive to Holi- 
ness; 106. Holiness Exalted by the Sacred Scriptures; 107. Holi- 
ness Testified to by Natural Law; 108. Psychology and Holiness; 
109. History and Holiness; no. Divine Love; in. Is God a God 
of Love? 112. Is God Merciful; 113. The Right Conception of 
Mercy; 114. Resume. 



xvi 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



CHAPTER V 

CONCERNING MAN ; SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 

115. The Second Element in Moral Science; 1 16. Correlation of 
Human Nature to the Divine; 117. Correlation of Conscience and 
Will to God; 1 18. The Knowing Faculties; 1 19, Certainty of Our 
Knowledge; 120. The Sensibilities; 121. Moral Philosophy and 
the Sensibilities; 122. The Conscience; 123. What is Conscience ? 
124. The Existence of a Moral Faculty; 125. Is Conscience a Dis- 
tinct Faculty? 126. Conscience is a Distinct Faculty; 127. The 
Criterion of Distinctness of Faculty; 128. Genesis of the Denial 
that Conscience is a Faculty; 129. The Function of Conscience; 
130. Obligation and Right Emptied of Their Meaning; 131. A 
Typical Case for Analysis; 132. Essential Elements in the Typical 
Case; 133. The Cognition of the Lawgiver and of the Law; 134. 
The Primary Movement of Conscience; 135. Conscience Respon- 
sive to Authority; 136. The Temptation, Outside of Conscience; 
137. Good or 111 Desert; 138. Conscience not a Faculty of Com- 
paring and Judging; 139. Resume; 140. This Analysis Just; 141. 
Obligation the Primary Dictum of Conscience; 142. Other Facul- 
ties Co-operative with Conscience; 143. The Dicta of Conscience 
Infallible; 144. Conditions Requisite for the Action of Conscience; 
145. Testimony of Dr. Baird; 146. Testimony of Dr. McCosh; 
147. Dr. Strong's Testimony; 148. A World without Authority or 
Law; 149. Sentiments Mistaken for Conscience; 150. Obscure 
Movements of Conscience; 151. Apparent Absence of Authority; 
152. A Law Present, Though not Apparent; 153. Methods of Con- 
structing Ethical Codes; 154. Fragments of the Moral Law; 155. 
Personal Authority not Absent; 156. Without the Idea of God, 
Conscience Weak; 157. Degrees of Energy in the Action of Con- 
science; 158. Degrees of Depravity Affecting Conscience; 159. 
Abuse of Conscience a Cause of Weakness; 160. Vagueness of 
Ideas a Source of Weakness ; 161. Some Doctrines Enervate 
Conscience ; 162. Conscience under Wicked Law ; 163. Illus- 
trations ; 164. The Authority of Conscience ; 165. Conscience 
Echoes the Voice of the Lawgiver ; 166. Authority Emanates 
from Will; 167. Conscience not Coercive; 168. The Discernment 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



XVII 



of what is Right; 169. Conscience Deals with Moral Principles 
Only; 170. Discerning Right by the Light of Nature; 171. A 
Positive Law Needed; 172. Conscientiousness not Identical with 
Right 

CHAPTER VI 

CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE 

173. Importance of the Subject; 174. Definition of the Will; 
175. The Will, Sui Generis; 176. Will a Distinct Faculty; 177. 
Will is not Reason; 178. Will not Conscience; 179. Will not Sen- 
sibility; 180. Will not the Strongest Motive; 181. President Ed- 
wards' Argument; 182. Edwards' Argument an Identical Equa- 
tion; 183. What is a Motive? 184. Anticipative Sense of Motive; 
185. Motives Inert; 186. Relation of Motives to the Mind; 187. 
Conception of Freedom; 188. Difficulty of Conceiving Freedom; 
189. Proposed Definitions of the Idea of Freedom; 190. The Con- 
flict of Ages; 191. The Will Makes and Changes Moral States; 
192. Historic Proofs; 193. Proof from Spiritual Regeneration; 
194. The Testimony of Consciousness; 195. The Testimony of 
Conscience; 196. Ability to Choose, and Penalty; 197. Classes of 
Choices; 198. General and Particular, Generic and Executive 
Volitions; 199. Choices with no Moral Element; 200. The Moral 
Element in Generic Choices; 201. Choice Involves Real Alterna- 
tives ; 202. The Nature of Real Aternatives ; 203. Fixedness of 
Choice; 204. " Facilis Descensus Averno" ; 205. Consequences of 
Choices; 206. Consequences not Under the Control of the Will; 
207. The Will Co-operative with Other Faculties; 208. Will and 
Character; 209. Freedom not Lost; 210. Desire and Love Move- 
ments of the Will; 21 1. Choice Without a Motive; 212. Motives 
as Influences; 213. Sensibilities as Motives; 214. The Will as an 
Expression of the Existing Self ; 215. Reasoning in a Circle; 216. 
Will and Sensibility; 217. Without Sensibility, no Choice; 218. 
Sensibility a Stimulus to all Faculties; 219. Sensibility as an Object 
of Choice; 220. Sensibility, as a Motive, a Future Sensibility; 
221. The Abyss of Moral Philosophy. 



xviii 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



CHAPTER VII 

CONCERNING RIGHT 

222. The Grounds of Right; 223. The Idea of Right — Defini- 
tion; 224. Scope of the Idea of Right; 225. The Rule of Right 
Found in God; 226. Objection — Will Arbitrary and Changeful; 
227. The Being of God the Archetype of Man's Being; 228. God 
Central and Supreme; 229. The Testimony of Scripture; 230. 
Other Standards Fragments of the Divine Will; 231. Conse- 
quences of Conduct as a Rule of Right; 232. Ideal Human Na- 
ture as a Rule of Right; 233. The "Nature of Things" as a 
Standard of Right; 234. God's Will the Only Practical Moral 
Law; 235. Positive Commands; 236. Theory of Hobbes; 237. 
Objections to Hobbes' Theory; 238. Herbert Spencer's Theory; 
239. Stands or Falls with "Evolution" ; 240. Facts Fundamental 
to Evolution; 241. Huxley and Spontaneous Generation; 242. 
Huxley on Transmutation of Species; 243. The Testimony of 
Geology; 244. Current Theories of Right; 245. Theories of 
Utility; 246. The Argument for Utilitarianism; 247. Statement of 
Mr. David Metcalf ; 248. President Edwards' Argument; 249. Mr. 
Metcalf's Fatal Admission; 250. The Idea of Right and of Utility 
Distinct; 251. Utilitarianism and Selfishness; 252. Suggestive Il- 
lustrations; 253. Brutus and his Sons; 254. Utilitarianism Counts 
Rectitude Inferior; 255. Utilitarianism Irreligious; 256. The 
Tendency of Utilitarianism; 257. Epicurus and Epicureanism; 
258. The Antidote for Utilitarian Theories; 259. Utility not a 
Guide in Right Doing; 260. Consequences Remote and not Dis- 
cernible; 261. The Experiences of Past Generations not Enough; 
262. If not a Guide, not a Standard of Right; 263. Regard for 
Consequences not a Moral Element; 264. Happiness Attained In- 
directly; 265. Subjective Standards of Right; 266. Dr. Hickok's 
Theory; 267. Dr. Peabody's Theory; 268. The Practical Supple- 
ment; 269. Right and Wrong "In the Nature of Things" ; 270. 
Nature of Things in the Obvious Sense; 271. His Language Un- 
fortunate; 272. His Intended Meaning; 273. The Real Significance 
ofthe Theory 5274. Objection — the Standard Subjective; 275. Mag- 
istracy in Place of Sovereignty; 276. Obedience not Due then to 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



XIX 



God; 277. Destroys the Sense of Moral Obligation; 278. Defense 
of "Right in the Nature of Things" ; 279. Arguments Founded 
on Misconception; 280. All Objections Reducible to Two; 281. A 
Change of Right Inconceivable ; 282. What if God Should Change ! 
283. A Standard by which to Test the Standard; 284. The Genesis 
of the Theory. 

CHAPTER VIII 

CONCERNING THE REVELATION OF THE RULE OF RIGHT 

285. One Law — Multiform Revelation; 286. Revealed in Man's 
Own Nature; 287. The Testimony of the Sacred Scripture; 288. 
Scope of this Revelation in Man's Nature; 289. The Rule of 
Right Expressed in the Nature of Things; 290. The Law of Right 
Indicated in History; 291. Franklin's Testimony; 292. The Rule 
of Right Revealed in Sacred Scripture; 293. Duty Revealed Di- 
rectly by the Divine Spirit; 294. Specialized Guidance Necessary; 
295. The Spirit's Guidance Explicit; 296. Striking Illustrative Ex- 
ample; 297. Danger of Self-deception; 298. The Test of Spiritual 
Impressions; 299. The Test of Reason; 300. The Touchstone of 
Peace; 301. Safeguards. 

CHAPTER IX 

CONCERNING THE GROUNDS OF OBLIGATION 

302. Obligation Ultimate but Rational; 303. Ultimate Obliga- 
tion Grounded in Creatorship; 304. Limitation of Proprietary 
Right; 305. Obligation Grounded in Perfection of Being; 306. 
The Perfections of God a Ground of Obligation; 307. " De jure" 
Rationally Grounded in " de facto" ; 308. Divine Love a Ground 
of Obligation; 309. Grounds of Inferior Obligation; 310. Rami- 
fications of Obligation; 311. Grades of Being. 

CHAPTER X 

CONCERNING THE REQUISITES FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 

312. Some Conditions Requisite; 313. Intelligence Requisite for 



XX 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



Responsibility; 314. Limitations of Intelligence; 315. Limitation 
by Infancy; 316. Responsibility Limited by Idiocy; 317. Limited 
by Necessary Ignorance; 318. Conscience Requisite for Responsi- 
bility; 319. Disregard of Conscience not a Lack of Conscience; 
320. Power of Choice Requisite for Responsibility; 321. A Guilty 
Loss of Freedom. 322. Sanity Requisite for Responsibility; 323. 
Degrees of Moral Responsibility. 

CHAPTER XI 

CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS 

324. The Term Righteousness; 32$. Objective and Subjective 
Righteousness; 326. Neutral Conduct; 327. Neutral Conduct In- 
directly Right or Wrong; 328. Neutral Conduct Counted Right; 
329. Subjective Righteousness; 330. Illustrations; 331. Effort to 
Know the Right; 332. Righteousness and the Sensibilities; 333. 
Sensibility as an Element of Moral Character; 334. Sensibility as 
a Product of Choice; 335. Inherited Debasement of Sensibility; 
336. The Cure of Evil Sensibility; 337. Sensibility and Desire; 
338. Evil Sensibility Itself an Object of Choice; 339. Some Con- 
clusions; 340. Responsibility for Character; 341. No Moral Neu- 
trality; 342. Evil Thoughts; 343. Safety from Evil Thoughts; 344. 
The Psychological Remedy; 345. Limitations of Moral Responsi- 
bility; 346. Responsibility Limited by Physical Inability; 347. In- 
ability Itself a Sin; 348. Responsibility Limited by Mental In- 
ability; 349. Unused Abilities; 350. Responsibility Limited by 
Ignorance of the Law; 351. To be Remembered. 

CHAPTER XII 

CONCERNING MORAL DEPRAVITY 

352. Depravity a Fact; 353. Moral Science must Recognize De- 
pravity; 354. Effects of the " Fall" ; 355. Effects of the Fall upon 
the Body; 356. Depravity and the Intellect; 357. Depravity in the 
Sensibilities; 358. Resisting Depraved Sensibility; 359. Depravity 
in the Conscience; 360. Depravity in the Will; 361. Depravity 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



xxi 



Known by Consciousness; 362. Depravity Hereditary; 363. De- 
pravity and Responsibility; 364. The Duty of Holding Depravity 
in Check; 365. Depravity Actually held in Check; 366. Sensibil- 
ity not Dominant over Will; 367. Fixedness in Evil not Incon- 
sistent with Responsibility; 368. Responsibility for Depravity 
Itself; 369. Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do Right; 370. 
Responsibility and Supernatural Help. 

CHAPTER XIII 

CONCERNING SOCIETY 

371. Human Beings not Unrelated Individuals; 372. Relation- 
ships Necessary; 373. Classes of Relationships — The Brother- 
hood of Man; 374. Family Relationships; 375. Government and 
Subject; 376. Relationships of Mutual Consent; 377. First-class — 
a Common Relationship to the Creator; 378. Brotherhood in the 
Race; 379. Equality of Natural Rights; 380. Universal Benevo- 
lence; 381. Benevolence not Communism; 382. Resume; 383. Rela- 
tionships of the Second Class; 384. Marriage; 385. Parentage; 
386. The Filial Relationship; 387. Informing Principles of the 
Family Relationship — Fidelity; 388. Reverence, Obedience; 389. 
Love, Self-sacrifice; 390. Relationships of the Third Class — Civil 
Government; 391. Theories of Civil Government; 392. Not a 
Question of Form; 393. Not a Question of Good Government; 
394. Not a Question of Legitimacy, or De jure ; 395. Not a 
Question of Limit; 396. Authority not Founded in Consent. First 
Objection; 397. One Generation Consenting for the Next; 398. 
Non-consenting Law Breakers; 399. Born under Authority; 400. 
Authority Administered by Men; 401. Ramifications of Divine 
Authority; 402. Authority Ramifies Downward; 403. The Divine 
Authority Limiting Civil Authority ; 404. Determination of Methods 
and Limits; 405. Relationships of Ruler and Subject — How Deter- 
mined ; 406. The Civil Organization to be Characterized by Jus- 
tice; 407. Government Benevolent; 408. The Duty of Government 
not Self-perpetuation ; 409. Principle Clear — Application Difficult; 
410. Justice Includes Protection; 411. The Right of Public De 
fense; 412. Punishment; 413. Government must Punish; 414. 



xxii 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



Punishment not Contrary to Benevolence; 415, Immaterial Inter- 
ests; 416. The Present Tendency ; 417. The "Higher Law" ; 418. 
Licensing Evil; 419. Civil Authority in a Republic; 420. The Sub- 
ject a Ruler also; 421. Forming Public Sentiment; 422. The State a 
Unity; 423. A Community of Burdens ; 424. Majorities and Minor- 
ities; 425. Dangers which Arise from Parties; 426. The Principle 
of Sacrifice; 427. Relationships of the Fourth Class; 428. Volun- 
tary Associations under Law; 429. Associations Unknown to Law; 
430. The Christian Church ; 431. The Church as an Association 
of the First Class; 432. The Church as an Organization of the 
Second Class; 433. The Church as an Association of the Fourth 
Class. 

CHAPTER XIV 

CONCERNING SELF-LOVE 

434. The Nature of Self-love; 435. Self-love and Selfishness; 
436. Self-love to be Limited by Reason; 437. Reason Distinguishes 
Between Enjoyments; 438. Reason Prefers Lasting Enjoyments; 
439. Reason Leads to Self-denial; 440. Reason Takes Account of 
Means; 441. Self-love Limited by Duty; 442. Self-love Limited by 
the Rights of Others; 443. Self-love and Self-sacrifice; 444. Selfish- 
ness. 

CHAPTER XV 

CONCERNING FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 

445. The Idea of Soul-liberty; 446. Not Indifferentism ; 447. 
Does not Forbid the use of Rational Influences; 448. Only the 
Right to Hold and Enjoy; 449. Disapproval of False Doctrines; 
450. Not a Shield for Immorality; 451. Not Freedom to Sow the 
Seeds of Vice; 452. The Denial of Soul-liberty Unjust; 453. In- 
tolerance Futile ; 454. Intolerance Destructive ; 455. Freedom 
Abridged by Assumed Authority; 456. An Established Church; 
457. Discriminating Favors; 458. A Distinction; 459. A Second 
Distinction, 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



XX111 



CHAPTER XVI 

CONCERNING PROPERTY 

460. The Right of Private Ownership; 461. The Idea of Owner- 
ship; 462. Ownership Grounded in Production; 463. Ownership 
Grounded in First Appropriation; 464. Ownership by Exchange; 
465. Ownership by Gift; 466. Ownership and Public Policy; 467. 
Estates and Landlords; 468. Vested Rights; 469. The Nature of 
the Problem; 470. Limitation of Rightful Ownership; 471. Owner- 
ship Grounded in Mere Possession Limited; 472. Ancient Hold- 
ings Subject to Public Policy; 473. The Increment of Value from 
Labor. 

CHAPTER XVII 

CONCERNING THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN 
RELIGION. 

474. The Christian Religion Grounded in Ultimate Principles; 
475. A Philosophy Implies Comprehension; 476. A Reason for 
the Purpose of Redemption; 477. Why the Written Revelation; 
478. Possibility of the Incarnation; 479. Limitation of the Divine 
Manifestation; 480. W 7 herefore the Incarnation ; 481. The Signifi- 
cance of the Atonement; 482. The Special Problem of the Chris- 
tian Religion ; 483. The Solution of the Problem; 484. Represent- 
ative Sin-bearing not Unrighteous; 485. Representative Sin-bear- 
ing Grounded in Reality ; 486. The Atonement Adequate for 
Government; 487. Love's Appeal in the Atonement; 488. The 
Atonement Grounded in True Psychology; 489. Mystery not a 
Philosophic Objection; 490. Representative Responsibility Illus- 
trated; 491. Salvation and Blessings Conditioned upon Faith; 
492. Ye Must be Born Again; 493. Purification and Power Through 
Faith; 494. Faith Forever. 



xxiv 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



PART II.— PRACTICAL ETHICS 
CHAPTER XVIII 

CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 

495. Obligation Concrete; 496. Obedience to God; 497. The 
Obligation Supreme; 498. Subjective Effects of Obedience to God; 
499. Characteristics of Perfect Obedience; 500. Scope of Obedience 
to God; 501. Grounds of the Duty of Obedience to God; 502. The 
Duty of Love to God; 503. The Duty of Gratitude toward God; 
504. The Duty of Reverence toward God; 505. Manifestations of 
Reverence; 506. The Duty of Faith toward God; 507. The Duty of 
Prayer and Worship; 508. Worship Grounded in Nature; 509. 
Worship Commanded in Holy Scripture ; 510. Prayer Commanded ; 
511. Theoretical Difficulties; 512. Prayer not Dictation; 513. 
Prayer not for the Purpose of Overcoming Reluctance; 514. Prayer 
and Eternal Purpose; 515. Conditions of Prevailing Prayer; 516. 
The Testimony of Experience; 517. Characteristics of Worship; 
5 1 8. Private Worship ; 519. Family Worship ; 520.' Public Worship; 
521. Repentance; 522. Repentance a Duty; 523. Repentance a 
Privilege; 524. Keeping the Sabbath Holy; 525. Physical Bene- 
fits; 526. Intellectual Benefits; 527. Moral and Religious Benefits; 
528. The Holy Scriptures and the Sabbath; 529. Permitted Work 
upon the Sabbath; 530. All Days not Equally Sacred; 531. Man- 
ner of Keeping the Sabbath; 532. Dedication of Property to God; 
533. Recognizes God's Right; 534. Dedication of Property as a 
Thank-offering; 535. Dedication of Property for Public Worship; 
536. Dedication of Property for Public Needs; 537. Dedication of 
Property to Relieve Suffering; 538. The Dedication of Property 
not for Man's Sake Only; 539. Actual Service to God; 540. Ac- 
knowledging the Unseen; 541. Testimony to Revealed Truth; 
542. Testimony of Religious Experience; 543. The Duty of Serv- 
ice to God Imperative. 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



XXV 



CHAPTER XIX 

CONCERNING DUTIES HAVING RESPECT TO ONE' S SELF 

544. Obligation Cannot be to Self; 545. The Duty of Self-pres- 
ervation; 546. Self-preservation a Duty to God; 547. The Duty of 
Caring for Health; 548. The Duty of Self-preservation Limited; 
549. The Duty of Self-improvement; 550. Self-cultivation a Duty 
toward God; 551. The Duty of Claiming One's Rights. 

CHAPTER XX 

CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MEN 

552. Scope of the Discussion; 553. The Duty of Non-interfer- 
ence; 554. Interference with the Rights of Property; 555. Inter- 
ference to Corrupt Character; 556. Interference with the Rights of 
Reputation; 557. Interference with the Rights of Conscience; 
558. Interference with Personal Liberty; 559. Origin of Slavery; 
560. Grades of Slavery; 561. Slavery is Robbery; 562. The Propa- 
gation of Slavery Works no Justification; 563. Attempted Justifi- 
cation of Slavery; 564. Pleas for the Continuance of Slavery; 565. 
Duties of the Master; 566. Renunciation of Ownership, not Aban- 
donment; 567. Slavery Nullifies Marriage; 568. Slavery Nullifies 
Parental Obligations; 569. Slavery and Chastity; 570. Slavery 
Necessitates Ignorance; 571. Slavery and Moral Character; 572. 
Slavery Gives no Place for Aspiration; 573. The Christian Relig- 
ion and Slavery; 574. Caste; 575. The Injustice of Caste; 576. 
Truthfulness — its Nature; 577. Prevalence of Falsehood; 578. 
Truth and Concealment; 579. Figures of Speech not Falsehood; 
580. Mere Evasions not Falsehoods; 581. The Obligation to be 
Truthful Imperative; 582. Defense of Falsehood; 583. Replies to 
the Above; 584. An Illustration; 585. Subjective Influence of 
Sincerity; 586. Subjective Effects of Falsehood; 587. Why so Im- 
portant? 588. Training Children in Truthfulness; 589. Duties in 
Family Relationships — Principles; 590. Fidelity; 591. Love; 592. 
Reverence; 593. Bread-winning; 594. The Submission of the Wife; 
595. Duties of Parents in Respect to their Children; 596. Obliga- 
tions Under the Principles of Heredity; 597. Care in Childhood; 



xxvi 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



598. Care for the Education of Children; 599. Moral and Relig- 
ious Training; 600. Parental Rights; 601. Limits of Parental 
Authority; 602. The Duties of Children; 603. Honor toward 
Parents; 6oa. Grounds of Filial Duty. 

CHAPTER XXI 

CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT 

605, Taxes; 606. Justice in Taxation; 607. Community and 
Brotherhood in Taxation; 608. Public Charities; 609. Honesty in 
the Payment of Taxes; 610. Obedience to Law; 611. Standing 
with the Magistrate; 612. Railing at Rulers; 613. Responsibility 
of the Citizen; 614. The Higher Law. 

CHAPTER XXII 

CONCERNING RIGHTS 

615. Self-defense — General View; 616. Non-resistance in the 
New Testament; 617. Defense by the Magistrate; 618. The De- 
fense of the Helpless; 619. The Element of Justice in Self-de- 
fense; 620. The Law of Love and Self-defense; 621. Limit of In- 
jury which maybe Inflicted in Self-defense; 622. Denial of the 
Right of Self-defense; 623. The Instinct of Self-preservation; 624. 
Revenge; 625. War — Classes of Wars; 626. Justifications of War; 
627. War must be Justified by Expediency; 628. Dueling; 629. 
Dueling not Self-defense; 630. Dueling Unchristian; 631. Suicide; 
632. Suicide as Related to God; 633. Suicide as Related to Men; 
634. Suicide as Related to the Actor; 635. Is it Right to Prevent 
Suicide by Force ? 636. Individualism in the Extreme; 637. Licen- 
sing Vice and Sin; 638. License and Partial Prohibition; 639. 
License and Taxation; 640. The Attitude of Civil Law toward 
Evil; 641. Is a License of the Liquor Traffic a Partnership ? 642. 
Evils of the License System; 643. "Personal Liberty" and In- 
temperance; 644. The Right to Save a Man from Self-destruction; 
645. Personal Liberty Subject to Limitation; 646. The Drink 



CHAPTER ANALYSIS 



XXV11 



Habit a Menace to All; 647. Heredity; 648. The Drink Traffic a 
Conspiracy. 

CHAPTER XXIII 

CONCERNING CASUISTRY 

649. The Nature of Casuistry; 650. Conflict of Obligation; 651. 
Conflict of Obligation Impossible; 652. The Chief Difficulty ; 653. 
The First Case; 654. The Second Case; 655. A General Answer 
Impossible; 656. What do General Principles Determine? 657. 
A Neglected Element; 658. Considerations to be Noted; 659. 
Cases of Conscience. 



PART I 
PRINCIPLES 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



CHAPTER I 

DEFINITIONS 

1. Definition of Moral Philosophy. 

Moral philosophy is that department of mental and 
metaphysical science which treats of the moral law and 
of its relationships and applications to human conduct 
and character. It has to do with ideas and principles 
expressed by such words as right and wrong ; ought, 
obligation, and duty ; righteousness and sin ; reward and 
penalty. It inquires what ought to be and why. 

2. Distinction in Terms — Ethics. 

The term ethics denotes properly the rules of practi- 
cal morality. This is indicated by such expressions as 
these : The ethics of trade ; the ethics of the street ; 
political, social, med'cal ethics. This use of the word 
is agreeable to its derivation from ethos (l#oc), meaning 
habit, manner, custom. 

3. Moral Science. 

Moral science is the rational unfolding of the prin- 
ciples which underlie practical morals and the system- 
atic arrangement of duties according to those principles. 

3 



4 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



4. Moral Philosophy. 

Moral philosophy includes moral science, but it goes 
farther and investigates the grounds and validity of the 
moral principles themselves. It not only answers the 
questions, What ? and How ? but also explains the rea- 
son why. But the terms moral science and moral phi- 
losophy are often used interchangeably, as if nearly or 
quite synonymous. 

5. Moral Philosophy and Other Sciences— Mathematics. 

The science of mathematics treats of numbers, and 
of extension which can be represented by numbers. 
The conceptions and processes of mathematics enter 
largely into all the natural sciences. The universe of 
things is framed on mathematical principles. But 
the conceptions of moral science cannot be repre- 
sented by numbers nor can they be reduced to mathe- 
matical formulae. Duty is not equal to pleasure nor 
a multiple of pleasure ; right is not a plus quantity and 
wrong a minus quantity; two wrongs do not equal a 
right. 

6. Natural Science. 

The natural sciences treat of the phenomena and 
forces of matter. The characteristic of all phenomena 
of matter is unintelligent, unconscious uniformity. Moral 
philosophy, on the other hand, investigates the moral ac- 
tivities of spiritual beings, the characteristic of which is 
intelligent, conscious freedom. The forms of thought, 
therefore, which befit physical science cannot be trans- 
ferred to moral philosophy. The attempt to do this is 
the death of moral science. 



DEFINITIONS 



5 



7. Psychology. 

Psychology investigates the activities of man's mental 
faculties and the general phenomena of mind ; but psy- 
chology raises no question touching the moral quality of 
the mental phenomena which it investigates. But moral 
philosophy treads upon the edge of psychology, for in 
moral science the functions of conscience and will are 
fundamental factors. Moral science "inquires what a 
moral agent is in his constitution in order to determine 
how he ought to choose and feel and act." 

8. Will and Conscience to be Investigated. 

Moral philosophy cannot afford not to investigate the 
faculties of conscience and will. The action of these 
faculties is fundamental in all moral concernments. 
Apart from the will, with its power of choice, moral con- 
duct and responsibility are impossible. Without con- 
science there could be no sense of obligation or of 
right It surely belongs to moral science to investigate 
for itself the action of those faculties and the origin and 
value of those ideas upon which its very existence de- 
pends. 

9. Contrary Opinions. 

The right of moral science to examine for itself the 
activities of conscience and will is by some stoutly de- 
nied. Dr. Laurens P. Hickok says, " Moral science 
must be preceded by mental science," and therefore in 
his treatise on moral science he leaves conscience and 
will entirely without treatment. Dr. Joseph Haven says, 
" Many of our most popular works on moral philosophy 
treat of topics which properly belong to psychology, e. g., 



6 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



the nature of conscience, the sensibilities, and the will" ; 
and he in like manner gives these faculties little con- 
sideration. The more recent writers, however, count the 
activities of conscience and will as belonging to the do- 
main of moral science not less than to psychology. 

10. Theology. 

Theology and moral philosophy are closely related. 
Theology, signifying primarily the science of God, em- 
braces not only that which may be known of God, but 
also man's relationship to him and man's conduct and 
character so far at least as they concern his final destiny. 
Moral philosophy in turn overlaps theology. The moral 
law is from God, and the ultimate grounds of obliga- 
tion and right can be found nowhere except in the being 
of God. Moral science cannot afford to ignore the sacred 
Scriptures. The moral elements of a man's life in this 
world cannot be duly estimated apart from immortality 
and final destiny. 

11. The Sciences not Separate. 

The attempt to draw severe lines of separation be- 
tween departments of knowledge is both artificial and 
futile. Fact and truth everywhere are so related that it 
is impossible to sunder them. Ideas of number pervade 
the universe ; mathematical processes are the very soul 
of astronomy and pervade all natural science ; physics 
and chemistry mingle everywhere in geology ; psychol- 
ogy counts it needful to overrun the domains of physi- 
ology and biology. In like manner the student of ethics 
must make incursions into the territory of psychology 
and theology, and wherever it can find good material. 



DEFINITIONS 



7 



12. A Moral Philosophy Without God or Conscience. 

There are moralists, indeed, who so apprehend their 
science that they feel no need of reference to the Divine 
Being, and have no occasion to touch the hem of the- 
ology. They who count right and duty as only refined 
forms of selfishness and self-gratification, have no need 
to investigate the action of conscience. If man is noth- 
ing more than a "more highly evolved" beast, the fac- 
ulty of choice needs no attention. But such views are 
the death of moral conceptions, and leave no place for a 
real moral philosophy. Holding fast to imperative moral 
obligation we have need of conscience and of God. And 
the presence of God in moral philosophy brings it into 
relationship with all truth, fact, and science. 

13. Obligation the Primary Idea in Moral Philosophy. 

The primary conception in moral philosophy is obli- 
gation — not right, but obligation. Ought expresses a 
simple, primary, undefinable idea. It is important to 
hold this fact well in mind, for otherwise the action of 
conscience cannot be well understood. The idea of 
obligation rises in the mind of the child before the idea 
of right. The notion of obligation is universal and uni- 
form with men of every kind, but notions of what is right 
are various and incongruous to the last degree. 

14. Obligation Implies Two Parties. 

Obligation implies relationship, and relationship im- 
plies the existence of two or more persons. A being 
existing alone in the universe could not be under obliga- 
tion. In the mind of a being so existing the idea of 
duty could not arise. Conduct might be pleasant or 



8 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



unpleasant, injurious or otherwise, but nothing could be 
conceived as duty, for there would be no being to whom 
he could be morally obligated. 

15. Obligation to Self not a Reality. 

That form of speech which represents a man as owing 
this or that to himself, covers a lurking fallacy of thought ; 
it conceives the indivisible unit of personality as at once 
debtor and creditor in the same transaction. If the ex- 
pression be at all admissible in scientific discussion, it 
must be taken as a figure of speech in which a right or 
privilege is spoken of as a duty. A better form of speech 
would be : I have the right to claim this for myself ; my 
honor or my happiness cannot be secured except by 
doing this. But a privilege or a right for myself may be 
my duty to my friends or to God. 

16. What Two Parties? 

The two parties always present in every transaction 
having moral quality, and always to be taken account of 
in moral philosophy, are, first, the responsible human 
being who is under obligation, and secondly, the Creator 
to whom every human being is supremely obligated. 
Were there but one human being on the earth, this 
primary obligation would exist in full force and there 
would be no second. From this primary obligation all 
other obligations spring. In this comprehensive obliga- 
tion all other obligations are involved. 

17. A Triangle of Relationships. 

Moral obligation implies at the least two related per- 
sons, but moral science in its simplest form must take 



DEFINITIONS 



9 



account of more than two. There must needs be a tri- 
angle of relationships. No human being can exist un- 
related to God, and not, except temporarily and abnor- 
mally, unrelated to other members of the human family. 
These relationships may become exceedingly complex 
and intricate, but in their simplest form they must needs 
include a triangle of persons and relations. 

1 8. Two Classes of Obligations. 

From the triangle of parties and relationships set forth 
in the preceding paragraph, arise two generic classes of 
duties ; first, duties owed directly and solely to the Divine 
Being; secondly, springing from the first and finely in- 
terwoven with them, duties owed to men, our fellow- 
creatures. Obligations of the first class are in their 
nature simple and easily understood ; obligations of the 
second class are complex and tangled beyond the possi- 
bility of complete analysis or full comprehension. 

19. Law. 

The term "law" is important, and the student of moral 
science must learn to distinguish carefully its various 
senses. Under an ill-defined and uncertain use of this 
word lurk many false conceptions and dangerous fallacies. 

20. Law as a Rule of Conduct. 

Law signifies primarily a rule of conduct to which 
obedience is required. This rule may issue from a 
father, from a sovereign, from a legislature, from an un- 
written consensus of public opinion, from a council of 
nations, or from the Creator of the universe. In this 
sense law has one essential characteristic, it is a rule 



IO INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

which has for its object the control of free beings by 
their voluntary submission to its requirements. With 
this obedience force, as force is understood in physics, 
can have nothing whatever to do. Where physical force 
as a cause begins, obedience ends. From this primary 
sense of law the secondary uses are easily derived. 

21. Law as Uniformity of Operation. 

Because obedience to law as a rule of conduct secures 
regularity of conduct, therefore any principle or method 
of uniformity of operation is called a law. We speak of 
"the law of our being," "the law of hereditary descent," 
"the law of falling bodies." The law of one's being is 
that uniform method of development or action which is 
normal to a being so constituted. The law of heredity 
is that uniformity in the transmission of qualities from 
parents to offspring, by which species, races, and families 
preserve their characteristics through successive genera- 
tions. Illustrations of this use of the term law might be 
given without limit. 

22. Moral Philosophy and Law as Uniformity of Operation. 

This second sense of law as signifying uniformity of 
operation, is not excluded from moral philosophy. We 
may rightly speak of the law of the conscience, the law 
of the will, but we must bear in mind that these expres- 
sions do not signify a rule of conduct issuing from these 
faculties, but their special, normal mode of action. 

23. Law as a Fixed Order of Sequence. 

In natural science, the term law is often used to mean 
a fixed order in the sequence of phenomena. This, like 



DEFINITIONS 



the preceding, is uniformity of operation. A law of 
nature, as the phrase is commonly used, is the fixed 
order in which the phenomena of matter follow each 
other. Here again appears a half-unconscious personifi- 
cation of nature as a sovereign giving laws in the primary 
sense, to which every atom of matter gives strict obedi- 
ence. 

24. Natural Law in Moral Science. 

The use of the term, law, as signifying a fixed order of 
sequence is not excluded from moral science. It is a 
law that suffering follows sinning, and that virtue is fol- 
lowed by happiness. But this is not the moral law. 
This is natural law in the moral world. To confound 
this natural law with the moral law, introduces dire con- 
fusion into moral philosophy. 

25. Law as Signifying a Force. 

A uniformly acting force, tendency, or instinct, which 
produces regularity of operation is sometimes called a 
law. The planets move obedient to the " law of gravi- 
tation." There is the "law of self-preservation," the 
"law of love," the "law of life," the "law of sin." 
These ever-acting forces are conceived as ruling the 
phenomena of motion and conduct. This use of the 
term law by Paul indicates its applicability to moral 
questions. But it must be remembered that this is not 
the moral law. 

26. Law, as the Moral Law. 

In the definition of moral philosophy, law is used in 
its primary sense, a rule of conduct for the control of 



12 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

free beings through their voluntary submission to its re- 
quirements. The moral law is God's will revealed in 
many ways for the government of men, and administered 
by the moral agency of reward and penalty. With this 
agrees Webster's definition: "The will of God as the 
rule for the disposition and conduct of all responsible 
beings toward him and toward each other." In this 
definition every element must be emphasized. 

The moral law is not uniformity of operation or 
regularity in the sequence of phenomena ; it is a rule of 
conduct to which conformity is due, but to which dis- 
obedience is possible. The moral law is not the expres- 
sion of impersonal nature, but the will of the living God. 
The moral law is not .a code of principles deduced from 
an experience of consequences ; it is a rule of conduct 
intended to guide men previous to experience and to 
save them from disastrous experiences. The moral law 
is not mere advice, however urgent ; it is a law pro- 
claimed by a sovereign, enforced by rewards and penal- 
ties, administered through the agencies of nature and of 
special providences, and maintained by the infinite ener- 
gies of the divine personality. 

27. The Revelation of the Moral Law Multiform. 

It is easy to see that the moral law is not limited, and 
is not to be limited, to one brief code, as the Decalogue, 
or to one method of revelation. The law is outlined in 
the Decalogue, but the revelation of it is broader than 
the Decalogue. The law is revealed in the sacred 
Scriptures, but the revelation of the law is not confined 
to the Scriptures. That revelation which is the founda- 
tion of all, and is presupposed by every other, is found 



DEFINITIONS 



13 



in man's own moral nature. Also for us who live so 
late in the course of time, the will of God has been re- 
vealed by a long experience of every kind of conduct, 
and by deep research into the nature of things. Wher- 
ever and however the mind of God touching the moral 
conduct of men is indicated, there and thus is seen a 
revelation of the moral law. 

28. Scope of the Moral Law. 

As has been shown in the triangle of necessary rela- 
tionships, the moral law has a duplex code. It defines, 
first, man's dispositions and duties toward God, and 
secondly, the due conduct and temper of mind between 
fellow-members of the human race. Also, preliminary 
to its fuller discussion in its place, it should be noted 
that the moral law covers not only the outward conduct 
of action and speech, but also the inward life of thought, 
appetence, sensibility, love, purpose, and character. 
The inward life is primary and chief. " Out of the good 
treasure of the heart" or "out of the evil treasure" 
proceeds the outward life of men. 

20. Man's Relationship to Things. 

Man's relationship to the world of non-sentient things 
is indirectly, but only indirectly, a question of morals. 
What men shall do or how they shall feel toward moun- 
tain or sea, cloud or tree, is not directly the subject of 
moral commandment. A man may stand spellbound 
with awe in the presence of Mont Blanc or Niagara, 
and gaze with rapture upon the Bay of Naples by 
moonlight or upon the Golden Horn, or he may be 
slightly moved by scenes of grandeur and beauty, and 



14 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

moral character may receive neither gain nor detriment 
by the one or the other. Whether a man shall feed on 
wheat or on rice, on beef or on mutton, is not directly 
a question of right or wrong ; if he does the one he is 
no better, or if he does the other he is no worse. 

30. The Use of Things Indirectly Right or Wrong. 

While it is true that moral obligation cannot subsist 
toward things, that wrong and injustice cannot be done 
to things, that man's relationship to things is not directly 
a moral relationship, it is nevertheless true that he may 
so use things as to bring that use under the purview of 
the moral law. If men subject grains and fruits to fer- 
mentation and drink the intoxicating products of organic 
decay, this use of things comes within the scope of the 
moral commandment, because by this they throw both 
their inward life and outward conduct out of harmony 
with ethical requirement, and render themselves unable 
to meet their obligations either toward God or toward 
men. The use of things for any kind of vicious self- 
indulgence comes under this principle. In this manner 
man's use of nature, in almost every form of use, comes 
indirectly and more or less remotely within the domain 
of right and wrong. Food and health, dress and style 
of living, come thus within the sphere of morals. 

31. Righteousness and Hygiene. 

Our relationship to the world of things may, as has 
been shown, become an element of right and duty ; but 
they greatly err who count food and health, or any other 
right adjustment of ourselves to the physical world, as 
moral concernments of equal grade with " the weightier 



DEFINITIONS 



15 



matters of the law — judgment, mercy, and faith." Sick- 
ness is not always sin. To ignore hygiene and to sacri- 
fice the welfare of the body may become the dictate of 
supreme right. The law of love and self-sacrifice is 
higher than the law of self-preservation. Heroism for- 
gets personal well-being. Many moral emergencies 
justly tread hygiene under foot. 

32. Excessive Exaltation of Nature, 

The practical effect of accounting virtue as consisting 
too much in the right adjustment of man to nature, is 
not so much to exalt the real value of that adjustment, 
as to degrade the real and essential righteousness. It 
not seldom happens that as nature is exalted, the Creator 
of nature is depressed. Moral philosophy must count 
our obligation to God as primary and chief; our obliga- 
tions to men as secondary, but immeasurably impor- 
tant ; our relations with nature as moral, incidentally and 
indirectly. The first and great commandment is, "Thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart" ; the 
second is like unto it, " Thou shalt love thy neighbour as 
thyself." 

33. Criticisms. 

For the purpose of comparison and criticism it may 
be well to consider certain other characteristic definitions 
of moral philosophy. These will show in what funda- 
mental conceptions diverse or antagonistic ethical sys- 
tems find their point of departure. 

34. Dr. Hickok's Definition. 

Dr. Laurens P. Hickok 1 defines moral science as 

1 "A System of Moral Science," p. 55. 



i6 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



"the systematic application of the ultimate rule of right 
to all conceptions of moral conduct." The germinal 
idea in this definition is found in " the ultimate rule of 
right" This ultimate rule of right Dr. Hickok declares 
to be " that all voluntary action should be held in sub- 
jection to the dignity of the rational spirit." He recog- 
nizes no standard of right except suitableness to the 
dignity of such a being as man. And a man must be 
his own judge of that suitableness. From this germinal 
thought Dr. Hickok evolves a system of morals which 
finds 1 its " ethical grounds and validity independently 
of the considerations of God's being." 

35. Herbert Spencer's Definition. 

Herbert Spencer 2 says : "Acts are called good or bad 
according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends." The 
end of all activities he explains as being, first, the pres- 
ervation and personal welfare of the individual, the 
lowest grade in the evolution of conduct ; the preserva- 
tion of the species, the second grade of evolution ; and 
third, the accomplishment of these ends on the part of 
each individual in such a way as to be a help and not a 
hindrance to other individuals, the highest grade in the 
evolution of conduct To sum it all up, he says : " No 
school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a 
desirable state of feeling called by whatever name — grati- 
fication, enjoyment, happiness." Starting with defini- 
tions from which every trace of moral obligation is 
rigidly excluded, Mr. Spencer carefully frames a system 
of ethics which makes self-pleasing the highest aim and 
the highest good, and self-denial an impossibility. 

1 " A System of Moral Science, " p. 295 . 2 " Data of Ethics, ' ' Chap. III. 



DEFINITIONS 



17 



36. Professor Haven's Definitions. 

Prof. Joseph Haven 1 defines moral philosophy as 
"the science which treats of morals, the science of 
right" Right he declares to be a quality of actions 
"inherent in the nature of things," independent of God, 
to which God himself is subject, so that no man is more 
or less under obligation to do a thing or not to do it by 
reason of any divine command or prohibition. The law 
of God is only a guide in understanding what is that 
right which exists independent of God. 2 Here we have 
a system of ethics which denies utterly any standard of 
right outside of a man's own intuitions, and finds for 
God an incidental place as a magistrate, but no place for 
him as a sovereign. 

37. Dr. Wayland's Point of Departure. 

Dr. Francis Wayland 3 defines moral science as " the 
science of moral law." Law in this definition he ex- 
plains as signifying "an order of sequence," and the 
moral law as " a form of expression denoting an order 
of sequence established between the moral qualities of 
actions and their results." He conceives the moral law 
as a law of nature in moral concerns, the fixed sequence 
of good or ill to certain courses of conduct. This order 
of sequence in morals he declares to be as fixed and in- 
evitable as sequences in physics. Still further 4 he says : 
"The happiness or misery of which we speak affects 
men simply in consequence of the action and without 
any regard to the innocence or guilt of the actor." 
This conception of the moral law pursues and entangles 

1 "Moral Philosophy," p. 15. 2 Ibid., Div. I., Chap. II., III. 

3 "Elements of Moral Science," pp. 25, 26, 27. 4 Ibid., p. 1 12. 

B 



1 8 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

the author, and leaves no place for law as a rule of con- 
duct. The ultimate standard of right he nowhere con- 
siders. His high religious faith saves him from following 
his definitions to their logical issue. 

38. Moral Law Not an Order of Sequence. 

That suffering follows sinning, that right-doing brings 
happiness, and that these results are brought to pass in^ 
some degree by an automatic agency through the nature 
of matter and spirit is surely true. But this is natural 
law. To show that the moral law is not an order of 
sequence but a rule of conduct we need only point to 
that great epitome of the moral code, the Decalogue. 
The Ten Commandments enjoin duties rather than make 
a declaration of consequences. 

39. A Suggestive Defect. 

A noteworthy and suggestive defect in Dr. Wayland's 
definition is seen in this, that an order of sequence is not 
a thing to be obeyed or disobeyed. An order of se- 
quence cannot be broken by man. To break an order 
of sequence is to tear asunder the chain of causation. 
The very conception of this is self-contradictory, for 
that force which should break the chain would merely 
constitute an accessory cause, bringing, of necessity, a 
modified result. If the moral law is an order of se- 
quence, the only possible law-breaker is he who has 
power to forgive sins, for nothing else than forgiveness 
can disturb the order of sequence between the moral 
qualities of actions and their results. 



CHAPTER II 



CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 

40. The Moral Standard, a Being with Moral Attributes. 

Moral Tightness is conformity to a standard of morals. 
Between objects compared there must be a likeness in 
respect to that element which is the point of comparison. 
The dimensions of a body must be measured by a 
standard which itself has extension. Moral qualities can 
be compared with nothing except moral qualities. The 
standard of measure for a moral being, like man, must 
needs be a perfect being of like moral nature. Is there 
such a being, the supreme standard of moral perfection 
for all men? It belongs to moral science to answer this 
question. 

41. Unity of Moral Obligation. 

Moral science is the science of obligation. Is such a 
science possible ? If duty is not a tangled skein of 
competing obligations, but a unity capable of scientific 
treatment, that unity must be found in some supreme 
obligation, of which all other obligations are only unfold- 
ings and ramifications. If there is one supreme obliga- 
tion, it must be found in man's obligation to his Creator. 
It can be found nowhere else. Is there a supreme being 
to whom man is under supreme obligation, an obligation 
in which is found the unity of all duty? Moral science 
must answer this question. Till this question is answered 
there can be no science of morals. 

19 



20 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



42. Obligation not Possible Except toward Moral Beings. 

Moral obligation cannot subsist except toward a 
being, and a being of moral attributes. Duty is not a 
mere abstraction. Obligation cannot subsist toward 
things. It may subsist in respect to them, but not to 
them. Obligation subsists between one personal being 
and another personal being, or else it has no existence. 
Is there a supreme being, the center of supreme obliga- 
tion for all men ? It belongs to moral science to give 
reply to this question. 

43. God's Existence a Question for Moral Science. 

In moral science, if anywhere, the inquiry concerning 
the existence of a Supreme Being is appropriate. Moral 
science does not presuppose previous theological study, 
and moreover, if at all the existence of God is to be ac- 
cepted without investigation, that acceptance would best 
be found in theology itself. This inquiry becomes im- 
perative when we consider the general effort to develop 
a philosophy of morals apart from the idea of a Supreme 
Ruler. Any system so constructed must, as a philosophy, 
be shallow ; as a science, it must be false to the facts of 
spiritual existence ; as an ethical system, it must be 
lacking in grip of moral obligation. It is reasonable to 
demand the grounds of our belief in the existence of 
that Being who can be recognized by no bodily sense. 

44. First Proof— the Universe as it Is. 

The first proof that there is a Creator and Supreme 
Ruler is derived from the organized and working universe. 
The world as it stands before us, with its countless marks 
of mind, intelligence, and purpose, its matching of 



CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 



2 I 



element to element and part to part, with its adaptation 
of means for the accomplishment of ends — marks which 
meet us everywhere — renders any hypothesis except that 
the universe is the product of an intelligent Creator an 
absurdity. It is possible to deny this in words ; but a 
rational account of the universe, upon any other supposi- 
tion, is impossible. Apart from the idea of a Creator sci- 
ence can give no account of the origin of life. Assuming 
the existence of matter with all its properties and forces, 
and assuming the existence of life, the most that science 
attempts to do is to show possible modes of change. 

45. Illustrative Marks of Intelligence. 

As illustrations of the finger-prints of intelligence seen 
in the world as it exists, we may note the adaptations 
between light and the eyes of living creatures ; between 
sound vibrations and the ear ; between the properties 
of matter and all the senses of the inhabitants of the 
earth; between heat and cold and the world of vege- 
table and animal life. We may consider water, its 
specific heat and its latent heat ; its solid, liquid, and 
gaseous forms, with all their wonderful relationships. 
We may take note of oxygen, with its active, eager affin- 
ities, and of nitrogen, with its singular inertness. Study 
the structure of the solar system with its balanced forces 
and automatic take-ups and compensations. Study the 
structure of man himself, complicated and subtile in con- 
trivance and function beyond conception. Investigate 
the qualities of matter by which this organic universe is 
rendered a possibility, and the relationships of this ma- 
terial world to the intellectual development and moral 
discipline of man. Put all these things together, and 



2 2 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

more without limit, and say whether it is possible to give 
a rational account of the universe as it exists, except upon 
the hypothesis that it is in some way the work of an in- 
telligent Creator. 

46. Intelligence not in Matter. 

The world bears the imprint of intelligence. The im- 
press of thought pervades the universe. The supposition 
that it is the workmanship of God sufficiently explains its 
origin and structure. No other supposition meets the 
case. The one alternative hypothesis imputes these in- 
finite adaptations to matter itself. This is nothing else 
than " begging the question." It is imputing to matter 
the qualities of mind. It is, in effect, a denial of the dis- 
tinction between matter and spirit. And this the new 
materialism admits. Matter is said to have two faces ; 
on the one side it shows the qualities of extension, weight 
and inertia ; on the other, the psychic attributes of intel- 
ligence and sensibility ; matter has an unconscious will 
and purpose. This may show a fine fancy, but nothing 
can be more unscientific than to impute attributes the 
most diverse in kind to the same substance. With bet- 
ter reason we might count oxygen, with its furious attrac- 
tions, and nitrogen, with its feeble affinities, one and the 
same substance. The universe bears the marks of intel- 
ligence and mind, and upon the testimony of conscious- 
ness and clear thought we must hold that matter and 
mind are not one. 

47. The Impress of whose Intelligence? 

When once it is seen that the universe is the work- 
manship of an intelligent being, the minds of men do 



CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 23 

not hesitate to ascribe it to that infinite being whom we 
name God. The infinitude of the universe forbids its 
ascription to any inferior intelligence. And when the 
idea of God is accepted, clear thought will not hesitate 
to impute the creation of the universe to the Divine Being 
of the holy Scriptures. 

48. Second Proof— the Origin of Life. 

So far as science can read the autobiography of the 
earth and of the universe, it declares that a time was 
when organized things did not exist. The astronomer, 
gazing into the infinite past, thinks he sees worlds and 
systems fade out and dissipate into gaseous nebulae. 
The geologist believes that the hieroglyphics of his 
science declare that once this earth was a glowing sphere 
of molten rock, and earlier still, a whirling mass of fiery 
vapor. It is conceded and affirmed by all that there was 
a time when animal or vegetable life could not exist 
on this globe. Organized matter was an impossibility. 
Touching the origin of life the last word of science, and 
its only word, is this, that "life proceeds from life and 
from nothing else." The most solicitous experiments 
have not been able to throw the slightest doubt upon this 
scientific dictum. Clear thought can give no account of 
the origin of life except to ascribe it to the creative act 
of God. 

40. The Argument from the Life of Man. 

The above proof of the divine existence, the origin of 
life, acquires immensely increased force when we con- 
sider the life of man. The life of men is very much more 
than that undefinable force which is able out of dead 



24 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

material to build up a living organism and to propagate 
and perpetuate its own existence. Man is a self-con- 
scious and rational being, endowed with conscience and 
will and with aspirations for immortality. If dead matter 
cannot of itself begin to stir and to organize itself with 
the life of a tree, how much less can it rise to the life of 
a beast animate with the intelligence of instinct ! And 
if dead matter cannot spontaneously assume the low life 
of instinct, how shall it rise to the high rational and 
spiritual life of man? Man's life can have no origin 
lower than itself. 

50. The Third Proof— the Moral Faculty in Man. 

The faculty of conscience in man postulates the exist- 
ence of God as the necessary ground of its moral affir- 
mations. Conscience is the faculty which stands correl- 
ative to moral authority. As the eye stands correlative 
to light, and its structure and functions postulate the 
existence of light, so does conscience in the human soul 
postulate the moral authority of God. Take from con- 
science the idea of supreme authority, and its action 
becomes exceedingly feeble ; take from it all idea of 
authority, and its action as conscience ceases. Conscience 
recognizes the authority — the supreme authority — of 
some being. Conscience speaks of conformity to some 
rule of right — a rule of right emanating from some being. 
Conscience presses upon men the idea and sense of obli- 
gation — obligation to some being. Conscience throws 
the minds of men into a state of expectancy, a looking 
for reward or penalty corresponding to moral desert — a 
reward or penalty administered by some being. That 
being whose presence in the minds of men gives law 



CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 2$ 

and potency to conscience, is intuitively recognized as 
supreme. 

51. Apart from God, Conscience False. 

The full and perfect action of conscience requires the 
idea of a supreme personal ruler, as positively demands 
this as perfect seeing requires light and the notion of 
space. If there is no God, the intuitions and ultimate 
dicta of conscience are nothing other than falsehoods. 
The "categorical imperative" of conscience and its 
ominous forebodings must then be counted as irrational 
babblings. But intuitive conceptions and beliefs are the 
basis of all knowledge, not of one kind only, but of all 
kinds. They are in themselves the surest knowledge. 
It is no more unscientific to deny the principle of cause 
and effect or the reality of time and space than to deny 
the affirmations of conscience. Conscience postulates 
the existence of a Supreme Moral Ruler as the condition 
of its own perfect action. 

52. Fourth Proof— God's Manifestation of Himself. 

God has not left his existence to be inferred by 
reasoning processes, or to be searched out by curious 
investigations, or to be beheld dimly by more or less 
blurred intuitions ; he has manifested himself. For the 
chief record of the divine self-manifestations we go to 
the sacred Scriptures. We count the historic testimony 
of the Scriptures sufficient. The evidences of this will 
be briefly examined in due time. In numerous personal 
manifestations to antediluvian fathers from Adam to 
Noah ; in the Jehovah-angel to Abraham and the patri- 
archs ; in the burning bush to Moses ; in the miraculous 



26 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



plagues to Pharaoh ; in thunders, lightnings, and voices 
from Sinai to the Hebrew tribes ; in sign and wonders 
wrought by judges and prophets to confound the wor- 
shipers of idols ; in miracles of mercy and blessing 
wrought by Christ and his apostles, by many manifesta- 
tions of his Spirit since the unseen God has compelled 
his existence to be felt and recognized by men. The 
spiritual renovation wrought upon sinful human nature 
through belief in the gospel of Christ is a perpetual 
declaration of God's existence. As historic events no 
facts are better attested than these. The denial of them 
withdraws a factor from human history, without which 
the course of events and the development of the race 
cannot be explained. These manifestations carried con- 
viction to the minds of the men to whom they were 
made, and the record itself has a wonderfully convincing 
power over those who thoughtfully read it. 

53. Is Belief in the Existence of God an Intuition? 

Dr. A. H. Strong 1 holds that belief in the divine ex- 
istence is strictly a rational intuition. He affirms that 
this belief has the three characteristics of a truth of 
direct intuition, that it is universal, necessary, and presup- 
posed by all other knowledge — universal, in the sense 
that all men by language and by life show that belief in 
the existence of God is present in their minds ; necessary, 
in the sense that under suitable conditions this belief 
necessarily arises ; presupposed in all knowledge, in that 
only upon the supposition that our faculties are the 
creation of a God of truth have we any assurance that 
our knowledge is real. 



1 "Systematic Theology." 



CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 27 

54. Criticism of the Argument from Intuition. 

The claim that belief in the divine existence is a 
direct rational intuition seems somewhat too strong. It 
seems to count belief in the existence of invisible 
spiritual beings, demons, or fairies, as identical with belief 
in the existence of God. The conditions under which 
belief in the divine existence must necessarily arise are 
not such as naturally obtain, but such as are brought 
about by a supernatural revelation. In respect to the 
claim that belief in the existence of God is a postulate 
of all knowledge, it must be said that the major part of 
the human race trust their faculties and feel no need of 
accounting to themselves for that confidence in any 
manner whatsoever. It does not occur to them to doubt 
their senses. This however we must hold, that belief 
in God is so normal to man's moral nature that when 
once the idea of God is clearly presented it satisfies 
both reason and conscience, and only a strongly perverse 
moral bias can prevent its acceptance. The sacred 
Scriptures powerfully present the fact of God's exist- 
ence, and the minds of men promptly respond to that 
presentation. The reality of the divine existence is so 
well established that moral philosophy must needs recog- 
nize it and build upon it as upon a chief corner-stone. 

55. Resume' of Proofs. 

These proofs do not undertake to exhaust the subject, 
but they are conclusive as to the facts which they are 
adduced to establish. They render it impossible for 
rational thought to deny that there is a God, and that 
he is intelligent and supreme over nature ; but many 
things concerning the attributes of this Supreme Being 



28 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



it remains for the holy Scriptures to show. The argu- 
ment from the organic universe as the expression of 
intelligence and purpose can be impugned only by im- 
puting to matter those attributes which consciousness 
reveals as the faculties of spiritual beings. This denies 
the reality of mind by clothing all matter with the attri- 
butes of mind, and denies an intelligent Creator by im- 
puting to wind, water, and dust an infinite intelligence. 
But consciousness will never cease to affirm the distinc- 
tion between the thinking self and dead matter. The 
argument from the beginning of life cannot be weakened 
until science shall indicate the possibility of life issuing 
from burning chaos, or that vegetable and animal life 
can spring spontaneously from lifeless dust. So long as 
science continues to repeat that life proceeds from life 
and from nothing else, we must believe in a living source 
of terrestrial life. And while the consciences of men 
continue to speak of right and wrong, of sin and guilt, 
and to warn men of a judgment to come ; while the 
holy Scriptures continue to chant the record of God's 
revelations of himself ; while the preaching of the gospel 
is followed by the spiritual renovation of those who be- 
lieve, and while in every extreme crisis of life, when 
heart and flesh fail, human weakness is made strong and 
men are lifted above themselves by a help which they 
know to be not of themselves, so long the belief of men 
in a living God, who is not nature but above nature, 
will not fail. 

56. Note— Animal Instincts. 

The argument from intelligence as manifest in nature 
finds countless curious and interesting illustrations in the 



CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 



29 



instincts of animal life. This instinct is wise in adapting 
means to ends. No cunning hunter after long experi- 
ence prepares nets and traps for his prey more shrewdly 
than does the spider without experience. This instinct 
is sometimes mathematical and architectural, as in the 
bee and the beaver. The hornet sides and shingles his 
house with tissue paper, but no master builder can con- 
struct a roof to shed rain more securely. This instinct 
knows healthful food from poisonous before testing it. 
And, most wonderful of all, this instinct is prophetic. 
Prescient of the coming winter, the migratory bird flies 
from a cold it has never felt to a country of perennial 
summer which it has never seen, the direction of which 
it has never been told. The squirrel lays up in store for 
a time of need which it has never experienced. The 
mother bird prepares a nest for the young of which she 
has felt no quickening. The caterpillar weaves a cocoon 
for her coming sleep and change, and makes provision 
for her exit when her awakening shall come. The mud 
wasp builds her cells of mud, lays her eggs, and in the 
same cells seals up living spiders — living, because other- 
wise they would spoil — against the time when her young 
shall issue from the egg and require food. The intelli- 
gence manifest in these animal instincts is superhuman ; 
it is wise antecedent to experience. When we crush a 
spider or a worm we destroy a life of higher than human 
attributes, an intelligence more far-seeing than man's, a 
creature of prophetic gifts, an angel in disguise, unless 
indeed the intelligence and the prevision belong to the 
Creator of the insect and not to the insect itself. 



CHAPTER III 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

57. Importance of this Inquiry. 

In any science the certainty and the worth of the con- 
clusions reached depend upon its materials as well as 
upon its methods. Pure mathematics, having to do with 
ideas only, with abstract conceptions of quantity and 
number, and handling those conceptions in equations, 
has in it no element of error or uncertainty. Applied 
mathematics, using the same processes, but handling 
concrete values, shows instantly an element of uncer- 
tainty. The difference lies in the material used. Given 
the exact parallax of the sun, and the distance of the sun 
can be easily found with an error less than any assignable 
quantity. The only element of uncertainty lies in the 
data of the problem. The sciences of geology and of 
medicine, on the other hand, are notably uncertain in 
their conclusions ; their material is hard to be understood 
as facts merely, and the relations of those imperfectly 
comprehended facts are so complex and intricate, that 
their causes and consequences are traced with difficulty. 
In moral science, therefore, we must have regard to facts 
as well as to logical processes. We must scrutinize the 
sources of our knowledge. The work of the moralist is 
not to construct a system to suit his pleasure, but to 
comprehend the facts, principles, and methods of God's 
government of men. In moral philosophy the facts are 
30 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3 I 

as rigid as the facts of physics, and as comprehensible as 
the facts of psychology. 

58. Intuition the First Source of Moral Science. 

The primary source of moral science must be the in- 
tuitions of man's own spiritual being. The conscious 
activities of will and of conscience give those fundamental 
ideas and truths upon which the entire superstructure 
must rest. If the primary moral affirmations which the 
spirit of man makes to itself be true, — absolutely and 
eternally true, — the science and the philosophy of morals 
have a firm foundation, but other foundations they can- 
not .have. ' 

59. Illustrative Rational Intuitions. 

In preparation for understanding the moral intuitions 
of will and of conscience, we may glance at certain other 
intuitions of the mind. 

As a necessary condition of all knowledge, conscious- 
ness gives us the idea of the ego as distinguished from 
the non-ego. This distinction comes to us as an ultimate 
and absolute truth. 

From the intuitive faculty spring the ideas of time and 
of space. We cannot put these ideas away from us ; we 
cannot conceive them to be other than true and valid. 
We may conceive ourselves as becoming unconscious of 
the lapse of time ; we may conceive the flow of time as 
unmarked by horologic periods, unvexed by change, 
transition, or epoch ; but we cannot put away the con- 
ception of time as forever passing, whether men or gods 
are conscious or unconscious of its flow. With the cog- 
nition of motion and change, and the consciousness of 



32 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



exertion, there come the ideas of force and of cause and 
effect. These ideas are more than mere notions or forms 
of thought, — they are intuitions, — the clear and direct he- 
holding of that which is objectively true and real. These 
intuitions are the basis r^f all knowledge, 'I hesc intuitive 
truths may illustrate the certainty of the intuitions of the 
moral faculties. 

60. Moral Intuitions. 

In morals, as well as in pure reason, there are ultimate 
affirmations and certainties of thought and knowledge, 

no more 1o he denied or doubled than the principles of 
force and change. These ideas are the basis of all moral 
conduct and character. Without them a mail could not 
be a responsible being, At this stage of study it can 
only be- said that from this souree come the idea and 

conviction of moral freedom and of obligation, the eon 

ception of right and wrong, and the sense of good and 
ill desert. In respect to these primary elements of moral 
science, there is the same certainty as in mathematics. 
The- intuition of obligation toward God is as sure as that 
three times two are- six. That sin brings guilt is no less 
certain than thai matter has extension, <>v thai duration 
is a property of all existence. The- conviction of moral 
freedom is as ineradicable as the belief that motion and 
change are product offeree. 

61. The Denial of Moral Intuitions. 

The reality of moral obligation and the validiiy of 
moral distinctions, are sometimes denied, and so also is 

theworld of things, When the affirmations of the senses 
are denied, ii is not surprising thai the moral intuitions 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 33 

should receive the same treatment. Sometimes this 
denial is made as a logical ground for trampling upon 
moral precepts. Evolutionists of a certain grade, in ex- 
plaining a hypothetical development of moral ideas along 
with the supposed physical development of man, are 
compelled to do the same. A certain blatant blasphemer 
said, "We have yet to learn that there is a valid distinc- 
tion between right and wrong. Satan is as holy as God ; 
the floor of hell is as high as the jeweled floor of heaven." 
These denials are not science or philosophy, but the de- 
struction of both. 

62. Second Source of Moral Science — the Holy Scriptures. 

The second source of moral science we find in the 
holy Scriptures. The Scriptures are second, of necessity, 
in logical order, and only secondary in importance. 
They presuppose moral intuitions in man, and they con- 
fidently address those intuitions. If man were not en- 
dowed with moral faculties, the Scriptures could find no 
response in their addresses to the human soul. Light 
did not create the eye, and neither the Scriptures nor 
any external cultus can create a conscience in man. 

63. The Claims of Holy Scripture. 

The Scriptures claim to be a revelation of God and a 
message from God, an authoritative declaration of God's 
will and of man's duty. If this claim is valid, their im- 
portance in moral science cannot be overstated. 

64. The Holy Scriptures not to be Ignored. 

The claim of the holy Scriptures to be the word of 
God to men is a proper subject of investigation by 

c 



34 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



moral science. It would be unscientific to accept the 
claims of Scripture without convincing evidence ; it 
would be equally unscientific to reject such claims with- 
out examination. 

65. The Scriptures not a Source of Theology Only. 

Shall the sacred Scriptures be counted exclusively a 
source of theology and therefore be left out of account 
in moral science? Shall they be admitted only inciden- 
tally to show that the ethics of the Christian religion are 
not at variance with the conclusions of moral philosophy? 
From such a course both philosophy and practical morals 
suffer deeply. Without the authority of God and with- 
out supernatural sanctions, morals become flabby and 
flimsy. The life of man has outlooks beyond nature, 
and that philosophy which shuts the windows which 
open toward the spiritual world, must be false by the 
very fact of its narrowness. Moral philosophy ought to 
be broader with Christian men than with Socrates, Cato, 
and Seneca. 

66. The First Step of Argument — the Bible Trustworthy 

History. 

Apart from its claim to be the word of God, the Bible 
stands chief among historic works. The most laborious 
investigations, whether by friend or foe, are showing ever 
more conclusively that as an epitome of the most ancient 
history the Bible has no peer. It holds this place not 
because its friends are unlearned or uncritical, nor be- 
cause its enemies are forbearing, but because the most 
scholarly historic criticism sustains its claim to truthful- 
ness. A library of books would be required to show the 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3 5 

amplitude of the historic evidence with which the holy 
Scriptures are buttressed. 

67. Second Step of Argument— the Character of the Writers. 

The writers of the Bible were manifestly men of sin- 
cerity and integrity. Their love of truth shines unob- 
scured through the unadored simplicity of their style. 
Their histories were largely their personal testimonies 
touching facts which they knew and events in which they 
themselves were conspicuous actors. They nowhere 
strain after effect. They do not paint character. They 
make no comments upon the conduct of men. Men 
and events pass before the reader as before the eyes of 
a spectator, and are left to make their own impression. 
The faults of good men are not skipped, or glozed, or 
excused. The writers do not omit or cover up their own 
sins. The severe sincerity of these writers impresses the 
reader more than in any other book in the world. The 
thoughtful reading of the Bible commonly convinces 
the reader of its truth. 

68. Third Step of Argument— the Mental Characteristics of 

the Writers. 

The Bible writers were bright, sound, practical men 
•from every walk in life, not visionary theorists, not addle- 
brained speculators, but men of affairs, quick to observe, 
trained to alertness by business, danger, and war, able to 
distinguish between appearance and reality, and to record 
what they saw and knew. Moses was a scholar, a states- 
man, a warrior, a great leader of men, a man of books 
and of the world. Joshua, Samuel, and David were 
great leaders and rulers. The prophets were not merely 



36 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



students and poets ; they were the chiefs of their times. 
The apostles were called from the keen struggle to win 
bread to the sharper collision with the minds of critical 
or hostile men. If any men in the world could give 
trustworthy testimony these were the men. 

69. Fourth Step of Argument— Harmony of Testimony. 

The Bible is not one book but many. Like the great 
republic it is " E pluribus ununi." The Scripture writ- 
ings span a period of fifteen hundred years. During 
these centuries their theme, though multiform, was 
essentially one. They declared one and the same God ; 
they taught one religion, one system of religious truth, 
one code of morals. Writing under so diverse circum- 
stances, with so various interests and with such remote- 
ness in their lives, in their harmony they have the 
authority of independent witnesses. This is often the 
case in respect to historic events, and often er in respect 
to religious and ethical teaching. The variations and 
agreements are such as arise from the free and independ- 
ent statement of the same facts and truths as appre- 
hended by different minds. More likeness might be 
a less convincing harmony. 

70. The Harmony of Organic Unity. 

The harmony of the Scripture writers is much more 
than a mere formal agreement of statement, like that 
between the three synoptical Gospels. It is also a 
harmony of parts as in an organic unity, a harmony as 
between the roots, the trunk, and the branches of a tree ; 
a harmony as between the flower and the fruit. The 
holy Scriptures are essentially one book, with one plan 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 37 

followed through the centuries. The God of the Old 
Testament is the God of the New Testament ; Judaism 
is .the bud and Christianity the blossom ; prophecies and 
prophetic symbols are given, and as the ages pass away 
the fulfillments find their record. There is the harmony 
of statement, as the many blossoms upon the fruit tree 
are alike ; there is the harmony of correspondence and 
adaptation, as the stem is in harmony with the root, the 
leaves in harmony with the woody trunk, and the fruit 
in harmony with the blossom. 

71. Significance of Concurrent Testimony. 

It is a sure principle that "The testimony of two men 
is true," not that two witnesses, or ten, may not bear 
false testimony; but independent falsehood cannot agree 
in details, and if it is not independent it is not the testi- 
mony of two but of one. Harmonious testimony in 
details must of necessity be true testimony, or else 
concerted falsehood. Independent, agreeing testimony 
must be true, whatever the character of the witnesses. 
The sacred Scriptures in respect alike to history, revela- 
tions, religion, and ethical code have the character of 
concurrent testimony in the highest sense. 

72. Fifth Step of Argument— Concurrent Secular Records. 

Archaeological researches have accumulated an im- 
mense mass of material which at many points and in 
many ways justify the biblical records. There are his- 
toric writings, monumental and numismatic inscriptions, 
and mural paintings ; there are remains of ancient cities, 
with their architecture, art, and handicraft, and there are 
the historic lands themselves, with their characteristic 



38 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



features and their people cherishing still their ancient 
customs. These all by countless coincidences bear testi- 
mony that the Bible is true. 

73. First Preliminary Conclusion — the Bible is Good Histcry. 

From the considerations adduced above, without 
reference to inspiration or to any supernatural origin, 
we must count the facts recorded in the sacred Scrip- 
tures as supported by the best of human testimony. 
The writings themselves, by their own coincidences and 
their coincidences with the ancient world at numberless 
tangential points, are shown to be altogether trustworthy. 

74. Sixth Step of Argument— the Claims Made by the Scrip- 

tures Themselves. 

The writers of the Bible, sincere lovers ot truth, 
bright, practical men, men of experienced sagacity, 
men of affairs, professed to be inspired of God. They 
affirm that they received special revelations from God, 
and that they were charged with imperative messages 
to men. These professions are either true or false. If 
true, the Scriptures are final authority in those concerns 
of which they speak ; if false, then were the writers 
themselves as false as were their pretensions, or else 
sheer fanatics who lived on the border-land of insanity. 
But if they were either false or fanatical, we must revise 
the conclusion already reached in regard to the historic 
character of the Bible. But when we review our former 
inquiries we come again to the same conclusion, namely, 
that the Scriptures have the highest historic character 
and that the writers were endowed with rare candor and 
practical sense. It is not possible to count them fanatical 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 39 

deceivers. Their claim to inspiration must therefore be 
counted as having great weight. The claim is made by 
themselves, but it is not thereby discredited, for from the 
nature of the case it could not be made by another. 

75. Seventh Step of Argument— Miracles. 

The Scripture writers, prophets, apostles, and Jesus 
Christ, wrought many miracles. The reality of those 
miracles cannot be denied except by invalidating utterly 
the historic character of the records. But however often 
we examine the records we find their historic character 
impregnable. Apart from the question of inspiration 
the miracles stand as undeniable historic transactions. 
Chief among these supernatural wonders stands the 
resurrection of Christ. Gilbert West and Lord Little- 
ton, acute English infidels, agreed together to criticise 
and expose the biblical imposture of miracles. West 
chose the resurrection of Christ as his point of attack ; 
Littleton took the conversion of Paul. They studied 
the records to expose their weakness, but the Scriptures 
were victorious. Both were converted to the Christian 
faith, and each wrote a treatise in defense of the miracle 
which he had undertaken to assail. Miracles sustain the 
claim to inspiration. They were the letters patent of 
the Lord's messengers. This is the reasonable and 
necessary conclusion in the case, — " We know that thou 
art a teacher come from God, for no man can do these 
miracles which thou doest except God be with him." 

76. Eighth Step of Argument— Prophecy. 

The sacred Scriptures carry within themselves the 
enduring miracle of a train of prophecy reaching 



4Q 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



through a period of fifteen hundred years. A miracle 
of power is seen once by those who chance to be pres- 
ent when and where the miracle is wrought. Ever 
afterward it lives only in memory and in the record. 
But prophecies are for all men and for all generations. 
They grow more impressive as the ages pass and the 
fulfillment becomes more complete. It must be ad- 
mitted that foretelling future events is not possible for 
human intelligence. Real prophecy is a miracle of 
knowledge. The prophecy of Moses concerning the 
Jews ; of Isaiah concerning Christ ; of Jeremiah con- 
cerning Babylon ; of Ezekiel concerning Tyre ; of 
Daniel concerning the great kingdoms ; of Christ con- 
cerning the destruction of Jerusalem, may be cited as 
illustrative examples. These prophecies certify the 
inspiration of the prophets. They are for all genera- 
tions what the miracles were for those who beheld them. 

77. Second Preliminary Conclusion— Inspiration. 

No other explanation of biblical miracles and proph- 
ecies is possible except that they are manifestations of 
divine power and knowledge. We must count them 
vouchers given to assure the world that prophets and 
apostles were God's special messengers, and in certifying 
the messenger they certify the message also — that is, 
they prove inspiration. 

78. Ninth Step of Argument— Explains the Life of the Race. 

The question of questions to-day for scientific answer 
concerns the origin of the human race. Whence came 
man ? Is man a creation of God, or an " evolution v 
from brutish life, which in turn was evolved from some 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 4 I 

lower and still lower life? Is the human family one race, 
or many? Is the savage state a fall from original per- 
fection, or a stage and a step in man's ascent from the 
life of his brutish ancestors ? A phase of recent thought 
affirms the evolution of man from lower and the lowest 
forms of life, and puts this forward as its hypothetical ex- 
planation of man's origin and condition. This explana- 
tion stands to this time as a mere hypothesis supported 
by no crucial facts and in absolute contradiction to what 
have been counted established principles in science. 
The sacred Scriptures present an account of the origin, 
fortunes, and condition of the race, not as hypothesis, 
but as history. According to this biblical history the 
race of man is one, a creation and not an evolution, 
God's perfect work, bearing the image of the Creator ; 
man's present abject condition the result of his abuse of 
moral freedom, and man's progress toward real perfec- 
tion the result of supernatural influences and agencies 
acting through the Christian religion. Place side by 
side these competing explanations of man's origin and 
condition — on the one side an evolution from brutish life, 
on the other the creative act of God ; on the one side 
the savage state as a stage in the slow, unconscious ascent 
from the brutes, on the other the savagery and sin as a 
fall from a state of primal uprightness ; on the one side 
a brutish ancestry and a hard and slow emergence from 
bestial instincts, on the other the dignity of a being made 
in the likeness of God and thinking God's thoughts ; on 
the one side a death which ends all in extinction of being, 
on the other an immortality which may be made a sharing 
of the Creator's blessedness — which account presents the 
more rational and adequate explanation of man's exist- 



4 2 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



ence and present condition? If the biblical account is 
the more adequate, it is scientific to accept it as true. 
But the acceptance of the biblical account of man car- 
ries with it the essential truth and the essential inspiration 
of the Bible, for this explanation is chiefly a revelation. 

79. Tenth Step of Argument— the Origin of the Christian Re= 

ligion. 

The religion of the Bible, in its two periods of devel- 
opment, the Judaistic and the Christian, is a reality and 
a fact running through the entire period of human his- 
tory. It is the supreme fact of history. It is potently 
and intimately connected with the fortunes of the race. 
This great fact did not arise without a cause. The 
Scriptures give an account of its genesis and develop- 
ment. To place the religion of the Bible, with its God 
of burning holiness and its requirement of holiness in 
man, in the same class with the unclean pagan religions 
and to ascribe them all alike to the blind yearning and 
groping of human nature, is to impute the most diverse 
consequences to the same causes ; it is gathering good 
fruit and bad from the same tree ; it is drawing sweet 
water and bitter from the same fountain ; it is bringing 
forth a clean thing out of an unclean. Whatever else 
may be said of this, it is to the last degree unscientific. 
But if the biblical account of the Christian religion be true, 
it carries with it the inspiration of the holy Scriptures. 

80. Eleventh Step of Argument — the Scriptures a Mirror of 

Man's Inward Life. 

The Scriptures unfold the deepest psychological as- 
pects of human nature. The Bible reveals men to 
themselves. Prevision is the test of true science. The 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 43 

astronomer predicts the movements of the heavenly 
bodies ; the chemist foretells the action of elements and 
molecular forces ; the Scriptures foretell the experiences, 
inward and outward, of men and nations that believe 
the doctrines of the holy Scriptures. Inspired or unin- 
spired, the psychology of the Bible is deep and true, 
and it bears the crucial test of true science, the test of 
prevision. 

81. Twelfth Step of Argument— the Moral Code. 

The Christian Scriptures embody an ethical code 
which commends itself to the intellect and conscience of 
man as supremely good. Pagan writers have expressed, 
here and there, many fine moral sentiments and true 
principles, but surely no man would think of putting any 
heathen writing in the place of the Bible as a source of 
moral light to the world. The moral code of holy 
Scripture could not spring from human nature. Human 
nature is deeply selfish, but the biblical code is summed 
up in the requirement of self-abnegation and perfect love. 
Human nature is deeply and essentially unclean, but the 
Scriptures demand holiness of heart. In the mythologies, 
whether of savage or of civilized nations, gigantic men 
and women stalk to and fro upon a superhuman stage, 
or perhaps dwarfs and brutes with superhuman powers, 
magnified and grotesque projections of humanity with 
all its moral weaknesses, and these are their ideals of 
moral conduct and character. The Bible presents one 
God, a God of infinite attributes, of spotless holiness, 
of perfect love. It is scientific to refer such concep- 
tions and principles to a source higher than human 
nature. 



44 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



82. Thirteenth Step of Argument— the Influence of the Sa- 

cred Scriptures. 

The work which the Christian Scriptures have done 
and are doing, in lifting up the nations and saving men 
from wickedness, a work done by no other system of re- 
ligious doctrine, is an unanswerable argument for their 
truth, otherwise an organized system of falsehood works 
out a higher good for men than all the world of truth 
beside. With belief in the holy Scriptures there comes 
to men the power of a new moral life. Wicked men are 
led to repentance ; profane and defiant men become 
reverent and gentle ; unclean men become pure ; the 
weak become strong with a strange and supernatural 
endurance ; the despairing and the dying are inspired 
with wonderful hopes. There is no civilization which is 
worthy of the name, no civilization which extirpates the 
natural savagery of man and nurtures righteousness and 
love, which does not owe its uplifting power to the Bible. 

83. Final Conclusion. 

From these considerations, here stated very briefly 
or only suggested, we must conclude that the sacred 
Scriptures are the inspired word of God to men, having 
authority to bind the conscience and to give a final 
judgment in many a matter where reason fails. This 
gives the Bible a pre-eminent rank as a source of moral 
science. To ignore the Scriptures is a willing shutting out 
of the sunlight in order to practise groping at noonday. 

84. Characteristics of this Second Source of Moral Science. 

The holy Scriptures are rich in every kind of material 
for moral philosophy. They supplement the indefinite- 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 45 

ness and weakness of man's moral intuitions. They are 
suited to the need of beings whose moral sight and sen- 
sibilities have become dim and dull. In respect to God 
and his government, the Scriptures reveal many things 
which could not otherwise be known. The moral law is 
announced with clearness and authority. Certain devo- 
tees of physical science who arrogate to themselves the 
sole right to be counted scientific, drift strongly toward 
a denial of the real existence of anything which cannot 
be weighed. Were it not for the sacred Scriptures, 
these worshipers of the crucible and the scales would 
laugh to scorn belief in spirit or immortality. But the 
Scriptures boldly declare man's spiritual nature, appeal 
to his spiritual consciousness, proclaim immortality, and 
summon the consciences of men to action under the 
stimulus of the final judgment. If we ask for precepts 
or principles, motives or grounds of obligation, we find 
them in the Scriptures. 

85. Third Source of Moral Science— the Normal Action of the 

Human Faculties. 

Light is thrown upon moral questions by considering 
the normal functions of our own faculties. This is true 
alike of mental and of bodily faculties. In fact, the spir- 
itual and the physical act so largely in co-operation that 
it is not easy to separate their action and to estimate the 
share of each in the entire activity. 

86. Normal Activities Right. 

In the light of clear reason we must hold that the 
normal activity of every human faculty is right, other- 
wise we must impute inconsistency and self-contradiction 



4 6 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



to man's Creator. To illustrate the application of this 
principle we may refer to monastic asceticism with its 
wanton cramping of man's life, and its infliction of need- 
less suffering. It is manifest that man was made for the 
free development of his faculties in association with his 
fellows and in domestic life. The body was made for 
worthy use and not for contempt and abuse. When 
once we have ascertained what is the normal function of 
a faculty, without excess or abuse, we have learned what 
is right in its action. 

87. Distinction between Moral Action and Action Instinctive 

or Automatic. 

Moral science must distinguish between voluntary 
activity and that which is merely instinctive or automatic, 
and hence without moral quality. It must draw a line 
between the action of will and conscience on the one 
side and the operation of faculties which are only co- 
operative with these on the other. It must show the 
relationship of the sensibilities and the faculty of voli- 
tion, the relationship antecedent to choice and the subse- 
quent relation. A true psychology of the faculties of 
conscience, will, and sensibility is a necessary condition 
of a true moral philosophy. Otherwise an error of 
judgment may be treated as a wicked choice, and the 
automatic action of the body may be counted sin. 

88. Fourth Source of Moral Science— the Study of Conse= 

quences. 

A fourth source of moral science is the study of the 
consequences of conduct. This may signify the conse- 
quences of spiritual acts and attitudes upon the spirit 
itself, or it may have reference to the external conse- 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47 

quences of moral conduct. But whether we have to do 
with consequences physical or spiritual, this study of 
consequences brings us into the realm of natural law. 
Natural law represents an automatic agency by which 
certain consequences follow certain antecedents with the 
certainty of necessity. This fixed and necessary order 
of sequence represents the nature of things, and the 
nature of things represents the will of the Creator. From 
their natural consequences we understand that some 
courses of conduct are morally wrong and that certain 
other conduct is good and right. 

89. Illustrations in the Spiritual Realm. 

The law of consequences is as rigid in the nature of 
spirit as in matter. An evil choice is followed by a 
depraved condition of the sensibilities. Choices tend to 
repetition and to fixedness. Certain courses of conduct 
are surely followed by disquietude of spirit, by dissatis- 
faction, disgust, and unhappiness. Other conduct is 
followed by peace and joyfulness. Doubt has its own 
necessary consequences, and these are very unlike the 
consequences of faith. The law of consequences can- 
not be broken. This is not a question of freedom in 
volition. Man is free in choosing, but in respect to the 
consequences of the choice there is no option. We 
cannot stop the stream of cause and effect, nor turn its 
course. The law of consequences in the realm of spirit 
is a rich mine of material in moral philosophy. 

90. Illustrations in Man's Physical Life. 

In man's nature matter is tangential with spirit. The 
consequences of moral conduct show themselves there- 



4 8 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



fore in man's material nature and in the world of things. 
In this relationship with spirit matter seems to show the 
two faces of the moral law, blessing for the good and 
wrath for the evil. Righteousness seems graven upon 
the very atoms. The forces of matter, blind though 
they are said to be, see with the eyes of God. Vicious, 
sensual self-indulgence by the automatic operations of 
matter are pierced through with pains and smitten with 
the loathsomeness of decay. Few sins fail to become 
somehow and somewhere tangential with matter, and to 
be caught and ground in the enginery of natural forces. 
A life full of high moral intent and holy feeling shows 
physical consequences very unlike those which follow 
a life devoted to selfish purposes and base pleasures. 

91. Fifth Source of Moral Science— History. 

The last source of moral philosophy is history, the 
histoiy of individuals and of nations. This is the study 
of natural law and of divine providence in the life of 
man. For this moral purpose history must be interpreted 
with a fine ethical temper and a spiritual faith. An eye 
that discerns no spiritual element in the life of man, and 
finds in the development of the race no agencies except 
food and climate, will of course find little ethical instruc- 
tion in human experience. In the convention which 
framed the constitution of the great republic, Benjamin 
Franklin arose and said : " I have lived, sir, a long 
time, and the longer I live the more convincing proof I 
see of this truth, that God governs in the affairs of men. 
And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his 
notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his 
aid? We have been assured, sir, in the sacred writings 



CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 49 



that, 4 Except the Lord build the house, they labor in 
vain that build it' I firmly believe this." This provi- 
dence in history is the combined working of all natural 
and spiritual agencies in their sweep through the centu- 
ries, now responding to the prayer of a child, now lift- 
ing up a great leader to the crest of the billows, who 
seems for a time to rule the waves which bear him up, 
and anon undermining an empire and grinding to pow- 
der the institutions of ancient nations. Moral causes 
sure and resistless may be slow in reaching their results. 
" Providence moves through time as the gods of Homer 
through space ; a step is taken and a century has passed 
away." Or, as says the well-worn proverb, "The mills 
of God grind slowly." False principles have long 
periods of incubation, but at length the disease breaks 
out and hastens to its issue. There is a " power that 
makes for righteousness " and repays wrong with ruin. 
There is an "inferno of the nations," and no unjust and 
corrupt nation has been able to escape it. The more 
deeply the study of history penetrates beneath the mere 
appearances of things and ponders the realities of life 
the more instructive does it become. For such use 
history must needs be written by men of conscience and 
spiritual discernment, men not afraid to recognize 
spiritual forces in human affairs. So studied, history 
becomes a fruitful field of investigation for moral 
philosophy. 



D 



CHAPTER IV 



CONCERNING THE SUPREME RULER 

92. Our Conception of the Supreme Ruler Important. 

Moral philosophy cannot leave out of account the 
existence of God, and no more can it afford to ignore 
the attributes of that Supreme Ruler of the universe. 
■ As well might one discuss the government of the British 
Empire with no reference to the crown, that " fountain 
of law," and with no reference to the prerogatives of the 
crown. The position assigned to God in a system of 
moral philosophy must largely determine the character 
of that system. It is easy to see that a philosophy 
which ignores the existence of the Divine Being must be 
radically unlike that philosophy which makes him the 
primary element, the center alike of theoretical and of 
practical ethics. If there is a God who concerns himself 
with the affairs of men, it is certain that he cannot, in 
actuality, hold a secondary place. 

93. The Divine Being a Person. 

Concerning God it must be said, in the first place, that 
he is a personal being. He is a person in distinction 
from any personification of natural forces ; in distinction 
from any pantheistic conception of the Deity as identical 
with the universe or as immanent in nature and undis- 
tinguishable from it ; in distinction from any Stoic con- 
ception of the Deity as emotionless and unconscious. 
God is a personal being in the same sense in which the 
50 



CONCERNING THE SUPREME RULER 



51 



reader or the writer is a person. To deny the person- 
ality of God is equivalent to a denial of his existence, for 
pantheism accords to God no more than a name. 

94. Origin of the Idea of Personality. 

The idea of personality is derived irom the first source 
of moral science, the consciousness of our own spiritual 
being. In the consciousness of every man there arises 
the conception of himself as an intelligent being distinct 
from other like beings and distinct from the world 
around him. This conception of himself every man 
transfers to other beings like himself in form and action. 
We spontaneously impute to other men those attributes 
of being of which we are conscious as existent in our- 
selves. We cannot do otherwise. 

95. Contents of the Idea of Personality. 

What elements are contained in the idea of personality ? 
What is a person ? From the consciousness of our own 
nature the answer must come. A person is a being of 
intelligence, thought, and reason ; he is a being of sensi- 
bility, susceptible of pleasure and of pain, of joy and of 
sorrow ; he is a being endowed with conscience, making 
moral distinctions and knowing good and evil ; he is a 
free being, choosing for himself his own spiritual atti- 
tudes and activities. From this conception we can 
eliminate no element, neither rational intelligence, sensi- 
bility, conscience, nor will. 

96. Conception of the Divine Personality. 

That conception which consciousness gives of our own 
form of being by a necessity of thought we apply to 



5^ 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



other men and to the Divine Being. We have the right 
to do this. We have the right to do it because by a 
necessity of thought we cannot do otherwise. It is pos- 
sible for a man to deny God's existence ; it is possible 
to apply the name God to a generalized idea of the 
forces of nature ; it is possible to empty the name of all 
distinct meaning ; but counting God a real being, the in- 
telligent Maker and Ruler of the universe, we cannot do 
otherwise than impute to him the essential elements of 
our own personality. By an effort of imagination we 
may maim and dismember this conception of personality ; 
but we ourselves can see that we have formed a notion 
of a being imperfect, deformed, or it may be, grotesque. 

97. Man Made in the Divine Likeness. 

In transferring to God that conception of personality 
which comes to us through the consciousness of our own 
personality, we do that which is authorized and required 
by the second source of moral philosophy. God said : 
" Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." 
" So God created man in his own image ; in the image 
of God created he him." By the testimony of sacred 
Scripture the nature of man is a finite copy of the infi- 
nite personality of the Creator. And those who see in 
our Lord Jesus' Christ a personal union of God and man 
must needs find the possibility of that union in the like- 
ness of the two personalities, for diverse personalities 
could hardly enter into union. 

98. The Personality of God in Scripture. 

In the second source of moral philosophy, the sacred 
Scriptures, the personality of God is assumed. The first 



CONCERNING THE SUPREME RULER 



53 



sentence of Scripture denies every form of pantheistic 
conception of the Divine Being. " In the beginning 
God created the heavens and the earth." The Creator 
existed before his works ; he is separate from his works ; 
by his will the heavens and the earth exist; whatever 
properties, forces, or possibilities belong to matter are of 
his appointment. The personality of God stands writ- 
ten as distinctly in sacred history as the personality of 
man in secular history. 

99. Consequences of the Personality of God. 

The importance of this conception of God as a per- 
sonal being cannot be stated too strongly. Our ethical 
ideas must all be conformed to this radical conception. 
We are under obligation to a person, not to a force or 
principle. Obedience is due to a person. The sanc- 
tions of the moral law are administered by a person. 
The agencies of nature are means by which the personal 
sovereign makes known and administers his will. The 
penitence of the wrong-doer is directed toward a person, 
and forgiveness is not the slow wearing out of conse- 
quences, but the remission of guilt by a merciful Father. 
Because God is a person, and the personal being in 
whose likeness man was made, his law is suited to man's 
nature, and his character and will are the standard of 
right for man. 

100. The Absoluteness of the Supreme Ruler. 

We must conceive the supreme personal ruler as not 
himself under law, but as the " fountain of law." It is 
impossible that the Creator of all things should be other- 
wise than absolute. " All things were made by him and 



54 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



for him, and he is before all things, and by him all 
things consist." "Of him, and through him, and to 
him are all things." It is impossible that the Creator 
should be dependent upon the thing made, or limited 
by it except as he is limited by his own choice. There 
is no nature of things apart from the creative will. 
That the Creator of all things should be under law, 
apart from his own nature, is from the nature of the 
case impossible. 

101. Limitations of the Divine Absoluteness. 

The limitations of the Creator's absoluteness are the 
limits which he has pleased to set to himself. A watch- 
maker will treat a watch according to its mechanism 
which he himself has planned. He might perhaps have 
made it otherwise, but in making it as it is he fixed the 
law of its management. In the making of it he set to 
himself the law of its treatment. So far he limited 
himself. Having made man in his own likeness, God 
will govern him by methods and agencies in harmony 
with the moral nature which he gave. He will do man's 
free nature no violence. His law will be in harmony 
with reason. We may thus look upon the act of crea- 
tion as so far an act of self-limitation of the Creator's 
absoluteness. 

102. Consequences of the Divine Absoluteness. 

The consequences of this divine absoluteness and 
autocracy, like the consequences of the divine person- 
ality, are very important. We see at once that all 
moral distinctions must have their ground and measure 
in the nature of God. Also the moral law, however ex- 



CONCERNING THE SUPREME RULER 



5 5 



pressed, in the final analysis must be the expression or 
declaration of the divine will and nature. Whether the 
law of right be found in man's own being, or in the 
nature of things, or in utility, or in the Decalogue, all 
these, so far as there is truth in them, are the product 
and expression of God's will. It is not philosophic to 
stop at that which is partial and fragmentary. Moral 
philosophy can find no resting-place till it trace moral 
distinctions to God's own eternal being and the moral 
law to God's will. 

103. Objections to the Divine Absoluteness. 

In anticipation of coming discussions, we may glance 
at the common objection to divine absoluteness, as that 
absoluteness has been here presented. It is said that if 
moral distinctions have their ground in God, and if the 
moral law be the expression of the divine will, then it is 
possible that right and wrong should in a moment and 
by a word be reversed. This objection forgets that the 
will of God created all things, the nature of moral beings 
and the nature of matter, and all things in harmony 
with himself and in harmony with one another. It fails 
to consider that the divine will is the one element of 
stability and certainty in the universe. A change of the 
will of God is not the change of a word merely ; it is a 
reversal of the moral nature of man ; it is a change in 
the ultimate elements of the universe, a change in the 
essence of spirit and of matter. The notion that the 
Creator's will for the government of men can be con- 
trary to his will expressed in their creation is a setting 
of his will against his will. They make his will self- 
contradictory. 



56 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



104. God a Holy Being. 

God's government of men cannot be comprehended 
apart from his holiness. Eliminate the idea of holiness 
from the divine judgments in the earth and the Creator's 
terrible doings become an utter stumbling-block to 
man's moral sensibilities. Apart from holiness, penalty 
becomes revenge and the expression of hatred. The 
holiness of God is perfect righteousness and purity of 
nature and of will, and purity of sensibility in harmony 
with purity of nature. One phase of holiness is hatred 
of impurity, that is, hatred of sin. In holiness the ele- 
ments of love and of revulsion or wrath, like action and 
reaction in matter, are equal. "Our God is a consum- 
ing fire." He dwells in "light unapproachable." If 
we would understand either God's government of men 
or the constitution of the world we must emphasize his 
holiness. 

105. Man's Moral Nature Responsive to Holiness. 

Every source of moral science testifies that God's 
government of the world is administered in the interest 
of holiness. Conscience enthrones right, obligation, 
holiness, not pleasure or enjoyment. The idea of pleas- 
ure is foreign to the moral faculty. Conscience gives no 
sense of obligation to follow pleasure. 

106. Holiness Exalted by the Sacred Scriptures. 

The second source of moral science very greatly 
emphasizes holiness. The Old Testament refrain is, 
God is one and God is holy. The inspired history from 
Eden to the New Jerusalem is an account of God's en- 
forcement of respect for his holiness. The character of 



CONCERNING THE SUPREME RULER 



57 



Christ is summed up in the words, " Holy, harmless, un- 
defined, and separate from sinners." The celestial song 
reiterates forever the refrain, "Holy, holy, holy." 

107. Holiness Testified to by Natural Law. 

With no supernatural intervention the very elements 
of matter conspire to afflict and destroy the men who 
love pleasure and disregard holiness, but they that for- 
get pleasure and love holiness with all the heart make 
peace with all nature. Wickedness is punished without 
a miracle. The heavens are silent, the sun rises and 
sets, the seasons come and go, the centuries roll away, 
and unrighteous and unclean families and nations fall 
into decay and disappear. What means this automatic 
agency which works for holiness and punishes sin ? 
Nature proclaims the holiness of the Creator. 

1 08. Psychology and Holiness. 

The fourth source of moral science testifies of the 
Creator's holiness in the government of moral beings. 
Every human faculty finds its normal and perfect action 
in the love of holiness, and every faculty deteriorates 
somewhat when perverted to a lower aim. When selfish- 
ness and pleasure usurp the place of righteousness, little 
by little a blight falls upon every faculty. Even " the 
counsel of Ahithophel," when perverted to base ends, 
becomes infected with an element of folly. By low 
aims the sensibilities become utterly debauched and cor- 
rupted. 

109. History and Holiness. 

The verdict of history is that " Righteousness exalteth 



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INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." The 
virtues which have in them the element of self-denial, 
somewhat of severity, that is, the strenuous pursuit of 
right and obligation, are elements of strength and endur- 
ance. On the other hand, the pursuit of delights is 
weakness and the precursor of decay. A pleasure- 
loving age indicates the approaching end. 

no. Divine Love. 

In human government sovereignty has been so gener- 
ally an assertion of supreme selfishness, that the word 
sovereignty suggests at once the idea of despotism. The 
autocracy of God is a sovereignty of love. It is the 
essential nature of love to be self-imparting and self-sac- 
rificing. A sovereignty of selfishness is to be feared ; a 
sovereignty of hate is to be abhorred ; a sovereignty of 
love is to be rejoiced in. 

in. Is God a God of Love? 

Man's own nature gives testimony that God is love. 
We accept the word of Scripture that human nature has 
the likeness of the divine. The noblest element in the 
noblest human character is love. All truest, tenderest, 
noblest love, self-devotion, self-sacrifice, is an element of 
God's image in man. The self-sacrificing love of Jesus 
Christ is presented to us as an expression of the divine 
character. The great world as it stands shows the divine 
care and solicitude for the welfare of man ; it shows also 
God's terrible wrath against wickedness. So in God's 
character love and wrath exist together. Wrath ought 
not to be counted a form of love, but the revulsion from 
evil emphasizes love. 



CONCERNING THE SUPREME RULER 



59 



Is God Merciful? 

Toward evil-doers the divine love becomes mercy. 
The divine government admits the reconciliation of of- 
fenders, and makes provision for their repentance and 
restoration to favor and welfare. It belongs to moral 
philosophy to consider mercy, repentance, and forgive- 
ness, no less than justice, the consequences of wrong- 
doing, and penalty. Moral philosophy must find a place 
and a way for the recovery of the fallen. It is not true 
that the natural consequences of sinning must take their 
inevitable course to the end. Divine forgiveness mod- 
ifies the psychological action of conscience. It would 
be a most imperfect human character that embraced no 
element of mercy. Here we only note that the Creator 
is merciful and that he finds a place for mercy in his 
moral government. 

113. The Right Conception of Mercy. 

Mercy must not be conceived as the opposite of justice. 
Mercy does not signify a feeble hatred of evil, a slight 
recoil of the divine nature from moral pollution. In the 
highest human character, the one that is holiest is most 
pitiful and gracious. The mercies of the Lord show that 
his justice is not revenge, and his mercy is shown to be 
mercy indeed, and not indifference to evil, by the fact 
that he will not clear the impenitent guilty. 

114. Resume. 

Theology would call for a consideration of other divine 
attributes, and for a fuller discussion of these which have 
here been named. For the purposes of moral philos- 
ophy it is enough to note that there is a living God ; that 



60 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

he is a person after the mode of our own personality ; 
that he created the world of things according to his own 
pleasure ; that he created man in his own likeness ; that 
the Creator of all things must needs be absolute over all ; 
and that he exercises that autocracy in holiness, in love, 
and in mercy. In the work of creation there is involved 
all of power and of infinitude which the mind of man 
can conceive. The wisdom of Him who planned the 
universe is sufficiently manifest without discussion. 

Such is the God who governs the world and stands as 
the supreme, central element in moral philosophy. 



CHAPTER V 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 

115. The Second Element in Moral Science. 

The second element in moral science is man, and for 
each student of the science this second element may be 
counted the student himself. The primary source of 
our knowledge of man is consciousness. The holy 
Scriptures are rich in instruction concerning the origin, 
nature, and moral condition of the race. History has 
man for its theme, and shows in concrete life the attri- 
butes of human nature. Every man finds in himself a 
sample of all the rest. Next to the right idea of the 
Creator, the right conception of man is most important. 

116. Correlation of Human Nature to the Divine. 

Man is a personal being endowed with faculties of 
thought, sensibility, conscience, and will. From the holy 
Scriptures we learn that our personality is a likeness of 
the divine. This signifies a correspondence in form of 
spiritual being, a similarity in mental and moral con- 
stitution. But the relationships of the Creator and the 
creature indicate that this correspondence in form of 
spiritual being consists in a correlation of attributes rather 
than in absolute sameness. God is the Creator, man is a 
creature ; God is self-existent and absolute, man is de- 
pendent — in him we live and move and have our being ; 
God is sovereign, man is subject ; God imparts and does 
not receive, man receives from God and cannot give in 

61 



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INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



return. This correlation of faculty carries with it as a 
necessary principle that man's moral faculites find their 
normal functions in this correlation, and not in inde- 
pendence. 

117. Correlation of Conscience and Will to God. 

The principle that man's moral faculties must find 
their normal functions in their correlation to the Creator, 
has important applications. All moral distinctions have 
their ground in the nature of God. He is the fountain 
of law. Conscience cannot, then, be a law unto itself, 
but must find its normal action in its relation to the 
divine will. The will of man is imperial in its functions, 
but the will is freest and most imperial when it accepts 
most fully its subordinate relationship to the divine will. 
This correlation of the human faculties to the divine is a 
fundamental principle in moral philosophy. The physics 
of the earth cannot be understood except by due recog- 
nition of the earth's relationship to the sun ; no more 
can the moral nature of man be rightly treated except 
in its subordinate relation to God. 

118. The Knowing Faculties. 

The knowing faculties we notice incidentally in pass- 
ing, partly to distinguish them from the moral faculty 
and partly to note the validity of our knowledge in its 
relation to moral science. In the group of knowing 
faculties we find consciousness, by which we know our- 
selves and our mental modifications ; the perceptive 
faculties, which acting through the bodily senses give 
us knowledge of the phenomena of matter ; the faculty 
of intuition, which gives such forms of thought as ideas 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 63 

of time, of space, and of causation ; the faculty of rea- 
son, by which we combine in logical relationships — that 
is, in relationships corresponding to objective reality — 
the conceptions given by other faculties ; the faculty of 
taste, by which we perceive those properties of form, 
motion, and color, and analogous properties of mental 
conceptions, which we call beauty. 

119. Certainty of Our Knowledge. 

The chief need of referring at all to man's intellectual 
faculties, as distinguished from the moral, is to estimate 
the value of that knowledge which comes through their 
action. This knowledge is doubtless incomplete. How 
much more might be known if we had other senses and 
other faculties we cannot even conjecture. To man's 
perceptions there inheres a certain subjective element. 
But so far as our knowledge extends it must be counted 
real knowledge and not falsehood. This principle is 
fundamental. Whether this conviction be based upon 
a universal belief in a faithful Creator, or whether it be a 
bare instinct, with no reason behind it save the absence 
of any reason for doubting, to impugn the veracity of 
human faculties is contrary to the principles of science 
and of common sense. Here we simply note that our 
knowledge, from whatever source it come, is no less 
valid for moral science than for physical science. 

120. The Sensibilities. 

Man is endowed with faculties of feeling, emotion, or 
sensibility. When certain facts and conceptions are 
presented to the mind, at once there arise spontaneously 
certain corresponding emotions. The quality of these 



6 4 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



emotions depends on the one side upon the nature of 
the conceptions which are their occasion, and on the 
other side upon the qualities of our own personal being. 
Vice awakens in some persons a feeling of pleasure ; in 
others it awakens deep disgust. Cruel men find delight 
in that, the mere thought of which to tender hearts 
would bring distress. Faith finds enjoyment in that 
which is offensive to unbelief. By their sensibilities men 
show their characteristic moral qualities. 

121. Moral Philosophy and the Sensibilities. 

Moral philosophy cannot ignore the sensibilities. 
What is the relation of sensibility to moral choices ? 
Do the sensibilities dominate the will ? Is there such a 
a relationship between will and sensibility that the choice 
must needs be according to the most eager appetence? 
Or is the will no distinct faculty at all, but merely the 
combined action, the resultant, of all the appetencies? 
The answers to these questions must come in their place. 

122. The Conscience. 

Man is endowed with a moral faculty commonly called 
conscience, a faculty too little understood in theory and 
too much abused in practice. The functions of this 
faculty and the mode of its activity hold an important 
place in moral philosophy. He who fails in the psy- 
chology of conscience must needs fail in many another 
point in theoretical, if not in practical, ethics. 

123. What is Conscience? 

Conscience is that intuitive faculty of man's spiritual 
nature which gives the idea and conviction of moral 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 65 

obligation ; the idea of right and wrong, and of good or 
ill desert, with sensibilities corresponding to these ideas 
and convictions. 

124. The Existence of a Mora! Faculty. 

That man is endowed with a moral faculty, the activi- 
ties of which pertain specifically to moral concernments, 
is just as manifest as that there are faculties of reason 
and imagination. In every race of man, civilized or 
barbarous, and in every individual not lacking in com- 
mon intelligence, there is found a conviction of moral 
obligation. This idea appears in many forms : duty 
toward parents, duty to fulfill promises, duty to the chief 
or king, duty to respond to kindness, duty toward the 
gods. When selfishness has completely overmastered 
this sense of duty as a principle of action toward others, 
men still show the existence of this faculty by demand- 
ing from others the fulfillment of their obligations. 
With this idea of obligation we find the idea of right 
and of wrong, the idea that, according to some standard 
or other, some things are morally right and the contrary 
are morally wrong. There may be, and there is, the 
greatest possible difference touching what is to be 
counted right ; but the validity of moral distinctions is 
not on this account to be called in question. Among 
all people are found the ideas of good and of ill desert. 
These ideas of duty, right, and moral desert are as 
clearly marked among pagan as among Christian peo- 
ples. The methods of measuring time are many ; the 
idea of time is one. The standards of duty are 
many and diverse ; the idea of obligation is one and uni- 
versal. 

E 



66 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



125. Is Conscience a Distinct Faculty? 

Is conscience a faculty distinct from all other faculties, 
as distinct as any faculty can be, or is that which is 
called conscience merely the general judgment and 
reason occupying themselves with moral concernments ? 
Dr. A. H. Strong says : " Conscience is not a separate 
faculty, like intellect, sensibility, and will, but rather a 
mode in which the faculties act." "Conscience is a 
knowing of self in connection with a moral standard or 
law." Pres. Noah Porter says: "Conscience should 
not be used as an appellation for a separate or special 
moral faculty, for the reason that there is no such 
faculty." He uses the term conscience as meaning 
"the intellect and the sensibility in those judgments and 
feelings which are concerned in the acts and states of 
the will." Pres. E. G. Robinson says : " Conscience is 
the whole rational power of a person pronouncing moral 
judgments and awaking moral emotions." "The differ- 
ence in the emotions attendant upon the moral judg- 
ments and on the purely intellectual judgments is due, 
not to any difference in the faculties pronouncing the 
judgments, but to differences in the objects judged, and 
in susceptibilities of our nature to which the objects 
stand related." Dr. Joseph Haven says: "Conscience 
is simply the intellect perceiving and judging moral 
truth, together with certain corresponding excitement 
of the sensibilities, in view of the objects thus con- 
templated." "Psychologically viewed it is not so 
much a distinct faculty of the mind co-ordinate with 
perception, memory, imagination, etc., as a distinct 
exercise, or department of action, of the general fac- 
ulty of judgment, and of the power of feeling, as em- 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 67 

ployed with reference to one particular class of truth, 
viz, moral." 

126. Conscience is a Distinct Faculty. 

From the estimate of conscience given in the preced- 
ing paragraph we must strongly dissent and must assert 
the contrary. Conscience is a distinct faculty, as dis- 
tinct as any faculty can be, as distinct as perception, 
memory, or imagination. 

127. The Criterion of Distinctness of Faculty. 

The one sole criterion of distinctness of faculty is 
such uniqueness of action that the action of one faculty 
cannot be analyzed and reduced to some form of the 
activity of another faculty. This test rightly applied 
indicates that conscience has the characteristic quality of 
a distinct faculty. The full proof of this must be found 
in the complete analysis and discussion of conscience. 

128. Genesis of the Denial that Conscience is a Faculty. 

The reason for the opinions quoted in paragraph No. 
125, that conscience is not a faculty but the general 
intellect occupying itself with moral concernments, may 
be found in the wide range of functions attributed to 
conscience. Activities are referred to conscience with 
which conscience has nothing to do. Conscience does 
not reason or judge in any sphere. To determine what 
is the moral law does not belong to the moral faculty. 
To determine whether conduct agrees or disagrees with 
the moral law is not a function of conscience. Con- 
science does not discuss questions of casuistry. When 
the unique action of conscience is clearly apprehended 



68 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



it becomes at once apparent that conscience has the 
characteristic of a distinct faculty. 

129. The Function of Conscience. 

Give to the intellect the idea of the one God and 
Creator, supreme over all, and at once conscience gives 
the idea and the conviction of obligation to obey this 
supreme being. This is an intuition, the clear behold- 
ing of that which the general intellect has no eyes to 
see. This obligation is not a quality of things, of 
actions, or of beings ; it is a bond, a moral bond, a bond 
of duty binding one being to another, and beyond this 
undefinable. This intuition is absolutely unique and 
has no affinity with the intuitions of the general intellect 
pertaining to time and things. Given a law apprehended 
by the intellect as the will of the Creator and conscience 
responds with the idea that voluntary conformity to this 
supreme standard is morally right The question 
whether choice and conduct do agree with the law of 
right comes under the purview of the general intellect. 
Beyond the question of formal agreement comes the ele- 
ment of moral rightness. This moral Tightness of the 
intentional agreement with the moral law is an idea given 
by conscience, and with this the general intellect has 
nothing to do. The same must be said of the ideas of 
good and of ill desert. They are right who say that 
man has not two intellects, for conscience is a faculty of 
intuition and does not reason and judge. 

130. Obligation and Right Emptied of Their Meaning, 

Another method by which conscience is reduced to a 
specialized activity of the general intellect is by empty- 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 69 

ing obligation and right of their true and characteristic 
meaning. If right signify "utility," or ''fitness," or 
"adaptability to promote happiness," or "dignity of 
spiritual being," and if moral conceptions mean no more 
than this, then conscience may be counted the activity 
of the general intellect, and with little need of special- 
ized action. But the time has not yet come for count- 
ing obligation and right, in their highest sense, as the 
mere exuvice of moral philosophy. 

131. A Typical Case for Analysis. 

For the purpose of analysis we must take an operation 
of conscience in which all the elements are present in 
their simplest form. No better historic illustration can 
be found than the account of man's primal sin. To 
Adam in Eden the Creator said, " Of every tree in the 
garden thou mayest freely eat, but of the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat, for the 
day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Under 
the impulse of Satanic temptation Adam disobeyed the 
divine mandate, and suffered the penalty. For the use 
now to be made of this fragment of inspired history, 
questions of interpretation do not concern us. It is the 
historic fact we are after. 

132. Essential Elements in the Typical Case. 

In this typical transaction we find three elements which 
seem essential : first, the Creator exercising authority ; 
secondly, Adam, the creature, the subject of authority ; 
thirdly, a rule of conduct proclaiming and defining the 
authority of the one and the duty of the other. Seeing 
that we are not discussing choice but conscience, the 



7o 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



agency of the tempter is not an essential element. A 
careful analysis of this fateful transaction will show what 
parts fall within the sphere of conscience and what be- 
long to other faculties. 

133. The Cognition of the Lawgiver and of the Law. 

The recognition of the Lawgiver and the understand- 
ing of the law, does not belong to the action of con- 
science. The Creator manifested himself and gave the 
command, "Thou shalt not eat." Whether the Creator 
came visibly as a majestic man and gave the solemn pre- 
cept in audible words, or whether the transaction was 
subjective, a revelation to the consciousness of Adam, 
matters nothing. Adam recognized his Lord and under- 
stood the law, but this involved no movement of con- 
science. This belonged to the general intellect. And 
this is true of the bare cognition of the lawgiver and the 
law anywhere. 

134. The Primary Movement of Conscience. 

Following the recognition of the Creator and the cog- 
nition of his command, at once there arose in the mind 
of Adam two associated ideas, the idea of obligation 
toward the person and the idea of rightness with respect 
to the law. These ideas arose responsive to authority, 
correlative to the idea of authority, not the idea of power 
or coercive force, but of that undefinable reality and fact, 
moral authority. These are intuitive ideas, necessary 
and ultimate, as necessary in morals as the idea of causa- 
tion in general thought. This is the primary movement 
of conscience, the intuitive beholding of obligation and 
of moral rightness. 



CONCERNING MAN; SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE J I 

135. Conscience Responsive to Authority. 

This intuition of obligation and of right arose at the 
cognition of the lawgiver and of his law addressed to a 
being conscious of freedom. The joint cognition of the 
two is necessary. The bare beholding of conduct apart 
from a rule of conduct, gives no occasion for conscience 
to act. The eye cannot see unless there is light as well 
as an object to be seen ; so must there be not only con- 
duct having intrinsic moral quality, but also the light of 
moral precept in which to behold it Apart from a rule 
of right, right has no meaning. And apart from the 
personality of the lawgiver whose authority awakens the 
sense of obligation, the words of the precept have no 
power to move conscience to activity. 

136. The Temptation, Outside of Conscience. 

After the command and the primary response of con- 
science next came the temptation, presented perhaps 
through the perceptive faculties, and then the movement 
of sensibility, a glow of feeling at the thought of possible 
pleasure. Then followed the great choice of the will, a 
choice in sheer opposition to those ideas of obligation 
and of right presented by the moral faculty. The temp- 
tation, the moving of sensibility, and the choice are 
plainly outside of conscience. 

137- Good or 111 Desert. 

Following close upon the disobedience there appeared 
the idea and sense of guilt, a painful sense of ill desert, 
joined with the expectancy of the divine displeasure. 
When the presence of the Lord was again announced 
Adam hid himself in dread of expected disapprobation. 



; 2 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



If Adam had chosen obedience, conscience would have 
spoken words of approval and breathed a prophecy of 
blessing. This idea and sense of good or ill desert, of 
merit or of guilt, and this expectancy of reward or of 
penalty, are given by no other faculty than conscience. 
These are intuitions of the moral faculty. 

138. Conscience not a Faculty of Comparing and Judging. 

Previous to the self-approval, or the self-condemnation, 
there must needs be a comparison of the conduct with 
the rule of right, and a judgment that the conduct is in 
harmony with the rule or that it is not in harmony. This 
comparison and judgment cannot be made by conscience. 
The intention of obedience or of disobedience is known 
by consciousness. The objective and actual agreement 
or disagreement of conduct with the rule of right is 
known through consciousness and the general intellect. 
The intellect holds the two conceptions, the conception 
of the law and of the conduct, and laying them side by 
side notes the points of harmony and of variance. When 
the comparison has been made and the judgment ren- 
dered, then conscience comes forward with its contribu- 
tion of moral intuition and moral sensibility. 

139. Resume. 

We find then that the distinctive functions of conscience 
are four in number : 1. As a faculty correlative to the 
divine authority it gives the idea of authority and of ob- 
ligation ; it affirms the duty of obedience to the divine 
will and to all authority which represents the divine 
authority. 2. Conscience gives the ideas of right and of 
wrong ; it discerns the moral quality of voluntary con- 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 73 



formity or non-conformity to the rule of right. It de- 
clares the supremacy of moral obligation. It discerns 
and affirms, but does not create. 3. Conscience gives 
the ideas of good and of ill desert ; the feeling of moral 
complacency, self-respect, and moral worth, or the sense 
of shame, guilt, and degradation which follows evil doing. 
4. From conscience springs the expectancy of reward or 
of penalty ; the anticipation of favor and blessing or the 
dread of impending retribution. 

140. This Analysis Just. 

The proof that the analysis given above is just is seen 
in this, that the activities which have been referred to 
conscience are universal and invariable, while other 
elements are variable and hence not essential. Among 
all men we find the idea of duty, and the conviction of 
duty to obey the supreme authority ; we find the idea of 
right and of wrong according to some standard or prin- 
ciple of conduct; we find also the idea of good and of 
ill desert and the expectancy of retribution. These ideas 
of right and duty are flouted in pagan and in Christian 
lands alike, but nevertheless they are never absent from 
the minds of men. In respect to the standard of right 
and the corresponding moral judgments there is no uni- 
formity, but in respect to the moral intuitions there is 
universal agreement. 

141. Obligation the Primary Dictum of Conscience. 

Among the intuitions of conscience the obligation to 
obey the supreme authority must be counted the primary 
dictum. This is the " categorical imperative." The 
earliest movement of conscience in children is the recog- 



74 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



nition of parental authority and of the duty of obedience. 
There is no thought of abstract right ; there is no notion 
of a general principle ; there is the simple concrete duty 
of obeying another being, a superior being, who stands 
invested with authority. When the one living God is 
recognized, conscience affirms with single and potent 
voice the duty of obedience to him. The moral character 
of the supreme authority, as judged by Christian stand- 
ards, makes little difference in this sense of obligation. 
The moral codes of pagan religions are base and revolt- 
ing, but the conscience of Christian and of pagan alike 
gives the sense of duty to obey. The duty of submis- 
sion to authority is the primary intuition of the moral 
faculty. 

142. Other Faculties Cooperative with Conscience. 

From previous discussions it is manifest that other 
faculties are normally co-operative with conscience. In 
the unity of the mind each faculty brings its own con- 
tribution of activity and service, and every faculty co- 
operates with every other. For whatever purpose the 
knowledge of facts and their relations is wanted the gen- 
eral intellect brings it forward. Through the perceptive 
faculties comes the knowledge of external phenomena ; 
consciousness presents the subjective phenomena ; the 
intuitive faculty takes the individual phenomena and sets 
them in the framework of time and space, pours through 
them the idea of force and binds them together with the 
chain of causation ; then conscience throws upon them 
the light of its moral intuitions. Thus the faculties work 
in harmony. Conscience cannot do the work of other 
faculties, nor can it supervise and correct their work. 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 75 

143. The Dicta of Conscience Infallible. 

The proper dicta of conscience are infallible. But in 
what sense is this true? Conscience affirms always and 
everywhere the distinction between right and wrong, and 
this distinction is always true. Conscience affirms the 
supremacy of the ultimate rule of right and the obliga- 
tion to obey the supreme authority. This also is true 
without exception. If a man with intention transgress 
the supreme rule, conscience declares him guilty and 
bids him expect merited penalty. In this field of moral 
intuitions conscience makes no mistakes. For the facts 
in the case conscience depends, and must needs depend, 
upon other faculties. 

144. Conditions Requisite for the Action of Conscience. 

Touching this matter some considerations have already 
been presented. To awaken conscience to action these 
conditions are requisite : (i) the recognition of personal 
authority ; (2) a law or rule of conduct, expressing the 
personal authority on the one side, and on the other 
defining the subordination which is required ; (3) the 
consciousness of freedom in ourselves, or the idea of 
freedom in others. If either of these is lacking, con- 
science is silent. And conscience does not of itself fur- 
nish either the law or the authority. 

145. Testimony of Dr. Baird. 

The principle laid down above is affirmed by the most 
careful students of the phenomena of conscience. Dr. 
Samuel J. Baird says : "Every element in the phenomena 
of conscience supposes subordination recognized to a 
rightful and supreme lawgiver." In a world without 



7 6 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



sovereignty and without law "we should find," he says, 
"intelligence without a conscience, without a conception 
of the duty of rectitude, or the crime of wrong-doing 
and sin." 

146. Testimony of Dr. McCosh. 

Dr. James McCosh unfolds and affirms the same prin- 
ciples. He says : "Our moral nature reveals a law which 
is, first, independent of it ; secondly, binding upon it ; 
thirdly, binding upon all intelligent beings. The con- 
science declares that it has not created the law ; it feels 
that the law has been impressed upon it. It feels that it 
is merely the interpreter of a law binding independently 
of the recognition or the non-recognition of it by any 
individual. It declares regarding itself that its function 
is not to assume authority over the law, but to bow to 
the law as having authority over it." 

147. Dr. Strong's Testimony. 

Dr. A. H. Strong says : " Conscience must judge ac- 
cording to the law given to it" It follows of necessity 
that if no law is given to it conscience cannot act. 

148. A World Without Authority or Law. 

Let us imagine that which practically could not be, 
that a boy be suffered to grow to maturity without con- 
trol, with no command, human or divine, ever suggested 
to his mind. The idea of authority has no place in his 
mind. His conscience would lie as undeveloped as an 
infant's. He would have no notion of right or duty. 
Selfish, vengeful passions he might have, or kindly im- 
pulses, but not virtues or sins. As a child would be, left 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE // 

thus without ideas of obligation, so our race would be if 
left without a moral law, a race in moral infancy forever. 
Let now the lawgiver and the moral law come in ; ideas 
of duty and of right spring to life ; the will is compelled 
to make moral choices ; the moral affinities of the soul 
show themselves ; moral capacities are developed and 
matured into moral forces and moral character. 

149. Sentiments Mistaken for Conscience. 

Care must be taken to distinguish between conscience 
and sentiment. Not every high and good impulse is 
the imperial word of conscience. Pity responsive to 
helplessness and beauty may move the heart when con- 
science is silent. Self-love is put for obligation, and 
stubbornness stands for conscientiousness. Because 
" honesty is the best policy," politic men count them- 
selves honest. Because virtue brings happiness, seeking 
for happiness is analyzed into the love of virtue. 

150. Obscure Movements of Conscience. 

The analysis of a movement of conscience so simple 
as in the primal transgression, seems clear and sure. 
The majestic personality of the Creator is the lawgiver ; 
the rule of right is a direct command ; after the offense 
there is quick calling of the offender to account. But 
often the activities of conscience are complex and 
obscure. The presence of authority is not apparent ; 
the supreme lawgiver is not recognized ; other voices 
mingle with the moral law ; self-love clamors to be 
heard, until conscience becomes confused, uncertain, and 
feeble in its movements. This obscure action of con- 
science ought to be carefully noted. 



78 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

151. Apparent Absence of Authority. 

It must be admitted that sometimes the idea of 
authority and of law does not seem to be distinctly 
present in the mind, and yet conscience seems to oper- 
ate. Does conscience act apart from an authoritative 
rule of right? Or is there a moral law somewhere and 
somehow present, though unrecognized, latent, yet 
operative ? A moral law to whose force, though uncon- 
sciously to the actor, the action is due? 

152. A Law Present, Though not Apparent. 

Wherever the action of conscience is seen, an authori- 
tative rule of conduct is never altogether lacking. Some- 
thing stands in the mind as a kind of law. Take an ex- 
treme illustration. A man denies the existence of God, 
denies the life to come, and mocks at all religious obli- 
gation, and yet in his mind there may be a certain infe- 
rior action of conscience. How is this possible ? He 
constructs for himself out of his own sentiments, or from 
his experience of the consequences of actions, or from 
the elements which make up the welfare of society, or 
from some other source, a rule of conduct which he 
counts binding upon men. To this rule he imputes 
authority. It is evident that this rule stands in his mind 
as authoritative, for he enforces it as a rule of conduct 
for others. 

153. Methods of Constructing Ethical Codes. 

The methods of constructing these authoritative moral 
codes which recognize no authority above man, are curi- 
ous. One man is a "reformer," a reformer in hygiene, 
in dress, in social science, in law, and his notions of what 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 79 

would be beneficial to men constitute his moral law. 
Another makes " personal development " his rule ; what- 
ever seems to him to promote his own development he 
counts right. A third mocks at "the higher law," but 
counts the civil law supreme. A fourth constructs a law 
out of popular sentiment, and generalizing society into 
a personality, he imputes to it authority. Wherever the 
one supreme moral law is not recognized this process of 
law-making goes on. By this means a feeble action of 
conscience is maintained. 

154. Fragments of the Real Moral Law. 

The various rules of conduct which men construct for 
themselves are commonly fragments, more or less dis- 
jointed, of the real and comprehensive moral law. For 
this reason they have some relation to the moral nature 
of man and a certain measure of value. Hygienic rules 
express the Creator's will touching man's physical life. 
That which conduces to real development of the indi- 
vidual is good, for a perfect human nature is in itself a 
partial declaration of the moral law. A true social 
science expresses the mind of the Creator, for God 
created man for social life. Civil law has its measure of 
authority to bind the conscience, for "the powers that 
be are ordained of God." The moral sentiments which 
men project from themselves and then label " the nature 
of things," may be elements of the divine likeness in 
man. These fragments of the moral law are often 
distorted, and are always false in the sense of being 
partial ; but as elements of the moral law, they have 
some authority and some power to stir conscience to 
action. 



SO INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

155. Personal Authority not Absent. 

Even in that inferior action of conscience under the 
stimulus of disjointed fragments of the moral law, the 
element of personal authority is not wholly absent. 
Rules of conduct stand in the minds of men as repre- 
senting a consensus of sentiment. Back of that consen- 
sus of opinion stands a numerous personality, greater 
than any one man, and mightier to enforce its will. By 
a kind of generalization society becomes a person vested 
with authority not to be lightly disregarded. States and 
nations are great corporate persons enforcing their will 
even unto death. Some men even personify nature and 
seem to have regard for natural law as representing an 
obscure personality. But where the idea of personality 
is entirely absent from the rule of right, conscience is 
dormant and the idea of obligation is not found 

156. Without the Idea of God, Conscience Weak. 

In proportion as the idea of the one living God drops 
out of belief or out of mind, the action of conscience be- 
comes weak. If hygiene furnish the law of right, the 
allurements of pleasure easily triumph. The conscience 
of Joseph was dominant because he feared God. If the 
welfare of society stand for the moral law, his own per- 
sonal advantage will seem to every man the most im- 
portant matter. Right "in the nature of things," with- 
out God to administer the law, holds nobody back from 
transgression. But in the presence of the living God, the 
sense of right and duty becomes clear and strong ; con- 
science makes her voice to be respected ; or if men dis- 
regard her monitions her wrath breaks out like the thun- 
ders and lightnings of Sinai. If a man will strengthen his 



CONCERNING MAN * SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 8 1 



conscience, let him clarify and vivify his sense of God 
and his law. That unfaithfulness in positions of trust, 
which seems to be ominously increasing, is to be ac- 
counted for by a decaying sense of the divine authority. 1/ 

157. Degrees of Energy in the Action of Conscience. 

With conscience, as with other faculties, there may be 
various degrees of energy. Its action may be normal, 
but yet feeble. The causes of these differences lie close 
at hand and are easily found. 

158. Degrees of Depravity Affecting Conscience. 

The depravity of human nature shows itself in no 
small degree in the conscience ; indeed, since depravity 
is a moral deterioration, it must needs show itself pri- 
marily in the moral faculties. This disturbance in the 
moral nature manifests itself with varying energy in dif- 
ferent persons. The blurring of the moral sight and 
senses may be more or less complete. 

159. Abuse of Conscience a Cause of Weakness. 

The voice of conscience is often disregarded and its 
monitions flouted, till it almost ceases to speak. Spurned 
and despised, it retires into silence till the day of retribu- 
tion shall come. It is a law of the activity of conscience 
that the strength and delicacy of its movements can be 
enjoyed only by faithfully and lovingly following its 
monitions. 

160. Vagueness of Ideas a Source of Weakness. 

Indistinct and uncertain conceptions of things, as. 
apprehended by the general intellect, leave the con- 

F 



82 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



science to feebleness ; they furnish no sufficient stim- 
ulus to vigorous action. Knowledge is too meagre and 
vague ; there is no worthy ideal of excellence in the 
mind ; the character of God is not apprehended ; the 
requirements of the moral law are not understood ; all 
mental operations are ineffectual gropings, and the 
activities of conscience are correspondingly feeble. 

161. Some Doctrines Enervate Conscience. 

The belief of some certain doctrines, religious or philo- 
sophic, cannot do otherwise than weaken the action of 
conscience. The denial of final retribution tends to en- 
feeble the action of this faculty, for in this life the pun- 
ishment of wickedness is notoriously uncertain and inade- 
quate ; and if future punishment be denied, the prophecy 
of conscience touching retribution is flouted as being 
false. If God does not punish wrong-doing, why should 
conscience weary itself in uttering ineffectual protests? 
The doctrine of pantheism, by its denial of a personal 
deity, takes away the most potent stimulus of conscience. 
The doctrine of materialism, by degrading the choices 
of free beings to the level of molecular affinities and 
vibrations, takes away all ground for moral distinctions. 
The denial of revealed religion, by the doubt which it 
throws upon all spiritual verities, leaves conscience un- 
supported, for in this matter, as in everything else, doubt 
is weakness. These are given merely as illustrations of 
the influence upon conscience exerted by some beliefs. 

162. Conscience under Wicked Law. 

Light may be thrown upon the normal action of con- 
science by noting its working under wicked authority 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 83 

and vicious law. Wicked laws are sometimes laid upon 
conscience, laws which outrage and lacerate human 
nature. It is possible for the intellect to accept the 
fiendish will of a demon in place of the beneficent will 
of the Creator. In such a case a man is divided against 
himself ; conscience is set against the moral nature of 
man and the nature of things. To obey the voice of 
conscience is moral ruin ; not to obey is to suffer the 
pangs of guilt and fear. The true rule of right is agree- 
able to reason ; it is in harmony with all high sentiment 
and generous sensibility ; it is the ideal of perfect man- 
hood. Obedience leads to perfection of being and per- 
fect happiness ; it brings a man first into harmony with 
the Creator, and then into harmony with the world of 
things which God has made. A wicked law works the 
opposite of all this ; it is contrary to reason ; it condemns 
the best sensibilities of a good heart ; it requires that 
against which the moral nature of man rebels ; it breaks 
down the ideal of perfection, and as far as possible re- 
creates a man in the likeness of a fiend. 

163. Illustrations. 

The moral law requires temperance and sobriety, and 
the nature of man requires the same. If Bacchus be 
followed, the constitution of a man is shattered and 
wrecked. The moral law commands purity, and purity 
promotes health and happiness. But if Venus be wor- 
shiped, the springs of life are poisoned at the fountain, 
and disease and decay trail down through the genera- 
tions. On the other side, for the completest example of 
an evil law laid upon conscience, we may cite the ethical 
code of the Jesuits, a code which enthrones falsehood 



8 4 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



in the place of truth, puts perfidy in the place of fidel- 
ity, roots kindness and pity out of the heart, divorces 
conscience from intelligence and reason, and swears the 
will to blind and limitless submission to the authority of 
a man. A blind sense of obligation is made the sole 
virtue. 

164. The Authority of Conscience. 

It is common to speak of the authority of conscience, 
and to assert its supremacy among the faculties. Dr. 
Francis Wayland declares conscience to be "the most 
authoritative impulse to which we find ourselves sus- 
ceptible." As a popular expression "the authority of 
conscience " may not be extremely objectionable, but as 
a scientific statement, the language of Dr. Wayland be- 
trays a lack of clear thought. Authority, from its very 
nature, is objective, ab extra. A subjective impulse 
cannot be authoritative. Conscience may furnish an 
impulse for choice or effort, but this impulse cannot have 
the nature of authority. 

165. Conscience Echoes the Voice of the Lawgiver. 

• The authority of conscience is nothing else than the 
authority of the lawgiver whom the moral faculty 
recognizes. Conscience affirms the duty of obedience, 
but obedience to what, or to whom ? To itself? Not 
to itself at all, but to the lawgiver. If conscience takes 
its law from Jehovah, then the authority of conscience is 
the authority of God. If the supreme rule of right is 
deduced from utility, then the authority of conscience is 
merely that measure of influence which arises from the 
idea of advantage. 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 85 

166. Authority Emanates from Will. 

As we have already seen, obligation cannot exist 
except toward a personal being. In like manner 
authority has its ground in personality, and cannot issue 
except from a person. And still further, authority is 
an attribute of will. Obedience is the correlative ot 
authority, and obedience is the voluntary acceptance of 
the will of another as our own will ; it is the choice 
of one will freely conforming itself to another will. 
Hence an authoritative law implies, of necessity, the 
will of a personal being behind the law as the ground 
of its authority. Civil law in a republic expresses 
the resultant authority of many wills. The unwritten 
law of public opinion is in like manner a consensus 
of will. The authority of conscience is, then, not the 
urgency of a subjective impulse, but the objective au- 
thority of him who gives law to conscience. It is the 
force of a personality rather than the influence of a 
principle 

167. Conscience not Coercive. 

Whatever authority conscience may exercise, or what- 
ever urgency of impulse may be found in the action of 
conscience, the will is not dominated by conscience. We 
know that the will can act contrary to the monitions of 
conscience, because it does so act. Nor does this indi- 
cate feebleness in the action of conscience. Conscience 
may thunder and lighten in the soul, and the will may 
yet entirely disregard its voice. As Paul reasoned be- 
fore Felix touching " righteousness, temperance, and the 
judgment to come," the king trembled, but he went on 
in his evil way all the same. 



86 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



168. The Discernment of What is Right. 

Before leaving the subject of conscience, we must con- 
sider in what manner the mind discerns what is right 
and what is wrong : that is, what is the moral law and 
what its contents. Conscience does not of itself know 
what is right The utterly various and contradictory 
notions of men concerning the rule of right, prove that 
ideas of right are not direct intuitions. The answer to 
this inquiry has been already suggested, but a fuller con- 
sideration is needful. 

169. Conscience Deals with Moral Principles Only. 

In determining what is right, the action of conscience 
is analogous to the operation of the general intuitive 
faculty. Intuition affirms the principle of cause and ef- 
fect as necessary and universal, but when the question 
comes, What is the cause of this particular effect ? or, 
What effect must follow that particular cause ? other 
faculties than intuition must give the answer. In like 
manner conscience affirms the distinction between right 
and wrong, and the imperative obligation to obey the 
supreme authority, but the general intellect must investi- 
gate the rule of right and determine what authority is 
supreme. Whether Jupiter or Jehovah be the true God ; 
whether the Decalogue be the will of God or the will of 
Moses ; whether Jesus be " the Lord of life and glory," 
or only a pretender to the Jewish Messiahship ; whether 
the holy Scriptures are inspired, and what is their mean- 
ing ; whether king or congress, federal or confederate 
officers exercise the powers of legitimate government ; 
whether this man's duty be to till the soil, sail the sea, 
or to preach the gospel, these are questions belonging to 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 87 

the general intellect, and not at all to conscience. But 
when the intellect has done its work, conscience comes 
in promptly with its intuition of obligation. Give to the 
intellect the conception of an idol god, or a demon deity, 
and along with this the biblical conception of Jehovah ; 
the intellect, comparing the attributes of each, declares 
the being who made the heavens and the earth to be the 
true God, and rejects the idol and the demon. And 
conscience acts upon this decision of the intellect. When 
the Scriptures have instructed the intellect and clarified 
its operations, the application of this principle is easy. 
But when the Scriptures are not known, the process is 
more difficult of analysis. 

170. Discerning Right by the Light of Nature. 

The discernment of the rule of right without a special 
revelation is attended with great difficulties, and for the 
crude thought and base sensibilities of savage men it is 
especially difficult. Traditional notions of right and 
wrong doubtless follow men in their lowest degradation. 
Aside from this we may follow the working of the intel- 
lect something as follows. Everywhere there come, of 
necessity, to the minds of men, contrasted ideas, as of 
truth and falsehood, kindness and cruelty, justice and 
robbery, obedience and disobedience. The intellect dis- 
cerns the superiority of the one set of ideas ; they are in 
harmony with all the better elements of his nature ; by 
experience they are found to work out good. Take, for 
illustration, the question between truth and falsehood. 
It is the function of the intellect to discern between that 
which is true and real, and that which is false and only 
apparent ; truth satisfies the intellect, while falsehood 



88 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



offends it. Truth works out good ; truth is seen to be 
the only basis of profitable or pleasant association among 
men ; it agrees with the instinctive disposition to trust 
men till they show themselves false. Truth is seen to be 
a higher and better principle of action than deception ; 
that it is in harmony with the realities of things. Then 
conscience comes in and clothes with the attributes of 
right and duty that which the intellect has declared to be 
true and practically good. Falsehood comes in as a dis- 
turbing element, as something out of harmony with that 
which is real. It outrages the intellect, putting that 
which is not, in place of that which is ; it disappoints 
trust ; it works trouble everywhere. In like manner 
theft violates the sense of ownership ; it deprives men of 
the means of comfort ; it is easily seen by all men to be 
practically injurious. And almost every kind of wrong- 
doing is seen to come somehow and somewhere into 
collision with the nature and welfare of man. These 
conclusions of the intellect furnish a basis for a feeble 
action of conscience. 

171. A Positive Moral Law Needed. 

The crude notions of the moral law which are found 
among savage tribes, emphasize the need of a positive 
moral code and a clearly recognized supreme authority. 
When the revelation of God and his will comes, it com- 
mands assent, not only by the force of objective evidence, 
but also by the power of subjective correspondence, and 
by meeting a deep subjective need. The Scriptures 
clarify man's natural notions of right, supplement that 
which is lacking, and by superior definiteness and higher 
authority in a measure supersede those ideas. 



CONCERNING MAN J SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE 89 

172. Conscientiousness not Identical with Right. 

From discussions already had, it is manifest that con- 
scientiousness gives no certainty that a man's conduct is 
actually in harmony with the moral law. Conscientious- 
ness indicates a sincere intention to do right, and this 
gives a certain measure of probability that one has made 
due effort to ascertain what is right. But a conscientious 
man may make grave mistakes in practical morals. 



CHAPTER VI 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE. 

173. Importance of the Subject. 

Man is endowed with that regnant faculty called the 
will. This faculty, like conscience, requires careful 
study and exact statement A false psychology of the 
will can hardly fail to show itself in a false philosophy 
of morals. A theory of the faculty of choice may be so 
radically wrong as to leave no basis for a moral element 
in human conduct and character. 

174. Definition of the Will. 

The will is that imperial faculty which makes choices 
and decisions ; which determines to what ends man's 
energies shall be directed, and gives character and 
limit to the sensibilities ; it gives the word of command 
for the execution of its chosen purposes, and by these 
sovereign acts fixes the moral attitude and determines 
the moral character of the spiritual being. "Will is the 
soul's power to choose between motives and to direct 
its subsequent activity according to the motive thus 
chosen — in other words, the soul's power to choose both 
an end and the means to attain it." 1 

175. The Will, Sui Generis. 

Concerning the will it must be said, first of all, that it 
is a faculty entirely sui generis, like itself and like nothing 
1 Dr. A. H. Strong. 

90 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE 9 1 



else. In its nature and mode of action it is unlike every 
other faculty of the spiritual being. Will is knowable 
by consciousness only. It cannot be explained through 
forms of thought furnished by any other faculty. This 
is true, indeed, in its measure, of every radically distinct 
faculty. But this is pre-eminently true of the will. This 
may seem nothing else than a truism, yet nothing is 
more common in discussion touching the will, than the 
attempt to explain its mode of operation by forms of 
thought furnished by the causal faculty, and to reduce 
its function to the principle of cause and effect. It is 
necessary therefore to emphasize the thought that will 
cannot be understood otherwise than by the clear con- 
sciousness of its own activity. 

176. Will a Distinct Faculty. 

We must emphasize the fact that will is a distinct fac- 
ulty. The action of will cannot be resolved into some- 
thing else, and we do well to challenge every process of 
analysis by which this is attempted. 

177. Will is not Reason. 

Will is not reason, and cannot be resolved into func- 
tions of reason. The activities of the reasoning faculty 
represent reality, truth, and its relationships. Anything 
contrary to truth and reality is contrary to the normal 
conceptions and processes of reason. But the action of 
will is not an intuition or a logical process. The deter- 
minations of will are often contrary to known truth, un- 
reasonable, illogical, and foolish. Will often tramples 
upon every dictate of common sense. It is characteristic 
of wrong-doing that it is so unreasonable that the evil- 



92 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

doer, confronted with his sin, stands confounded and 
speechless. To give a good reason for an evil choice is 
to justify it. 

178. Will not Conscience. 

The movements of will cannot be resolved into the 
monitions of conscience. Men are constantly acting 
contrary to the monitions of the moral faculty. A char- 
acteristic quality of remorse is the consciousness of hav- 
ing acted contrary to the strong conviction of right and 
duty. 

179. Will not Sensibility. 

Will is not an impulse of emotion, a wave of sensibil- 
ity, neither some single emotion, nor the resultant of 
many. On the other hand, will is that faculty whose 
function is to hold sensibility and passion in subjection. 
When Quintus Mucius Scaevola thrust his hand into the 
altar flame and held it there till consumed, was it emo- 
tion which dominated the physical anguish? Was it 
the gratification of the stronger sensibility ? When the 
aged Polycarp refused to curse his Lord and gave his 
body to the flames, was it some overmastering sensibility 
that made the great decision ? In the stillness of every 
other emotion, the will is able to deny gratification to 
the most clamorous passion. The whole soul may be 
tremulous and distressed with the conflict of contending 
appetencies and sensibilities ; the will denies which it 
pleases, or denies them all. And when will has made 
its decision and declared it final, it refuses to reopen 
the case for further consideration ; against the fixed pur- 
pose, as waves against a cliff, raging passion beats in vain, 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE 



95 



and the will abides in imperial peace. Herein lies the 
stability of high moral character. 

1 80. Will not the Strongest Motive. 

Current language touching motives is misleading. Will 
is not the strongest motive, nor is it determined by the 
strongest motive. It sits as arbiter between rival appeten- 
cies, and weighs them, not according to their urgency, and 
gives supremacy to which it pleases ; and the standard by 
which it measures motives is of the will's own choosing. 

181. President Edwards' Argument. 

The famous argument of President Jonathan Edwards, 
by which he seems to reduce the action of the will to 
links in a chain of necessary causation, and by which, it 
has been said, he shut up every opponent to a bare pro- 
test against his conclusion, may be briefly stated as fol- 
lows : The will chooses, and cannot do otherwise, accord- 
ing to the strongest motive ; by the strongest motive is 
meant that motive which under the circumstances seems 
to the mind most agreeable ; that which is the most 
agreeable, namely, the strongest motive, determines the 
action of the will, for if it were not the most agreeable, 
"something else would be chosen. The prevailing motive 
is shown to be the strongest by the fact that it prevails. 
Thus it is made to appear that motives rule the will, and 
rule it by their pleasurableness. The choices of the will 
are resolved into movements of sensibility. 

182. Edwards' Argument an Identical Equation. 

Unconsciously, it would seem, President Edwards re- 
duced his argument to the form of an identical equa- 



94 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



tion, x=x, a proposition equally true and nugatory. 
"The will," he says, "is always as the greatest apparent 
good." "The greatest apparent good," he carefully 
explains as having "the same import as agreeable." 
Then he says that "an appearing most agreeable or 
pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring or choos- 
ing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct" ; 
that " a man's choosing, liking best, or being pleased 
with a thing, are the same with his willing that thing." 
In this unperceived shifting of terms lies the strength of 
Edwards' argument. It all amounts to this, that the will 
chooses according to its choice. 

183. What is a Motive? 

The word motive properly signifies something which 
has been chosen, something which by being chosen be- 
comes a stimulus to effort to attain, possess, or enjoy it. 
To one man money is a motive ; to another, pleasure ; 
a third says, My motive is to do good. They have 
chosen these things as objects for which to labor and 
spend life. They are motives, but not motives to the 
will, for the choice has already been made, but motives 
to the executive faculties to gain and possess them. 

184. Anticipative Sense of Motive. 

That which has not been chosen, but which is pre- 
sented to the mind as an object of possible choice, is 
sometimes by anticipation called a motive. To rouse 
his sluggish boy to exertion, the father pictures to him 
the benefits which he may win by hard study, the excel- 
lency of knowledge, and the personal power to which 
he may attain, in the hope that the boy may choose 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE 95 



these things as his motives. In this sense, doubtless, 
Edwards thought of motives when he affirmed that the 
strongest motive determines the action of the will. But 
his argument plays back and forth between the two 
senses. But in respect to this anticipative sense of 
motive there is a false conception which demands notice. 

185. Motives Inert. 

Motives seem often to be looked upon as things of 
positive energy, as having an attractive force of their 
own, by which they get a pull upon the will. In this 
lies a fertile source of fallacies in discussions concerning 
the will. A motive, as an object external to the mind, 
is in itself utterly inert and powerless. A motive is en- 
tirely passive ; it cannot compel or incite, persuade or 
influence. The energy and the appetency are in the 
spiritual being who makes the election. There is no 
mutual attraction or interaction ; the action and the at- 
traction are all upon the side of the mind. 

186. Relation of Motives to the Mind. 

A motive, as an object external to the mind, first be- 
comes a subject of knowledge. It has no potency beyond 
the physical properties by which it makes an impression 
upon our bodily senses, equally inert, whether it be a 
clod of earth or a nugget of gold. Next in order, the 
mental conception of this external something — let it be 
a discovered nugget of gold — awakens in the mind a 
train of associated conceptions : other deposits of gold 
close at hand ; the possibility of getting possession of 
this gold ; the wealth, position, and power which the 
possession of the gold may bring ; enjoyments extending 



9 6 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



through years to come ; the same great things for chil- 
dren and children's children ; a series of associated ideas 
extending without limit. These conceptions give rise to 
certain emotions ; a warm glow of excited sensibility 
ensues. If the object of knowledge be a clod of earth, 
the associated ideas are different, and the sensibility is 
slight. But as external objects, both are equally passive 
and inert. They can neither determine, nor persuade, 
nor influence the will. As external motives, neither of 
them can be said to be either stronger or weaker. 

187. Conception of Freedom. 

It is common to assert freedom as an attribute of the 
will, and the denial of freedom is seldom heard except 
when made for a purpose. The popular mind resents 
the denial of freedom. But this consensus of opinion in 
favor of freedom is joined with the greatest possible dif- 
ference in the conception of that freedom. With some 
writers, freedom of will means the impossibility of com- 
pelling choices, in a causal way, by external physical 
force. With others, freedom signifies inward spontaneity 
of action, the choices of the will being the true expression 
of a man's own dispositions and appetencies. Some can 
conceive no real freedom except the absence of all inward 
bias, a condition of complete indifference toward all ob- 
jects of choice. The agreement, therefore, in affirming 
freedom, is by no means an agreement touching the doc- 
trine of freedom of the will. 

188. Difficulty of Conceiving Freedom. 

The difficulty of conceiving and defining freedom of 
will is psychological and metaphysical. There is the 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE 



97 



supposed necessity of harmonizing the intuition of causa- 
tion and the consciousness of freedom. This is an 
attempt to impose upon the consciousness of freedom a 
form of thought given by another faculty. There is also 
the difficulty of conceiving the absolute beginning of 
anything. Choice as a link in a chain of causation, the 
causal faculty easily apprehends ; but a cause which is not 
a link in a chain, a cause which has no antecedent, 
which is a fountain and not a mere conduit of causal 
energy, the causal faculty does not understand. That 
which is simply outside or beyond the apprehension of 
the causal faculty is often accounted contrary to it. The 
faculty of choice is understood by the consciousness of 
its operation, and by that only. 

189. Proposed Definitions of the Idea of Freedom. 

The following definitions of the idea of free will are 
submitted : 

First, the will is free in the sense that it represents the 
spontaneous activity of the personal, rational being. 

Secondly, the will is free in the sense that no outward 
influence or force has, or can have, any coercive or 
causal relation to its action. The external world comes 
into causal relations with the bodies of men, but it has no 
causal connection with the faculty of choice. There is no 
tangential point between physical force and will. 

Thirdly, the will is free in the sense that its choices 
are not dominated or determined by the action of other 
faculties, whether reason, conscience, or sensibility. Will 
does not act apart from other faculties, but its action is 
not dominated by any. The will may flout reason and 
conscience, and deny the entreaties of sensibility. 

G 



9 8 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



Fourthly, the will is free in the sense that its choices 
are not determined by the existing state of the being at 
the moment of choosing, but by its action will can mod- 
ify and reverse that state. If this be not so, no being 
created in purity and uprightness has ever fallen into sin. 

Fifthly, the will is free in the sense that its choices are 
not links in a chain of necessaiy causation. As the 
creative acts of God must be conceived as absolute be- 
ginnings and not links in a chain of cause and effect, so, 
in their limited sphere and significance, the generic 
choices of the will are beginnings which may stand in 
causal relations to consequents, but have no causal re- 
lation with antecedents. As God created all things, so 
the will originates its own moral attitudes. In this crea- 
tive faculty lies the profoundest element of likeness be- 
tween man and his Maker. The conception of this abso- 
lute origination of moral choices, is no more difficult 
than the conception of any act of creation. 

190. The Conflict of Ages. 

The conflict of ages touching the will concerns this 
question, whether the will does truly originate moral 
attitudes, or whether generic choices spring of necessity 
from antecedent conditions and forces. The child be- 
gins his existence with a personality determined in no 
respect or degree by his own volition ; he is environed 
also by conditions not of his own making. The EGO 
which he did not make or choose, and the NGN-EGO 
which is beyond his control, constitute the universe. 
Either the totality of his life and destiny is the product 
of the interaction of these two elements, or else there is 
the absolute origination of something new, something 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE 



99 



outside of the chain of cause and effect. Between these 
alternatives there is no middle ground. 

191. Will Makes and Changes Moral States. 

We must hold that it is the function of will to origi- 
nate generic moral choices and states ; to modify and 
reverse existing moral attitudes ; with temptation, or 
without temptation to turn the soul from good to evil ; 
with the touch and impulse of God's Spirit to turn the 
soul from evil to good ; that the will is, in its highest 
moral action, a first cause. 

192. Historic Proofs. 

The inspired history affirms as a fact that God created 
our first parents morally upright and good, and that 
under the impulse of temptation they disobeyed the law 
of their Creator, and by this choice reversed their moral 
condition. The same history briefly and significantly 
indicates that certain spiritual beings had passed through 
this experience before the creation of man. Certain 
"angels kept not their first estate," and this primal fall 
must have been without a tempter. These facts demon- 
strate the possibility of such facts. 

193. Proof from Spiritual Regeneration. 

According to Christian doctrine and according to fre- 
quent experience, the will, out of antecedent unbelief 
and sin, through the stimulus and uplifting of divine 
grace, reverses the moral attitude and chooses faith and 
righteousness. Divine grace does not work abnormally 
with respect to the faculties of the soul ; the normal 

operation of the will is not disturbed, but rather helped ; 
L.cfC. 



IOO INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



under the divine impulse, the will working according to 
its own proper function turns from evil, reversing thus 
its previous moral state. This indicates again that it be- 
longs to the nature of will to originate generic moral 
choices. 

194. The Testimony of Consciousness. 

Touching the action of the will, consciousness is the 
final authority. Consciousness testifies to the simple, 
ultimate fact of a generic choice, and gives no hint of 
antecedent causes. It is the essential nature of choice 
that it is an election between two alternatives. In 
affirming the fact of choice, consciousness affirms the 
ability to accept either alternative, and to accept it under 
existing conditions, otherwise there is no choice. This 
testimony is so positive that we may count it the uni- 
versal conviction of the human soul. 

195. The Testimony of Conscience. 

Conscience declares unequivocally the duty of choos- 
ing the good and the right, not under other more favor- 
able conditions, but under present conditions, whatever 
they may be ; and if the will chooses known evil, con- 
science proclaims the man guilty, whatever his condi- 
tions. Upon what ground can conscience affirm obliga- 
tion, and good or ill desert, except upon the ground of 
ability to place the soul in the right moral attitude ? 

196. Ability to Choose, and Penalty. 

God and men inflict punishment upon evildoers. 
The loving father as well as the stern executioner counts 
this just. These penalties imply positive ill desert. 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE 



IOI 



Only upon the ground of ability to originate moral atti- 
tudes can we justify the judgments of righteous rulers or 
of God. 

197. Classes of Choices. 

The action of the will must in all cases have the qual- 
ity of a true choice, that is, there must be an election 
between real alternatives. Nevertheless, there are dif- 
ferences in choices. The relationship of acts of choice 
to other mental operations is not in all cases the same. 
We may therefore classify choices, and thus better under- 
stand the action of will. 

198. General and Particular, Generic and Executive Volitions. 

Choice may be either general or particular, the choice 
of a motive, or executive volitions for doing or attaining 
that which has been chosen. A -man chooses the at- 
tainment of rank in office as his aim and end in life. 
This election is made once for all and is not reconsidered. 
It is a general choice, a generic choice, the choice of a 
motive. Then follow numberless executive volitions for 
the accomplishment of the all-embracing purpose. In 
these executive volitions there is a choice between real 
alternatives : a choice between means, between times and 
seasons, between doing instantly and waiting ; but in 
these subsidiary choices the action of other faculties 
seems especially prominent. The will seems to say to 
the intellect, I have chosen my end ; do you search out 
the best method of accomplishing my chosen object, and 
I will command the doing. And the intellect applies 
itself with equal alacrity to devising means for robbing a 
bank, for undermining the virtue of the innocent, for 



102 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



building a hospital, or for preaching the gospel to the 
world. It is manifest that the paramount action of the 
will is found in the generic choices, the election of mo- 
tives. 

199. Choices with no Moral Element. 

Movements of the will may be classified again with 
reference to the moral element involved in them. There 
is presented to me a dish containing a variety of fruits, 
apples, pears, peaches, grapes, all equally healthful for 
me. In taking one in preference to another, there must 
be a choice, but a choice with no moral element. In 
the numberless volitions by which the course of life is 
carried on, many choices are of this neutral kind, and 
many more have a moral quality in a secondary, in- 
direct way only, by virtue of their relation to true ge- 
neric choices. 

200. The Moral Element in Generic Choices. 

In the great generic choices the moral element is pri- 
mary and supreme. To every man there comes the 
great question of loyalty to God, as against all lower 
motives in life. The choice must be made ; it cannot 
be evaded. It is a generic choice ; it involves a lifetime 
of executive volitions in harmony with it. To every man 
in business there comes the question of truth, honesty, 
and honor in all his dealings, or of tricks and deceptions 
for the increase of profits. This choice is moral and 
generic ; it is the choice of a motive. Moral philosophy 
concerns itself chiefly with these radical choices in which 
the will elects a supreme moral motive. In these great 
choices there confront men such alternatives as these ; a 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE IO3 

life dominated by God's will or by self-will ; benevolence 
and love or selfishness ; truth and sincerity or falseness 
and pretense. Subsidiary choices are comparatively un- 
important. Love to God and love to men, truth and 
righteousness, may be expressed in a hundred ways, all 
equally good and right in their place. 

201. Choice Involves Real Alternatives. 

Real choice requires that objects of choice be pre- 
sented which are real alternatives. This signifies that 
the objects shall be such that if one be chosen, by that 
same choice the other must be rejected. By a generic 
choice a man makes gain rather than honesty his motive. 
He is ready to sell his vote for a bribe. On the one side 
a bribe of ten dollars is offered, on the other side twenty 
dollars. Here is no alternative ; in accepting the twenty 
he accepts the ten twice over. For a man whose motive 
is gold, there is no alternative between ten thousand 
pieces and a hundred thousand pieces. For one whose 
motive is to do good, there is no alternative between a 
little good and a great good. 

202. The Nature of Real Alternatives. 

Let the nature of real alternatives be fixed well in 
mind. Alternatives are mutually exclusive. In making 
choice between alternatives, the action of the will shows 
a two-fold attitude, an attitude of acceptance and an 
attitude of rejection. But in choosing the greater gain 
there is no element of rejection ; the less is chosen plus 
their difference. Thus it appears that in many apparent 
choices there is no real choice. The real choice was 
made in the previous election of a motive. 



104 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

203. Fixedness of Choice. 

No conception of the will can be adequate which does 
not recognize its tendency toward fixedness and perma- 
nence of moral choices. A generic choice is very much 
more than a purpose to perform an individual moral act. 
It is the election of a permanent motive. It puts the 
spiritual being into a moral condition or attitude. A 
repetition of the choice is a ratification of the previous 
action. The soul determines to stand by the position 
already taken. There is an increase of moral momen- 
tum. The ratification is made with less of conscious 
agitation than the original choice, but with greater fixed- 
ness. It belongs to the nature of high moral choices 
that they are intended to stand forever. To choose the 
doing of the divine will as the supreme motive, with the 
proviso that the choice is a temporary measure, is impos- 
sible. To assume to do this, shows that something else 
than the divine will is the real object of choice. To 
choose an evil motive is to take a wrong moral attitude, 
and this evil state must needs continue till it is reversed. 
The will having made its choice of a motive and of a moral 
state, and having confirmed and ratified the choice, 
there crystallize around it all the energies and activities 
of the spiritual being. Corresponding appetencies urge it 
on ; the sensibilities rally around it to strengthen it ; the 
intellect devotes all its resources to its service. Thus the 
choice becomes final — final, not by the loss of volitional 
power, but because the will has taken its stand, has 
spoken the fateful word, and refuses to reconsider its 
decision, or to reopen the case. On the side of virtue 
this fixedness of choice signifies maturity of moral char- 
acter. 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE 105 



204. " Facilis descensus Averno." 

The power to change a moral state irom good to evil, 
to corrupt a nature previously pure, does not imply the 
power to restore the former moral state by a reverse 
choice. Men have found by sad experience that descent 
into evil is easy, but that return to right-doing is difficult 
exceedingly. The first man could choose evil and de> 
stroy his original righteousness ; but that former mora] 
state is recovered, not without a reverse choice indeed, 
but only by the special grace of God. Young people, 
especially, should bear in mind that the drift of human 
nature is toward evil, and that it is easy to go down, but 
hard to rise again. 

205. Consequences of Choices. 

In the world of things actions have consequences. 
Consequences spread and ramify. Given the antecedent 
cause, and the consequences are certain and necessary. 
In the moral world and in spiritual beings there is in 
like manner a law of cause and effect. The generic 
choices of the will are causes ; the consequences are sure 
to follow. E. g., when an evil motive has been chosen, 
evil thoughts spring up in the mind, as if the soil had 
been sown with vile seeds ; vicious sensibilities begin to 
burn in the soul ; that wickedness which formerly 
awakened aversion and disgust, now awakens a feeling 
of pleasure ; the appetencies of the soul reach out after 
base objects, and clamor to be appeased by unworthy 
indulgences. The causal bond between the evil choice 
and this consequent depravation of being is sure ; wrong 
generic choices generate evil sensibilities. In depraved 
sensibilities is written the record of evil choices. 



106 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

206. Consequences not Under the Control of the Will. 

In the world of material things the law of cause and 
effect cannot be averted or modified by man. That 
which is done cannot be undone, nor can its conse- 
quences be stayed. The same is true touching moral 
choices. The generic choice is optional ; the conse- 
quences follow by virtue of man's nature ; they are not 
optional ; they cannot be hindered. Some of the conse- 
quences of evil choices were indicated in the preceding 
paragraph. We can set no limit to the extent or the 
duration of these consequences ; they trail through gen- 
erations and ages ; they extend to the utter wreck and 
ruin of human welfare. The doctrine of this paragraph 
is, that a reverse choice cannot annihilate the conse- 
quences of a previous choice. The primal transgression 
brought depravity into human nature : no reverse choice 
has been able to eliminate that element of depravity and 
restore human nature to its original purity. The Chris- 
tian religion brings to light divine agencies for destroy- 
ing the consequences of sin. But the direct control of 
the consequences of moral choices is beyond the power 
of will. 

207. Will Cooperative with Other Faculties. 

As has been already said, man as a spiritual being is 
a unit, and in the unity of that spiritual being every fac- 
ulty co-operates with every other. Memory is memory 
for intellect, conscience, and will. Reason is reason for 
all the faculties. So the will acts in conjunction with 
reason and conscience. It is normal for the will to act 
in harmony with a good conscience and with right reason. 
It is abnormal for the will to choose that which to the 



CONCERNING THE POWER OE CHOICE IOJ 

reason is foolish, or to the conscience is wrong. It is a 
characteristic of evil choices that they are dislocated 
mental operations, antagonized and condemned by con- 
science and clear thought. Movements of will in har- 
mony with all the faculties are at once normal and right. 

208. Will and Character. 

Moral character is the product of will. Character is 
composed of two elements : (1) The present attitude of 
the will itself; (2) The condition of the appetencies and 
sensibilities. The first is the existing generic choice. 
The second element is made up of the consequences of 
choices, past or present, wrought upon the spiritual be- 
ing. When the attitude of the will has been rectified, 
there may yet remain a large residuum of evil conse- 
quences from previous choices. The first element of 
character may be changed instantly ; the second element 
changes with more or less of slowness. Many a good 
man is dogged and tormented by the persistency of de- 
praved sensibilities. "To will is present," but "how to 
do the good he finds not." The will may be right, 
while the character is marred by multitudinous defects. 

209. Freedom not Lost. 

Persistence of choice is not bondage of will nor does 
it imply the loss of power to choose. Stability of choice 
signifies that the will has acted and refuses to change. 
But children are born under conditions and with environ- 
ments which make it practically sure that they will 
choose evil and live in wickedness. Whence comes this 
practical certainty of an evil life ? From paralysis of the 
volitional faculty ? From servitude of will ? Not from 



I08 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



these sources, but there is a lack of ideals ; evil is pres- 
ent to the mind ; the good is absent and is not appre- 
hended ; the moral law is not recognized in its strenuous 
authority. The will takes that which comes to hand ; it 
cannot choose that which the mind does not apprehend. 
This is the condition of pagan nations. High and clear 
ideals of right and goodness are not present to their 
minds. But when Christian ideals and Christian graces 
are apprehended by them in their completeness of beauty 
and power, not a few from sinks of vice and from the 
deepest depths of heathenism turn from evil and choose 
the good. The " Five Points " and ■ 4 Water Street " are 
as fruitful fields for philanthropic labor as " Fifth Ave- 
nue." The east end of London is as able and as ready 
to repent as the west end. 

210. Desire and Love Movements of Will. 

It is common to think of love with reference to the 
sensibilities only. This omits the essential element. 
Every movement of sensibility finds its ground in some 
other mental activity. The sensibilities of desire and love 
have their ground in the action of the will. Choice is 
the perennial trunk and branches ; sensibility is the foli- 
age and efflorescence. The sensibility may be either 
pleasure or pain. To desire money or fame or pleas- 
ure, is nothing else than choosing them as motives. To 
love a friend is to elect him as an object of self-devo- 
tion. Parents love their children, they devote them- 
selves to their children, to labor and sacrifice for them ; 
but the wayward son may make a happy love impossible. 
To love God supremely is to make him the object of com- 
plete self-consecration ; the joy of that love is the spon- 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE IO9 

taneous sensibility which follows the supreme choice. 
That which does not contain the element of chosen self- 
devotion is not love. The characteristic quality and the 
measure of love is self-sacrifice. "God so loved the 
world that he gave his Son." " Hereby perceive we the 
love of God, because he laid down his life for us." To 
desire an object for the purpose of self-gratification, is 
not love. Admiration is not love. No mere stirring of 
emotion, no matter what that emotion may be, is love. 
A life of heroic goodness excites general admiration ; 
few persons love such a life. 

an. Choice Without a Motive. 

"The power to choose is not a power to choose with- 
out a motive." 1 This must of course be true, for a mo- 
tive is either something which has been chosen, or some- 
thing presented as an object of possible choice. It is 
surely true that the mind cannot choose without an object 
of choice. But President Porter meant something more 
than this identical proposition. We find here the fallacy 
already discussed, that a motive is a thing of potency 
which has power to lay hold of the will and move it to 
the act of choice. 

212.. Motives as Influences. 

" Motives are not causes which compel the will, 
but influences which persuade it." 2 If by motive 
Dr. Strong means something external to the mind, 
or something conceived as external, we have here 
again the same error as in the preceding paragraph ; 

1 Pres. Porter, "Elements of Moral Science," p. 80. 

2 Dr. A. H. Strong, "Systematic Theology," p. 258. 



110 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



a motive is counted a thing of potency which lays hold 
upon the mind with more or less of control. But an ex- 
ternal object of choice is neither a cause nor an influ- 
ence ; it is an object of knowledge, but absolutely inert. 

213. Sensibilities as Motives. 

" Motives=sensibilities." 1 Here we find motive used 
in another sense, not as an object chosen, or which may 
be chosen, but as signifying an excited condition of the 
sensibilities. It may be granted that an object, the idea 
of which held in the mind awakens no sensibility, will 
not become a motive. No man will choose that in which 
he feels absolutely no interest. But the proposition that 
motives are nothing else than excited sensibilities, is a 
misleading half-truth. The subjective element implies 
the objective also, and in the act of choice, the will elects 
the objective motive and not the subjective sensibility. 
The man who chooses duty as the alternative of pleasure, 
consciously elects duty objectively considered, rather than 
the pleasure arising from the doing of the duty. Other- 
wise the choice of duty and of pleasure would be identi- 
cal. The hero who risks his life to rescue the ship- 
wrecked sailor, chooses the saving of the poor sufferer 
and not the gratification of an emotion. If this is not so, 
* all motives are one and the same, namely, the indulgence 
of pleasurable sensibility, or the avoidance of the oppo- 
site. Then, since only one motive is possible, virtue and 
vice become identical in principle, and the distinction 
between virtue and vice ceases to exist ; all human con- 
duct is resolved into varieties of self-pleasing, and no 
place is left for moral science. 

1 Harris, " Philos. Basis of Theism," quoted by Dr. Strong. 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE I I I 



214. The Will as an Expression of the Existing Self. 

"The will can never be anything else than an expres- 
sion of the actually existing self at the moment of voli- 
tion." 1 By this doctrine all choices are brought into the 
chain of necessary causation ; the power of real choice is 
j denied ; the will expresses that which is, and cannot do 
otherwise. The existing self is a fact with no alterna- 
tive. This principle would render impossible the begin- 
ning of sin, or the recovery of the sinner, except by pro- 
cesses of corruption or of restoration acting outside of 
the will. According to this doctrine, virtue and sin have 
nothing to do with the activities of the will, but belong 
solely to the conditions which the will expresses. Virtue 
and sin pertain, then, to involuntary states. With this 
conception of the will, it is not easy to see how a man 
who finds himself in an evil condition shall set to work to 
recover himself ; all that will can do is to express the ex- 
isting evil. 

215. Reasoning in a Circle. 

" Motives are not causes which compel the will, but 
influences which persuade it. The power of these mo- 
tives, however, is proportionate to the power of will 
which has entered into them and made them what they 
are." 2 What is this but reasoning in a circle? Motives 
influence the will ; the power to influence the will is 
given by the will. The bellows drives the windmill ; the 
windmill works the bellows. It is a strong man that can 
lift himself by his boot-straps. A "perpetual motion" 
is no more rational in morals than in physics. 

1 Pres. E. G. Robinson, " Principles and Practice of Morality, " p. 119. 
2 Dr. A. H. Strong, "Systematic Theology," p. 258. 



112 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



216. Will and Sensibility. 

What is the relation of sensibility to the action of 
will ? It has been affirmed that the faculty of choice is 
dominated by no other faculty. This must be insisted 
upon, otherwise the existence of the will as a distinct 
faculty can hardly be vindicated. But the denial of sub- 
ordination on the part of will, is not a denial of relation- 
ship of will and sensibility. Every faculty co-operates 
with every other. What is the relation of sensibility to 
choice ? 

217. Without Sensibility, no Choice. 

It may be admitted without question that in the com- 
plete absence of sensibility there will be no action of 
will. I shall not choose that which to me is a matter of 
absolute indifference. Absolute deadness or torpor of 
sensibility must also mean inaction of will. 

218. Sensibility a Stimulus to all Faculties. 

The sensibilities stimulate all other mental activities. 
Under the stimulus of excited emotion, reason, memory, 
imagination, conscience, act with greatly increased en- 
ergy ; the entire spiritual being is stirred and spurred 
to intensest action and effort. In this general stimulus, 
will receives its share ; it acts with a promptness and 
energy corresponding to the general excitement. But 
this stimulus to action must be carefully distinguished 
from a determination of the kind of action. 

219. Sensibility as an Object of Choice. 

A pleasant excitement of sensibility may become itself 
an object of choice. This is often true in the case of 



CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE I 1 3 



bodily pleasures. The enjoyment of eating and drinking 
is made an end in itself; men labor and spend to gain 
agreeable sensations. But in these cases pleasure be- 
comes a quasi objective motive ; it is not an antecedent 
pleasure determining the choice, but a pleasure which, as 
an objective matter, follows the choosing. 

220. Sensibility, as a Motive, a Future Sensibility. 

A choice always looks to the future. Not that which 
is, but that which may be, must be chosen. That which 
now is, as a thing now existent, cannot be made an object 
of choice ; that which is, already exists, and there is no 
place for an alternative. Therefore excited sensibility, 
as an existing state, cannot become a motive. The 
future continuance of a present pleasure may be an ob- 
ject of choice. 

221. The Abyss of Moral Philosophy. 

The abyss into which, in this place, so many plunge 
with infinite zest, and into which it is death to fall, is the 
analysis of every motive with its idiopathic sensibility, 
into some form of pleasure. This analysis is a wonderful 
psychological alchemy ; throw what you will into its 
crucible, it comes out enjoyment. Obedience to the 
stern call of duty, in this alchemy, is only a form of self- 
gratification. Self-denial, self-abnegation even unto 
death, for the good of others, is only a subtile form of 
self-indulgence. At this point of the discussion there is 
more need of conscience than of analysis. Here is the 
place for indignant mockery at this calling of good, evil, 
and of evil, good. It must be affirmed as the ultimate 
testimony of consciousness, that the will can choose, and 

H 



I 14 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



does choose, right, duty, and self-denial, as such, and not 
as a "more highly evolved" form of self-gratification. 
Conscience distinguishes sharply between right and 
agreeableness, and denies utterly that potency of obliga- 
tion means simply superior enjoyment. If this is not so, 
the Christian requirement of self-denial is an empty and 
delusive form of words and nothing more. 



CHAPTER VII 



CONCERNING RIGHT 

222. The Grounds of Right. 

The ground of moral distinctions can be found no- 
where except in the facts and verities of real being ; first 
of all, in the eternal, unchangeable nature of God ; 
secondly, in the nature of man and of other beings made 
in the likeness of God ; thirdly, in a subordinate way, in 
the nature of things created with properties and forces 
harmonious with the nature of moral beings. Right and 
wrong are what they are because God is what he is, be- 
cause man is what he is, and because the universe is what 
it is. These three grounds agree and are one, because 
God made man and the universe in harmony with him- 
self. Ideas of obligation and right have their origin in 
the intuitive action of conscience, in the clear beholding 
by the moral faculty of that which is eternally true. The 
conditions under which these ideas arise are those which 
awaken conscience to action, that is, the recognition of 
authority expressed in and by a rule of conduct. 

223. The Idea of Right — Definition. 

Right, in its broad, general sense, or in its special, 
ethical sense, is conformity to a rule or standard. That 
is right which agrees with the pattern, standard, or rule 
which represents perfection ; wrong is non-conformity. 
The wrong may be merely imperfection, or it may be 
moral obliquity and guilt, but in either case the idea of 

115 



u6 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



right and of wrong is the same. The rule of conduct 
may be sharp and positive, as in statute law ; it may be 
less exact, as in usage and precedent ; it may be yet 
more indefinite, as in a certain consensus of public senti- 
ment and popular feeling. In its strict ethical sense, 
right is intentional conformity to the moral law. 

224. The Scope of the Idea of Right. 

Since right is conformity to a rule of right, the idea of 
right must be co-extensive with the standard. The rule 
of right measures the meaning of right. That which the 
civil law requires, is legally right ; that which conforms 
to the sentiments and usages of good society, is socially 
right ; that which agrees with the natural functions and 
activities of the human organism, is hygienically right. 
That is morally right, right in the highest sense, which 
conforms to God's moral will, the moral law, that su- 
preme standard by which the conduct and characters 
of all men must be judged. 

225. The Rule of Right Found in God. 

In ethical discussion the crucial point is the standard 
of right. Touching this essential matter writers upon 
moral science have shown a singular diversity of judg- 
ment. The doctrine here presented is that the moral 
law, as already defined, is the will of God revealed for 
the government of men. If any one prefers to say that 
the nature of God, rather than the will of God, is the 
standard, let him use that form of expression. But we 
know the nature of God only as it is revealed in his will. 
Will rather than nature is expressed in preceptive 
form. The perfect Exemplar said, " I came to do the 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



117 



will of him that sent me." It seems more suitable and 
more definite to say, the will of God is the rule of right. 
The moral standard of being and of life, for man, is found 
in the nature and will of the Creator. We must accept 
no lower standard. 

226. Objection— Will Arbitrary and Changeable. 

The one weighty objection to the doctrine that the 
moral law is God's will, derives all its force from a radi- 
cally inadequate conception of the divine will. It is de- 
clared that this definition renders right and wrong an 
arbitrary thing, created by a word and liable to instant 
change and reversal. When we consider that the will of 
God has expressed itself in the moral nature of man and 
in the constitution of the universe, as well as in the Dec- 
alogue and the Sermon on the Mount, and that a change 
in the divine will involves a change in God's nature and 
a corresponding change in all created beings and things, 
it becomes manifest that this objection is based upon a 
misconception. The will of God is the stability of the 
universe ; matter has no other basis of unchangeable- 
ness. A change of the divine will is inconceivable in 
rational thought. 

227. The Being of God the Archetype of Man's Being. 

In the holy Scriptures we read, " God created man in 
his own image ; in the image of God created he him." 
The being of the Creator was the pattern of man's being. 
The ideal and perfection of man's moral nature is found, 
therefore, in likeness to God. From this it follows, of 
necessity, that the divine will is the supreme rule of 
right and the standard of perfection. 



n8 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



228. God Central and Supreme, 

If there is a living God, the Creator of all things, it is 
manifest that he must be central and supreme in the uni- 
verse. In every theory of morals also, as in every man's 
life, he must be supreme. In maintaining that the 
nature of God is the ultimate ground of moral distinc- 
tions, and his will the supreme law of right, we reverently 
accord to him that central place. He is the " fountain 
of law." There is no rational middle ground between 
the first place and no place. Writers on morals, and 
not atheists, often give to the Creator only an incidental 
place in their philosophy. Of his own theoretical prin- 
ciples, Dr. Hickok says, they " find their ethical ground 
and validity independently of the considerations of God's 
being." On the other hand, it is here taught that God 
holds that place in moral philosophy which the sun holds 
in the solar system ; without the sun and without God 
there is neither unity nor cohesion ; the elements fall in 
pieces. 

229. The Testimony of Scripture. 

The holy Scriptures everywhere press upon men the 
law of God's will and that only. In the primal test and 
transgression in Eden, the will of God emerges as the 
sole rule of conduct for man. The divine will was pro- 
claimed in words of thunder from Sinai and graven on 
tablets of stone. The Lord Jesus came to do his 
Father's will. When Jesus says, " Be ye perfect, even 
as your Father in heaven is perfect," he makes God the 
standard of perfection. He is counted great in the 
kingdom of heaven, who keeps and teaches the divine 
commandments, even the least. " Not my will, but 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



119 



thine be done," represents the supreme example of 
Christ, and the supreme Christian virtue. " To obey is 
better than sacrifice " ; " rebellion is as the sin of witch- 
craft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry." 

230. Other Standards Fragments of the Divine Will. 

That the divine will, revealed in many ways, constitutes 
the moral law, is also indicated by the fact that every 
other proposed standard, which shows any truth or use- 
fulness, is a partial and fragmentary expression of that 
will. The proof of this is found in illustrative examples. 

231. Consequences of Conduct as a Rule of Right. 

Right doing promotes happiness. God has so made 
man that welfare naturally follows virtue. No special 
interposition of divine working is necessary for reward- 
ing the good or punishing the wicked. This automatic 
working out of good and ill being seen, and God's re- 
lationship to this law being forgotten, fitness to promote 
happiness comes to be accounted the rule and standard 
of right — and right for the reason that happiness is pro- 
moted, and for no other reason. But this relationship of 
conduct to happiness is a partial expression of God's 
will. This fragmentary declaration of the divine mind, 
a torn leaf from the book of the law, is set up as an in- 
dependent standard and rule of right. 

232. Ideal Human Nature as a Rule of Right. 

Dr. Hickok affirms that the supreme standard of right 
is the " spirit's own excellency." A man may "do 
that and only that which is due to his spirit's ex- 
cellency." If there is any truth or value in this concep- 



120 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

tion, it is found in the fact that man's own nature is a 
partial expression of the Creator's will. What is the 
spirit's excellency but the attributes of a being made in 
the divine likeness? Again a part, a fragment, a par- 
tially defaced inscription, is taken as the entire moral 
law. 

233. The «« Nature of Things "asa Standard of Right. 

One school of moral philosophy finds the standard of 
right in the " nature of things." If this expression signi- 
fies the nature of the material universe, or the nature of 
moral beings plus the universe, this also, like the pre- 
vious case, is a partial revealing of the divine mind. Or, 
if it is intended to signify a denial of any objective 
standard, then it is a falling back upon the bare unin- 
structed sentiments or instincts of human nature as the 
sole and sufficient law of right. But unperverted human 
sentiments express, in a certain measure, the mind of 
the Creator. Illustrations might easily be multiplied. 
Every proposed rule of right, aside from the divine will, 
is nothing else than a fragment of that will, torn from its 
normal relationships and set up as a law independent of 
God. It is better and more scientific to say that the one 
comprehensive will of the Creator, expressed in many 
ways, is the one universal rule of obligation. 

234. God's Will the Only Practical Moral Law. 

It is noteworthy that when men come to practical 
morals and to the construction of ethical codes, every 
Christian thinker finds himself compelled to take the 
divine commandments as the practical rule of duty. No 
other law is definite ; no other law is sufficiently compre- 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



121 



hensive ; no other carries with it force of obligation ; 
no other can stand for a moment in the presence of 
this ; they fall before it as Dagon before the ark of 
the covenant. And they who will not have God as 
the fountain of law, find themselves compelled to ac- 
cept him as the administrator of the law and the prac- 
tical Lawgiver. 

235. Positive Commands. 

Some most imperative duties are enjoined by no law 
which can be deduced from the nature of man or of 
things. Forms of worship and works of direct service 
toward God are matters of positive commandment. The 
mission of Moses to Pharaoh ; the ritual of worship en- 
joined upon the Hebrews ; the call of Christ to his apos- 
tles ; the Great Commission, " Go, teach all nations " ; 
the appointment of Baptism and the Memorial Supper, 
these duties could not be deduced from anything natu- 
ral. But when God has spoken and enjoined them, con- 
science instantly recognizes the obligation as supreme. 
When positive commands have vindicated themselves to 
the mind as being the sure will of God, they at once are 
accounted as outranking nature. So the word came to 
Abraham, "Take now thy son, thine only son, Isaac" ; 
so Paul went "bound in the Spirit" to Jerusalem, un- 
derstanding that it might be going to his death ; so the 
"secret whisper" comes to many a young man calling 
him to the foreign mission field, and conscience responds 
to the word as supreme above nature or sentiment. 
These things indicate that conscience counts the will of 
God as the rule of duty. And to deny positive com- 
mands is to deny the Christian religion. 



122 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



236. The Theory of Hobbes. 

Thomas Hobbes (1 588-1679) taught that civil statutes 
are at once the ground and the standard of all right. 
The idea of right and duty, according to Hobbes, is the 
product of the civil law. Nothing is either just or un- 
just till the law has declared it so. Men are naturally 
hostile and dangerous to each other, but they must needs 
live together, and laws are made and penalties enforced 
to defend men from their fellows. The only right is that 
which the civil law creates, and that upon which the law 
visits pains and penalties is the only wrong. The only 
duty which a man owes is obedience to his sovereign. 
There is nothing behind or above the king's authority. 

237. Objections to Hobbes' Theory. 

This theory of Hobbes deserves little attention except 
as a curious philosophic fossil. If there were no moral 
faculty, law could no more gender the idea of right than 
a candle could give rise to the idea of light in the mind 
of a man born blind. Fines and imprisonments, the rack 
and the fagot, excite fear and hatred, but they show no 
tendency to awaken a sense of obligation. The idea of 
right and the laws which kings have made, have waged 
incessant warfare. Rule by kings is apt to awaken a 
sense of wrong and injustice. It is not possible that the 
sense of obligation should be in conflict with that rule of 
right which the mind recognizes as true, and from which 
it derives its existence. 

238. Herbert Spencer's Theory. 

Herbert Spencer (b. 1820) says, "The happiness or 
misery caused by it, are ultimate standards by which all 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



123 



men judge of behavior." This doctrine touching the 
standard of right in conduct is not peculiar to Mr. Spen- 
cer. But his account of the genesis of moral ideas is 
recent and peculiar. His theory of morals, from first to 
last, is based upon his doctrine that man has been slowly 
"evolved" from the lower and the lowest forms of ani- 
mal life. Pari passu, with the evolution of physical 
structure and function, there was, he says, an evolution 
of conduct. Activity was at first the product of nervous 
excitation ; by and by, in the progress of evolution, action 
became conscious and intelligent. All activity had for 
its object the conservation of life and the continuance of 
the species. As conduct became more highly evolved 
it was seen that the welfare of the individual was related 
to the welfare of other like individuals, and that by a 
certain regard for others each one best promoted his own 
happiness. Men learned that welfare was best secured 
by giving preference to remote rather than present pleas- 
ure, and by sharing enjoyments in place of greedily 
monopolizing them. Thus ideas of equality, justice, and 
benevolence arose ; there was a blending of egoism and 
of altruism, of selfishness and self-sacrifice ; but, he says, 
always and forever the ultimate aim of all action is, and 
must needs be, the promotion and conservation of 
one's own happiness, and that benevolence and self- 
sacrifice are admissible only as a means to more highly 
evolved enjoyment for one's self. The imperative ele- 
ment in morals, the conviction of obligation, he explains 
as the product of penalties inflicted for disobedience to 
law. In this item he goes back to Hobbes. But as was 
said before, law and penalty cannot develop moral ideas 
where there is no moral faculty. 



124 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

239. Stands or Falls with" " Evolution." 

Spencer's theory is an attempt to analyze a hypotheti- 
cal evolution of man up from a spontaneous generation 
in reeking "ooze." But if there was no spontaneous 
generation of life, and no evolution of man from beasts 
and from slime, then this theory is a useless effort to 
analyze a process which did not take place. In the con- 
fessed absence of the slightest scientific proof, we must 
count the doctrine of evolution, in this extreme form, 
the most chimerical hypothesis to which the vagaries of 
modern thought have given birth. Spencer's theory of 
morals cannot have a better foundation. 

240. Facts Fundamental to Evolution. 

As its necessary basis, the doctrine of evolution in its 
complete form assumes two facts — assumes them not only 
as conceivable and possible, but as actual and historic ; 
first, the spontaneous generation of living creatures from 
lifeless matter ; second, the transmutation of one species 
into another ; that lower forms of life may change into 
the higher, that fish may change into bird and beast, and 
beast to man. If either of these assumed facts be not 
true and actual, evolution falls for the lack of founda- 
tion. But if both were proved, it would do no more 
than indicate the possibility of evolution in the case of 
man. But the very friends and advocates of the hy- 
pothesis admit that neither spontaneous generation nor 
transmutation of species has any scientific basis. 

241. Huxley and Spontaneous Generation. 

Thomas H. Huxley, the prince of evolutionists, affirms 
that in his opinion, Pasteur's experiments gave the death- 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



125 



stroke to belief in the spontaneous generation of life. 
"For my own part," he says, "I conceive that with the 
particulars of M. Pasteur's experiments before us, we can- 
not fail to arrive at his conclusions, and the doctrine of 
the spontaneous generation of life has received a final 
coup de grace." 

242. Huxley on Transmutation of Species. 

Mr. Huxley admits and declares that no attempt to 
modify species has been successful to the extent of form- 
ing a new species ; that geology furnishes no proof that 
this has taken place in the past ; and that indications 
given by geology all point in the opposite direction. He 
says, "It is admitted on all hands that, at present, so far 
as experiments have gone, it has not been found possi- 
ble to produce this complete physiological divergence," 
that is, the formation of distinct species, " by selective 
breeding." "So far as we have gone yet with our 
breeding, we have not produced from common stock 
two breeds which are not more or less fertile with one 
another. I do not know that there is a single fact which 
would justify any one in saying that any degree of steril- 
ity has been observed between breeds absolutely known 
to have been produced by selective breeding from a 
common stock." 

243. The Testimony of Geology. 

Having given this testimony concerning the results of 
experiments and experience with living species, Mr. 
Huxley declares that geologic investigations give no sup- 
port to the doctrine of the transmutations of species. 
He says : 



126 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



What does an impartial survey of the positively ascertained 
truths of paleontology testify in relation to the common doctrine 
of progressive modification, which supposes that modification to 
have taken place by a necessary progress from more or less em- 
bryonic forms, or from more or less generalized types, within the 
limits of the period represented by the fossiliferous rocks ? It 
negatives this doctrine, for it either shows us no evidence of such 
modification, or demonstrates such modifications as have occurred 
to have been very slight ; and as to the nature of that modifica- 
tion, it yields no evidence whatsoever that the earlier members of 
any long-continued group were more generalized in structure 
than the later ones. . . Contrariwise, any admissible hypothesis 
of progressive modification must be compatible with persistence 
without progression through indefinite periods. — Lay Sermons. 

Our acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis must be provi- 
sional so long as one link in the chain of evidence is wanting ; and 
so long as all the animals and plants produced by selective breed- 
ing from a common stock are fertile with one another, that link 
will be wanting. 

It would seem from this statement of the chief of the 
evolutionists, that the first link of the chain of evidence 
has not yet been found. Professor Tyndall sums up the 
case in this statement of a general principle: " Without 
verification a theoretic conception is a mere figment of 
the intellect." From Mr. Huxley's admissions it appears 
that Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics" is a hypothesis in 
explanation of a "mere figment of the intellect." This 
is not science but profitless mental gymnastics. 

244. Current Theories of Right. 

Theories of right, rival or antagonistic to that which 
is maintained in this treatise, may be divided into two 
classes : first, those which find the standard of right in 
some form or grade of utility ; second, those which find 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



12/ 



the ultimate rule of right in man's own moral sentiments, 
which denying any and all objective standards, attribute 
to human nature certain moral sentiments, instinct or 
intuitions, which constitute the court of last appeal in 
questions touching right and wrong. These two classes 
of theories must now be considered. 

245. Theories of Utility. 

Theories of right which find the standard of right in 
tendency to promote some kind of welfare, span the en- 
tire scale of human w r eal or woe. But they all agree in 
this, that the highest good is pleasant sensibility ; that 
this pleasant sensibility is the supreme object of choice 
and endeavor ; and the ultimate test of the moral quality 
of conduct is its fitness or tendency to promote enjoy- 
able feeling. This utility may signify pleasure in the 
debased Epicurean sense ; it may be the higher grade 
of enjoyment expressed by the word happiness ; the 
idea of happiness may be disguised under the term well- 
being ; the happiness may be extended to include not 
only the individual actor, but the entire human race, or 
" being in general " ; it may be explained to signify perma- 
nent rather than present and transient enjoyment ; that 
permanent enjoyment maybe exalted to mean blessedness 
for evermore. These theories stand, all of them, opposed 
to the doctrine that the idea of right is logically, morally, 
and scientifically distinct from tendency to promote 
good feeling. 

246. The Argument for Utilitarianism. 

The strong defense of all those theories of right which 
find their standard in tendency to promote happiness, is 



128 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



briefly this : enjoyment is of necessity the aim and end 
of all intelligent action ; intelligent beings cannot do 
otherwise than choose that which is most pleasurable ; 
happiness is the one supreme good, and nothing else can 
be of value except as it tends to promote happiness ; 
if a man chooses virtue rather than vice, it is because in 
this he finds more enjoyment. 

247. Statement of Mr. David Metcalf. 

No writer has stated the utilitarian argument more 
acutely than Mr. Metcalf. 1 He says : 

The two facts, that desire of happiness comprehends all possible 
subjective motive, and that happiness is the only possible object 
of the voluntary action of voluntary beings, are essential to the 
basis of moral obligation, and constitute the basis in the soul of 
man for moral obligation. . . Most evidently right is a source 
of happiness and must be so regarded or it could not be desired. 
Therefore nothing, happiness alone excepted, can be desired, 
loved, sought after or practised, which is not desired for the sake 
of resulting happiness. . . What is a desire of the right rather 
than the wrong in moral action but an involuntary preference of 
the pleasure known to be inseparably connected with right moral 
action ? . . If desire of right leads to doing right, this doing 
right will gratify that desire, and this gratification will' be some 
degree of happiness. . . Should it be said that we can desire to 
do right for the sake of glorifying God, then to glorify God would 
be to us a source of happiness. To glorify God from a desire to 
glorify him, and to take pleasure, delight, or happiness in promot- 
ing his glory are one and the same thing. And so of every other 
action. 

Let these statements be held in mind for a little while. 
They must be referred to again. 

1 " An Inquiry into the Nature, Foundation, and Extent of Moral Ob- 
ligation. ' ' 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



129 



248. President Edwards' Argument. 

President Edwards urges, with manifold repetitions, 
that agreeableness in the object chosen is that on account 
of which the object is chosen, and cannot be otherwise 
than chosen. For if the object chosen were not the 
most agreeable, then would something else be chosen 
more agreeable. The fallacy in this argument was 
pointed out in the discussion of motives. By a confu- 
sion of terms an elect motive is conceived as still before 
the mind as an object of possible choice. Edwards him- 
self says, without perceiving the bearing of the admission : 
"An appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind 
and the mind's preferring or choosing, seem hardly to 
be properly and perfectly distinct." 

249. Mr. Metcalf's Fatal Admission. 

By pointing out that agreeableness and desire repre- 
sent the action of the will, Edwards gave the clue to his 
own fallacy. Mr. Metcalf guards this point of his argu- 
ment by accounting the preference for the chosen object 
to be an involuntary preference. He saves his logic, 
but at what dreadful cost. " What is a desire of the 
right," he asks, "rather than the wrong, but an involun- 
tary preference of the pleasure known to be inseparably 
connected with right moral action?" He makes the 
desire of the right to be an involuntary preference for a 
certain kind of pleasure. Desire for the wrong must be 
an equally involuntary preference for another kind of 
pleasure. And a man cannot do otherwise than choose 
and follow this involuntarily preferred pleasure. To 
maintain his theory he eliminates entirely the voluntary 

element from human conduct. Wickedness in man is 

1 



I30 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



as involuntary as fierceness in a tiger, and gentleness in 
a lamb is as virtuous as heroic self-sacrifice in a Christian 
martyr. 

250. The Idea of Right and of Utility Distinct. 

Against every form of the utilitarian theory it is here 
affirmed that the idea of right and the idea of utility, 
advantage, pleasure, or happiness, are not only distinct 
but generically unlike. They are so unlike that a man can- 
not make happiness his supreme motive and at the same 
time make right his choice. The conceptions are mu- 
tually exclusive ; the choice of the one as a supreme 
motive, is of necessity a rejection of the other. It is im- 
possible to seek for pleasure as a supreme obligation. 
To seek for happiness as a duty, is not to seek for happi- 
ness as the aim and end, but the doing of the duty. 
Any logical process which leads to the conclusion that 
love and selfishness, self-indulgence and self-abnegation, 
the love of right and hunger for titillated sensibility, are 
at the core one and the same, is by this very conclusion 
branded as a patent fallacy. If choosing right be noth- 
ing else than seeking pleasure, and if choosing evil be 
the same, then virtue and vice are not opposites but in 
principle the same. Such a moral philosophy is suicidal ; 
it is not a philosophy of morals but of ways and means 
for procuring pleasure. 

251. Utilitarianism and Selfishness. 

It is impossible to disguise the manifest flavor of self- 
ishness in a life whose supreme motive is enjoyment. 
We may cloak the selfishness by putting forward the 
good of others as the means by which that enjoyment is 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



131 



to be gained, but so long as the real object sought is 
one's own pleasure, the selfishness remains. Let this 
principle of seeking enjoyment for one's self be expressed 
in plain words in social life, and at once it is felt to be 
offensive and base. The question is not whether an un- 
selfish life finds its fitting reward of happiness, but 
whether the real and only possible motive is that reward. 

252. Suggestive Illustrations. 

Illustrations have not seldom the force of logical ar- 
guments. In heroic action the thought of pleasure 
drops out of consciousness. The wean* mother walks 
the floor through the long night to soothe the pains of 
her wailing child ; is her real motive to get enjoyment 
for herself? Regulus before the Roman senate urges 
that he himself be sent back to the Carthaginians, to 
certain torture and death — was that his method of seek- 
ing pleasure ? A fireman rescues a child from a burn- 
ing house and goes through life disfigured and maimed 
as the price of his generous daring ; the mother can 
never forget her gratitude, nor sufficiently express her 
thankfulness by words or deeds — is all this on her part 
and on his a mere matter of self-pleasing? " O judg- 
ment, thou art fled to brutish beasts, and men have lost 
their reason." If enjoyment is the sole possible motive, 
that prudent but honest fireman should say frankly to 
the grateful mother : "There is no cause for gratitude on 
your part ; I was only seeking my own enjoyment ; a 
person constituted like myself could not do otherwise ; 
you may pay me for my work and trouble, if you please " ; 
that is all the case calls for. She pays him, takes a re- 
ceipt, and the transaction is ended ; henceforth he is no 



132 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



more to her than the tramp who clears the sidewalk and 
takes his pay in cold victuals. Is this the meaning of 
heroism and self-sacrifice ? Of our Lord it is written, 
"Even Christ pleased not himself" In the crucible of 
this new analysis this declaration becomes, It pleased 
Christ more not to please himself than to please himself ; 
with him the not pleasing himself was the intensest self- 
pleasing. 

253. Brutus and his Sons. 

Livy relates that Brutus sitting as judge condemned 
his own sons to death — and the historian remarks that as 
Brutus pronounced the sentence his face was a sight to 
see, the tenderness of the father struggling with the sense 
of justice and duty in the judge. It is a wonder-working 
analysis that makes the father sentence his sons to death, 
not for the public weal, but for his own enjoyment ! 

254. Utilitarianism Counts Rectitude Inferior. 

Every form of the utilitarian theory gives rectitude, 
as rectitude, an inferior place. Rectitude is counted of 
value only as a means of gaining something else. Con- 
science and the Scriptures agree in placing rectitude first. 
" He that loveth his life," that is, puts enjoyment first, 
"shall lose it," even the enjoyment which he seeks; 
"but he that hateth his life," that is, leaves enjoyment 
out of account and chooses God's will only, "shall keep 
it," even the enjoyment which he rejected as a motive. 

255. Utilitarianism Irreligious. 

This does not mean that all who hold utilitarian doc- 
trine are practically irreligious and undevout. But 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



133 



every form of the utilitarian theory, consistently held, 
displaces God from his central and supreme place in 
man's love and life. Utilitarianism is essentially irre- 
ligious. Whoever loves God as a means to something 
else, namely happiness, gives him the second place ; he 
does not so much love God as he loves that which he 
hopes to gain by means of God. It is well that with 
some men there is a chasm between their philosophy 
and their life. 

256. The Tendency of Utilitarianism. 

The element of evil in utilitarianism is seen in its 
practical tendency toward degeneracy in morals. Fu- 
ture and eternal welfare insensibly gives place to present 
and transient happiness ; calm and substantial happiness 
cannot maintain itself against more potent pleasures ; 
and in minds wedded to pleasure, enjoyment surely 
gravitates toward sensuous, if not sensual, delights. No 
moral code, however excellent, starting with the prin- 
ciple that enjoyment is the supreme and only motive, 
and that tendency to promote enjoyment is the standard 
of right, can save itself from this practical degeneracy, 
except by inconsistency in the holding. 

257. Epicurus and Epicureanism. 

Epicurus taught in the first place that God does not 
concern himself with the affairs of men, and then that 
the feelings are the test of all ethical truth. But he 
said : 

When we say that pleasure is the end of life, we do not mean 
the pleasure of the debauchee, or the sensualist, as some from 
ignorance or malignity represent, but freedom of the body from 



134 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



pain, and of the soul from anxiety. For it is not continuous 
drinkings and revelings, nor the society of women, nor rare viands 
and other luxuries of the table, that constitute a pleasant life ; but 
sober contemplation that searches out the grounds of choice and 
avoidance, and banishes those chimeras which harass the mind. 

Epicurus himself lived a simple, abstemious, virtuous 
life ; he defined pleasure after the manner of a student 
and philosopher ; but neither his example nor his exhorta- 
tions could prevent the development of his doctrine in the 
direction of immorality. And his denial that God con- 
cerns himself with the affairs of men, eliminated the only 
element that could stay the descent toward evil. Epi- 
cureanism has become the synonym of sensual self-in- 
dulgence. 

258. The Antidote for Utilitarian Theories. 

The practical check to the tendency of utilitarian 
theories is found in that Christian teaching which empha- 
sizes the law and government of God. Philosophies are 
little understood or considered by the many, but every- 
where words of holy Scripture are pressed upon the 
minds of men, and every soul is summoned to stand and 
answer to the living God. And writers who make happi- 
ness the end and aim of all conduct, yet in practical 
ethics are constrained to assert the divine authority as 
supreme. Dr. Hickok's system of moral philosophy is 
a notable illustration. He unfolds a system which finds 
its " ethical ground and validity independently of con- 
siderations of God's being" ; his standard of right is 
" the spirit's own excellency and dignity." But in treat- 
ing of practical ethics he finds it necessary to introduce 
" a Being of absolute sovereignty, legislating and execut- 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



135 



ing in his own right." He admits that his theory of 
morals is not a sufficient basis for religion. He says : 
" Piety cannot be attained under the discipline of pure 
morality." " There is nothing here of the religious ca- 
pacity disciplined. Here is no love to sovereignty, no 
obedience for God's sake ; no reverence and confiding 
obedience ; no praise and thanksgiving ; no worship and 
reciprocal communion. All is in interest of humanity 
only, and nothing which brings humanity in communion 
with Divinity." "The sole constraint of piety is com- 
plete loyalty — the love of the Lord that is served and 
worshiped." "The whole moving influence of piety 
is love to God, and all the constraint of law upon it 
is solely regard for the will of the sovereign lawgiver." 
In this connection, Dr. Hickok affirms, "positive au- 
thority must be made especially prominent." This may 
stand as a sample. In actual life God and his authority 
must be recognized in spite of adverse theories. 

We may note in passing that if "sole regard for the 
will of the sovereign lawgiver" be possible in religion, 
then is the choice of something else than pleasant sensi- 
bility psychologically possible. 

259. Utility not a Guide in Right Doing. 

One important function of a law of right is to guide 
men in their moral choices before experience. For this 
necessary use all utilitarian rules of right are radically 
defective. Tendency to promote happiness cannot be 
known except by experience, and experience cannot be 
had till the choice of good or evil has been made, the 
moral act consummated, and the consequences felt. Such 
guidance comes too late. 



I36 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

260. Consequences Remote and not Discernible. 

The thought expressed in the preceding paragraph is 
emphasized by the fact that consequences, whether good 
or ill, are often very slow in their development. They 
are remote, obscure, and separate from their causes ; the 
results of diverse courses of conduct are intricately inter- 
woven and blended ; they are only partly experienced 
in this life ; the immediate consequence of wrong-doing 
may be pungent pleasure, the remediless ruin may be 
remote. Experience is not only insufficient, but brief 
experience is often utterly misleading. 

261. The Experience of Past Generations not Enough. 

It may, perhaps, be said that the experiences of past 
generations have already sufficiently shown the tendency 
of every kind of conduct. In some departments of 
knowledge there is a grain of truth in this. In some 
respects the later generations of men have advantages 
above the earlier. But in the highest moral concerns 
men learn little from the experiences of previous genera- 
tions ; moral attitudes and their consequences are too 
remotely and too subtilely connected. Consequences 
may be rewarding angels or a nemesis of wrath, but a 
sufficient guide they cannot be. 

262. If not a Guide, not the Standard of Right. 

If tendency to promote happiness be not a sufficient 
guide in moral conduct, may it not yet be the standard 
by which all conduct at the last must be judged ? This 
cannot be, for the rule of conduct cannot be one thing 
and the standard of right something else. That law 
which a man is bound by it oral obligation to obey, is. 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



137 



the law by which he must be judged ; and the law by 
which he must be judged is for him the standard of 
right. The will of God, expressing his own moral nature 
and man's moral constitution, wrought into the nature 
of things, and defined by positive precepts, is the rule of 
conduct and the final standard of right. Following this 
rule there is no need that a man perish in order to learn 
that the way is dangerous. 

263. Regard for Consequences, not a Moral Element. 

We have already seen that consequences cannot con- 
stitute a guide for conduct, nor the standard of right 
It is also true that regard for consequences has in it, 
strictly speaking, no moral element. Good men and 
bad men alike take account of consequences. There is 
surely no virtue in turning one's foot away from a recog- 
nized pest-house. What moral quality would the young 
man Joseph have shown if he had said, " I cannot do this 
thing, for surely an evil disease will cleave to me and 
consume my flesh," only this and nothing more. And 
the case is no different if the consequences to which re- 
gard be had are not expected to appear till a man shall 
enter upon the future life. Mere regard for consequences, 
here or hereafter, is prudence, and it may be a very 
selfish prudence. 

264. Happiness Attained Indirectly. 

That philosophy which teaches men to make happi- 
ness the object of supreme desire, would render happi- 
ness forever impossible. This principle explains the 
misery of the world. Happiness is won by choosing 
right without respect to happiness. Doubtless the Crea- 



I38 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

tor will permit no man to suffer ultimate loss by reason 
of obedience to him, but for this final reward he must 
be trusted. The government calls men to the battlefield, 
to risk limb and life in deadly strife ; the assurance of 
care for the sick and the maimed and of a pension for 
the widow and orphan, furnishes the suitable condition 
under which the patriotic heroism of the soldier may 
show itself In like manner does that government 
which is over all, give assurance that martyrs for right- 
eousness shall not suffer loss ; but blessedness is not the 
hireling's pay but the inheritance of faithful sons. " He 
that loveth his life shall lose it," expresses the pro- 
foundest philosophy. 

265. Subjective Standards of Right. 

The other class of theories antagonistic to that phi- 
losophy which finds the ultimate ground of moral dis- 
tinctions in the divine nature, and the standard of right 
for man in God's will, makes the standard of right a 
subjective matter — the moral instincts, sentiments, or 
notions of men. In a certain sense these theories make 
every man a law unto himself. 

266. Dr. Hickok's Theory. 

In his " Moral Science" Dr. Hickok affirms that the 
ultimate standard is the worthiness and dignity of every 
man's own spiritual being. Whatever agrees with the 
spirit's worthiness is right. But who shall estimate, 
grade, and define that worth and dignity ? Every man 
must needs do this for himself, otherwise at once an- 
other standard is introduced. This gives a sliding scale 
of morals, the most variable that can be imagined. To 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



139 



the prophet who walks with God, and whose faith em- 
braces immortality, the worthiness of his spiritual being 
has one significance ; to the Epicurean who says, " Let 
us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," the worth and 
dignity of man mean something very different. But for 
the Christian philosopher, for the savage, and for the de- 
bauchee, their own estimate of their worth and dignity 
is made the standard of right. 

267. Dr. Peabody's Theory. 

Dr. Andrew J. Peabody 1 says : " Fitness and unfitness 
are the ultimate ideas that are involved in the terms 
right and wrong." This in real significance is hardly 
distinguishable from Dr. Hickok's theory. The fitness 
or unfitness must have reference to such a being as a 
man counts himself to be, and under such and such 
circumstances. The standard proposed is within the 
man himself, and cannot rise above his own notions. 

268. The Practical Supplement. 

In this case, as with utilitarian theories, in practical 
morals the will of God is brought in to supplement the 
" spirit's worthiness," and the " fitness and unfitness," 
by declaring that which God accounts worthy and fit, 
and the supplement speaks with authority and super- 
sedes that which is supplemented. They who will not 
have God as sovereign, are constrained to receive him 
as magistrate — but the divine magistracy swallows up 
the subjective sovereignty, and becomes supreme. No 
rival can stand when brought face to face with the divine 
will. 



1 " Manual of Moral Philosophy." 



I4O INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

269. Right and Wrong " in the Nature of Things." 

Another theory, in essence like those already con- 
sidered but in statement more elusive, demands atten- 
tion. This is the theory of right and wrong grounded 
"in the nature of things." This is strongly stated and 
defended by Professor Joseph Haven. It is said that 
right and wrong have their ground, not in the nature of 
man, nor in the will of God, nor yet in the nature of God ; 
that the will of God does not in itself constitute a reason 
for doing or forbearing to do anything ; that whatever 
God commands, he commands because it is right apart 
from his will ; that God himself is under a law of right 
eternally existent apart from his own nature ; that what- 
ever is right, is right " in the nature of things " ; and 
whatever is wrong, is wrong "in the nature of things," 
entirely apart from any consideration of the will, charac- 
ter, nature, or existence of man or of God. Professor 
Haven goes so far in repudiating the authority of God, 
as to say, " Granting that the will of God is as is affirmed, 
what has that to do with my conduct? wherein and how 
does that place me under obligation to do what the 
Deity wills?" 

270. " Nature of Things " in the Obvious Sense. 

Understanding this phrase, the nature of things, in its 
most obvious sense, as meaning the nature or permanent 
constitution of the parts or elements of the material 
universe, we must say that there is no nature of things 
apart from the will of the Creator. Nature is what it is 
because God made it so. Moral distinctions which find 
their expression in the nature of things, have their ulti- 
mate ground in God, the creator of nature. 



CONCERNING RIGHT I4I 

271. His Language Unfortunate. 

The language used by Professor Haven would suggest 
a survival, or revival, of Manchaean Dualism. He says : 

Right and wrong are distinctions immutable and inherent in 
the nature of things. The}' are not the creations of expediency, 
nor of law ; nor yet do they originate in the divine character. 
They have no origin. They are as eternal as the throne of deity ; 
they are as immutable as God himself. 

The most obvious meaning of this language would im- 
ply the eternal, uncreated existence of things. And 
since these distinctions exist independent of God. and 
since God himself is accounted subject to this law inhe- 
rent in the nature of things, this nature of things is made 
sovereign and supreme over God. Does this signify 
Dualism? The author doubtless does not mean this. 
His language is unfortunate. 

272. His Intended Meaning. 

Professor Haven intended, doubtless, to deny the 
existence or possibility of any objective standard of 
right. By the nature of things he means the nature of 
actions. He intends to affirm that actions are right, not 
because they agree with any rule or standard, or on 
account of any relationship ; they are simply right or 
wrong in and of themselves, right or wrong without a 
reason. God recognizes actions as being what they are, 
and we must do the same ; and he stands related to this 
moral nature of actions just as do his creatures. The 
attempt to conceive clearly the sense of this language, 
to define sharply to the mind a moral quality apart from 
any rule or relationship, must of course be futile. This 
elusory property belongs to the nature of the theory. 



142 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



273. Real Significance of the Theory. 

The intention of those who talk of " right in the nature 
of things," seems to be to find a standard more immut- 
able than God and his will ; they succeed in setting up 
a standard absolutely subjective to the mind of man. It 
amounts to this, whatever agrees with one's own in- 
stincts, sentiments, or sensibilities, must without a reason 
be accounted right, binding alike upon man and upon 
God. A standard more subjective and illusory is in- 
conceivable. 

274. Objections— the Standard Subjective. 

The first objection to this theory of " right in the 
nature of things," is the fact that it is purely subjective. 
If this subjective standard be a man's own sentiments, 
right becomes merely a go-as-you-please in conduct Or 
if the theory implies an intuitive and infallible discern- 
ment of the moral qualities of actions, then we must deny 
that such infallible intuition is found in human nature. 
The diverse moral judgments which prevail among men 
prove that conscience does not intuitively discern the 
moral qualities of actions. 

275. Magistracy in Place of Sovereignty. 

This theory of right reduces the Creator of the universe 
from a sovereign to a magistrate and from a magistrate 
to a subject. God is represented as subject to a law 
existing apart from himself and above himself, as fully 
subject as is man. In his government he administers 
and enforces a law not his own. He is made a magis- 
trate without personal authority. By what right then 
does he assume to punish the disobedient? 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



H3 



276. Obedience not Due then to God. 

This theory transfers all moral authority from God to 
its imaginary subjective rule of right ; as Professor Haven 
boldly demands, " Granting that the will of Deity is as is 
affirmed, what has that to do with my conduct ? wherein 
, and how does that place me under obligation to do what 
the Deity wills ? " This dethronement is logically per- 
formed by setting up a superior authority. God be- 
comes merely a "primus inter pares" first and chief in 
the brotherhood of subjects. 

277. Destroys the Sense of Moral Obligation. 

This theory leads legitimately to decay in the sense 
of moral obligation. Duty exists between persons. We 
cannot feel obligated toward things, or to consequences. 
Let it be once fully accepted that we do not owe obedi- 
ence to God, but to an impersonal something, and the 
conviction of obligation will die an easy natural death 
by atrophy. 

278. Defense of " Right in the Nature of Things." 

It is said that if the nature and will of God be the 
ground and rule of right, " we have only to suppose the 
will of Deity to change, and what is now wrong becomes 
instantly right." " It follows also that had there been 
no divine law to establish the character of actions, all 
actions would have been alike indifferent." " If there 
is no standard of right but the law itself, there is no pro- 
priety or sense in speaking of God's law as just and 
good." "To say that his statutes are just and right, is 
to say that his statutes are his statutes." "If the law 
creates moral distinctions, how can the law itself possess 



144 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



moral character? " " For the same reason, we are shut 
out, on this principle, from attributing to Deity himself 
any moral character. One thing is as right as another 
for him ; everything is equally right, and strictly speak- 
ing nothing is, for him, either right or wrong." " If 
right and wrong depend ultimately upon the character 
of God, then we have only to suppose God to change, 
or to have been originally other than he is, and our 
duties and obligations change at once. Had he been 
precisely the reverse of what he is, he had still been, as 
now, the source of right, and his own character would 
have been as truly good and just, as it is now. This is 
virtually to rob him of all moral character." "It does 
not meet this objection to say that God is holy, holy by 
a necessity of his nature and can never be otherwise." 

279. Arguments Founded on Misconceptions. 

The entire group of objections given above seem to 
spring from misconceptions. The divine will is con- 
ceived as an arbitrary thing without relation to the 
nature of man or of the universe. Let it be understood 
that the will of God is nothing else than nature ; that is, 
that the will of God is first of all expressed in the nature 
of the universe and the moral nature of man, and then 
was revealed as a precept, and let it be considered that 
the divine will cannot be conceived as self-contradictory, 
commanding by precept that which it forbids in nature, 
and at once all these objections are seen to be futile. 

280, Objections Reducible to Two. 

Passing over the fundamental misconception of the 
divine will as arbitrary, and possibly self-contradictory, 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



H5 



we find the multiform objections cited above, reducible 
in principle to two : (1) The difficulty of conceiving that 
the distinction of right and wrong should not exist, or 
should be other than it now is ; (2) the supposed neces- 
sity of finding a standard by which to test the ultimate 
standard of right. 

281. A Change of Right Inconceivable. 

A change of right and wrong is inconceivable ; but 
why? Because, forsooth, that one can conceive that 
God should change, but cannot conceive that "the na- 
ture of things" should be other than it now is? Surely 
not for that reason, for the latter conception is easier 
than the former. But the idea of right is one of the ul- 
timate forms of human thought. We can no more rid 
ourselves of moral ideas, or change the form of those 
ideas, than we can put away or change our notions of 
time or space. Man can think only as man, nor can 
he conceive how he would think if he were not man. 
But this indestructibility of moral ideas proves nothing 
touching the standard of right ; it only shows that the 
Creator has made the moral nature of man an incor- 
ruptible witness for him. 

282. What, if God should Change ! 

The changes are rung upon this exclamatory question, 
What, if God should change ! We must then found 
morals upon a more immutable basis than the nature of 
God ; let us try the "nature of things." The nature of 
God, forsooth, might change, but the nature of things, 
or perhaps the nature of human thoughts, that is change- 
less. 

K 



I46 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

But if the question be pressed for an answer, What 
if God should change? the reply lies close at hand. 
(1) The problem is incapable of solution, for a change in 
the Creator logically involves a change in the creation ; 
hence, the Creator and all created beings and things be- 
ing changed, our present thought and knowledge must 
needs be invalidated, and science, philosophy, or specu- 
lation finds no place to rest a foot. (2) If God change, 
the creation remaining unchanged, the Creator is brought 
into conflict with the creature, and infinite contradiction, 
confusion, and chaos must ensue. If the Creator come 
into conflict with the creature, the creature must perish. 
(3) An infinite fiend would, doubtless, create finite fiends, 
and thus the Creator would still be the matrix and norm 
of the creature. But the supposition of an infinite fiend 
at the head of a universe of fiends, turns all moral con- 
ceptions into chaos and renders virtue or vice equally 
absurd. And this would be equally true whatever the 
standard of right. 

283. A Standard by which to Test the Standard. 

The second class of objections, that there must needs 
be a standard of right other than God, and back of God, 
or higher than God, in order to give moral character to 
God and his law, is a short and swift reductio ad ab- 
surdiim. There must then be an infinite series of stand- 
ards, or else we must stop at a standard which, being 
the ultimate authority with nothing higher to which it 
must conform, is neither good nor evil, a moral standard 
without moral character. But those who talk of right 
inherent in the nature of things, and of actions right or 
wrong in and of themselves, do not escape the phantom 



CONCERNING RIGHT 



147 



abyss which they have dug so deep. They say that to 
speak of God as being right, just, and holy in and of 
himself, is absurd. But of actions, Professor Haven 
says : "We mean to say that such and such acts of an 
intelligent, moral agent, whatever they may be, are in 
themselves, in their very nature, right or wrong." The 
theory laughs at itself. Who asks for a standard for the 
"imperial yard"? Is it something else than a yard, 
neither right nor wrong, because it is itself the standard 
and there is none beside ? 

284. The Genesis of the Theory. 

How shall we explain the genesis of this theory that 
the ultimate rule of right is found in the nature of 
things? God has spoken, and the universe is full of 
echoes, and men mistake the echoes for original voices 
and proceed to measure the actions of men and of God 
himself by these reverberations. 



CHAPTER VIII 



CONCERNING THE REVELATION OF THE RULE OF RIGHT 

285. One Law— Multiform Revelation. 

The will of God has been shown to be the supreme 
rule of conduct, the ultimate rule of right. This has 
authority ; this is highest ; this immutable. When this 
has been recognized as the divine will, conscience re- 
sponds with an instant sense of imperative obligation. 
But this one will is expressed in many ways. In the 
multiform expression of the one rule lies the only possi- 
ble unity in the many proposed standards of right. Men 
have taken some torn leaf of the divine revelation ; they 
have listened to some one lone echo of God's voice ; 
they have attributed some scant authority to these frag- 
ments of revelation, apart from God himself. In the 
recognition of one supreme authority, one will, one rule 
of right revealed in many ways is found the unity of 
Moral Philosophy. 

286. Revealed in Man's Own Nature. 

The moral law is revealed, first of all, in man's own 
moral nature. This is the primary and most funda- 
mental revelation. This comes closest home to con- 
sciousness. From this a man cannot escape. From 
this they never will be able to escape in all the future. 
This is the basis and point of departure for eveiy other 
manifestation of the divine will in whatever way that 
manifestation be made. 
148 



REVELATION OF THE RULE OF RIGHT 1 49 



287. The Testimony of Sacred Scripture. 

That the nature of man is a revelation of the divine 
will the Scriptures expressly declare. God created man 
in his own likeness. In the divine nature we find the 
ultimate ground of moral distinctions. In the nature of 
man, created in the divine likeness, we must find, there- 
fore, a secondary or derivative ground of the same moral 
principles. 

288. Scope of this Revelation in Man's Nature. 

The revelation of the rule of right, made through the 
nature of man, is broader than the moral faculty merely. 
Perfection includes the perfect normal condition and 
action of every faculty — of the moral faculties first and 
chiefly, and then of every other faculty in due measure 
and proportion. So far as we are able by consciousness, 
reflection, experience, or by any other source of knowl- 
edge, to form an ideal of our own being according to 
the Creator's idea, we read the revelation of the divine 
will made in our own being. 

289. The Rule of Right Expressed in the Nature of Things. 

In the second place, the rule of right is revealed 
through the material universe. The world of things is 
what the Creator pleased to make it. The world is a 
school and a workshop for the training of human facul- 
ties ; it is an opportunity and an agency for forming 
and testing moral character; it is also an automatic 
agency for rewarding right doing and punishing evil, for 
declaring by means of the consequences of conduct the 
law of right. Molecular vibrations on earth and in the 
stars, keep rhythmic time with the thunders of Sinai and 



1 50 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

the Sermon on the Mount. When the lover of pleasure 
finds his vice smitten with the loathsomeness of decay, 
he feels the pressure of the moral law written upon the 
nature of things. In the health, long life, and happiness 
promoted by temperance, faith, and charity, we have 
the Creator's will declared concerning such a life. But 
nature is not the law, but the page of stone upon which 
the finger of God has graven the law. 

290. The Law of Right Indicated in History. 

The will of God is revealed through the experiences of 
men. In the life of man we see the product of unseen 
spiritual agencies ; of beliefs, aspiration, character ; of 
spiritual impulses and forces coming whence man knows 
not. These combined influences and agencies work out 
the fortunes of men and of nations. Such courses of 
conduct, such modes of life, such beliefs, such elements 
of character as work out the decay of man and of hu- 
man welfare, are marked thereby as evil. 

291. Franklin's Testimony. 

Before the convention which framed the Federal Con- 
stitution, Benjamin Franklin arose and said: "I have 
lived a long time, and the longer I live the more con- 
vincing proof I see that God governs in the affairs of 
men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground with- 
out his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise 
without his aid? We have been assured in the sacred 
writings that except the Lord build the house, they labor 
in vain that build it. I firmly believe this." So much 
of truth have they who hold that tendency to promote 
happiness is the test of right and wrong. But it is not 



REVELATION OF THE RULE OF RIGHT 1 5 I 

history, but God manifest in history, that has the moral 
authority. And the moral teaching of history as read 
even by the most discerning is partial and fragmentary. 

292. The Rule of Right Revealed in Sacred Scripture. 

With this revelation of the rule of right the common 
thought of men is most familiar. "Holy men of old 
wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The 
Scriptures teach many things which the world by search- 
ing could never find out. They affirm distinctly and 
powerfully where other forms of revelation speak faintly. 
The Decalogue carries a weight of authority which does 
not belong to nature. Sinai is greater than all the 
mountains of the earth. This is the most complete of 
all the revelations of the moral law, but even this could 
not stand alone ; it presupposes the existence of moral 
intuitions in man, and it would be utterly discredited 
were it not supported by nature and experience. It 
needs also to be supplemented by an expression of the 
divine will still more immediate. 

293. Duty Revealed Directly by the Divine Spirit. 

The rule of right as declared by methods and means 
already considered, needs to be supplemented by the 
direct teaching of the divine Spirit. This may seem to 
some to be leaving the domain of moral science and 
entering that of personal religion, and others may count 
it sheer mysticism ; but it is neither. Religion is an 
element of moral conduct and cannot be counted as out- 
side of moral philosophy ; and the direct teaching of the 
Spirit of God is no more mysticism for the reader than 
it was for Moses, the lawgiver, or for Paul, the apostle. 



152 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

294. Specialized Guidance Necessary. 

Every revelation of the moral law previously set forth, 
expresses the rule of right in general principles only. 
Duty is enjoined in such general forms as are applicable 
to all men alike. Love to God and to man ; truth, jus- 
tice, and purity ; these, and similar attitudes and activi- 
ties of the spiritual being are commanded always and 
everywhere. Aside from general principles the moral 
law, as heretofore treated of, is occupied with prohibi- 
tions. But the lives of men are not made up of general 
principles, or of prohibitions, but of specific and indi- 
vidual activities. No two lives can be alike. By what 
special acts shall the general principles of righteousness 
be lived out ? Shall Paul preach the gospel to his own 
people at Jerusalem, as he wished exceedingly to do, or 
shall he go to foreign cities? The specialized com- 
mand said, " Depart, for I will send thee far hence to 
the Gentiles." Shall the young man live virtuously, 
casting his net into the sea of Galilee, or shall he leave 
his nets and become a fisher of men ? Shall this young 
woman remain quietly under her father's rooftree, or 
shall she go to Asiatic zenanas, to teach the women 
whom only a woman can reach ? Consciences sensitive 
and strong, but without specialized guidance, are torn 
with anguish under the stress and strain of questions like 
these. Christian men, men in deepest harmony with 
God, believe that the Holy Spirit guides them with a 
teaching special to the needs of the individual life. They 
believe that in response to the prayer of faith, wisdom is 
given them beyond the mere discerning of truth by the 
human understanding. And not only this, but men 
who have previously " neither feared God nor regarded 



REVELATION OF THE RULE OF RIGHT 1 53 

man," feel themselves consciously called with a personal 
summons to repent and seek the Lord. Their souls 
stand trembling before the Judge of all the earth. The 
reality of these unseen transactions is evinced not only 
by Scripture, but by the radical, permanent, and benefi- 
cent character of the results. 

295. The Spirit's Guidance Explicit. 

The inward guidance of the divine Spirit is often very 
explicit and positive. To Abraham the word came, 
" Go from thy land, and from thy kindred, and from thy 
father's house, to the land that I will show thee." The 
Spirit led Paul to Troas, with his face to the sea, and 
then the word came, "Come over into Macedonia and 
help us." And every instance from sacred Scripture 
can be duplicated by a score of like experiences from 
modern Christian life. Upon the response made to 
such a special divine word has often turned the destiny 
of men ; from that hour the man has gone up or down, 
and if down, no opportunity of retrieving the fall has 
come. By this special guidance the outlines of general 
laws are filled in, according to the divine mind respect- 
ing individual lives. Phenomena like these in the life of 
man come easily within the purview of moral science. 

296. Striking Illustrative Example. 

A, Christian woman was led, by inward call and by 
outward discipline, first to adopt the Quaker habit and 
then the public gospel ministry according to the faith of 
the society of Friends. In the course of her ministry 
she felt impressed to go to New York City, to bear " testi- 
mony" in certain concert halls, or "dens" of that me- 



154 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

tropolis. She went, found a home with friends and told 
them her purpose. They tried to dissuade her ; they said 
that she must be mistaken in her sense of duty ; that it 
was unsuitable and unbecoming in a woman to do such 
a thing ; that it could not be done, and that she must 
not attempt it. Under such influences her purpose 
wavered ; she thought that perhaps she had been mis- 
taken in the divine call. But one morning as she awoke 
the call came again with all the distinctness of an audible 
voice, " If thou art faithful to-day thou shalt save a soul 
from death." She arose and told her friends that she 
must execute her purpose. They saw that further re- 
monstrance would be vain, and prepared to give her 
what help they could. They engaged a policeman to 
give the needed protection. Late in the evening they 
set out for the place of the intended visit. In the dark 
approach they halted, and the policeman went ahead to 
reconnoitre and see whether admission could be gained. 
He reported that admission could not be gotten and 
that the project must be abandoned. She insisted that 
admission must be possible ; that she must go and 
would go. The policeman went again to see whether 
admission were a possibility. She followed closely be- 
hind, and when he pushed the door a little ajar she in- 
stantly thrust herself in. The hall was full of men and 
women intent upon their orgies. In the momentary 
hush that followed her unexpected entrance she began 
to speak, and in her clear, sweet voice gave her testi- 
mony and her message. Then she kneeled and prayed. 
Rising from her knees she turned to a young woman who 
sat at the side of the hall having no part in the revelry, 
and said, " I have come for thee," and brought her out. 



REVELATION OF THE RULE OF RIGHT I 5 5 

The history of that young woman thus rescued was this. 
She herself was a Christian and the daughter of a Chris- 
tian deacon. That afternoon she had walked with her 
betrothed lover, and he, under pretense of having certain 
business which required immediate attention, had brought 
her there and left her to await his return. It appeared 
afterward that he did this to stain her fair name and 
make a reason for breaking his engagement. When she 
found herself alone, she soon discerned the character of 
the place, and she understood also that an attempt to 
escape at that time would be vain. She therefore sat in 
silence and gave herself to prayer for help. When at 
length she saw the Christian woman enter, she knew that 
her deliverance had come. Before her trouble and dan- 
ger came, the messenger had been sent for rescue. 
Moral science must recognize facts like these. 

297. Danger of Self=Deception. 

The field to which the preceding paragraphs have 
introduced us is spread thick with dangers. It is a 
region of traps and pits. Here we find delusions, self- 
deceptions, distempered minds, and fanaticism. The 
sacred Scriptures, with intense and tender earnestness, 
warn men to be on their guard against these dangers. 
"Take heed lest ye be deceived." "Believe not every 
spirit." "For Satan himself is transformed into an 
angel of light." 

298. The Test of Spiritual Impressions. 

The test of every spiritual voice in the soul, is the 
permanent and standard rule of right. This, as we have 
seen, is found in the moral nature of man, in the nature 



156 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

of things, and in the holy Scriptures. The transient 
and special must be tested by the permanent and uni- 
versal. That which addresses the personal consciousness 
alone, must be tried by that revelation which is accredited 
by objective proofs seen in supernatural works and pro- 
phetic knowledge. The doctrine, the precept, and the 
moral tone must first of all agree with sacred Scripture. 

299. The Test of Reason. 

That which comes to the soul as a special monition 
must be tested by right reason. That which in the light 
of clear reason is self-contradictory or absurd, cannot be 
accepted as the voice of the Lord. The Creator respects 
that rational nature of man which he himself created. 
But, on the other side, the perfect reasonableness of the 
subjective guidance cannot always be apparent till vindi- 
cated by results. The touch of the divine Spirit will do 
no violence to reason, but it may go beyond reason. 
When the spiritual call has certified itself to conscious- 
ness as divine, being in harmony with the holy Scrip- 
tures and not contrary to rational thought, then the final 
results must be awaited to vindicate to others the validity 
of the subjective word. 

300. The Touchstone of Peace. 

The touch ot the Holy Spirit upon an obedient soul 
brings deep calmness and peace. Simulated or spurious 
spiritual impressions bring a disturbed, agitated, dis- 
tressed mind. The one is normal to the nature of man ; 
the other is abnormal. Demoniacs become maniacs ; 
the touch of the divine Spirit brings clear thought, self- 
mastery, and peace. 



REVELATION OF THE RULE OF RIGHT 1 57 



301. Safeguards. 

Humility and love are safeguards against spiritual de- 
lusions and fanaticism. Humility is the atmosphere in 
which reason operates with transparent clearness. Pride 
is an air of fog and smoke in which truth appears dis- 
torted and falsehood can with difficulty be discerned 
from the truth. Love is the abnegation of the evil life 
of self. Fanaticism is proud and selfish and tends to- 
ward hatred. When love to God and to men are the 
ruling principles of a man's life, small foothold is found 
for delusive phantasms and fanaticism. 



CHAPTER IX 



CONCERNING THE GROUNDS OF OBLIGATION 

302. Obligation Ultimate but Rational. 

The idea of obligation is the primal and primary dic- 
tum of conscience. It arises spontaneously from the 
normal action of conscience. This idea is ultimate and 
incapable of analysis. It cannot be denned except by 
synonyms. Obligation is obligation ; duty is duty, and 
nothing else. Obligation is neither utility, nor happi- 
ness, nor yet a wise self-love. But the soul is able to 
account to itself for this conviction of obligation. 
Reason can give a rational ground for it. And the 
more clearly this rational ground of obligation is seen, 
the stronger and more intelligent becomes the action of 
conscience. 

303. Ultimate Obligation Grounded in Creatorship. 

Creatorship confers supreme proprietary right. The 
thing made belongs to him who made it. This principle 
is recognized among men as an element of absolute jus- 
tice. The highest application of this principle is found 
in God's relation to beings made by him in his own like- 
ness. In sacred Scripture this principle is presented in 
a pressing appeal to man's reason and conscience alike. 
" Hath not the potter power over the clay to make one 
vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? Shall 
the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast 
thou made me thus?" "Render therefore to Caesar 
158 



CONCERNING THE GROUNDS OF OBLIGATION 



159 



the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that 
are God's." The "image and superscription" of the 
Creator are upon man. 

304. Limitation of Proprietary Right. 

The limit of the divine proprietary right is that which 
the Creator has set to himself in the nature of man. 
He must needs deal with men according to their nature, 
for to do otherwise would be to destroy them. The 
watchmaker must treat his watch, and the machinist his 
engine, according to its structure ; and in like manner 
the Creator will deal with his creatures according to 
their moral constitution. In making man with reason, 
he limited law and obligation to that which is in harmony 
with reason. In creating man with free-will, he ^uar- 
anteed to man a government which should not treat him 
as dead matter under the law of necessary causation, 
but a rule under which submission should be voluntary, 
enforced by moral agencies alone. And seeing that the 
Creator made man in his own likeness, this limitation 
signifies that he will exercise authority- according to the 
principles of his own being. Authority and rule which 
accord with the divine nature, must needs accord with 
human nature also. 

305. Obligation Grounded in Perfection of Being. 

The perfection of man's being is found in voluntary 
submission to the divine will. This furnishes a rational 
ground for the conviction of obligation. In alienation 
from the Creator there is no perfection. This subordina- 
tion of man to the Creator is the supreme environment of 
the human soul. Harmonv with environment is volun- 



i6o 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



tary ; acceptance of this subordinate relationship is 
obedience. Men may do this and live in harmony with 
the divine ideal of their nature, or they may dash them- 
selves against the eternal bars and wreck their glory and 
beauty. It is rational to accept our necessary environ- 
ment, the only place which the attributes of our being 
render possible. 

306. The Perfections of God a Ground of Obligation. 

The conviction of obligation to God finds justification 
in the infinite perfections of his being. The holiness, 
the justice, and the love, which the Scriptures declare to 
be attributes of the Creator, and which the nature of 
man and of things so powerfully emphasizes, render him 
supremely worthy of man's devotion. Worthiness of 
the being who claims man's love, is a rational ground of 
obligation to render that love. The more intelligently 
the perfections of God are apprehended, the more pow- 
erfully conscience responds with the sense of obligation. 

307. Be Jure Rationally Grounded in De Pacto. 

The obligation to recognize God as supreme, is ra- 
tionally vindicated by the fact that he alone is able to 
govern the world. He alone has the attributes which 
render supreme sovereignty possible. He has infinite 
knowledge and wisdom for ruling well, and infinite power 
for maintaining universal dominion. Jehovah, Jupiter, 
and Caesar stand before the soul of man, claiming alle- 
giance ; Jehovah, the creator of all things, with wisdom 
to rule wisely and well, with power to maintain his au- 
thority over all, a ruler in fact over the universe, sitting 
on no precarious throne ; Jupiter, a gigantic man, shar- 



CONCERNING THE GROUNDS OF OBLIGATION l6l 



ing sovereignty with rival gods and waging uncertain 
warfare with those who dare his displeasure ; Caesar, a 
man like other men, to whom fortune has given a crown 
and empire for a day. When the intellect apprehends 
the attributes of each, conscience responds with instant 
sense of obligation to God. It is reasonable to recognize 
as supreme the being who possesses the attributes of 
sovereignty, and does actually rule the universe. 

308. Divine Love a Ground of Obligation. 

A strong showing of the goodness and benevolence 
of the Creator may be made from nature. The sacred 
Scriptures declare the love of God, an attribute deeper 
and higher than the good-will of benevolence — an attri- 
bute of mercy and self-sacrifice. He gave himself ; he 
emptied himself, took the attitude of a subject, was made 
in the likeness of man, that he might suffer with and for 
man. Benefits conferred expressing perfect love, pure 
self-sacrifice, constitute a rational ground for the deep- 
est obligation. To obligation grounded in love con- 
science is quick in its response. On grounds like these — 
on the ground of the divine creatorship ; on the ground 
of the infinite worth and worthiness of the sovereign ; on 
the ground of his actual sovereignty over the universe ; 
and on the ground of his measureless love and self- 
sacrifice, the soul gives account to itself and vindicates 
at the bar of reason, its intuition of supreme obligation 
to the High and Holy One. 

309. Grounds of Inferior Obligation. 

The primary dictum of conscience is the obligation 
to obey the Supreme Being. That being whom the 



162 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



mind apprehends as greatest and highest, is lord of the 
conscience and gives it law. But there are subordinate 
bonds of obligation, obligations and duties not wholly 
apart from God, but having indirect reference to him. 
Reason asks a ground for this inferior or secondary ob- 
ligation. 

310. Ramifications of Obligation. 

Obligations existing between men are often nothing 
other than ramifications of the one supreme obligation. 
The same law which says, "Thou shalt love the Lord 
thy God with all thy heart," says also, "Thou shalt not 
steal," "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy 
neighbor." One cannot obey God without doing right 
to his fellow-men. One and the same obligation em- 
braces both classes of duties. Obligation to God is the 
essence of all obligation. 

311. Grades of Being. 

In the second place, the grounds of obligation which 
we find in God, we find in an inferior and secondary 
way, in man made in the likeness of the Creator. In 
fatherhood and motherhood there is a reflection of the 
divine creatorship, on account of which it is reasonable 
to say, "Honor thy father and thy mother," "Children, 
obey your parents." There is excellence in human 
character, which constitutes a good ground for honor 
due. There are grades, ranks, and authorities among 
men, and these differences are realities of being which 
must needs be recognized. The self-sacrificing love of 
a mother, justifies to reason the obligation of the child 
to render love and tender care in return. 



CONCERNING THE GROUNDS OF OBLIGATION 1 63 



Obligation has, then, a solid rational basis in the 
realities of personal being, the supreme obligation being 
grounded in the being of God and in our relations to 
him ; the secondary obligations, in the realities of man's 
being and life. And the secondary obligations are con- 
tained in the primary — potentially, impliedly, and often 
expressly. 



CHAPTER X 



CONCERNING THE REQUISITES FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 

312. Some Conditions Requisite. 

The primary dictum of conscience is the duty of 
obedience to the Supreme Being. When this sense of 
obligation has been outraged, conscience confesses that 
guilt has been incurred, and stands trembling in the 
presence of impending penalty. This signifies a sense 
of moral responsibility. Children feel this toward their 
parents ; pupils feel it toward their instructors ; subjects 
toward their sovereigns ; all men toward those whom 
they recognize as standing in places of legitimate author- 
ity ; pagans toward their gods in proportion to the 
supremacy imputed to each ; and when the one true 
God is apprehended, the conviction of responsibility to 
him is unmixed and dominant. But that this moral 
responsibility may exist, certain conditions are prerequi- 
site. Men lay commands upon a horse or a dog, and 
expect obedience, but they do not impute to these a 
responsibility which can be called moral. They inflict 
pain upon them to secure obedience, and that infliction 
of pain implies a certain power of choice ; but real 
responsibility, with the consequent righteousness or guilt, 
is not imputed. What attributes or conditions are 
necessary to render a creature responsible with a respon- 
sibility which is truly moral ? In respect to general 
principles the answer to this question is easy, but the 
application of those principles to special cases which lie 
164 



REQUISITES FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 



165 



along the border line of accountability, within or out- 
side, is difficult to the last degree. 

313. Intelligence Requisite for Responsibility. 

First of all, intelligence to apprehend the rule of right, 
the lawgiver and his law, is requisite to render any 
creature morally accountable. Where there is no law 
there can be neither obedience nor transgression ; and 
where there is no intelligence to know the law, it is the 
same as if the law did not exist. If a sense of obliga- 
tion could exist apart from the recognition of a rule of 
right, it could be no more than an uneasy, ill-defined 
yearning ; a law of conduct would be necessary to give 
it direction and potency. 

314. Limitations of Intelligence. 

The ordinary limitations of intelligence by which 
responsibility is reduced or extinguished, are of three 
kinds. In proportion as intelligence is abridged in 
either of these ways, responsibility is approximately 
destroyed. 

315. Limitation by Infancy. 

It is scarcely needful to say that the intelligence requi- 
site for apprehending the rule of right may be limited 
by infancy. Out of the condition of infancy with its 
limitations, the mind emerges by insensible gradations. 
There is a period during which moral responsibility is 
manifestly impossible. Slowly some knowledge of the 
rule of right comes to the understanding, and evokes 
the idea of obligation, and makes its appeal to the will. 
At length responsibility becomes full and cannot be 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



evaded. The theological problem which meets one at 
this point does not belong to moral science, and is in- 
capable of solution anywhere. So long as by reason of 
infancy the mind can understand neither the law of duty 
nor the consequences of actions, accountability cannot 
exist. 

316. Responsibility Limited by Idiocy. 

In the second place, intelligence and the consequent 
responsibility may be limited by partial or complete 
idiocy. Unlike infancy this is a permanent limitation 
and incapacity. In this case also the extinguishment of 
responsibility is approximate or complete according to 
the degree of idiocy. 

317. Limited by Necessary Ignorance. 

Responsibility is limited by unavoidable and irremedi- 
able ignorance. Infancy, idiocy, or ignorance do not 
altogether bar the natural consequences of conduct ; but 
ignorance of the law's requirements, ignorance which 
cannot be helped, ignorance necessary in the begin- 
ning and irremediable to the end, must needs be a 
bar to moral accountability. But willful ignorance, 
which undertakes to evade moral responsibility by not 
knowing, ignorance which signifies indifference to obli- 
gation, is not a limitation to duty or responsibility. 
It is a part of duty to use every due and sincere effort 
to learn what duty is. 

318. Conscience Requisite for Responsibility. 

The second great requisite for moral responsibility is 
endowment with a moral faculty, or conscience. With- 



REQUISITES FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 67 

out conscience there could be no discernment of the 
element of moral rightness in conduct, and no sense of 
moral obligation. If a dog could have intelligence to 
understand his master's bidding, yet so long as the intui- 
tion of obligation and right should be lacking, there 
could be no moral responsibility. Without conscience 
the necessity of obedience might be felt, but necessity 
is not identical with duty. Without conscience one may 
understand the evil consequences of vicious conduct ; 
but regard for consequences is not regard for right. 
True responsibility presupposes the power of discerning 
the moral qualities of conduct and of feeling the bond 
of moral obligation. 

319. Disregard of Conscience not a Lack of Conscience. 

In this connection we do well to bear in mind that 
disregard of right and duty does not indicate the lack of 
conscience, or even a special weakness of the moral 
faculty. Dissolute men have shown by their praises of 
virtue, that they understand the right and are able to 
appreciate its excellence. Compare Goldsmith's de- 
scription of the village pastor with the life which he 
himself lived. Unjust men show a quick appreciation 
of justice when wrong-doing touches themselves. There 
may be, moreover, a stupor of conscience, which not 
only does not abridge moral responsibility, but which is 
itself a crime for which a man is deeply guilty. Dead- 
ness of the moral faculty comes from conscious wrong- 
doing. Conscience is flouted, insulted, trampled upon, 
until she retires into silence — silent until judgment looms 
into view. The silence of conscience on account of 
previous abuse works no limitation of responsibility. 



1 68 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

320. Power of Choice Requisite for Responsibility. 

Power of choice, that is, freedom of will, is a third 
necessary condition of moral accountability. The power 
of choice means here the ability to obey the law of 
right, or to disobey. If a creature has no natural power 
of choice in moral concernments, he is subject to the 
law of necessary causation ; he cannot be brought under 
moral government ; like a tree he develops of necessity 
according to the natural forces of his being ; like a river 
flowing in its bed, he goes his way and lives his life with 
apparent spontaneity, but that spontaneity is only appar- 
ent — there is no choice. A being that cannot choose, 
cannot be addressed by motives ; a being that cannot 
choose from considerations of right and wrong, is not 
morally accountable. 

321. A Guilty Loss of Freedom. 

In respect to power of choice, as with intelligence and 
conscience, there may be a lack which does not limit re- 
sponsibility, but for which lack itself a man is guilty. It 
is a law of the will that repetition of choices becomes 
a habit of choice ; habit grows into fixedness, and when 
habit and fixedness are on the side of evil, freedom 
becomes spontaneity, with no power of reversal. This 
is moral bondage ; the man has sold himself to work 
evil. This fixedness of moral choice, though it is a 
bondage, does not destroy responsibility. It is a great 
crime to come into such a condition. It is the indelible 
record of a habit of intended disobedience to the law 
of right ; it is the choice of evil, made and repeated, 
affirmed and re-affirmed as the irrevocable purpose of 
the spiritual being. He has made his choice and is 



REQUISITES FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 



169 



responsible for the issue, and the effect of his choice 
upon his own moral nature is one of the inevitable 
consequences. 

322. Sanity Requisite tor Responsibility. 

A fourth requisite for moral responsibility is that con- 
dition of health or sanity in which the normal action of 
the faculties of intelligence, conscience, and will is pos- 
sible. If by reason of insanity reason ceases to be 
reason, and knowledge becomes mere distorted, dislo- 
cated, and grotesque notions representing no reality ; if 
conscience is lost ; if will becomes a wild impulse with- 
out self-consciousness, responsibility cannot survive. 
But in this there appears again the provision that the 
inability be not the result, perhaps the intended result, 
of previous wrong-doing. The insanity of intoxication 
is sometimes induced for the very purpose of committing 
crime without relenting. The crime is planned "with 
malice aforethought," and then insanity is induced in 
order that conscience, kindness, and all thought of con- 
sequences may lie dead until the deed of evil is done. 
Or if this intoxication is induced with no purpose of 
crime, there must yet remain a certain residuum of re- 
sponsibility for crime committed while in this condition. 
A man knowingly puts out the eye of intelligence, and 
puts off self-control, and lets loose the evil beast that is 
in him ; he does this knowing what consequences may 
follow. It is a crime to induce this condition and there 
must be some responsibility for the consequences. 
These principles are generally recognized in Christian 
jurisprudence, and from these principles men judge men 
in common things. 



I/O INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

323. Degrees of Responsibility. 

The lack or the loss of intelligence may exist in all 
possible degrees, and there is a proportionate diminution 
of moral accountability. But where intelligence is 
found, it may be doubted whether conscience and will 
are ever so lacking as to render a man irresponsible. 
This would seem equivalent to becoming a brute, not as 
a figure of speech, but in reality. 



CHAPTER XI 



CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS 

324. The Term Righteousness. 

Righteousness is Tightness, that is, conformity to the 
standard of right, conformity to the moral law. The 
use of this term in theology and in religious litera- 
ture does not unfit it for the uses of moral science. On 
the other hand, by its exactness of definition, theology 
has prepared the word for scientific uses anywhere. 
There is no other word which can well take its place. 
Morality and virtue are both too general and too inexact 
in their common import. Morality is used to mean out- 
ward conformity to the moral law, uprightness of con- 
duct, and this outward conformity is not understood to 
signify completeness and exactness of conformity. To 
call a man moral is sometimes only a step removed from 
positive reproach. Virtue is used in like manner to sig- 
nify general moral excellence, but with a predominant 
reference to a right purpose or intention — a general con- 
dition of right feeling. But in the word righteousness 
we have a term already wonted to exactness of meaning 
and use. Complete conformity to the moral law is right- 
eousness always and everywhere ; anything less than this 
is not righteousness anywhere. 

325. Objective and Subjective Righteousness. 

Conformity to the moral law may exist with respect 
to action and conduct, or with respect to desire, choice, 

171 



172 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



love, and purpose. The first is actual objective con- 
formity to the rule of right, considered, where this is 
possible, apart from the quality of intention ; the second 
is the sincere intention of conformity considered apart 
from the actual, objective conformity in fact and deed. 
Conduct may show an outward, formal harmony with 
the moral law, while there is no inward harmony of in- 
tention ; and, on the other side, there may be complete 
nonconformity in fact, while perfect conformity was in- 
tended. The actual conformity we may call objective 
righteousness ; the intention of conformity, the supreme 
love of the right, we may call subjective righteousness. 
The former is partly expressed by the term morality ; 
the latter is poorly expressed by the term virtue. The 
former is a Tightness, or righteousness, of deed and life ; 
the latter is a righteousness of the doer. This distinc- 
tion must be kept well in mind if we would judge men 
with justice. 

326. Neutral Conduct. 

A large part of human conduct, considered by itself, 
must be counted morally neutral, strictly speaking, 
neither right nor wrong. Many things are neither com- 
manded nor forbidden ; to do them is not wrong, not to 
do them is equally blameless. A wicked man performs 
these actions, but they constitute no part of his wicked- 
ness ; a good man does the same, but they form no part 
of his righteousness. Men breathe and sleep, they 
hunger and thirst, the bodily functions go on, but we 
impute to these activities no moral quality. The moral 
law does not directly require a man to raise wheat rather 
than corn, or cotton instead of sugar. These concerns 



CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS 



173 



which do not come directly within the scope and pur- 
view of the moral law constitute no small part of a 
man's life. 

327. Neutral Conduct Indirectly Right or Wrong. 

Conduct which the moral law neither requires nor for- 
bids, must be counted, in and of itself, as morally neu- 
tral, but this is only half the truth in the case. This 
conduct, neutral in itself, may come into such relation- 
ship to a supreme motive as to become itself positively 
right or wrong. To speak the truth, to deal justly, to 
love and serve the Lord, are duties always and every- 
where. To till the ground is not always a man's duty. 
But if a man sees that by cultivating the ground he can 
better fulfill all his obligations to God and man than by 
sailing the sea, then it becomes his duty to do the former 
rather than the latter. That which ought to be done, 
ought to be done in the best possible way. This prin- 
ciple has numberless applications. When once a man 
has elected his supreme motive, no small part of his life 
consists of ways and means by which to accomplish that 
radical and supreme purpose. These ways and means 
may have in themselves no moral quality ; but from their 
relationship to the supreme motive, they derive moral 
character. To cut a die for coining lawful money is 
right ; to cut a second die like the first for coining coun- 
terfeit money is wrong. Agriculture is both right and 
necessary ; but if a man spend his life in raising corn for 
the distiller of whisky, it were better for that man, and 
for the world, that he had never been born. A good 
conscience will take account of this secondary and de- 
rivative right and rightness. 



174 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



328. Neutral Conduct Counted Right. 

In popular speech all neutral conduct, considered 
apart from some unlawful purpose, is spoken of as right. 
It is right in the sense that it is not wrong ; that is, it is 
not forbidden by the moral law. It is more exact to 
count such conduct neutral since the doing or the not 
doing is equally right. 

329. Subjective Righteousness. 

Subjective righteousness is the inward moral Tightness 
of the actor. The radical and essential element in sub- 
jective righteousness is the intention, the absolutely sin- 
cere intention, of doing right. If the actor intend per- 
fect conformity to the moral standard, whatever else is 
lacking, he is not counted personally blameworthy. On 
the other hand, in the lack of intention to do right, or 
in the positive intention to do evil, the actor is blame- 
worthy and guilty, whether or not he succeed in accom- 
plishing the purposed evil. This signifies that virtue lies 
primarily in the right action of the will. If the will acts 
in harmony with intelligence and conscience, there is 
subjective righteousness. 

330. Illustrations. 

Illustrations of the above principle might be multi- 
plied without limit. A troop of skirmishers disguised 
as the enemy, falls in with another company of their 
own men. Their friends take them for what they seem 
to be, and for what they intended to seem to be, and 
give them a quick and deadly volley. Here is matter 
for unmeasured regret ; there is good reason for saying 
that some one blundered in the arrangements, but there 



CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS 



175 



was no lack of right intention on the part of those who 
slaughtered their own friends. A mother receives from 
the druggist medicine for her child. The druggist had 
sent poison. Without suspicion, and with no reason for 
suspicion, the mother administers the supposed medi- 
cine and the child dies. The mother is wild with grief, 
but there is no proper place for self-reproach. A robber 
lays his plans to waylay a traveler and murder him for 
his money. He lies in wait, but the traveler goes on his 
way by another route, or the robber's pistol misses fire ; 
the traveler comes safe to his journey's end, but the 
other man is none the less a murderer. He intended 
murder, and his plan was unexecuted from no relenting 
of purpose. It is well that his intention failed, but he 
is none the less guilty. The conclusion is obvious ; sub- 
jective righteousness lies in the right action of the will. 

331. Effort to Know the Right. 

It cannot be denied that virtue is found in rightness 
of intention. But right intention cannot exist apart 
from due effort to know what is right. If there is a 
supreme desire to conform perfectly to the rule of right, 
there will be, there must needs be, a like desire to know 
what is the rule of right. Subjective righteousness is 
justly impeached by any lack of effort to attain objective 
righteousness. 

332. Righteousness and the Sensibilities. 

Excited sensibility may precede the action of the will, 
or may follow it as a consequence or product of that ac- 
tion. As an antecedent condition under which the will 
comes to its choice, excited sensibilities are sometimes 



I76 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



spoken of as motives. This aspect of sensibility has 
been already sufficiently discussed. But sensibility as 
affected by choice, as the product of choice, and hence 
as an element of personal moral character, remains for 
consideration. It is manifest that the condition of the 
sensibilities is an important element of moral character. 
In the mind of one man the thought of moral law and 
of strictness of duty awakens a feeling of repulsion ; 
there is an instinctive rebellion against the idea of moral 
obligation. In the mind of another, nothing else is so 
lovely as the rule of right ; the sense of obligation is 
joy. Not only does conscience approve the right and 
the will choose the same, but the sensibilities rejoice in 
it. The appetencies of the soul hunger and thirst for 
holy gratifications. To some the thought of dissipation 
and vice is an exciting pleasure ; to another the same 
thought brings a quick thrust of pain and awakens dis- 
gust. There are souls so corrupted that every moving 
of the sensibilities seems like the stirring of a cess-pool, 
whose breath is stench and poison. And there are also 
souls so pure that the sight of vileness stirs no impure 
thought or feeling, as the sunshine falls upon all unclean- 
ness and is tainted by none. 

333. Sensibility an Element of Moral Character. 

That condition of the spiritual being out of which 
pleasure in vice, or joy in right doing, spontaneously 
arises, must surely be counted an element of moral 
character. He is a better man to whom the thought of 
dishonesty, of dissipation, of uncleanness brings instant 
pain and aversion, than he who finds in such thoughts a 
seductive pleasure. And in the presence of those who 



CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS 



177 



struggle against depraved sensibility and deny it gratifi- 
cation, who condemn themselves for that condition which 
renders such sensibility possible, we must say that he is 
a better man who is a stranger to this struggle, whose 
moral enemies are outside, foreign foes, and not within. 

334. Sensibility as a Product of Choice. 

That sensibility is an element of moral character is 
manifest by the fact that depraved sensibility is largely 
the product and necessary consequence of previous 
moral choice. It is a natural and necessary consequence 
arising from the constitution of the human soul. One 
wrong choice not only begins a series of wrong choices, 
but also it engenders, as a natural consequence, a de- 
praved condition of the soul out of which evil emotions 
must needs arise. This consequence of the action of 
the will is not under the control of the will. Having 
chosen good or evil, a man cannot prevent the effect of 
that choice upon himself, nor can he by a reverse choice 
restore his emotional nature to its former condition. He 
may fight against perverted sensibilities ; he may refuse 
them satisfaction, but the corruption of sensibility he 
cannot cure by a mere act of the will. 

335. Inherited Debasement of Sensibility. 

Corrupted sensibility has become a permanent char- 
acteristic of the human race. It is transmitted to chil- 
dren and to children's children through the generations. 
For this degradation of the sensibilities, so far as it is 
purely an inheritance, we cannot impute personal respon- 
sibility. But perverted sensibility may be indulged and 
reinforced, or it may be weakened by self-denial , and 

M 



I78 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



for this every man is personally responsible. If we in- 
dulge vicious emotions and thus strengthen them, we 
accept the evil heritage and make it truly and wholly 
our own. 

336. The Cure of Evil Sensibility. 

It is not outside of moral philosophy to note that the 
cure of debased sensibility is found in the Christian re- 
ligion. That which the personal will cannot do, the gra- 
cious work of the Holy Spirit in the soul can accom- 
plish. To restore the emotional nature to its normal 
state, so that righteousness only shall give pleasure and 
evil shall awaken aversion, is a part of that radical spir- 
itual renovation which in Holy Scripture is called the 
new birth and sanctification. 

337. Sensibility and Desire. 

In clarifying our thought upon this question of sensi- 
bility as an element of moral character, we must care- 
fully distinguish between desire and mere emotion with- 
out desire. Desire signifies the choice of some object of 
possible attainment or possession in the future. Pleasant 
sensibility alone does not constitute desire. The will 
may resolutely put aside and reject the very thing the 
thought of which thrills the soul with delight. Under 
the bond of a supreme obligation many a maid has re- 
fused to wed the man she loved, though by that refusal 
pleasure perished from her life. 

338. Evil Sensibility Itself an Object of Choice. 

We ought also to note in this connection that the 
pleasure of excited debased sensibility may itself be- 



CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS 



*79 



come an object of choice, entirely apart from objective 
wrong-doing. There is, it may be. no purpose of overt 
evil doing. Shame hinders. The risk of troublesome 
consequences seems too great. The deed seems per- 
haps more evil than holding the pleasant picture in the 
mind. But the thought of evil is invited and cherished 
for the sake of the pleasant excitement The fact to 
which attention is here called is that the moving of de- 
praved sensibility is itself made the object of choice. 
This inward corruption of life is surely an element of 
moral character. 

339. Some Conclusions. 

From the preceding considerations we must conclude 
that moral character belongs, first and radically, to the 
generic choices by which the soul takes its permanent 
attitude toward the Creator and his law ; secondly and 
in a lower degree, to the special volitions by which the 
generic choice is carried into effect; thirdly, to the sen- 
sibilities which arise responsive to acts of choice, and 
by which the action of the will records itself upon a 
man's own moral nature. 

340. Responsibility for Character. 

On the ground that character is generic choice and 
the reflex consequences of choice, we must hold that 
men are responsible not only for conduct, but also for 
character. And since the normal and constitutional 
relation of sensibility to will is not one of mastery, it fol- 
lows that debasement of sensibility-, whether inherited or 
originated by one's own personal act, does not destroy 
responsibility. And still further, by reason of that 



l80 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

special provision of grace made by the Creator for the 
renovation of man's moral nature, every man becomes 
responsible for his own moral recovery. The spiritual 
forces and appliances await his acceptance, and to re- 
fuse them is to choose continuance in his debased moral 
condition. 

341. No Moral Neutrality. 

The law of right is not satisfied with moral indiffer- 
ence, inertness, or neutrality ; it demands the choice of 
obedience with all the energies of one's being. ''With 
all thy heart," "with all thy mind, might, and strength," 
is the required measure of right choice and intention. 
Moral neutrality is indeed from the nature of the case 
impossible. Between the intention of obedience and 
the absence of that intention there can be no middle 
ground. But there may be a comparative moral inert- 
ness, a feebleness of choice which falls far short of the 
law's requirement. "I did not think" does not excuse 
wrong-doing; strenuous intention will secure the need- 
ful thought and attention. "I do not care " signifies 
the choice of disobedience. 

342. Evil Thoughts. 

The sight and the knowledge of evil do not of neces- 
sity imply evil thoughts. Jesus Christ lived in the 
midst of wickedness ; it met his eyes and saluted his 
ears everywhere, but no word spoken by him indicates 
a tainted thought or a sullied feeling. There is danger, 
however, that the knowledge of evil will become to us 
an allurement to evil ; that the frequent thought of evil 
will become thought that is evil. The question of ques- 



CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS I 8 I 

tions in the moral education of the young, is the method 
of introducing them safely to the knowledge of evil ; to 
meet the evil of the world, to feel the thrill of tempta- 
tion, and not be contaminated by it, but overcome it. 

343. Safety from Evil Thoughts. 

To know the world at all in truth is to know it as 
evil, and to know its evil. To prevent this touch of 
evil from gendering evil thoughts, there must be the ut- 
most vigor of moral choice. There must be no double- 
mindedness. Wherever and whenever the slightest 
hesitation of strenuous moral choice appears, evil finds 
a joint in the armor and thrusts in its spear. But evil 
thoughts sometimes pursue men in whom there is no 
feebleness of virtue. They are a heritage from a pre- 
vious life of lower moral grade ; they dog them ; they 
haunt them as if supernaturally injected into the mind. 
They cannot be driven away by direct efforts of the 
will. Whatever fixes attention upon them tends to hold 
them in mind rather than to expel them. Great moral 
victories come of supernatural grace. 

344. The Psychological Remedy. 

As already indicated above, evil thoughts cannot be 
expelled by any process which fixes continual attention 
upon them. There are psychological means, however, 
which are useful in driving away these birds of night. 
Let the mind be intently occupied with that which is 
good. In proportion as the mind is filled with themes 
which are high and uplifting, other thoughts will fall 
away for lack of place and opportunity. If sporadic 
evil thoughts start into consciousness, attention must not 



1 82 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



be directed to them. Neglect them ; ignore them ; 
treat them as of no consequence ; direct the mind all 
the more earnestly to worthier work. By this process 
evil tends to fall out of thought, and out of our lives, as 
dead leaves fall from the trees ; it ceases to be an attri- 
bute of one's self, drifts away into the past, and is for- 
gotten. 

345. Limitations of Moral Responsibility. 

Limitations of moral responsibility have been consid- 
ered in part in treating of the requisites for responsi- 
bility. But in giving a resume of these limitations 
something more needs to be said. 

346. Responsibility Limited by Physical Inability. 

Taking no account of physical inability or infirmity 
caused by previous wrong-doing, we must say that moral 
responsibility cannot extend beyond physical ability. 
The rule of right does not require of a man that which 
his physical limitations render impossible. Among the 
poor and the vicious in our great cities, Christian women 
go about intent on ministries of charity. But the work 
is too great for the workers ; if they were multiplied ten- 
fold, they could not make the charity and grace equal 
to the suffering and sin. They wear themselves out in 
labors beyond their strength, and then can scarce quiet 
their consciences, and cannot at all satisfy their pity. 
Physical inability limits their duty. 

347. Inability Itself a Sin. 

Inability, which is itself the product of wrong-doing, 
cannot be counted a limitation of responsibility. On 



CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS 



the other hand, it is plainly a crime to render one's self 
unable to fulfill his obligations. A drunkard is not re- 
lieved by his drunkenness from any obligation which 
would rest upon him as a sober man. If a man wastes 
his means in riot and revelry, he is not cleared by this 
from the duty of paying his debts. If this be not so, 
then by flagrant disobedience to the moral law a man 
may free himself from obligation to keep the law ; 
wrong-doing and duty become then inversely propor- 
tional; as wickedness increases obligation diminishes. 
And the limit on the one side is moral wreck and ruin 
of being; and on the other the annihilation of obligation. 

o to 

But ability may perish while duty- survives. 

348. Responsibility Limited by Mental Inability. 

The mind of man is limited in its possibilities as abso- 
lutely as is the body. There are impossibilities of 
knowledge and thought, and that which is possible for 
one may not be possible for another. The future is 
hidden from man, and we do innocently that which fore- 
knowledge would render a crime. The possession of 
"five talents" brings the duty of using five talents well. 
Natural gifts define and limit obligation. 

349. Unused Abilities. 

Limit of mental ability is a limitation of duty. But 
unused and undeveloped ability does not signify limita- 
tion of ability. Faculties are given for use and growth. 
Till the limit of development is reached, use and growth 
of faculty are a duty-. Shrinking from untried work, 
from difficulties and from possible failure, is not a limi- 
tation of faculty. We are under obligation to do not 



184 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

only what we now can do, but also that which we can 
make ourselves able to do. Moses said, " I am not elo- 
quent," but when pressed into leadership no lack of 
ability was found. The real limit of personal power 
cannot be known till ability has been used to the 
utmost. 

350. Responsibility Limited by Ignorance of the Law. 

The general principle is this — in proportion as knowl- 
edge of the rule of right becomes impossible, so that 
knowledge is not a duty, in that proportion responsibil- 
ity for failure to obey is limited. A general sends his 
adjutant with an order for a regimental commander. 
The adjutant falls by the way and the order is never de- 
livered. The colonel does not obey the order. He 
could not obey because he did not know ; he could not 
know, and ignorance was not a fault. The justice of 
this principle is easily recognized by all. And the holy 
Scriptures recognize the same principle in the Divine 
administration : "To him that knoweth to do good and 
doeth it not, to him it is sin." 

351. To be Remembered. 

We ought to remember, as a weighty admonition to 
ourselves, that unless there is first a supreme love of the 
right, and the unmixed intention to obey the rule of 
right, there can be no relief from the full measure of 
obligation and responsibility, by any limitation what- 
soever. 



CHAPTER XII 



CONCERNING MORAL DEPRAVITY 

352. Depravity a Fact. 

Moral depravity in man is a fact We may call it by 
what name we will — a deterioration of man's moral nature, 
a tendency toward evil, a habit propagated and inherited 
— but whatever the name, the fact of an inclination, a 
tendency, a drift in human nature and in the race 
toward evil, lies upon the face of all life and all history. 
It is easier to do wrong than to do right. This means 
more than that right is one and wrong many. The 
presence and touch of evil is recognized by a sympa- 
thetic stir in the soul as if evil were something congenial. 
The sacred Scriptures declare the fact and explain the 
historic genesis of this evil drift. Under the impulse of 
temptation the first man disobeyed the divine command- 
ment and lost his righteousness. One consequence of 
this transgression was that moral deterioration which we 
call depravity. In the transmission of life this depravity 
is transmitted — for in the transmission of life there must 
needs be a transmission of its qualities — and now the 
supreme word declares "the mind of the flesh" to "be 
enmity against God." This record of Scripture no 
historic or psychologic criticism can controvert. 

353. Moral Science must Recognize Depravity. 

Moral philosophy must take account of depravity. 
Unless it does this, it deals with mere conceptions, not 

185 



1 86 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

with actualities, with ideal men who have no existence 
anywhere. If a man is under obligation to God, it is a 
depraved being that is under obligation ; if the moral 
law speaks to man, it speaks to a fallen race ; and what- 
ever relations subsist between man and man, those rela- 
tions subsist between beings in whose nature evil has 
already wrought deep damage. It belongs to moral 
science to investigate the psychological nature of this 
depravity, and estimate its bearing and effect upon 
obligation and responsibility. Nor is it averse from the 
work of this science to examine the rationale of the 
methods proposed for the recovery of man from the 
ruin of wrong-doing. 

354. Effects of the " Fall." 

Speaking with broad generality, we may say that man's 
primal transgression brought, directly or indirectly, 
deterioration or damage to every human faculty ; to 
bodily faculties as well as mental ; to intellectual facul- 
ties as well as moral. But this is not sufficiently specific 
and exact. We must examine more in detail that moral 
deterioration which now affects the human race. 

355. Effects of the Fall upon the Body. 

The consequences of the fall were either direct or in- 
direct. Among the indirect consequences are infirmi- 
ties, disease, decay, and death of the body. We must 
say indirect, because the most flagrant violations of the 
moral law do not act like corrosive poisons, nor do they 
implant germs of disease to breed functional derange- 
ments. Falsehood and blasphemy pertain to the spirit- 
ual nature. But all will acknowledge that the wicked- 



CONCERNING MORAL DEPRAVITY 



187 



ness of the world is the great promoter of disease and 
untimely death. The sacred Scriptures indicate more 
than this, that from the primal sin death took its rise. 
We ought to note here how deep a damage is wrought 
upon the physical nature by vicious excitements and 
indulgences. Pure and noble emotions are the friends 
of all the physical functions, but base sensibilities dis- 
order the body. Lack of faith in God, leaving men the 
prey of gloom and despondency, has brought many a 
man to an untimely end. The Fall has also introduced 
vices which destroy health and life. Gluttony, drunken- 
ness, licentiousness, and excesses of every kind, work 
damage to man's physical nature. Idiocy and insanity 
show the extremest damage to the nervous system. No 
organ of the body escapes the touch of evil. But this 
physical degeneracy is not to be counted depravity. 

356. Depravity and the Intellect. 

There is a connection between moral character and 
the body, but there is a closer connection between moral 
character and thought. If the moral " eye be single," 
there is clear light in the understanding ; if the moral 
"eye be evil," the judgment is disturbed in its action 
and becomes untrustworthy. By reason of depravity 
the intellect is clouded and becomes an easy prey to 
false beliefs and delusions ; the mind busies itself with 
trifles, follies, and base things. Under the influence of 
wicked purposes, even the counsel of Ahithophel be- 
comes foolishness. Selfishness does not reason so clearly 
and safely as does love. But this damage to the intel- 
lect is not that deterioration which is signified by the 
term depravity. 



1 88 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

357. Depravity in the Sensibilities. 

The Fall affected man in his emotional nature very 
deeply, and this is true depravity. In the normal and 
perfect condition of man's moral nature, that which is 
right gives pleasure ; that which is wrong is offensive. 
But wrong-doing has reversed this condition of the sen- 
sibilities. Evil once tasted has become very pleasant, 
and the rule of right has become offensive. Men enjoy 
evil doing. A "good time" commonly signifies a 
relaxation of moral tension and self-restraint. There is 
now no righteousness without self-denial. The world is 
full of taking pleasure in evil — too full to call for illus- 
tration. The common notion is that a life of strenuous 
conformity to the rule of right must be a painful and 
joyless life. 

358. Resisting Depraved Sensibilities. 

Debasement of the sensibilities renders great vigor 
of choice necessary for continuance in right doing. The 
more eager the hunger for evil enjoyments, the more 
vigorous must be the action of the will in opposition. 
In this sense virtue maintained in the face of special de- 
pravity, is virtue of special merit ; it must be vigorous 
in order that it may exist at all. But a holy soul is right 
not only in respect to choice, but also in respect to sen- 
sibility. But that depraved sensibility can be resisted, 
is proved by the fact that good men do resist it. 

359. Depravity in the Conscience. 

Since depravity is a moral deterioration, it must needs 
show itself primarily and especially in the moral faculty. 
It shows itself strongly in the conscience. As an intui- 



CONCERNING MORAL DEPRAVITY 1 89 

tive faculty conscience discerns the element of right in 
conduct ; depravity is a blunting of the sharpness and 
fineness of that discernment. Conscience discerns and 
affirms moral obligation ; depravity weakens the sense of 
that moral bond. The hot indignation which burns in a 
good conscience at sight of wrong and injustice, is cooled 
and quenched. The accusing voice of conscience is 
hushed, and the apprehension of impending wrath upon 
a guilty soul is soothed to sleep. Depravity enfeebles 
conscience in all its action. 

360. Depravity in the Will. 

The will is the spring of moral action. From this 
fountain transgression and evil took their rise. Deprav- 
ity must, therefore, have touched human nature pri- 
marily in the element of will. And at this point that 
touch has been most disastrous. Since the will, in re- 
spect to its own choices, is a first cause and the mode of 
its action a mystery, it is not easy to put into language 
an account of depravity in the will, without introducing 
an external determining element contradictory to the very 
nature of the will. The first transgression was a generic 
and radical choice ; in that choice the soul took its atti- 
tude toward the moral law ; that choice was the root of 
a limitless series of choices, and gave to all the series a 

bias toward evil. Without renderings the will less a fac- 
es 

ulty of choice, a habit of choice was begun. As the 
first transgression brought guilt upon the soul which no 
subsequent act of obedience could cancel, so the first 
evil choice engendered a tendency to evil choices, and 
out of will begot self-will, which no right choice could 
rectify. A generic moral choice, when once the choice 



I90 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

has been made, can never come again before the mind 
in the same form ; when the question reappears, it has 
respect to the ratification of a choice already made, and 
the momentum of the previous decision makes its repeti- 
tion easy. It is of the nature of will that a chosen 
moral attitude tends to permanence, and a repetition of 
choice becomes fixedness of choice. From the nature 
of the case, a chosen attitude toward the moral law, is 
not a choice for a moment or for a day, but forever. 
Depravity weakens the will in the choice of the right, 
and generates a corresponding readiness in the choice of 
evil. 

361. Depravity Known by Consciousness. 

Any attempt to investigate the nature of the change 
wrought in the essence of a spiritual being by the com- 
ing in of depravity, must needs be utterly vain. To 
conceive depravity after the analogy of physical or 
chemical change is foolish and futile. It is childishness 
and fatuity in philosophy to think of depravity as a dis- 
ease of the spirit, a disturbance of function by the com- 
ing in of a foreign something, a molecular derangement 
of spiritual substance. We know depravity by con- 
sciousness of it in ourselves and by its manifestation in 
the life of men. What it is previous to consciousness is 
inconceivable, as unknowable as the essence of spirit 
apart from its attributes. As to the origin of depravity, 
we can only say, going at once to the heart of religious 
thought, the normal life of the spirit is a life in most inti- 
mate union with the Creator, the source of its life ; trans- 
gression severed that union ; and the life of the spirit in its 
separation from the Creator, becomes of necessity a self- 



CONCERNING MORAL DEPRAVITY 



IQI 



life — a life which finds its spring and its end in self, an 
abnormal life. By the very fact of its being a self-life, 
it becomes a depraved life. 

362. Depravity Hereditary. 

Life is propagated, and in the propagation of life the 
attributes of the propagated life are also propagated. 
Life is a mystery, undefinable, perhaps inconceivable, 
except as the consciousness of a self-conscious being. 
But whatever it is, if life is propagated, it must needs be 
propagated with its own rather than with other attri- 
butes. That this is a fact is manifest from all history. 
Depravity in the sensibilities, in the conscience, and in 
the will, is universal ; it is found semper, ubique, et in 
omnibus. It may be modified in its form and power, 
but everywhere its presence is manifest. As certain 
families show in successive generations special and char- 
acteristic mental traits, so do families show a hereditary 
bias toward characteristic forms of vice and wickedness. 

363. Depravity and Responsibility. 

To measure the exact moral merit or demerit of men 
does not belong to man, and the attempt to do this does 
not belong to moral philosophy. To do this, one must 
be able to read the heart and to balance power and op- 
portunity against limitations, far beyond the knowing of 
the intent and motive. He alone who made man, and 
knows his nature, and knows the ruin wrought by the 
Fall, and also understands what touch of supernatural 
impulse and help comes to each individual, can measure 
responsibility and merit. But moral philosophy must 
consider the relation of depravity to responsibility. 



192 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



And this must be based upon a correct psychology of 
the will in its relation to other faculties of the soul. 

364. The Duty of Holding Depravity in Check. 

It will hardly be questioned anywhere that every man 
ought to hold the evil tendency of his nature under 
strict control. The denial of this would mean that a 
man may rightly, or must freely, indulge his evil pro- 
pensities. But the duty of holding depravity under 
control, implies that depravity is not a force which must 
needs dominate the will. The will, as will, is free. If 
the thought of vicious self-indulgence kindle a glow of 
pleasant sensibility, that brings no necessity of yielding 
to vice. The practical denial of this duty would turn 
men into beasts. 

365. Depravity Actually Held in Check. 

That men can hold their evil propensities under con- 
trol is manifest by the fact that they actually do this 
when they will. Drunkards resist a perverted appetite 
and become sober men. Men hold their anger firmly 
in leash, when they count it for their self-interest to do 
this. It is an element of " social culture" to restrain 
sensibilities and give no sign of their excitement, to 
school the face to be the mask of feeling. The worst of 
men, for bad ends, hold their evil impulses in restraint. 
The pugilist may be a glutton and a drunkard, but in 
his training he denies himself and " keeps his body un- 
der." A man's heart is full of hot revenge, but he 
holds it in absolute control until he pleases to indulge it. 
That self-mastery which bad men can exercise for bad 
ends, good men surely can exercise for right ends. 



CONCERNING MORAL DEPRAVITY 



193 



366. Sensibility not Dominant over Will. 

In our study of the will we reached the conclusion 
that the normal relationship of will to sensibility is not 
the relationship of subordination. Emotion naturally 
follows in the train of choice. Depravity does not reverse 
this normal relationship. For this reason also we must 
believe that men are under obligation to hold depravity 
in firm restraint. The punishment of crime by human 
governments everywhere proves that the natural sense 
of justice does not look upon depravity as neutralizing 
guilt. 

367. Fixedness in Evil not Inconsistent with Responsibility. 

It is to be noted also that the probability, or the prac- 
tical certainty, that a man will choose evil indicates 
neither the lack of freedom nor the absence of responsi- 
bility. Stability and certainty may have other ground 
than necessity. To deny this is to declare stable virtue 
to be impossible. In proportion as character becomes 
settled, the action of the will becomes uniform and cer- 
tain. There are good men whose moral choices are so 
certain that men build upon them as upon the uniformi- 
ties of nature. And in regard to some men there is no 
doubt that they will choose evil. But the fixedness of 
the good man's will exalts his virtue, instead of neutral- 
izing it, and the fixedness of the bad man's will aggra- 
vates, and does not palliate, his guilt. Fixedness of 
choice signifies a choice made, affirmed and reaffirmed 
till the soul refuses to reopen the case or to consider 
the question of an alternative. The fixedness of the 
Divine will is the immutable ground of all certainty. 
We conclude, therefore, that fixedness and certainty in 

N 



194 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



evil choices, which is the token of mature depravity, 
does not involve the loss of moral responsibility. 

368. Responsibility for Depravity Itself. 

There is an inherited depravity ; but not all depravity 
is inherited. If as soon as a soul comes to know good 
and evil, the will chooses the good and sets itself to 
deny indulgence to all depraved appetencies and to re- 
strain evil feeling, the native depravity left unnourished 
falls into feebleness. But depravity indulged, encour- 
aged, fed, and renewed in strength by personal trans- 
gressions, takes on an increment greater far than the 
original. For this personal increment of depravity 
every man is responsible ; it is the product of his own 
evil choices ; he has invited it ; it is his by creation. 
Men feed and fatten to a giant and a monster that infant 
evil which they should leave to perish of atrophy. 

369. Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do Right? 

It cannot be denied that many human beings are born 
into the world under conditions in which right doing is 
beset with exceeding difficulties. Poor and disordered 
nervous systems ; intellect feeble and clouded and left in 
ignorance ; sensibilities effervescing at the sight or the 
thought of evil ; conscience dull and weak ; will irreso- 
lute in withstanding base hunger ; evil soliciting and 
clamoring on every side ; the moral law dimly appre- 
hended ; the authority of the lawgiver scarcely recog- 
nized ; no high ideal before the eye of the soul — under 
such circumstances, if virtue survive it must struggle 
against fearful odds. To measure the merit or demerit 
of unfortunates thus born, and allot the due reward or 



CONCERNING MORAL DEPRAVITY 



195 



penalty, requires a knowledge that does not belong to 
man. Philosophy must here join with faith and believe 
that the Judge of all the earth will do that which is just 
in the final adjustment of destinies. 

370. Responsibility and Supernatural Help. 

The supernatural help which comes to men, a stimu- 
lus and a strengthening for right doing, is an element of 
responsibility. We are responsible not merely to the 
measure of that which is possible in our separation from 
the Creator, but for all that good which supernatural 
grace shall render possible. Philosophy must recognize 
the fact that man's spiritual nature lies en rapport with 
spiritual forces. "He giveth power to the faint, and to 
them that have no might he increaseth strength." With 
the proffer of this supernatural aid there comes responsi- 
bility, first for accepting it, and then for every moral 
achievement which that help renders possible. The 
victorious lives of men great in goodness show the 
moral possibilities of human nature, even when handi- 
capped, as it is at the start, by depravity. 

We nurse sturdy, strenuous virtue in ourselves better 
by binding the moral law about our souls and strength- 
ening the sense of moral obligation, than by petting our- 
selves, pitying our weaknesses, and palliating our faults. 



CHAPTER XIII 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 

371. Human Beings not Unrelated Individuals. 

Hitherto we have been considering the moral law and 
individual human beings under the law. This was nec- 
essary for the understanding of certain facts and princi- 
ples which pertain to men as individuals, and to all men 
alike. But the human race is not composed of mole- 
cules unrelated, or having only the accidental relation- 
ship of juxtaposition. The human inhabitants of the 
earth constitute one species. By the teaching of holy 
Scripture, and by all the tests which science employs to 
distinguish between species and mere varieties, the 
human race is shown to be one race. In their widest 
separation and in their greatest differences, every mem- 
ber of this race is related to every other. They sprang 
from common ancestors. There is one kind of life in 
all. The same nature with like attributes is found in 
all. In their bitterest hostilities men are brothers. 
They are bound by common bonds to the same God 
and Creator. The necessary relationships subsisting be- 
tween these brothers in the human family, embody and 
reveal certain moral principles. Some of these social 
principles must now receive our attention. 

372. Relationships Necessary. 

The various relationships of men with men are neither 
accidental nor optional, but in the highest sense neces- 
196 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



197 



sary. They have their ground immediately in the 
nature of man, and ultimately in the nature of God. 
Without these relationships the human race would per- 
ish ; or if isolated individual existence were possible, 
the individual in this isolation could not come to full 
personal development. Without society, large develop- 
ment of thought, conscience, or sensibility is impossible. 
By the mutual interaction of social forces, infant human 
beings grow to men of thought and power. 

373. Classes of Relationship. 

The necessary forms of human relationships may be 
grouped under four heads. First, the universal human 
brotherhood. This has been already referred to. Every 
human being is a member of the same species or uni- 
versal family. "God hath made of one every nation of 
men for to dwell upon all the face of the earth." The 
Christian religion very greatly emphasizes this relation- 
ship. 

374. Family Relationships. 

The second class of necessary relationships are those 
which are seen in the family, in the narrower sense of 
the word family. That there may be families there 
must be husbands and wives, parents and children. 
Husbands and wives are related to each other as to no 
other human beings, and the relation of parents and 
children is unlike any other relationship in the universe. 

375. Government and Subject. 

The third class of relationships is composed of those 
which arise from civil government. There must be 



I98 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

rulers and subjects. Men must have relationships as 
citizens with other citizens and with the State. 

376. Relationships of Mutual Assent. 

The fourth class of relationships include all those 
which arise through personal assent and choice. These 
are again divisible into two sub-classes : first, those 
which are formed by mutual consent and agreement, 
but which, when once entered upon, cease to be matters 
of mere consent, and come under the regulation of 
law; second, those relationships which have their origin 
in consent and agreement, which also have their form 
and limits fixed in the same manner, and which may be 
terminated at the pleasure of the parties. Some of the 
relationships of the second and of the third class fall 
also into the first of these sub-classes. In their incipi- 
ency, the marital relationship, and in the formation of a 
new government, the relations of rulers and subjects are 
matters of choice, arrangement, and consent ; but when 
once established they cease to be optional and come 
under the dominion of fixed law. The acceptance of 
the relation is optional, but not its form or termination. 
There are also relations which are optional at every 
stage ; they are formed, modified, and terminated at the 
pleasure of the parties concerned. Each of these 
classes of relationships must now be examined with re- 
spect to their essential form or controlling principle. 

377. First Class : a Common Relationship to the Creator. 

In considering the human race we find two funda- 
mental facts, plainly seen in the nature of things, and as 
plainly included in the essential principles of the Chris- 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



199 



tian religion. The first fact is that every human being 
holds the same fundamental relationship to the one God 
and Creator. The differences which exist among men 
in respect to condition cannot be exaggerated. From 
the idiot to the genius ; from the savage to the savant ; 
from Lazarus to Dives ; from the slave to the king ; from 
Nero to Paul, we find every possible gradation. Some 
of these differences are by no means unimportant. In 
the sight of God some of these differences are exceed- 
ingly great. They pertain to perfection of being and 
determine destiny. Some distinctions are indeed mere 
names. 

Princes and lords may flourish or may fade, 

A breath can make them, as a breath has made. 

But none of these differences affect the one common 
relationship which all men hold to the one Creator. 
Upon the same Divine will and care all depend for life ; 
the same Divine will gives moral law to all ; and before 
the same impartial Judge all shall stand at the last. 
We cannot too strongly emphasize this common rela- 
tion of all men to the one Creator. 

378. Brotherhood in the Race. 

The second fact is that all men hold the same rela- 
tionship to the one human race. Descended from the 
same first parents, all men inherit the same human na- 
ture, with the same essential attributes of good or 
evil. This means the essential brotherhood of man. 
That brother of ours may be a lordling who refuses to 
know us ; he may be a menial who does base work for 
scanty pay; he may be a brutal master, or a lying, 



200 



.INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



cringing slave ; he may be a prophet whose spiritual life 
shines like a star, much too high for our kinship ; he 
may be Caucasian, Mongolian, or Ethiopian ; but who- 
ever or whatever he may be, he is of the same species ; 
he is our brother. 

379. Equality of Natural Rights. 

A right is some advantage, privilege, or good which 
one person cannot take away or withhold from another 
without injustice or wrong-doing. That privilege or 
good which we may justly claim for ourselves is our 
right. Grounded in the two facts set forth above, we 
find the principle of equality in all natural rights. One 
God over all ; one human nature in all. Prove that 
some natural right belongs to one man, and you prove 
it for all men. This lord has an " unalienable right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" ; the peasant 
and the serf have then the same right. The rich man 
has the right to possess and enjoy the fruit of his own 
labor, and so has the poor man. If the priest has the 
right of "soul liberty," the unpriestly layman has the 
same right, and to the same degree. Right and justice 
are the same for all. 

380. Universal Benevolence. 

In the two great facts already cited we find also the 
principle of universal good-will or benevolence. Since 
all have the same natural rights, since right is right for 
all, and justice is the same for all, justice requires that a 
man have the same regard for the rights of others as 
for his own. To all men their own welfare is equally 
precious, and to God the welfare of each is equally 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



201 



dear; in the universal brotherhood it belongs, there- 
fore, to each to seek the good of each with equal solici- 
tude. To seek good for ourselves by depriving another 
of his equal rights is a breach of the universal brother- 
hood. This principle of universal good-will is the 
golden rule of the New Testament. If this principle is 
denied, we find no limit to the right of sacrificing the 
welfare of others to our greedy grasping after selfish 
advantage. 

381. Benevolence not Communism. 

The Golden Rule is a true principle of moral and 
social science. Universal benevolence is grounded in 
human nature, but universal benevolence does not sig- 
nify communism. No man can live another's life for him. 
Every man must carry his own load of responsibility. 
The activity of one cannot secure the personal develop- 
ment of another. The attempt to throw upon others 
that care for ourselves which belongs to us and not to 
another, and the attempt to do for others that which 
God intended that they should do for themselves, are 
alike destructive to individual welfare. For personal 
development and for moral discipline every person must 
bear burdens and responsibility for himself. Not com- 
munism but the benevolence of the Golden Rule is re- 
quired. In doing each his own work and bearing his 
own responsibility, men must work as friends and 
helpers, and not as enemies or as pitiless competitors. 

382. Resume, 

We find, then, in this most general relationship of 
men, two informing or controlling principles : First 



202 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



equality of natural rights ; secondly, universal benevo- 
lence. Whatever conduct violates these principles, is 
shown by this to be wrong. No other more special re- 
lationship can justly violate this most general. 

383. Relationships of the Second Class. 

The second class of social relationships are seen in 
the family. First comes the relationship of wedded 
life, then the parental, and then the filial. Some of 
these relations are, in their incipiency, matters of choice ; 
but even in their incipiency they are optional in respect 
to the individual only ; for the race they are the most 
necessary of necessities. They are entered upon in full- 
est freedom, but back of that freedom lies a necessity 
of nature. It must needs be that human beings put 
themselves into these relationships, which once formed 
must continue forever, the form and responsibilities of 
which they must accept, but have no voice in determin- 
ing. 

384. Marriage. 

The relationship of marriage is freely entered upon 
by consent and agreement. But the relationship of 
wedded life, when once established, comes under the 
control of law and cannot be terminated at the will of 
the contracting parties. Law, divine and civil, becomes a 
party to the contract. The duties and responsibilities of 
the marriage relation are not determined by agreement. 

385. Parentage. 

The same doctrine essentially must be laid down 
touching parentage as concerning marriage. With re- 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



203 



spect to the individual, parentage is optional ; but the 
duties and responsibilities of parentage, when once as- 
sumed, are fixed by nature and law, and are to the last 
degree imperative. 

386. The Filial Relationship. 

From the nature of the case the filial relation can 
have in it no element of choice. The child finds itself 
with certain parents and with certain environments, and 
however painful or unfavorable those conditions, they 
are unalterable. The moral law and not choice or 
agreement, determines the form and the duties of that 
unchosen relationship. 

387. Informing Principles of the Family Relationships. First, 

Fidelity. 

One aspect of the marriage relation is that of an in- 
dissoluble covenant. Two persons join their fortunes 
for life, giving themselves to each other and assuming 
very weighty obligations and burdens. This they do upon 
the ground of mutual confidence, upon the assurance 
that each will be true to the other in keeping the covenant. 
Only on the basis of a life-long covenant, to be faithfully 
kept, could marital responsibilities be assumed by either 
part}". The informing principle of the marriage rela- 
tion, in this aspect, is faithfulness, fidelity. A lack of 
fidelity, according to the degree of unfaithfulness, is so 
far a breach of the marriage covenant. 

388. Reverence, Obedience. 

The family is a natural organization ; not a combina- 
tion of similar elements, but an organic and vital union 



204 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



of unlike elements, forming a unity. This organic unity 
finds its headship, leadership, or representative unity, in 
the husband and father. So the nature of man and 
of woman indicates, and so the holy Scriptures declare. 
The recognition of this headship in the family unity, is 
expressed by such words as reverence and obedience. 
"Let the wife see that she reverence her husband," for 
he is the representative and executive head of the fam- 
ily. The combined will of the husband and of the wife, 
as one will, finds expression and energy of execution in 
the one head. Reverence is the willing recognition of 
the family unity in the headship of the husband and 
father. For the children this headship in the family 
marks a profounder difference of essential rank, and 
their recognition of this headship is expressed by the 
word obedience. These principles are fundamental to 
the existence of true family life. Without this reverent 
and obedient recognition of the family unity, there can 
be no true family life, but a collection of human units 
each struggling for self-assertion or, it may be, contend- 
ing for the mastery. 

389. Love, Self=sacrifice. 

We must here recall the essential nature of love. Love 
is more than sensibility, and something else than sensi- 
bility. Love is something else than finding in another 
person a source of pleasure. Beings and things may be 
sources of enjoyment, yet such that love would be im- 
possible, or if possible, highly unseemly or positively 
wrong. Love is choice, the choice of an object to which 
to give one's self, an object of self-sacrifice. According 
to the readiness for limitless self-sacrifice is the greatness 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



205 



of the love. This fullness of self-giving and self-sacrifice 
brings a deep movement of sensibility. Love is the 
informing and characteristic principle of the family or- 
ganization. Love is the principle which creates the or- 
ganism and controls its growth, as life controls the 
growth of a tree. It is in response to love that fidelity, 
reverence, and obedience become possible. Real family 
life cannot be maintained upon the principle of justice 
merely, so much given for so much received. Family 
life expresses self-sacrifice, in which each gives himself to 
each and to all, and lives for all. The divine ideal is 
given by Paul, "Even as Christ loved the church, and 
gave Himself 'for it." 

390. Relationships of the Third Class. Civil Government. 

A third class of social relationships arises from civil 
government. With no reference now to the form of 
government, we must say that civil government is a ne- 
cessity of nature and the appointment of God. "There 
is no power but of God. The powers that be are or- 
dained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, 
resisteth the ordinance of God." To administer justice 
and to punish crime, to defend men from injury and to 
promote the common welfare, to gain by combination 
advantages which cannot be secured by individual effort, 
there must be a controlling governmental agency. Aside 
from even- other need, bad men compel the establish- 
ment of governments. Xo nation, no tribe of men has 
ever been able to do without civil rule. Men complain 
against government ; they rebel and break it in pieces, 
and then straightway proceed to organize another, more 
imperious perhaps than the former. 



206 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



391. Theories of Civil Government. 

Touching theories of civil government, we need to 
consider here one question only. Does civil government 
find its ultimate ground of authority in the concessions 
and consent of the governed, or does it exist independ- 
ently of consent and by a necessity which is altogether 
above individual consent? Does civil authority derive 
its right from the consent of the subject or from the ap- 
pointment of God expressed in the constitution and ne- 
cessities of nature ? 

392. Not a Question of Form. 

This inquiry touching the ultimate grounds of civil 
authority has nothing to do with the form of government, 
whether patriarchal, monarchical, republican, or purely 
democratic. A monarchy may be as legitimate, as popu- 
lar, and may rest upon the consent of the governed as 
fully as any republic. Napoleon, " Emperor of the 
French," commemorated in his title his appeal to the 
people and the popular acceptance of the empire. On 
the other hand, the great American Republic, with popu- 
lar consent, suspends the right of habeas corpus, and 
establishes for the time a military dictatorship. The 
grounds of righteous civil authority are doubtless the 
i same in every form of legitimate government. 

393. Not a Question of Good Government. 

This inquiry concerning the ultimate ground of civil 
authority is not at all a question concerning just or un- 
just administration. Any form of government may be 
unjustly and wickedly administered. A republic may be 
mercenary and corrupt ; a pure democracy is most com- 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



207 



pletely irresponsible. It is possible also that an absolute 
monarchy should seek assiduously and promote effect- 
ively the welfare of the people, and for this a monarchy 
has some great advantages over a republic. 

394. Not a Question of Legitimacy, or de jure. 

This is not a question concerning legitimacy. The 
genesis of some certain government, the process by 
which it becomes a de facto government, the means by 
which a dynasty comes to the throne, is one thing ; the 
ultimate ground of civil authority is quite another matter. 
In one sense every government rests on force ; its founda- 
tion stones are cemented by blood. But this signifies 
only that force must be used in maintaining civil author- 
ity. Back of the force we must look for the right to use 
the force. In changes of administrations and in the es- 
tablishment of new governments there is an element of 
consent and agreement ; but consent does not explain 
the genesis of authority as authority. 

395. Not a Question of Limit. 

Our inquiry concerning the ground of authority does 
not concern the limits of civil authority. Let the author- 
ity be stretched to the utmost, or let it be held within 
the narrowest limits, upon what basis does authority exist 
at all ? By what right does civil authority come to you 
and to me and demand submission, with limitless penal- 
ties if we refuse obedience? 

396. Authority not Grounded in Consent. First Objection. 

To the theory that civil authority finds its ground in 
the consent and agreement of the governed, only this 



208 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



and nothing more, there are sundry insuperable ob- 
jections. These objections amount to a reductio ad ab- 
surdum. In the first place, if civil authority is grounded 
in the consent of the governed, then must that consent 
be the personal assent of every subject. For if one may 
consent for all, then at once the basis for authority is 
shifted from consent to something else. But if consent 
is the ultimate basis, then civil rule is binding upon those 
who give their assent, and not at all upon those who re- 
fuse and give their voice against it. It surely will not 
be said that on the ground of consent one hundred men 
have the right to govern ninety and nine who do not 
consent — that a consenting majority have the right to 
rule a protesting minority. 

397. One Generation Consenting for the Next. 

If civil authority rests absolutely upon the consent of 
the governed, then complete unanimity of consent cannot 
bind the next generation. Every individual of every 
succeeding generation must consent for himself, other- 
wise the government lapses into a mere usurpation of 
authority. But if it is said that consent is requisite only 
in the incipiency of the government, this is a full aban- 
donment of the principle that all just civil authority is 
grounded in consent and agreement. We have to do 
with an authority that lives through generations and ages. 

398. Non=consenting Law Breakers. 

Another objection to theory of consent is seen in this, 
that by this theory authority is stripped of all right at the 
very point where it must needs assert itself most vigor- 
ously. Government has then no authority over law 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



209 



breakers, for they of all men refuse assent. The most 
dangerous of all criminals, the anarchist, goes free. At 
every crucial point the theory of consent breaks down. 
The right of ten good men to restrain and punish one 
bad man cannot rest upon his consent, either present or 
past, actual or constructive. 

399. Born Under Authority. 

The naked, obvious fact is that authority exists inde- 
pendently of consent. Touching modes of administra- 
tion there must needs be a consensus of consent enough 
to give efficiency. But human beings are born under 
authority, a three-fold authority, the authority of parents, 
civil authority, and the authority of God. Neither of 
these authorities asks our consent that it may exist and 
assert itself. We have no part in the origination of 
either authority. If a citizen changes his country, he 
merely shifts the authority which holds him. He cannot 
escape authority except by fleeing from the dwellings of 
men and living in solitude. But if this solitude is in- 
vaded by other men, men fugitive like himself from so- 
ciety, they soon find themselves constrained to organize 
a rule which shall assert itself alike over those who con- 
sent and those who protest. 

400. Authority Administered by Men. 

Civil authority, whatever its genesis, must of necessity 
be administered by men. Even the Hebrew theocracy 
was so administered. The form and method of adminis- 
tration must therefore be matters of consideration, con- 
cession, and agreement. The right of reform and revo- 
lution inheres in the right of administration. This, 



210 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



however, is not an origination of authority. And in no 
proper sense do majorities rule minorities ; but since 
unanimity is impossible, the entire people administer the 
government by means of majorities. To this method of 
administering civil affairs the minority assents and wishes 
to have it so. But this is a method of administration, 
and does not touch the ground of authority. 

401. Ramifications of Divine Authority. 

Ultimate authority belongs to God. As the source and 
ground of all existence, for "all things were made by 
him," and "in him all things consist," the Creator has 
authority over all. But he has arranged that some part 
of his government of men shall be administered by men 
themselves. The holy Scriptures say to the child, 
" Honour thy father and thy mother " ; " Children, obey 
your parents in the Lord, for this is right." The Creator 
invests parents with a certain limited portion of his own 
authority, and commands the child to recognize that 
authority. In like manner civil government is God's 
arrangement for governing the world in civil affairs. The 
sacred Scriptures therefore declare the magistrate to be 
" God's minister" "attending continually upon this very 
thing." The authority which he exercised is declared 
to be a branch of the divine authority : "All power is 
of God ; the powers that be, are ordained of God." For 
this reason we must obey the magistrate, not from fear 
only, but for conscience' sake. 

402. Authority Ramifies Downward. 

The general principle is that authority always and 
everywhere ramifies from above downward, and not 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



211 



from below upward. He who has no authority cannot 
impart it to another. The sum of authority belongs to 
the Creator, and from him it ramifies downward accord- 
ing to his appointments and the nature of things which 
he has made. Civil authority finds its ground then in 
the divine authority, and takes its rise from the divine 
appointment. Administered within the proper limits, 
and according to God's will, it has power to bind the 
conscience. 

403. The Divine Authority Limiting Civil Authority. 

If civil authority has its ultimate basis in the Creator's 
authority, is " the right divine of kings to govern wrong " 
the legitimate conclusion ? Not this, but the opposite 
is the necessary conclusion. If the civil ruler is the 
" minister of God" to administer an authority which is 
above himself, then is his authority strictly limited by 
that which is given him. When the ruler exalts himself, 
and makes his government destructive of the welfare of 
the subject, disobedience may become a duty. Rebellion 
against tyrants may be obedience to God. This princi- 
ple helps to determine the due limits of civil authority. 
When the civil ruler undertakes to come between the 
individual soul and Creator, it is manifest that he has 
gone beyond his right. When civil laws assume to 
forbid that v/hich God has commanded, or to require 
that which God has forbidden, to repeal the Decalogue 
and to enact statutes contrary to it, we see again that 
the civil government has become a transgressor. In 
this principle we find the unchangeable constitutional 
rule which holds all civil government within righteous 
limits. 



212 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



404. Determination of Methods and Limits. 

Accepting the principle that all authority descends 
from above, it yet remains for man to determine the 
form and manner of the administration. Shall the gov- 
ernment be monarchical, aristocratic, or republican ? 
This determination, in times past, has commonly been 
brought about by long processes, in strife, in war, and in 
mutual concessions ; and foundations laid in one age in 
cement of blood, the next age has torn up and relaid in 
gore. This is man's folly, selfishness, and crime. Limits 
must be set to the sphere of civil government. By all 
manner of tentative and experimental processes, by 
enactment and repeal of enactment, by decision of 
courts and the growth of precedents, this work goes on, 
never finished. When general principles have been 
elaborated and accepted, their application still remains 
more or less a matter of experiment. New exigencies 
arise calling for new adjustments. This is a work of 
endless detail. Into this detail it is not the province of 
moral philosophy to enter. We consider here only the 
general principles which underlie civil government. 

405. Relationships of Ruler and Subject ; how Determined. 

From the principles considered above, it is plain that 
the relationships of the ruler and the subject cannot be 
determined by reference to the fiction of a compact be- 
tween the king and his subjects, or between citizen and 
citizen. If such a compact were made, it could by its 
force as a covenant bind only the contracting parties. 
But moral philosophy must look upon civil government 
as grounded in the necessities of nature and life, and as 
representing the Divine will. It must discern the moral 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



213 



elements in civil government, not as interpreting a com- 
pact, but as applying general and immutable principles. 

406. The Civil Organization to be Characterized by Justice. 

The informing principle of this third class of social 
relationships is justice — justice on the part of the ruler 
toward the subject, justice on the part of the subject 
toward the ruler, and justice in the law which defines 
the relations of the two parties. One chief purpose of 
civil government is to secure justice between man and 
man ; to protect the people and all the people against 
all forms of wrong ; to make every individual secure in 
all his rights. To accomplish these results, the govern- 
ment itself must be just. The ruler must be just and 
impartial in his ruling. This is the prime touchstone by 
which every law and every administrative act must be 
tried. On the other side the citizen must be just toward 
the ruler and the government. " Render to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar's." 

407. Government Benevolent. 

A second informing principle of civil government is 
benevolence. This is the purpose for which govern- 
ment exists. Benevolence, as here used, of course does 
not signify the giving of alms. But government is 
established for the benefit of the governed. The ruler 
does not hold his place for his own easement or advan- 
tage. If this is not so, then is government itself organized 
injustice ; it is exacting service from the many for the 
benefit of the few. But " the magistrate is the minister 
of God to thee for good" He that is greatest of all is 
servant of all : and he is made great for the sole purpose 



214 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

of being servant. Every law or public measure must be 
tested by the intent of benevolence. Any measure 
which has not the purpose and the fitness to promote 
the welfare of the people, has no reason for its existence, 
and no right to exist. 

408. The Duty of the Government not Self=perpetuation. 

The doctrine laid down above shows the utter fallacy 
of the proposition that the State may do that, and only 
that, which is necessary for its own preservation. In the 
presence of the Christian religion the Lycurgan notion 
that the individual exists merely for the State, cannot 
survive. If the government exists and operates merely 
that it may continue to exist and operate, there remains 
no reason for its existence. The government builds forts, 
maintains armies, equips navies — for what purpose ? To 
save a dynasty? To maintain intact a form of govern- 
ment ? To continue its own existence ? Not this at 
all, but that the people, the public weal, may suffer no 
damage; " ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica" The 
proposition that the State may do only that which is 
necessary for its own preservation, is a quick reductio ad 
absurdum. Why should the people bear burdens to 
maintain that which lays burdens upon them merely that 
it may continue to exist and lay burdens upon them ? 
The State educates the people, not merely that they 
may be intelligent voters, but that they may be able to 
win for themselves every kind of welfare. The State 
bristles with arms that there may be peace and security 
for all in every kind of work and enjoyment. When a 
government comes to exist for self-perpetuation merely, 
the time has come for a just revolution. 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



215 



409. The Principle Clear; the Application Difficult. 

The doctrine that justice and benevolence are the in- 
forming principles of civil government, is plain enough 
in the abstract, but exceedingly difficult in the applica- 
tion. Measures of general beneficent intent and effect, 
sometimes work damage to this or that individual. To 
draw the line between that good which is best secured 
through governmental agencv, and that other welfare 
which is better left to be wrought out by private enter- 
prise, demands the highest wisdom, a wisdom which 
must, in part at least, be derived from experiment and 
experience. One element of welfare is that personal 
development which comes of bearing responsibility. 
The highest qualities of manhood appear when men are 
left to hew and carve their own fortunes from the rough 
material of circumstance, without overmuch help or 
embarrassment from others. There must be a balan- 
cing of advantage and disadvantage. But it is as legiti- 
mate for the State to build a road for commerce as for 
war ; to build a schoolhouse as a fort ; to educate a 
civilian as a soldier ; to train men for self-support as for 
public defense. But expedience would seem to require 
that the agency of government be minified as much as 
possible, and the sphere of private enterprise be magni- 
fied — and this for the welfare of the individual. 

410. Justice Includes Protection. 

The administration of justice signifies, first of all, the 
protection of every subject in the undisturbed enjoyment 
of his natural rights. This secures for even- one a free 
field in which to work out his own welfare. For this 
object no small part of the machinery of government is 



2l6 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



devised. This defense from damage may be against a 
robber, against a slanderer, or against a foreign foe ; the 
principle is the same in either case. This work of de- 
fense is exceedingly great and far-reaching, and is 
equally just and beneficent. Men seldom appreciate 
its value except by its loss. 

411. The Right of Public Defense. 

The question of individual non-resistance toward in- 
jury, is not involved in the right and duty of civil gov- 
ernment to protect the subject. The individual often 
foregoes, indeed, the exercise of private defense, because 
defense and retribution are better exercised by the 
higher powers. In respect to government, the right to 
protect itself is inherent in its very nature. Without 
the right to do this, and the power also, government 
would cease to be government. Righteous authority 
leans upon power. The "magistrate bears not the 
sword in vain," but for solemn use. Even the govern- 
ment of God stands because he is omnipotent. 

412. Punishment. 

The administration of justice involves not only the 
restraint, but also the punishment of evil-doers. Much 
confusion of thought would be avoided if those who dis- 
cuss the subject of punishment would hold in mind its 
real significance. Punishment is not revenge, nor the 
expression of malevolence, nor is it retribution in the 
low sense of paying back evil for evil. Punishment is the 
expression of conscience. It is the testimony of right- 
eous authority against wrong-doing — that testimony 
which the nature of all moral beings demands. Con- 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



21 J 



science sees and feels the eternal distinction between 
right and wrong. Conscience feels a deep indignation 
toward the wrong. This indignant disapproval cannot 
be quenched or repressed. Conscience is in God, and 
his conscience can no more be quenched or denied ex- 
pression than can his justice, truth, or love. The ex- 
pression of the indignation of conscience is punishment 
This expression of conscience must needs make a differ- 
ence between well-doers and evil-doers. Not to make 
a difference would be unjust Punishment is a neces- 
sity of government Man's moral nature demands it 
It is the ultimate appeal of conscience unto conscience. 
When punishment ceases to be the voice of conscience, 
and becomes the voice of anger or malevolence, it loses 
the characteristic quality of punishment and becomes 
itself a crime. 

413. Government Must Punish. 

Xo government, human or divine, has been able to 
escape the necessity of inflicting punishment, in the 
strict sense of the word. Something more than mere 
curtailment of opportunity to repeat crime is necessary. 
Men of criminal intent must be made to understand 
that crime will be followed by painful consequences for 
the wrong already done — an infliction of loss and suffer- 
ing which shall express the aroused consciences of good 
men and of God. 

414. Punishment not Contrary to Benevolence. 

The purpose of government, as we have already seen, 
is benevolent The infliction of punishment is not con- 
trary to this principle. Punishment is not, in and of 



2l8 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

itself, a direct expression of love toward the offender, 
nor can it be analyzed and resolved into love. Punish- 
ment is the indignant testimony of excited conscience. 
The infliction of penalty ought, however, to be pervaded 
by benevolence. It seeks the welfare of the people. 
And from this benevolent intent the criminal himself is 
not excluded till his own obduracy, or the heinousness 
of his crime, put the welfare of the criminal beyond re- 
gard. Nor does the element of punishment in the 
treatment of the criminal render the benevolent intent 
less operative. The contrary effect is produced. If the 
criminal understands that his imprisonment and his daily 
tasks are punitive inflictions ; that he is incarcerated, 
not as an insane man for safe-keeping, but as a punish- 
ment for his crime ; that it is the testimony of con- 
science addressed to his conscience, this of itself will 
constitute a stirring call to repentance and reformation. 
Mere restraint sets watchfulness and power on the one 
side against watchfulness and wit on the other ; malice 
stirs up malice ; conscience mingled with benevolence 
and addressed to conscience moves the heart to repent- 
ance. Gushing sentimentality, which sees no guilt in 
crime and eliminates the element of conscience in the 
treatment of the criminal, renders the moral improve- 
ment of the criminal hopeless. 

415. Immaterial Interests. 

The protection of the people in the enjoyment of 
their rights signifies much more than defense from in- 
jury done to body or property. Reputation is more 
precious than riches. The most grievous of injuries is 
corruption of moral character. It is legitimate for the 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



government to defend the young, the inexperienced, 
those who are morally weak, from agencies which work 
for their moral ruin, and this is more important than to 
keep the orphan secure in the enjoyment of his patrimony. 
Among the corrupting agencies against which govern- 
mental protection is requisite, we must reckon that liter- 
ature which glorifies crime, defiles the imagination, and 
incites to lewdness ; obscene art, which through the eye 
engenders moral defilement ; the allurements of lotteries, 
gambling places, drinking saloons, and houses of shame. 
If the government cannot concern itself with the real 
welfare of the people, why should men lay down life in 
its defense? And why should indignant wrath fall upon 
the villain who only speaks an insulting word to the 
daughter, but to the same man be given the legal right 
and the privilege of alluring the son to drunkenness and 
debauchery with impunity ? 

416. The Present Tendency. 

In matters of detail the limits of just governmental 
action cannot be determined by the study of general 
principles. As the result of experience and of chang- 
ing conditions, the sphere of governmental control is 
continually changing. In recent times, on the one side, 
the drift has been away from the attempt to control the 
individual in respect to conduct, injurious perhaps, but 
not immoral per se and not directly damaging to others. 
Among these personal concerns we may mention the 
rate of personal expenditures, the style of dress and of 
living, and forms of religion. This drift in some coun- 
tries has already reached its utmost limit. On the other 
side there is a tendency to extend governmental control 



220 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

over private concerns, which in the vastness of their op- 
erations affect the welfare of all the people, and threaten 
to crush the individual and dominate the State. This 
includes such matters as the management of railroads, 
the acquisition of immense landed estates, combinations 
of capital to destroy competition. The civil government 
is also more and more relied upon to suppress agencies 
which injure the people partly by their own consent and 
choice. Here we find laws against the adulteration of 
food, against the manufacture and sale of intoxicating 
liquors, and the publication of obscene and corrupting 
literature. The drift in this direction is becoming 
stronger, and the end is not in sight. The bounds 
which justice and benevolence will set to this drift can 
be determined only by experience. 

417. The " Higher Law." 

Civil authority cannot nullify God's authority and 
must not assume to do this. The law of God repre- 
sents alike the nature of God, the nature of man, and 
the nature of things. That which negatives the divine 
law is contrary to the nature of man and the nature of the 
universe. It follows that no civil law can be expedient 
as a measure of policy which requires that which God 
forbids or forbids what God commands. But it does 
not follow that civil government shall undertake to ad- 
minister and enforce all the moral law. It does follow, 
however, that civil authority shall not ally itself with 
evil and license and protect transgression of the moral 
law. So far as civil law reaches, it should be a helper 
of the highest right. Shall the divine authority in its 
civil ramifying turn against itself and become self-con- 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



221 



tradictory ? Or shall men undertake to legislate against 
the Divine will? 

418. Licensing Evil. 

Legislation for the repression of an evil, where only 
repression is possible and extermination is impossible, 
in order to mitigate an evil which the law cannot uproot, 
is not contrary to the principle that civil rule must not 
ally itself with sin against God. Moses undertook to 
restrict and reduce the evil of unlimited divorce, without 
attempting to administer the full moral law in the case. 
But when the civil government sells the legal permission 
to do evil and by selling becomes a sharer in the gains 
which accrue from the evil doing ; when the government 
represses the wrong-doing by the many, that it may pro- 
tect the gains of the few to whom the gainful privilege 
has been sold for money paid into the public treasury, 
this surely is not repression but partnership. This is 
"framing mischief by a law." Such legislation is not 
practically repressive, for it makes the wrong-doing more 
gainful to those who engage in it. But a general tax 
may be at once repressive and righteous ; it makes the 
evil expensive and gives no protection. It gives no per- 
mit and confers no monopoly, but lays a burden upon 
every wrong-doer without distinction. But taxation has 
not proved successful in repressing the sale and use of 
intoxicating drinks. 

419. Civil Authority in a Republic. 

The principles which have been laid down touching 
civil authority, are true alike in a monarchy and in a re- 
public. In the one the sovereign comes to the throne 



222 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

by inheritance ; in the other the legislator, the magis- 
trate, the judge, comes to his office by designation of 
the people. In either case civil authority means the 
same and rests on the same ultimate basis. The vote 
which elects the president of the great republic invests 
him with no authority; it merely designates the man 
who shall exercise the authority which inheres in the 
place. But in both monarchy and republic there is an 
element of popular influence in the government which 
must be noted. The influence and responsibility of the 
people in the government of themselves ought to re- 
ceive careful consideration. 

420. The Subject a Ruler Also. 

In a monarchy, simple and absolute, civil authority is 
vested in one ruler. It is characteristic of a republic 
that the administration of the government is in the 
hands of the people. By means of majorities the citi- 
zens choose their own rulers, make laws for themselves 
and rule over themselves. The same people are sub- 
jects and rulers. From this it follows that upon the 
people, individually and collectively, rest the duty and 
the responsibility of good government. In the second 
place, the rule of the sovereign people, like the rule of 
the monarch, must be characterized by justice and 
benevolence. Not for private gain, not for the advan- 
tage of a class, but for the good of all, must laws be en- 
acted and government be administered. And for the 
sovereign people there is a supreme rule of right, a 
"higher law," the will of God. All the people are as 
absolutely under the supreme rule of right, as any one 
of them. In the third place, we note that in a repub- 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



223 



lie there are special difficulties in the way of good gov- 
ernment The law-breakers have an active part in shap- 
ing and administering the laws by which they themselves 
are to be brought to justice ; the voter of to-day may 
have been a criminal yesterday and may be a criminal 
again to-morrow ; folly and vice have as potent a part 
in the management of affairs as wisdom and virtue. 
These difficulties may become overwhelming and render 
good government impossible. Only a virtuous and in- 
telligent people are prepared to administer a republic. 

421. Forming Public Sentiment. 

In a republic there must be a sustaining consensus of 
public opinion, otherwise good government is impossi- 
ble. It becomes therefore the duty of a good public 
officer to do his best to develop a right public senti- 
ment. For a ruler in a republic three courses are open : 
he may undertake to represent the popular mind, right 
or wrong ; he may undertake to enact right laws and 
then leave them to become inoperative for lack of pop- 
ular favor ; or he may use his official influence to de- 
velop that moral sentiment among the people which 
shall secure good administration. In the first case he 
governs the people as a weather-vane governs the wind ; 
in the second case authority fails to assert itself and 
government exists only in name. A good officer will 
be a bold public leader in righteousness. 

422. The State a Unity. 

In a very deep sense the people who are grouped 
under one government constitute a unity. There is a 
community of interests and welfare. The advantage of 



224 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

the damage, the gain or the loss of each individual, is 
shared by all. While the personal molecules are ever 
changing, the State survives with interests and obliga- 
tions unimpaired. There is a continuity of existence, a 
continuity of welfare, and a continuity of obligation. 
Good and ill are perpetuated. The labors and sacrifices 
of the fathers win welfare for the children. From this 
unity of life and responsibility there arise very impor- 
tant consequences. 

423. A Community of Burdens. 

From the unity of the State there arises the obliga- 
tion for all the people, in proportion to their strength, 
to bear the burdens necessary to secure the welfare of 
all. In respect to no welfare of the body politic has 
any citizen the right to say, This is of no advantage to 
me ; in this good I have no share, and I will bear no 
burden for the sake of it. A tax is laid upon the prop- 
erty of some citizen for the support of public schools, 
but he has no children. He is not an importer of 
goods, nor an owner of ships, nor does he travel by sea, 
yet he is taxed to build lighthouses and maintain life- 
saving stations. He never saw the great river, but he 
must help clear its channel and improve its mouth for 
the passage of ships. But what citizen is not benefited 
by the education of all the people? What individual 
does not receive advantage from the prosperous com- 
merce of the country? In the prosperity of manufac- 
turing and trade, the lowest laborer receives a benefit. 
It is the duty, therefore, of all to share in the burden- 
bearing. In this community of burden-bearing, justice 
and the Golden Rule walk hand in hand. 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



225 



424. Majorities and Minorities. 

In the unity of the State is found the rational ground 
for government by means of majorities. When a ma- 
jority of the citizens determine the policy of administra- 
tion, this does not signify that the many triumph over 
the few and hold them in subjection, but that the State 
as a unity governs itself by means of majorities. How 
otherwise than by majorities can officers be elected and 
the will of the people be expressed ? Surely not by 
minorities. It is the will of all the people that the gov- 
ernment be administered by majorities In the hour of 
their success the majority should consider that for the 
time the minority has entrusted to them the keeping of 
their welfare. When, instead of this the majority in 
their hour of triumph, exult and mock and taunt the 
minority, it is no wonder that bitterness springs up, and 
citizens come to count each other as enemies. 

425. Dangers which Arise from Parties. 

One danger which is likely to arise from government 
by means of parties, was indicated at the close of the 
preceding paragraph The exultation of the victorious 
party and the corresponding chagrin of the other, may 
beget bitterness and alienation. This alienation, as the 
last result, may bring war and the destruction of the 
government. 

There is another more imminent danger. When 
good citizens are divided into parties, the bad come at 
once to hold the balance of power. The lawless classes 
understand this and make the most of it for the destruc- 
tion of efficient government. They demand concessions 

from each party as the price of their votes. If either 

p 



226 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

party adopts measures to suppress vice, the vicious ele- 
ment at once transfers its vote to the other party, and 
the attempted good government becomes futile. And 
in the heat of party strife, to keep themselves in power, 
each party vies with the other in making concessions to 
the worst elements of society; and so it comes to pass 
that the wicked bear rule by means of good citizens. 
This danger cannot be escaped so long as good citizens 
separate into parties upon minor issues, and count party 
success more important than the great measures of 
righteousness. At this point appears the inefficiency of 
republican forms of government. 

426. The Principle of Sacrifice. 

In the unity of the State it may chance that the wel- 
fare of all must be secured by the special danger and 
damage of some, as the hand must meet the blade which 
threatens the breast. When danger assails the State 
some individuals, and not all alike, must needs bear the 
brunt of the assault. The property of some must be 
taken, and some must risk limb and life for the good of 
all. In the unity of the public weal this principle of 
vicarious sacrifice finds its explanation. In this, also, 
the characteristic principles of civil society, justice, and 
benevolence, have a distinguished application. Justice 
and benevolence alike demand that sacrifice and dam- 
age, as well as benefits, shall as far as possible be shared 
by all. This signifies that damage of property incurred 
for the public weal, shall be shared and borne by all, 
and that for loss of limb or life in hazardous service 
for the State, compensation shall be made as far as the 
case admits. A pension for the maimed soldier or fire- 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



227 



man, and for the widow or child of him who falls in 
his country's defense, is a benevolence, but it is no more 
almsgiving than is the payment of a just debt. If one 
member of the unity is left to suffer alone, the unity is 
broken. 

427. Relationships of the Fourth Class. 

The fourth class of social relationships are those 
which are alike freely formed and freely terminated. 
To remain out of them, to enter into them, to withdraw 
from them, involves no wrong per se, and no necessary 
repudiation of obligation. These relations may be con- 
sidered under two sub-classes : First, those which are 
regulated by civil law, relations which must be formed 
and dissolved according to legal forms ; secondly, those 
which are unknown to civil law, organizations which 
from inception to dissolution are shaped and managed 
solely at the pleasure of the parties concerned. 

428. Voluntary Associations under Law. 

The voluntary associations which are recognized and 
regulated by civil law are commonly those which in- 
volve the ownership or management of property. In 
this class are business firms or corporations, banks, in- 
corporated institutions, and municipalities. For the 
conservation of property interests, for the protection of 
stockholders, creditors, or heirs, these organizations must 
be formed and conducted according to law, and their 
existence must be terminated at the last by legal 
methods. The law holds them till they have fulfilled 
all obligations, or until their ability to fulfill them has 
been exhausted. But these relations are nevertheless 



228 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



purely voluntary. To enter them or not to enter is 
purely optional ; and there is an easy way out, and 
when the members please, there is a legal method by 
which the organization may cease to exist. The inform- 
ing principle of these organizations is justice. The 'law 
watches over them to secure exact justice. For this 
cause alone does the law take account of their existence. 
They are beneficent so far as justice is beneficent. 

429. Associations Unknown to Law. 

These are voluntary associations formed and termi- 
nated at pleasure. For social enjoyment, for mutual 
improvement, for moral influence, for co-operation in 
work, the constituent elements come together, and 
when the bond becomes too weak they fall asunder. 
These associations exist either with or without organic 
forms. They hold no property, and the civil law takes 
no account of their existence. The informing princi- 
ples of these voluntary associations are truth, fidelity, 
and friendship. By this touchstone must the mutual 
relations of their members be tried. 

430. The Christian Church. 

Consideration of this form of social relationship has 
been deferred to the last because its characteristic prin- 
ciples belong to no one class. They belong to the first, 
to the two sub-classes of the fourth, and in some re- 
spects to the second. 

431. The Church as an Association of the First Class. 

After the analogy of the great human brotherhood, 
the Christian church is a brotherhood of closer relation- 



CONCERNING SOCIETY 



229 



ships and stronger sympathies. In the church universal, 
along with many differences, there is a unity of inward 
life, of moral purpose, principle, and sensibility. This 
is intended, of course, to apply to those who are Chris- 
tians in deed, and have the Christian spirit. As in the 
great human brotherhood, so in the church universal, the 
informing principles are justice and benevolence. In 
addition to these, according to the fullness of the Chris- 
tian life, there is a sympathy which goes beyond benev- 
olence, and becomes a love which expresses itself in 
self-sacrifice. In the Christian brotherhood, whatever is 
contrary to these informing principles is abnormal and 
wrong. 

432. The Church as an Organization of the Second Class. 

In some aspects the church has a likeness to the fam- 
ily. It is of divine appointment ; the higher wants of 
man's life and nature require it ; the form of the organi- 
zation is set forth in the holy Scriptures. As with the 
family in its beginning, entrance into the church is a 
man's own free act. Religion is voluntary or it is noth- 
ing. But when by his own free act the individual has 
entered into church relationship, he finds the form of 
that relationship fixed by divine appointment. The ob- 
ligations assumed are not optional. He cannot with- 
draw without fault ; it is as if one repudiated the obli- 
gations of the marriage covenant. 

433. The Church as an Association of the Fourth Class. 

In certain respects local churches resemble social or- 
ganizations of the fourth class. With reference to civil 
obligations, it is optional whether one shall enter such 



23O INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

an association ; but if one will enter into that relation- 
ship, it must be done, not according to his own pleasure, 
but according to the divine command. The church is a 
voluntary association, yet not one to legislate, but to 
administer the law of its Founder. But the church, the 
spiritual body, belongs to the second sub-class ; it is a vol- 
untary association unknown to the civil law ; it is formed, 
organized, managed, disbanded, or abandoned at the 
pleasure of those who belong to it. There are no civil 
penalties ; the discipline of the church cannot go be- 
yond the withdrawal of the privileges of membership. 

If a church be incorporated under the civil law for 
the purpose of holding property, in this aspect it is not 
a church at all, but a civil body corporate, like a bank 
or a manufacturing corporation. 



CHAPTER XIV 



CONCERNING SELF-LOVE 

434. The Nature of Self=love. 

The term self-love needs no elaborate definition. 
Self-love is a desire for one's own happiness and welfare. 
On the one side, it is a shrinking from pain, or the loss 
of enjoyment ; on the other, it is a desire for positive 
enjoyment, pleasure, or happiness. Self-love is an in- 
stinct or impulse natural to all sentient beings, and 
necessary to their self-preservation. It belongs to the 
lower orders of life in proportion to their intelligence 
and sensibility. The absence of this instinct would in- 
volve a self-contradiction of nature ; it would signify 
that pain and pleasure were equally agreeable ; that is, 
that pain is not painful, and that pleasure is not pleas- 
ing. Without self-love living creatures would surrender 
themselves to destruction and perish without a struggle. 
As a mere natural instinctive impulse without relation to 
conscience or will, self-love, as such, has no moral 
quality. It is no more a matter of right or wrong than 
is hunger or thirst or sleepiness. 

435. Self=Iove and Selfishness. 

In the moral deterioration which has come upon the 
human race, self-love has been perverted into selfish- 
ness and has broken away from nil right and reason. 
Self-love, therefore, like the bodily appetites, must be 
regulated and held in due control. This regulation of 

231 



232 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

self-love is a very important element of virtue. Self- 
love unrestrained and excessive is itself an evil, and is a 
copious fountain of evil. The normal limits of self-love 
we must now consider. 

436. Self =Iove to be Limited by Reason. 

All right action is in harmony with reason. Self-love 
must be guided and limited by reason, otherwise it 
becomes a blind, brutish eagerness for self-indulgence. 
We see illustrations of this in the mad pursuit of pleas- 
ure, in gluttony, drunkenness, and licentiousness. The 
same unrestrained self-love we see in the greedy pursuit 
of gain, an insatiate hunger for riches, which disregards 
the needs and the rights of others. Self-love unguided 
by reason is sure to fail of its object. 

437. Reason Distinguishes Between Enjoyments. 

The subjection of self-love to reason is seen in the 
choice of higher enjoyments in preference to the lower. 
Not all pleasures are of the same grade. A delight 
which is nothing more than a titillation of fleshly sensi- 
bilities, an excitation of taste or smell or touch, is surely 
not of the same worthiness or desirability, as enjoyments 
which spring from mental activity — and much more is it 
inferior to the happiness which springs from high moral 
action. The alliance of reason with self-love is indicated 
by preference for the nobler forms of enjoyment. 

438. Reason Prefers Lasting Enjoyments. 

The alliance of reason with self-love shows itself also 
in the choice of lasting happiness rather than pleasures 
which are merely transient Some pleasures are in their 



CONCERNING SELF-LOVE 



233 



nature brief, almost momentary ; others are permanent. 
The pleasures of eating and drinking must of necessity 
be short. The excessive pursuit of bodily pleasures is 
followed by a sense of disgust and degradation. On 
the other hand, there are enjoyments which increase 
by their continuance. The higher intellectual activities, 
pure and unselfish social pleasures, activities which 
express benevolence and carry blessings to others, the 
exercise of faith and love toward God, the soul en rap- 
port with the heavenly world, are sources of an enjoy- 
ment which does not decay and is followed by no re- 
action. Reason leads self-love to these sources of 
permanent happiness. 

439. Reason Leads to Self=denial. 

The guidance of reason in the action of self-love is 
seen in the practice of self-denial for the sake of greater 
good in the future. Intelligence and reason are ahvays 
mindful of the future. It is a brutish life that takes 
account only of the present. One hour of self-denial 
may bring years of real welfare ; one hour of eager, 
reckless self-indulgence may engender remediless ruin. 
Rational self-love takes account of the future even more 
than of the present. 

440. Reason Takes Account of Means. 

The control of self-love by reason is shown by the 
choice of means suited to promote the happiness which 
is sought. A rational seeking for happiness must needs 
embrace the use of the means from which happiness can 
flow. A rational desire for a harvest will lead a man to 
plow the ground, sow the seed, and tend the growing 



234 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



crop. To snatch eagerly at pleasure and at self-indul- 
gence, is not wise self-love, but folly. In this matter, as 
in many another, unripe fruit plucked untimely, withers 
in the hand. 

441. Self=Iove Limited by Duty. 

In the second place, self-love is strictly limited by the 
moral law, the law of obligation. Self-love must not 
undertake to gain enjoyment by transgressing the law of 
right. It does not meet the case to say that happiness 
cannot be won by wrong-doing. This is true ; but self- 
love is blind and human intelligence is shortsighted, 
and unless the will of God be held supreme, self-love 
will seek gratification through breaking the moral law. 
Self-love must therefore be held strictly subordinate to 
right and duty. Obligation outranks self-love. 

442. SeIf=love Limited by the Rights of Others. 

A normal limit is set to self-love by the equal rights 
of every other human being In the pursuit of good 
for himself, no man has the right to encroach upon the 
equal rights of another man. To every man his own 
welfare is dear and equally precious. Before God every 
man has an equal right to seek for his own welfare. The 
strong must not crowd the weak. Rights do not conflict, 
and the line between rights is not justly determined by 
the ability to push. Might does not make right This 
principle that self-love is limited by the equal rights of 
others, is nothing else than the Golden Rule, " Thou 
shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Self-love is right so 
far as it is matched and limited by an equal regard for 
the rights and welfare of all. 



CONCERNING SELF-LOVE 



235 



443. Self=love and Self=sacrifice. 

In moral character self-sacrifice outranks self-love. In 
the highest forms of moral action self-love seems to drop 
out of consciousness and the divine will takes its place. 
One hour of conformity to God's will is counted better 
than a lifetime of good feeling. Love, forgetful of self 
and delighting only in the object of love, rises into joy- 
ful self-sacrifice. Damon and Pythias have had few suc- 
cessors, but Christian faith has furnished numberless 
examples of joyful self-abnegation. First of all is Jesus 
Christ, who came into the world not to please himself, 
" not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give 
his life a ransom for many." Following him there has 
been a line of men who have not counted life dear to 
themselves, but have rejoiced to suffer for him. In this 
sublime abnegation of self through supreme love, is 
doubtless found the highest blessedness of existence. 

444. Selfishness. 

Self-love, unregulated and excessive, is called selfish- 
ness. It is selfishness in that it seeks supremely for the 
pleasing of self, and it is selfishness in the sense that it 
has its source in the deepest springs of the self-life, that 
is, a life of alienation from the Creator. Selfishness shows 
itself in an eager reaching after one's own pleasure with 
less regard for the satisfaction of others ; in unwilling- 
ness to do for others that which is expected from others ; 
in greed to get more than is given. When this eager 
reaching after gratification is joined with power, the 
rights of others are disregarded and trampled under 
foot. Selfishness is willing to make gains through the 
losses of others, and to enjoy pleasure through their 



236 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

pains. In its extremest forms it becomes cruel and 
fiendish. Parrhasius tortures his slave to death that he 
may paint his dying agonies. Looking upon the sufferer 
as an enemy, selfishness can take pleasure even in the 
anguish itself, without respect to other gratification 
gained thereby. Thus an instinct and impulse, innocent 
in itself and for all sentient life a necessity, becomes by 
lack of regulation the cruelty of a fiend. 



CHAPTER XV 



CONCERNING FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 

445. The Idea of Soul=liberty. 

Freedom of conscience is the right of determining 
for one's self one's own relationship to God, without con- 
straint or interference, except by rational and moral in- 
fluences. It covers, first, the domain of faith or relig- 
ious belief, and secondly, the domain of religious wor- 
ship and service. Freedom of conscience is to be 
distinguished from religious toleration. Toleration im- 
plies a concession granted as a favor ; but freedom of 
conscience is a right which belongs alike to every human 
soul. It may justly be counted an affront for a man to 
assume to tolerate in another the enjoyment of a natural 
and unalienable right. This soul-liberty, which has been 
won from intolerance and tyranny by unmeasured suffer- 
ing, is often grotesquely misconceived, and thus made 
utterly inconsistent with strong convictions and loyalty 
to truth. If freedom of conscience is to be honored 
and defended, it must be rightly understood. 

446. Not Indifferentism. 

Freedom of conscience does not imply that all forms 
of religious faith are equally true, and to be equally re- 
vered. There is an absolute truth in respect to all 
things. There is such a thing as absolute truth in re- 
ligious concernments. Between the propositions, There 

237 



238 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



is a God and There is no God, no middle ground is 
possible ; one of them is absolutely true and the other 
is wholly false. Diverse religious doctrines abound in 
categorical affirmations and denials. Some of these 
doctrines are true. Freedom of conscience does not re- 
quire that a man hold his beliefs feebly and always sub- 
ject to revision. It requires only this, that he freely 
accord to every other man that which he desires for 
himself, the right of determining for himself that which 
he shall hold as true. Freedom of conscience lays upon 
every man the responsibility of choosing right and truth 
for himself. 

447. Does not Forbid the Use of Rational Influences. 

Freedom of conscience does not forbid the use of 
moral and rational influences for or against religious be- 
liefs. Truth and falsehood, doctrine and denial, may 
contend with the weapons of reason ; they may hurl the 
darts of invective, satire, and mockery ; they may im- 
plore with tenderness and tears — for all this lies in the 
field of moral influence. In this moral conflict, what- 
ever privilege or right is claimed for one form of faith, 
is to be freely accorded as the right of all. 

448. Only the Right to Hold and Enjoy. 

Freedom of conscience is the right to hold and enjoy 
one's own faith without molestation, but it does not im- 
ply the right to thrust our faith upon others, or to force 
the teaching of unwelcome doctrine upon unwilling 
hearers. If a religious teacher changes his faith, it is no 
part of his right to obtrude his new faith upon those 
who do not desire it, and if his former adherents refuse 



CONCERNING FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 



239 



his instruction and dismiss him from his place of leader- 
ship, they do him no injustice. It is hard to conceive 
anything more senseless than the charge of intolerance 
and persecution which is so often made against those 
who do no more than refuse the instruction of a teacher 
whose doctrine they count false and unsafe. The vio- 
lence done to freedom of conscience in such a case, is 
found on the side of the teacher. 

449. Disapproval of False Doctrines. 

The principle of soul-liberty does not forbid the ut- 
most moral disapprobation toward doctrines which are 
counted false and dangerous. Such doctrines taught 
among the people cannot do otherwise than awaken 
deep apprehension and displeasure on the part of good 
men. The contention of truth against falsehood is very 
much more than a trial of dialectic skill ; it engages 
heart and soul. Freedom of conscience does not signify 
the opportunity of corrupting the young and the unwary, 
while good men stand aloof and say, " Hands off ; every 
man has a right to be heard !" Every man must, indeed, 
bear the responsibility of electing his own belief, but by 
all moral means falsehood is to be resisted. 

450. Not a Shield for Immorality. 

The idea of soul-liberty is utterly perverted when it is 
made a defense for immorality. Freedom of conscience 
is not immunity for vice and crime. The most notorious 
and grotesque illustration of this perversion furnished by 
this generation is Mormon polygamy. Under the plea 
of religious liberty the Mormons claim immunity in im- 
morality destructive of the foundations of human wel- 



24O INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

fare. Yet, a great educator commended them for the 
battle they had waged in behalf of freedom. Crime com- 
mitted by Mormons, Jesuits, or Thugs, in the name of 
religion, is crime none the less. 

451. Not Freedom to Sow Seeds of Vice. 

Freedom of conscience does not signify the right to 
disseminate literature which engenders and fosters vice 
and crime. This principle is a corollary from the pre- 
ceding paragraph. But whenever an attempt is made 
to suppress the agencies which promote crime, at once 
a cry is raised against this curtailing of personal liberty. 
What kinship is there between the right to adjust unmo- 
lested one's own spiritual relations with his Creator, with 
the opportunity unhindered to corrupt the young by in- 
sidious temptations to vice ? 

452. The Denial of Soul=liberty Unjust. 

A man's personal relationships with God lie outside 
the sphere of civil government. Civil rulers cannot 
know the inward life of men, and must not interfere in 
that life. No man can work out a good destiny for an- 
other, and religion is nothing unless it be voluntary ; 
every individual must bear the consequences of his own 
choices, and therefore no one should embarrass another 
in making that choice, the results of which, whether good 
or ill, he alone must experience. To help another, by 
rational and moral means, to distinguish between truth 
and error, and to choose the good, is the greatest benefit 
which one person can bring to another. But interfer- 
ence by agencies which do not address reason and con- 
science is a great wrong. 



CONCERNING FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 24 1 



453. Intolerance Futile. 

It is true that many persons use their liberty to their 
own injury. They believe that which is false ; they love 
that which is evil ; they worship every kind of mental 
idol ; they work out their own remediless ruin. But the 
remedy cannot be found in coercion. Force cannot 
control the spiritual attitudes of men toward God. If 
force be used, it fails of its end. Force can gender hy- 
pocrisy; force can secure conformity to a ritual; it can 
drive truth into caves and mountain fastnesses ; it can 
bring brave souls to martyrdom ; but force cannot gen- 
der faith nor build up righteousness. 

454. Intolerance Destructive. 

Not only does persecution — even the persecution of a 
false religion — do no good to the true, but it does un- 
measured damage. Persecution makes the persecutor 
and the truth odious. Religious intolerance makes infi- 
dels as well as hypocrites. Truth suffers more when it 
persecutes than when persecuted. 

455. Freedom Abridged by Assumed Authority. 

Freedom of conscience is most violently restricted by 
positive pains and penalties. A milder restriction is 
sometimes imposed by the exercise of undue authority. 
This may be done by parents toward their children, and 
even when the children have reached an age at which 
they must needs act largely for themselves. Husbands 
sometimes assume to exercise a like control over the re- 
ligious professions of their wives. There is a place, in- 
deed, for legitimate influence, but even influence must 
not be pressed to the point of coercion. 

Q 



242 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



456. An Established Church. 

As it is a violation of soul-liberty to require uniform- 
ity of religious faith, so it is the same to compel men to 
pay for the propagation of a faith which they reject. 
This is done when the civil government levies taxes upon 
all for the maintenance of a State Church. This makes 
men unwilling sharers of the worship and unwilling 
propagators of the doctrine of such church. 

457. Discriminating Favors. 

Preferences shown and discriminations made by the 
civil government for the holding of certain forms of re- 
ligious faith, is a wrong done to freedom of conscience. 
Law-abiding citizens have equal rights under the law, 
but to bestow special favors upon one, is to limit the 
rights or privileges of another. Civil law must not dis- 
criminate between men on account of that which the 
law has no eyes to see and no right to recognize. And 
patronage is worse for religion than attempted repression. 
The favor of Constantine wrought deeper damage upon 
the Christian religion and the clergy than the sword of 
Diocletian. 

458. A Distinction. 

There are religious faiths which are something else, 
either more or less, than merely religious. They render 
their adherents something less than loyal citizens ; they 
bring the citizen under a foreign authority, and in effect 
make him an alien. So far as this is done the civil au- 
thority has the right to take account of it. In accord- 
ance with this principle it has been judicially declared 
that the religious oath of the Mormons is something else 



CONCERNING FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 243 

than religious, and that in its civil aspects it is incon- 
sistent with loyal American citizenship. This principle 
has other applications than to the Latter Day Saints of 
Utah. 

459. A Second Distinction. 

A second important distinction must be made. For 
the government to require the holding of John Calvin's 
doctrine as the condition of civil preferment, or to dis- 
criminate against the faith of John Wesley or of Roger 
Williams, would be violence done to the rights of con- 
science. But that which the law must not do, the indi- 
vidual elector may do without injustice. If the consti- 
tutional law should say, No red-haired man shall sit in 
the congress of the United States, it would be a flagrant 
wrong ; if the elector says, I will never give my vote to 
a man having red hair, he may well be counted gro- 
tesquely foolish, but no charge of injustice can be made 
against him. It is no wrong to a candidate for office to 
make inquiry touching his religious faith and character. 
If an atheist choose to try, on the basis of agnosticism, 
whatever destiny the future has in store, he has the full 
natural right to do this, — God alone is his judge, — but 
his unbelief is a sufficient reason for my withholding my 
help to place him in a position of advantage for weaving 
his atheism into civil legislation. I will not place in his 
care the educational agencies for molding the minds of 
the young. But his freedom of conscience is nowise 
impaired by my withholding my vote, for he has no 
claim upon my vote. 



CHAPTER XVI 



CONCERNING PROPERTY 

460. The Right of Private Ownership. 

All men everywhere hold property in private posses- 
sion and ownership. This has always been so. The 
consciences of men recognize this private ownership as 
just and right. God recognizes the same. The Deca- 
logue recognizes and defends private ownership. One 
important end of civil government is to ensure security 
to property rights. It is not easy to see how the affairs 
of the world could be adjusted and conducted without 
the recognition of private ownership. The right to hold 
property is so deeply rooted in the instincts, the con- 
sciences, the customs, and the necessities of mankind, 
and so intrenched in the divine law, that we accept it as 
a fundamental principle. 

461. The Idea of Ownership. 

Ownership signifies the right of exclusive use, the 
right to hold and to use, and the right to exclude others 
from a like possession and use. The right to use and the 
right to exclude others from a like use are both essential 
to ownership. The citizens of a city have the right to use 
the streets and public parks ; but this does not constitute 
ownership, for they cannot exclude others from the same 
use. Where from the nature of the case there can be no 
exclusive possession, there can be no ownership. No man 
244 



CONCERNING PROPERTY 



245 



owns the uncaught fish of the high seas, or the glories of 
the sunset clouds, or the sunshine and the rain. 

462, Ownership Grounded in Production. 

The right of private ownership is grounded in the fact 
that the product of a man's labor is his own. Wealth is 
the product of labor expended upon the raw material 
which God has provided in nature. Labor is requisite, 
first, to appropriate the material, to get it in possession ; 
secondly, to fit the raw material for use. A man's 
bodily and mental faculties are his own ; their activities 
are his own ; therefore that which is produced by his 
labor is his own. He may rightly use that which he 
has produced, and may justly exclude others from its 
use. 

463. Ownership Grounded in First Appropriation. 

In the second place, ownership may be grounded in 
acquisition and possession with no rival claimant — that 
is, upon first possession. A man who takes a fish from 
the sea, owns it. It was held in possession by no one ; 
this man has gotten possession ; he has dispossessed no- 
body ; there is no rival claimant — therefore it is his by 
exclusive right. In getting possession of it he, and he 
alone, has expended labor upon it, and whatever value 
pertains to it is the product of that labor. In this man- 
ner uninhabited lands are taken possession of by the 
first comers, and held in ownership by the first users. 
Mineral treasures are held in ownership by the discov- 
erers. When the previous possessors cannot be known, 
lost articles are held in ownership by the finders. Some 
limitations of this general principle are stated farther on. 



246 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

464. Ownership by Exchange. 

In the third place, the right of ownership may rest 
upon exchange. One man by his labor produces a 
harvest of wheat, another by his labor produces cloth. 
By mutual consent and agreement they exchange the 
products of their labor, a bushel of wheat for a yard of 
cloth. In this case the original ownership rested upon 
first appropriation or upon production. The secondary 
ownership is based upon the right of the owner to trans- 
fer to another the exclusive possession and use. He 
places the article in the possession and control of the 
other and surrenders his own claim forever. Thus the 
second owner holds it with no rival claimant. 

465. Ownership by Gift. 

This is like the preceding, except that there is no ex- 
change of property. Transfer by gift consists of two 
elements : first, the putting of the property into the pos- 
session and control of another ; second, the quitclaim 
or surrender of all further right of possession or use. 
When this transfer and quitclaim is made with the un- 
derstanding that it is final, it becomes final and cannot 
be withdrawn. Under this head comes the ownership of 
property by testament and by inheritance. The last will 
designates the person to whom the property is given, and 
by death the quitclaim of the former owner is made. In 
case of inheritance when death has established the quit- 
claim, the law designates the parties who shall succeed to 
the possession of the unowned property. Or, in the ab- 
sence of legal heirs, the property escheats to the State — 
that is, all the people take the ownership by virtue of 
possession with no rival claim. 



CONCERNING PROPERTY 



247 



466. Ownership and Public Policy. 

The most difficult problems touching the ownership of 
property, are questions of public policy, rather than of 
moral philosophy. Undoubtedly the Creator intended 
the surface of the earth to be the dwelling-place of the 
human race, for the benefit of all, and not for the enrich- 
ment of the few. But how shall that universal benefit be 
best secured ? Shall the land be held in private owner- 
ship as men take possession of it for use, or by fraud or 
violence ; or shall it be divided into equal parcels for the 
free use of all who wish ; or shall it be held by the State 
as the joint, undivided possession of all, and rented to 
users for the benefit of all ? This is largely a question of 
public policy, and this would be especially true in the 
first settlement of a country, when as yet no private 
ownership had been acquired. To this time all civilized 
nations have adopted the policy of private ownership. 
The fact that the value of improved lands lies so much in 
that which labor has wrought, and so little in the un- 
touched soil, the wild land priced at one dollar twenty- 
five cents per acre, the improved land worth fifty, or five 
thousand, or five million dollars per acre, and the diffi- 
culty of handling the immense increment of value which 
labor has brought, in separation from the very small 
original value, will be likely to hold civilized nations to 
this ancient and inherited policy. 

467. Estates and Landlords. 

The question of limiting landed estates is also a ques- 
tion of policy. It is surely better that there be many 
owners of the soil, each one working his own land, than 
that there be a few great landlords with many renters or 



248 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

laborers for hire. It is no injustice to refuse to a man the 
possession of immense tracts of land of which he has no 
personal need, and to hold such land for those who are 
perishing for its use. Great landed estates are not for 
use, but for the exclusion of others and for the exaction 
of rent. The public welfare is the law of public policy, 
but no policy which violates moral principles can work 
well for the public welfare. 

468. Vested Rights. 

A question of no small difficulty, a question of right 
and of public policy alike, arises in respect to certain 
ancient holdings and privileges. For example, many 
generations ago a hostile army overran a country, seized 
upon the lands, divided them among their chiefs, and 
held the former occupants as serfs. In the lapse of time 
the serfs have disappeared by rising to the condition of 
free citizens ; but the lands have come down in immense 
holdings to the heirs of the old plundering chiefs, and 
the actual tillers of the soil pay heavy rent to the great 
landlords. As the result, a few men are immensely rich 
with incomes derived from holdings which represent no 
benefits conferred upon mankind, and the many unable 
to get land for themselves are held in the condition of 
renters, or of workers in a market overstocked with labor. 
Here is a problem of right, as well as a question of public 
policy. 

469. The Nature of the Problem. 

In respect to right, it must be said that ownership by 
mere conquest is ownership by robbery ; possession is 
gained, but not rightful ownership. The military chiefs 



CONCERNING PROPERTY 



249 



could not confer upon others a right of ownership which 
they themselves did not possess. Successive transfers 
could not create ownership, it could only remove the hold- 
ers to an increasing distance from the original spoliation. 
But time has rendered restitution impossible. The orig- 
inal owners are gone, and the line of heirship is utterly 
destroyed, or cannot be traced. The serf has ceased to 
be servile, and his blood has mingled, perhaps, with the 
blood of the great lord. What are the equities in the 
case? Have the holders, with such a ground of owner- 
ship, the right on moral principles to hold the lands and 
exact rental forever ? 

470. Limitation of Rightful Ownership. 

There is an ownership to which no just limit can be 
set. If a man raise ten thousand bushels of wheat, but 
has need for only one thousand ; if he build a hundred 
houses, though he can dwell in no more than one ; if he 
dig gold from his lands beyond the counting, his right of 
ownership is not impaired by absence of personal need 
or of actual use. Does possession gained by conquest 
and transmitted by heirship confer a like limitless right 
of ownership ? 

471. Ownership Grounded in Mere Possession Limited. 

It was said above that discovery and occupancy with 
no adverse claimant gives ownership. But occupancy 
means more than discovery ; there must be appropria- 
tion for actual use. The berry picker upon the com- 
mons owns the berries which he actually picks, not all 
that he can see, or all that he can enclose within the 
limit of four stakes driven into the ground. And the 



2 50 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

ability to drive away other claimants does not confer 
ownership. So with the robber-baron. Even if the 
lands seized upon are wild lands, his ownership is limited 
by reasonable need and actual use. 

472. Ancient Holdings Subject to Public Policy. 

The historic illustrations of ancient landed estates are 
found in the landed aristocracies of the old world. The 
Norman chiefs appropriated the soil of England. Their 
possession of the country began in conquest. This con- 
quest and spoliation could confer no moral right of 
ownership. Their great estates have come down more 
or less impaired to their modern descendants and suc- 
cessors. Their title is not like ownership grounded in 
production. There is possession only, against which all 
rival claims have long since perished. This ownership is 
therefore subject to the requirements of public policy. 
No wrong is done in requiring such holdings to be 
broken up and reduced to the conditions of absolute 
ownership. The method of doing this must be in har- 
mony with all the equities in the case. 

473. The Increment of Value from Labor. 

In breaking up the great holdings of land, account 
must be taken, in the interest of the present holders, of 
the immense increment of value derived from labor since 
their original acquisition. It may happen, therefore, that 
the breaking up of ancient estates will entail little loss 
upon the present holders. The signs of the times indi- 
cate a probable process something like the following : 
a public sentiment forcing legislation which will operate 
to reduce rents ; a continuance of this movement till 



CONCERNING PROPERTY 



251 



holdings of land become less profitable than other forms 
of investment, and so much less profitable as to be less 
desirable ; then legislation will render it possible for ten- 
ants to become owners ; and then the great estates will 
be gradually divided and distributed. In these sales, 
partly voluntary, partly made compulsory by legislation, 
the sellers will be awarded such prices as will render the 
sale a gain rather than a loss. The purchaser will be 
enriched by passing from the condition of a tenant to 
proprietorship. The public welfare will be promoted by 
the multiplication of small land-owners. Uncultivated 
land will be brought under cultivation. The land will be 
more fully and better cultivated, and will be able to sup- 
port a larger population. This is the peaceful revolu- 
tionary movement, for righting the ancient wrong, which 
seems to be indicated by the present social drift 



CHAPTER XVII 



CONCERNING THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN 
RELIGION 

474. The Christian Religion Grounded in Ultimate Principles. 

If we count the Christian religion true, we must of 
necessity believe that it is the expression of a true moral 
philosophy. We must believe that it is grounded in the 
nature of God, and in human nature. The infinite 
reach of the Christian scheme, springing, as it does, from 
the eternity past ; embodying preparatory stages of hu- 
man history; fully revealed in this final age, the "last 
times" ; expecting the regeneration of all things; look- 
ing forward through the eternity to come ; having to do 
with things in heaven as well as on earth — this limitless 
scheme carries in itself the demonstration that it repre- 
sents no local or transitory phase or form of moral life. 
It expresses eternal principles ; it cannot do otherwise. 
The Christian religion meets the highest demands of the 
human intellect. It has its mysteries, but it never flouts 
reason by follies of thought, by self-contradictions, or by 
the denial of intuitive truth. 

475. A Philosophy Implies Comprehension. 

A true philosophy of the Christian religion implies a 
right comprehension, and a comprehension not wholly 
inadequate, of Christ and his work. The facts must be 
correctly apprehended as facts, otherwise they cannot be 
explained with reference to their principles. 
252 



ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION 253 



We account the Christian scheme as the divine method 
of saving sinners — a fallen, depraved, guilty race. We 
do not look upon it as a method of developing a race in 
process of evolution from lower orders of life. The facts 
of the Christian religion, and of human history, do not 
harmonize with such a conception. The holy Scriptures 
rehearse the story of a primal fall, and treat the deprav- 
ity of men as a guilty life. The very heart and soul of 
the Christian religion is atonement for sin. In paganism 
the need of atonement for sin stands out in gloomy dis- 
tinctness as the great conscious need of the human soul. 
By gifts, bloody sacrifices, and self-inflicted suffering, 
they try to expiate their conscious guilt. In Judaism, 
with impressive ceremonial grouped around bleeding 
victims and smoking altars forever unsatisfied, and in 
Christ, the sin-bearer, the " Lamb of God," atonement 
for sin stands as the central historic fact. This historic 
fact must be our point of departure. And a philosophy 
of the Christian atonement implies some explanation or 
theory of the atonement itself. We here accept without 
discussion that explanation of the atonement which ac- 
counts Jesus Christ as the sinner's representative substi- 
tute for penalty and for righteousness. The sublime 
simplicity of this historic fact of the atonement — a moun- 
tain summit lifting itself into the eternal silence, its mean- 
ing declared, but its philosophy unexplained — signi- 
fies that any attempted philosophy must be reverently 
simple. 

476. A Reason for the Purpose of Redemption. 

We look, in the first place, for a rational explanation 
of the divine purpose to save a fallen race. In the love 



2 54 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

of God we find a fountain from which all purposes of 
goodness and grace may flow. In the moral nature of 
man appears a correlative ground of the divine intent. 
What is man that God should be mindful of him ? Shall 
God undertake the salvation of beasts, of which the 
Creator said, "Let the earth bring forth," made of dust 
only, and quickly returning in their totality to dust ? In 
the moral nature of beings created in the likeness of 
God, endowed with immortality, with capacity for shar- 
ing the divine blessedness, or doomed to an alternative 
destiny of moral ruin and miseiy, in this high moral 
nature of man we find the rational explanation of the 
entire plan of revealed religion. Any account of the 
origin and nature of man which takes away this his crown 
of glory, robs the Christian religion of all rational ground 
for the divine self-sacrifice for man's sake. 

477. Why the Written Revelation ? 

The human being is wedded for this present time to 
matter. It is normal for him to receive knowledge 
through his bodily senses. Through his senses the soul 
is addressed by means of signs and symbols. The whole 
material world is a storehouse of symbols of thought. 
And not only this, but by the pestilent touch of sin the 
spiritual nature of man has become gross and dull, slow 
to receive spiritual impressions, and unresponsive. See- 
ing, men see not, and hearing, they hear not. In this 
condition of man there is need of a revelation which 
shall address the eye and ear, and address men inde- 
pendently of their subjective spiritual state. There is 
need of a revelation which shall stand for God in the 
world, a sign of the divine presence among men, having 



ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION 255 

a positive objective existence. In the two-fold nature 
of man, and in the inertness of his spiritual nature, we 
find the need and the rational ground of the written 
revelation brought to the world in the Christian religion. 

478. Possibility of the Incarnation. 

The possibility of the divine incarnation and the ra- 
tional ground of it are found in the likeness of the divine 
nature in man. God created man in his own image 
and as a manifestation of himself The great elements 
of man's spiritual nature have a likeness and a corre- 
spondence with God's being. That which is true and 
rational for man is the same for God. Man is able to 
think God's thoughts. And the normal life of the 
human spirit is not a life separated from the Creator, 
but in closest union. The divine and the human are 
normally in touch. In this likeness of human nature to 
the divine and in this normal spiritual union we find 
the possibility that God should be manifest in human 
nature, that the divine Word should become flesh and 
dwell among men. There is in this nothing to offend 
pure reason. There is somewhat in it which is beyond 
man's current experience, but there is nothing of which 
one can say that it is contrary to the divine nature or to 
human nature. The incarnation of Jesus Christ is rea- 
sonable. 

479. Limitation of the Divine Manifestation. 

The necessary limitation of the manifestation of the 
divine nature in Christ is found in the limitations of 
human faculties. The divine indwelling could do no 
violence to human faculties or human life. Through 



256 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



faculties infantile and undeveloped nothing distinctively- 
divine could perhaps be expressed. Even mature 
human intelligence, if seen in an infant, would seem 
monstrous. Through the largest and highest human 
faculties th'e expression of the divine life must be lim- 
ited. Here we have the rational ground for the limited 
manifestation of the divine Word in Christ. He ex- 
isted "in the form of God," but in the incarnation he 
must needs take "the form of a servant" and be "made 
in the likeness of men." 

480. Wherefore the Incarnation ? 

The human race had lost the true conception of God. 
The idea of the divine character, the blended holiness 
and love, had been lost from the minds of men. Words 
and descriptions could not give this conception. Law 
could not put into the minds of men the true idea of 
Jehovah. Here was a deep need of the incarnation, to 
the end that Jesus might say, " He that hath seen me, 
hath seen the Father." There was almost an equal 
need of giving to men the idea of perfect human char- 
acter and life. Words could not give it, and there was 
no man on earth whose life could give it except as an 
approximation. And whatever excellence of character 
there might be, stood before the world with no author- 
ity to say, I am a perfect example for all men and all 
generations. In Jesus Christ the world was given the 
needed ideal of perfect human nature, a life "holy, harm- 
less, undefiled, and separate from sinners." And by the 
indwelling divinity the life of Christ became authorita- 
tive ; it was the moral law written in a divinely human 
life. Still further, and it may be with a deeper neces- 



ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION 25/ 

sity, the divine Word was made flesh that he might be- 
come the representative sin-bearer for the race ; that in 
human nature he might bear the sins of men and might 
have the right to represent his own. These considera- 
tions seem to show a rational ground and a necessity for 
the incarnation. 

481. The Significance of the Atonement. 

Wherein lay the necessity of atonement or expiation 
in order that sin might be forgiven ? Why without the 
shedding of blood could there be no remission of sin ? 
Was it a spectacle of suffering needful to soften the 
hearts of wicked men and lead them to penitence? 
Was it a necessity of the divine government that penalty 
be inflicted somehow and somewhere lest law fall into 
dishonor? In these things reason finds no sufficient 
ground for atonement by the shedding of blood. The 
atonement expressed the conscience of God, the deep 
disapprobation, revulsion, or wrath of the divine nature 
against moral evil. There is as deep and eternal neces- 
sity for the expression of God's conscience as of his 
truth and love. The manifestation of love apart from 
holiness, with no expression of the infinite revulsion of 
the divine nature from sin, would be an essentially false 
revelation of the divine character — a misrepresentation 
and a caricature. The conscience of God must needs 
speak. 

482. The Special Problem of the Christian Religion. 

To express the disapprobation of God — that is, the 
wrath of the divine nature — toward sin and at the same 
time express his love ; to express the wrath without con- 

R 



258 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

suming the sinner, this is the problem of the Christian 
religion. Wrath and love must alike find expression, 
and equal fullness of expression. Love must not dis- 
parage conscience, and conscience must not limit the 
, free course of love — for in the divine nature there is no 
schism. 

It is from the solution of this problem in the holy 
Scriptures that we discern the nature of the problem 
itself. 

483. The Solution of the Problem. 

The problem referred to in the preceding paragraph 
finds its solution in the sin-bearing of the sinner's repre- 
sentative substitute, the " Lamb of God." To express 
this fact of vicarious sin-bearing no language is better 
than that of sacred Scripture. " Surely he hath borne 
our griefs, and carried our sorrows : yet we did esteem 
him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was 
wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our 
iniquities : the chastisement of our peace was upon him ; 
and by his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep 
have gone astray ; we have turned every one to his own 
way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us 
all." "He who knew no sin was made sin for us." 
"He bore our sins in his own body on the tree." As 
touching this representative sin-bearing, it cannot be 
said that the expression of the divine disapprobation is 
feeble or that love is insufficiently manifest. 

484. Representative Sin=bearing not Unrighteous. 

If vicarious sin-bearing is unrighteous, it must be un- 
just either toward the representative sufferer or toward 



ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION 2 59 

the actual sinner, or it must be inadequate, and hence 
unrighteous, for the purpose for which penalty is in- 
flicted. There is no element or aspect of injustice or of 
doubtful justice in either of these respects. As respects 
the sin-bearer, he was a willing sufferer, a voluntary sub- 
stitute. He came into human conditions and linked 
himself to the human race for this very purpose. Will- 
ing self-sacrifice is not unrighteous, otherwise all love is 
unrighteous, for love signifies self-sacrifice. The suf- 
ferer for love's sake is the last one to think of injustice 
in the case. As toward the sinner who receives the 
grace there surely is no injustice. And as we shall see 
in the paragraphs which follow, vicarious sin-bearing is 
adequate for all the purposes of penalty. In the life of 
men vicarious good and vicarious ill are ever-present 
elements in human life. 

485. Representative Sin=bearing Grounded in Reality. 

In order that representative sin-bearing may be ade- 
quate for the purposes of penalty, it must be grounded 
in reality. There is no place here for a mere fiction of 
words ; there must be reality. The Sin-bearer took 
human nature into actual union with himself ; he wedded 
himself forever to the human race. Those for whom 
the atonement is made effective he brings into a vital 
spiritual relation to himself through faith in him. He 
represents them because he has the right to represent 
them ; he has the right to represent them because they 
are his own, his own members. On rational principles 
of justice the head stands for the body with all its parts. 
The sin-bearer has the right to represent his own, those 
who are in and of himself. 



260 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

486. The Atonement Adequate for Government. 

This manifestation of the divine conscience, this wrath 
of the divine nature expressed in the atonement, accom- 
plishes every governmental purpose of penalty as fully 
as if the penalty fell upon the actual sinner. It does 
this with special emphasis. The certainty of the divine 
displeasure toward evil-doers is made doubly certain. 
The holiness which did not spare the holy representa- 
tive will surely not forget the actual transgressor. And 
the world feels this. Men stand in awe before Calvary 
more than before Sinai or the gates of Gehenna. The 
atonement is a beacon fire of holiness kindled on the 
supreme mountain top of the universe. It is the ulti- 
mate appeal and warning of God's conscience addressed 
to the consciences of men. 

487. Love's Appeal in the Atonement. 

The atonement expresses self-sacrifice, and self-sacri- 
fice is love. " God so loved the world that he gave his 
Son." " Herein is love, not that we loved God, but 
that God loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitia- 
tion for our sins." This makes the mightiest and ten- 
derest appeal to the soul of the transgressor to lead him 
to repentance. What could penalty inflicted upon the 
actual transgressor do like this? Here the rationale of 
the atonement goes beyond reason and conscience, and 
takes the fortress of " Mansoul " by storm, and breaks 
the sinner's heart by the limitless self-sacrifice of love. 

488. The Atonement Grounded in True Psychology. 

That the atonement made by divine vicarious sin- 
bearing is in harmony with man's moral nature, is indi- 



ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION 26 1 



cated by the fact that, when the atonement is believed, 
at once all oppressive sense of the divine displeasure 
leaves the penitent sinner's conscience, and nothing can 
bring it back except the return of unbelief. With this 
true psychology, John Bunyan made the burden fall 
from the back of the pilgrim as he stood before the 
cross, and tumble into the sepulchre of Christ to be seen 
no more. This phenomenon finds no parallel in false 
religions. Even the symbolic sacrifices of Judaism, 
symbolic of the great atonement, could not do this. 
By the fact that the atonement does actually take away 
the sense of guilt, and brings to the believer the con- 
sciousness of peace with God, it is shown that represent- 
ative sin-bearing is grounded in the ultimate principles 
of man's moral nature. It meets both the reouirements 
of the Creator and of the soul. 

489. iVlystery not a Philosophic Objection. 

The interior method of the divine incarnation is, and 
must remain, a mystery, and representative penal suffer- 
ing enfolds a constellation of mysteries ; but mystery is 
not a philosophic objection as against a fact. Mystery 
is no stumbling-block in philosophy. That the nexus 
between the divine nature and the human is unknown 
and unknowable, signifies only that it is outside of our 
conscious experience. So is the nexus of spirit and 
matter in human nature outside of consciousness. The 
blended consciousness of personal sinlessness and of 
vicarious penal suffering is doubtless beyond man's ex- 
perience. But the acceptance of blame and condemna- 
tion undeserved, in order to shield one who is loved, 
is not beyond our experience. Human experience so 



262 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



touches the hem of sin-bearing by the guiltless as to 
point to possibilities beyond, and to indicate that penal 
suffering by the innocent is grounded in reason and 
nature ; at least when the guilty party is man, and the 
sin-bearer is the divine Word in human conditions. And 
vicarious sin-bearing has its parallel in righteousness re- 
ceived by faith. 

490. Representative Responsibility Illustrated. 

The usage of the American military service during 
the Civil War furnishes a good illustration — inade- 
quate, of course — of the vicarious responsibility of the 
representative sin-bearer. The law permitted a man 
drafted into the military service to be represented by a 
substitute. This substitute must be, first of all, a man 
who himself owed no military service. Even so the 
divine Word existed in the beginning, not in the form 
of a servant owing obedience unto law. When the 
law accepted the substitute, the principal for whom he 
stood went out from under the law free. Henceforth 
the law knew only the substitute. The substitute be- 
came responsible for every duty and liable to every 
danger and risk which had belonged to the principal. 
If the substitute died, it was as if the principal had died. 
In like manner the divine Sin-bearer came under the 
law and was obedient. Whatever service the law re- 
quired, he rendered. He accepted man's responsibili- 
ties, the risks and liabilities under violated law, and paid 
the penalty. And the sin-bearing and the obedience 
are reckoned to those whom he has the right to repre- 
sent because they are his own, and of himself. The ex- 
perience of this is known by many. 



ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION 263 

491. Salvation and Blessings Conditioned upon Faith. 

This is a stumbling-block in the minds of many, yet 
nothing could be more fully in accord with reason. 
After that atonement has been made, what less could be 
required, what more need be required, than a restora- 
tion of normal relations between man and his Creator? 
Faith involves this restoration of sundered relationships, 
nothing more, nothing less. Faith is belief; belief in 
the divine existence ; belief in the revelation which he 
has made. Faith is trust ; trust in the living God ; trust 
in the Sin-bearer. And faith involves self-surrender and 
obedience. To believe truth and to follow falsehood, 
to trust in Jesus Christ and to refuse submission, is im- 
possible self-contradiction. Faith, taken all in all, is the 
acceptance of our necessary condition of dependence 
upon God, with all which that dependence naturally 
includes. The requirement of faith is, therefore, no 
arbitrary arrangement ; it is grounded in the nature of 
things, in the moral nature of God and of man. Faith 
represents the eternal normal relation of a creature to 
the Creator. The lapse of penalty is not salvation. The 
turning away of penalty is rather a condition precedent 
of salvation, than an element of salvation itself. 

492. Ye Must be Born Again. 

Something more than an adjustment of objective 
relationships between the . creature and the Creator is 
involved in salvation, or rather there must be a subjec- 
tive adjustment of conditions in order that an objective 
adjustment may be possible. The deep damage done 
to man's moral nature in the fall must be repaired. 
First of all, the will must be set right ; the radical and 



264 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



generic choice of evil must be reversed. This reversal 
of the will marks the beginning of a new life. This is 
the most characteristic element of the "new birth." 
Then that product of evil generic choice, depravity of 
the sensibilities, must be corrected. A work of inward 
adjustment and purification must take place, which shall 
put enjoyment of that which is good and holy in place 
of pleasure in evil. This requirement of a radical reno- 
vation of man's moral nature is surely in harmony with 
reason. 

493. Purification and Power Through Faith. 

The holy Scriptures represent faith as the beginning 
and the root of the new spiritual life. Through faith the 
atonement becomes effective for the removal of guilt and 
penalty. Through faith the will is set right and depraved 
sensibilities are corrected. Through faith temptations 
are overcome. "This is the victory that overcometh 
the world, even your faith." And not only this, it is 
also through faith that spiritual power is received, by 
which great moral and spiritual achievements are ac- 
complished. This also is grounded in a true philo- 
sophic principle. Faith represents the normal relation 
of the creature to the Creator. Man is not a self-existent, 
self-centered being. As the branch has its normal life 
in its union with the trunk and root, so does the soul of 
man find its true life in union with God. In this union 
the spiritual life is strong. Resolving, struggling, bra- 
cing the will, cannot take the place of that union with 
the Creator which comes of faith. Everywhere and in all 
things, doubt is weakness ; much more in experimental 
religion, unbelief is weakness and faith is strength. 



ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION 265 

494. Faith Forever. 

If, as has been set forth, faith represents the normal 
relation of man to God, then we might anticipate some 
suggestion in holy Scripture that faith belongs not only 
to the present life, but also to the future. This sugges- 
tion we find : " Whether there be prophecies, they shall 
fail ; whether there be tongues, they shall cease ; whether 
there be knowledge, it shall vanish away." But "now 
abideth faith, hope, charity." We find, therefore, that 
the Christian religion bases salvation neither upon an 
arbitrary condition, nor upon a transient phase of man's 
life, but upon the necessary and unchanging principles 
of man's spiritual nature. It belongs to the moral na- 
ture of man in his relationship to God that he should 
believe, trust, hope, and love forever. The Christian 
religion and moral philosophy walk hand in hand. 



PART II 
PRACTICAL ETHICS 



CHAPTER XVIII 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 

495. Obligation Concrete. 

Wherever obligation exists it must needs exist as a 
concrete obligation ; it must take the form of specific 
duties. Duty is expressed by the word ought. A duty 
is that which one ought to do, or to render, or to be. 
In Part First of these Institutes, it has been shown 
that obligations have their ground in the facts and prin- 
ciples of moral being, in the nature of God, and of 
beings made in the likeness of God. It remains now to 
take a rapid survey of human duties in the various con- 
ditions and relations of men. But it does not belong to 
moral philosophy to give homilies upon the virtues or to 
point out in detail the duties of men in all possible cir- 
cumstances. Moral philosophy should discuss and clas- 
sify duties with reference to their underlying principles. 
The range and amplitude of the discussion must be de- 
termined by this dominant purpose not to elaborate a 
volume of moral precepts, but to show the application 
of moral principles to actual life. 

496. Obedience to God. 

First of all, and embracing all other duties, comes the 
duty of obedience to God. Obedience is voluntary con- 
formity to the will of another; the acceptance of an- 
other's will , as our own. Obedience to God is the sur- 

269 



27O INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

render of the finite will to the infinite. The duty of 
obedience to God is the primary dictum of conscience. 
This obligation of obedience to God is absolute. The 
authority of no other being, or rule, or law, can stand 
for a moment against God's authority. No risk or dan- 
ger can be counted a sufficient reason for disobedience. 
There may be doubt touching what the will of God is ; 
but when the will of God has been certified to the soul 
the obligation to obey is absolute. 

497. The Obligation Supreme. 

The supremacy of the obligation to obey God is de- 
clared, in the first place, by conscience and reason. 
That which shows God to be supreme, shows also that 
the duty of obeying the divine will is absolute. 

The holy Scriptures teach the supremacy of the obli- 
gation to obey God by precept, by example, and by the 
imperial enforcement of the divine will. The first com- 
mand of the Decalogue declares the supremacy of the 
one Jehovah. Everywhere the Scriptures count the 
word of the Lord a finality, whether that word bring 
life or death. Abraham r-ecognized in the divine word 
an authority to which every sensibility and hope of a 
father's heart must submit The life of Jesus Christ 
shows the same full enthronement of the Father's will. 
As Paul "went bound in the Spirit unto Jerusalem, not 
knowing what should befall him there," so many men 
have gone to their life-work ready to suffer death for the 
Lord's will. And these examples illustrate the highest 
grade of moral character. The lack of the reverent 
recognition of this supreme obligation is the primary 
weakness of general morals. 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 2JI 

498. Subjective Effects of Obedience to God. 

For a man to bind himself to another man in the 
bond of absolute obedience, is on the face of it un- 
seemly and unreasonable. It does violence to the na- 
ture of him who exercises absolute authority and the 
nature of him who yields limitless obedience. The one 
becomes an imperious tyrant, the other an unreasoning 
slave. Limitless obedience to God does not operate in 
this manner. Perfect obedience to God expresses the 
highest action of conscience. With perfectness of obe 
dience there is a tenderness, a delicacy, a power of con- 
science which to the common grade of life is entirely 
unknown. The cultus of slavery cows and breaks the 
will of the slave ; it renders the slave abject. Submis- 
sion to God's will, on the other hand, develops the most 
imperial strength and majesty of will. It brings the 
human will into alliance with the divine and renders it 
invincible. With this divine alliance the will of a tender 
woman or of a child has been able to meet threats, tor- 
ture, and death with no weakness. Around such a char- 
acter temptation surges as the sea around Gibraltar. 
What dignity it gives in the presence of men. It pre- 
pares the peasant to stand unabashed in the presence of 
the king. And whether it be the rugged Elijah, the 
zealous Paul, or the loving John, it develops a character 
equally strong. And this is no more than reason would 
lead us to expect, for obedience to God is in accord with 
every element of man's nature. 

499. Characteristics of Perfect Obedience. 

Perfect obedience to God has three characteristics : 1. 
The intention of perfect obedience. The conformity to 



2J2 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



the moral law must not be an accident, and the inten- 
tion must not be the purpose to conform in part. 2. 
Obedience must spring from the right principle of 
action, namely, from love to God ; that is, from a choice 
of God as the supreme object of self-consecration. The 
obedience must not spring from fear, in the low sense, 
nor from self-love. 3. There must be actual conformity to 
the divine will, not only the intention to conform, but the 
conformity in fact. This supposes a knowledge of the 
divine will, the intention to do it, and the ability to do it. 

500. Scope of Obedience to God. 

Obedience to God includes, first, conformity to the 
moral law, as epitomized in the Decalogue and as inter- 
preted in the requirement of love to God and love to 
man. Obedience includes, in the second place, direct 
personal service toward God, as taught in the gospel of 
Christ — the service of worship and the service of work 
for building up God's kingdom among men. It includes, 
in the third place, quick and profound responsiveness to 
the monitions of the Holy Spirit of God in the soul. Per- 
fect obedience brings one into very intimate relations 
with God. 

501. Grounds of the Duty of Obedience to God. 

The duty of obedience to God is grounded, first, in 
the axiomatic principle, the primary dictum of conscience, 
that obedience is due to the supreme authority ; and 
secondly, upon the principles set forth in the chapter 
which treats of the grounds of moral obligation. The 
duty of obedience to God is the chief corner-stone in 
the temple of morals. 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 



273 



502. The Duty of Love to God. 

Love is the election of an object to which to give 
one's self and the sensibilities which arise from that 
choice. Sometimes the element of choice seems more 
prominent, sometimes the sensibilities. Whether the 
element of sensibility be joy or pain depends upon the 
attributes of the object loved. In God is the fullness of 
excellency and in loving him is the fullness of joy. 
Love to God signifies then the supreme action of the 
will by which a man places himself in his normal atti- 
tude toward his maker, giving himself to God and choos- 
ing God in preference to all things else in the universe, 
as the satisfaction of his nature, and the joyous response 
of the sensibilities to this high choice of the will. Love 
to God stands in us correlative to the supreme worthi- 
ness of the Divine Being. He is the sun of the soul, 
and we ought to recognize him as being what he is. 
He alone can make the life of man blessed, and we 
ought to seek in him that blessedness. Love cannot be 
separated from obedience, nor obedience from love. 
Not to love God and have pleasure in his attributes is 
to show a character the opposite of the divine. 

503. The Duty of Gratitude toward God. 

Gratitude is the response of the soul to God's good- 
ness, gifts, love, and grace. The consideration of his 
good will and favor awakens this sensibility. The world 
is full of the divine bounties ; the sunshine and the rain, 
the fat valleys waving with harvests, the hills full of 
treasures, all things upon which human faculties may 
find occupation, enlargement, and enjoyment. " God so 

loved the world that he gave his son." Who does not 

s 



274 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



need the divine grace? God created the nature of man 
correlative to his own in order that it might be respon- 
sive. The response of gratitude is not a mere barren 
sensibility, ending in itself. It carries with it substan- 
tial tokens of power ; it finds expression in self-devotion 
and service. Any profession of gratitude to God that 
does not give this substantial expression of itself proves 
by this sign its lack of sincerity. 

504. The Duty of Reverence toward God. 

Reverence is the response which the soul makes to 
greatness, to majesty, to infinity. In the great universe 
man is but an atom. The forces of nature grind him to 
powder with no recognition of his existence. In the 
grades and ranks of intelligent beings man finds " prin- 
cipalities and powers" far above him. In the presence 
of God all man's wisdom and power turn to folly and 
nothingness. Reverence is awakened by the infinite at- 
tributes of God and his mighty works. Reverence is the 
mark of a soul capable of appreciating greatness and 
excellence ; the lack of it is the token of a mind with 
no ideals higher than itself. The greater the soul the 
deeper the awe in the presence of the high and holy 
One. The duty of reverence is strongly taught in the 
holy Scriptures. Reverence is an essential element of 
worship. In the presence of God Moses said : " I ex- 
ceedingly fear and quake" ; the people before the golden 
calf "ate and drank and rose up to play." 

505. Manifestations of Reverence. 

Where reverence toward the unseen God exists it will 
show itself in many ways. It will express itself in the 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 275 

general tone of life. It will show itself in a thoughtful 
and restrained use of the name of God. Reverence is 
not flippant ; it does not use the words of sacred Scrip- 
ture to point a witticism or raise a laugh. Reverence 
counts places of divine worship sacred. Reverence is 
seen in the manner of addressing God in prayer ; it 
does not affect familiarity and does not summon and 
command the Divine Being ; it does not parade an in- 
flated rhetoric ; it does not appeal to men for admira- 
tion, while in form it addresses the high and holy One. 
Reverence is mindful of the words of solemn caution : 
" Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thine heart be 
hasty to utter anything before God ; for God is in heaven 
and thou upon the earth, therefore let thy words be 
few." 

506. The Duty of Faith toward God. 

Faith is belief and trust ; belief in the unseen spirit- 
ual world, belief in the existence of God and in the 
revelation which he has made of himself, his will, and 
his truth ; a belief by which the soul is brought under 
the dominion of spiritual facts and forces ; a trust by 
which a man surrenders himself obediently to the divine 
keeping. Saving faith is trust in Jesus Christ as the sin- 
bearer and Saviour, and is always connected with repent- 
ance for sin. Faith is the soul's recognition of the reality 
of spiritual things and of its own spiritual nature. Faith 
is correlative and responsive to the divine truth and 
faithfulness. As we have already seen, faith represents 
the normal relation of the creature to the Creator. 
These views of faith show well enough man's duty to 
exercise faith toward God. The lack of faith is an 



276 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



offensive sin ; it declares either that God is not or that 
he is untrue and untrustworthy, or that man is inde- 
pendent of him and needs him not. Unbelief is always 
connected with disobedience. It separates a man from 
his Maker and renders divine help impossible. It is as 
unnatural as it is sinful. The holy Scriptures continu- 
ally summon men to the exercise of faith. 

507. The Duty of Prayer and Worship. 

All prayer is worship, and one important element of 
worship is prayer. In some respects prayer and wor- 
ship may be considered together ; in other respects they 
must be treated separately. Prayer is a request ex- 
pressed and presented to God ; it represents conscious 
need, dependence, and faith. Worship is broader than 
prayer ; it is the expression of reverence, gratitude, faith, 
and love. It is expressed in words of prayer, in songs, 
in bodily attitudes, in symbolic actions and ceremonies, 
and in offerings. Prayer, praise, and offerings belong to 
worship always and everywhere. Symbolic ceremonies 
have been appointed and have been changed as the 
Lord has pleased. The simple forms of worship among 
the patriarchs were greatly amplified in the Levitic 
ritual, and then again new symbolic forms were intro- 
duced by Christ to express the experiences of the Chris- 
tian faith. 

508. Worship Grounded in Nature. 

The duty of worshiping God is deeply grounded in 
the nature of man. This signifies that there is in human 
nature a deep sense of weakness and dependence. It 
means also that the sensibilities which find expression in 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 



277 



worship are not exotic affections of the soul superin- 
duced upon man's nature. Reverence, gratitude, faith, 
and love are native to the true life of man ; it is a 
maimed and distorted human life in which they are 
lacking. And it means, in the third place, that the ex- 
pression of holy sensibilities is natural. The life of the 
soul develops spontaneously into expression. So natural 
is worship, that in some crude form corresponding to 
the dwarfed and meagre life of the soul it is found 
among the most degraded of the human race. 

509. Worship Commanded in Holy Scripture. 

The worship of God is strongly enjoined in holy 
Scripture. Under the Mosaic regimen the forms of 
worship were strictly defined, and participation in the 
worship was required of all. From birth to death re- 
ligious ceremonial touched the life of the people every- 
where. Christ and his apostles were devout worshipers. 
The voice of all Scripture is, "Worship God." 

510. Prayer Commanded. 

As has been said, prayer is the expression of con- 
scious need and faith. This element of worship is spe- 
cially enjoined in holy Scripture. As samples, we may 
cite injunctions like these: "After this manner there- 
fore pray ye" ; "I will that men pray everywhere" ; 
" Pray without ceasing"; " If ye ask anything in my 
name, I will do it " ; " Ask and ye shall receive " ; " If ye 
abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask 
what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." By pre- 
cept, by example, and by promise the Scriptures teach 
the duty of prayer as resting upon all men. 



278 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

511. Theoretical Difficulties. 

Theoretical difficulties touching the divine response 
to prayer spring in part from false notions of God and 
are partly futile ; and in no case can they be counted 
philosophic objections. Difficulties of understanding are 
found wherever free will touches the fixed order of the 
universe. And difficulties confront one in the denial of 
the efficacy of prayer as well as in the affirmation. 
Those who deny that prayer prevails with God must 
first of all give account, on the basis of nature alone, of 
the entire fabric of the Christian religion with all its 
supernatural elements. If they confess the existence of 
God, they must justify that conception of him which 
represents him as unmoved and pitiless toward cries of 
deepest distress which his creatures raise to him. Or if 
they deny even the divine existence, they must give ac- 
count of that spontaneous cry to an unseen power when 
extreme trouble comes. The difficulties which meet 
the unbeliever are greater than those which beset the 
man of faith. 

512. Prayer not Dictation. 

Efficacious prayer does not imply that God surrenders 
the option of giving or withholding according to his wis- 
dom and his pleasure, otherwise prayer would cease to 
be supplication and become demand. The promise of 
a gracious answer when the conditions are fulfilled is 
positive ; but this does not mean a surrender of the 
divine will. Prayer presupposes the divine sovereignty. 
This will become manifest in the further treatment of 
this subject. The supreme prayer said, "Thy will be 
done." 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 279 

513. Prayer not for the Purpose of Overcoming Reluctance. 

It is utter misapprehension of the nature of prayer to 
account it importunity to induce the Supreme Being to 
change his mind, to persuade him to do that which he 
is reluctant to do, or to forego the doing of that to which 
he is inclined. Reason must needs be offended by such 
a conception. Prayer seeks that which God desires to 
do, that which he awaits the opportunity of doing in the 
fulfillment of conditions embraced in the right asking. 
Prayer does not seek to change God's disposition toward 
men, but to place the suppliant in an attitude and rela- 
tionship to receive the good which God desires to be- 
stow. This does not signify that prayer is a mere sub- 
jective moral exercise, a kind of spiritual gymnastics. 

514. Prayer and Eternal Purpose. 

Philosophy finds no stumbling-block in respect to 
prayer in the stability of the divine purposes. God has 
declared it to be a part of his eternal purpose to answer 
the prayer of faith ; he has spoken of no purpose more 
immutable. The divine purpose embraces the prayer 
and the answer, the free action of man and the answer 
of God, and weaves them into the fabric of divine provi- 
dence in perfect harmony. If philosophy can admit 
freedom anywhere, it can equally well admit freedom in 
this matter. 

515. Conditions of Prevailing Prayer. 

Upon this subject there is one sole source of knowl- 
edge, the holy Scriptures. 

The radical conditions of prevailing prayer are three : 
First, prayer must be something more than a mere cry 



280 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

of distress ; it must be addressed to God ; it must ex- 
press faith in him. If it is not addressed to God it is 
not prayer ; if faith is lacking, the soul is separate from 
God and not in the right relationship to receive anything 
good. Second, prayer must be offered with a right in- 
tention. In sacred Scripture it is written, " I will that 
men pray everywhere, lifting up holy hands, without 
wrath and doubting." " Ye ask and receive not, be- 
cause ye ask amiss, that ye may spend it in your pleas- 
ures." The intention must not be self-indulgence or 
self-pleasing, but some purpose which in the sight of 
God is right and good. In the third place, prayer must 
represent not a man's own personal will merely, that is 
self-will, but a will that has become one with the divine 
will. The word of holy Scripture is, "If we ask any- 
thing according to his will, he heareth us." " Not my 
will but thine be done." " We know not how to pray 
as we ought, but the Spirit himself maketh intercession 
for us." The prayer which is inspired in the soul by 
the indwelling Holy Spirit cannot be contrary to the 
divine will. Jesus said, " If ye abide in me and my 
words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall 
be done unto you." These words express a union with 
Jesus Christ such that the words, "in my name," rep- 
resent a real fact of experience as if the prayer were pre- 
sented by Christ himself. These are three radical condi- 
tions of prevailing prayer as presented in the sacred Scrip- 
tures. Philosophy cannot stumble at these conditions. 

516. The Testimony of Experience. 

The experience of good men in all ages encourages 
prayer. The men who have the largest experience of 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 



28l 



prayer ought to know best whether prayer is useless. 
The men who decry prayer are the men who have never 
prayed. They have never tried it ; they have no expe- 
rience in the matter and have no right to speak. Those 
who pray most believe most strongly that prayer is not 
useless. Theoretical difficulties cannot stand against 
facts of universal experience. 

517. Characteristics of Worship. 

First of all, the worship of God must be sincere, ab- 
solutely sincere. It must express real feeling and the 
inward life of the worshiper. If it is not sincere it is 
worse than nothing. Worship is for God and not for 
the eyes and ears of men. " God is a spirit, and they 
who worship him must worship him in spirit and in 
truth." The worship of God ought to be characterized 
by great simplicity. Simplicity is closely allied with 
sincerity. Pompous or subtle rhetoric, artistic grouping 
of ceremonies, gorgeous ritualism, are nothing to him 
who made the heavens and the earth. Such things dis- 
sipate spirituality. The satisfying of a man's artistic 
sense can easily be mistaken for worship. Simplicity is 
an element of sublimity. Worship ought to be charac- 
terized by deep reverence. God is in heaven ; " God 
alone is great." Shall man approach God with affected 
familiarity? Worship ought to be suited to the divine 
majesty and holiness. Sensible of their nothingness 
and their sin, let men come thoughtfully, with head un- 
covered and bowed, into the presence of him who sits 
on the circle of the heavens, to whom all nations are as 
the dust of the balance, who dwells in light unapproach- 
able, and whose holiness is a consuming fire. A fourth 



282 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



characteristic of worship is suitableness to the occasion 
and the feelings which dominate the time. That which 
is suitable for private worship in the closet may be very 
unbecoming in the great congregation. Worship on 
days of joyful thanksgiving may rightly differ from the 
worship of humiliation and fasting. 

The formative principle of worship is that it suitably 
express the actual verities of the spiritual life. 

518. Private Worship. 

Every individual human being has an inward life 
peculiarly his own and unlike any other. In some of 
its elements this interior life is not expressed to men 
nor in the presence of men. This secret life has its re- 
lationships to God. It must be laid open to him ; it 
must be brought to him for comfort, for nurture, or for 
gracious correction. By this private waiting on God 
men of faith are prepared for public life. So Christ 
commands, " Enter into thy closet, and when thou hast 
shut thy door, pray to thy Father in secret, and thy 
Father who seeth in secret, shall reward thee." In the 
divine responses to private prayer are found the springs 
of great achievements. 

519. Family Worship. 

The . family is the unit of social relationships, the 
closest and most permanent form of social life. This 
family life has its own private elements with which a 
stranger must not intermeddle. Family life ought to 
have expression in worship. It must be brought to God 
for blessing and sanctification. That life may not be- 
come secular and material, there is need of worship in 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 283 

the family more frequent than the public assemblies. 
It is especially needful for training the children of the 
family in faith and the fear of the Lord. If the children 
see no worship in the family there will be little to remind 
them of spiritual realities, and those faculties of the soul 
by which it is brought in touch with the spiritual world 
will be left undeveloped. Piety is not hereditary, yet a 
pure and deep religious life in the family tends power- 
fully to propagate piety with all its blessings. 

520. Public Worship. 

There is a broader social life than that of the family. 
This larger social life demands expression before God ; 
it needs to be penetrated and permeated by spiritual 
influences. Public worship is especially necessary for 
instructing the people in religious truth and duties. No 
other method has been found so effective for doing this. 
In public worship spiritual influences are brought to 
bear upon the irreligious and the immoral to lead them 
to repentance. The resistless tide of emotion in great 
assemblies is often effective in turning the life of the 
most obdurate men into better channels. Under the 
stimulus and the uplifting force of the mighty current 
of emotion, the will is able to turn from the evil past 
and to make a new generic choice. 

521. Repentance. 

Repentance is the turning from sin and from the love 
of sin unto obedience to God and the love of righteous- 
ness. It is a generic choice of the will attended by 
excitement of the cognate sensibilities. This generic' 
choice and change of the will and of the related sensi- 



284 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

bilities is a "change of heart." From the nature of the 
case this change is radical and is intended to stand for- 
ever. The choice of righteousness with the purpose 
that the choice be temporary is impossible ; the thought 
of it is self-contradictory. That would not be the choice 
of righteousness, but of some ulterior object to be 
gained by the form of righteousness. 

522. Repentance a Duty. 

The duty of repentance is involved in the duty of 
loving and obeying God. If it is the duty of every 
man to obey God, it must needs be the duty of eveiy 
one who has not been obedient, to cease instantly from 
his transgression and begin a life of obedience. Every 
soul of man that has not loved God supremely is under 
the most pressing obligation to cease from that life 
which has self for its end and make God his supreme 
object of devotion. In affirming the duty of obedience 
conscience affirms the duty of repentance. The holy 
Scriptures strongly enjoin the obligation to repent of 
sin. God "commandeth all men everywhere to repent, 
because he hath appointed a day in which he will judge 
the world in righteousness." 

523. Repentance a Privilege 

Repentance should be accounted a duty, but it should 
not be looked upon as a hard and painful thing, to be 
contemplated with dread and approached with reluc- 
tance. Repentance is a door graciously opened to sin- 
ful men for their escape from evil and misery. It is the 
opportunity of recovering perfection of being, to be 
healed of a mortal taint and sickness, and to attain 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 



285 



health of the soul. That one has been a great sinner 
against God is ground for boundless regret, but the re- 
pentance is full of the elements of happiness ; it is to 
be embraced with eager haste and boundless gladness. 

524. Keeping the Sabbath Holy. 

The question whether the seventh day of the week or 
the first day shall be accounted the Christian Sabbath 
does not belong to moral science. Whichever day has 
been divinely appointed the obligation to observe it is 
the same, and the benefits of the observance are the 
same. The obligation to observe the Sabbath as a day 
of holy rest from secular labor finds its ground in the 
divine will declared first, in the nature of man ; secondly, 
in the sacred Scriptures. Corresponding to these are 
the benefits which flow from the observance of the Sab- 
bath, first, physical and temporal welfare ; secondly, 
spiritual and eternal good. Secular thrift, good morals, 
and spiritual elevation follow hand in hand the right 
observance of the Sabbath. 

525. Physical Benefits. 

Days of rest, regularly recurring and frequent, are 
needful for man's physical welfare. By experiments 
made in France it has been proved that a rest of one 
day in seven is better for men than of one day in ten. 
It has been proved by numberless experiences and ex- 
periments that in long-continued labor men can accom- 
plish more by observing the Sabbath than by continu- 
ous toil ; that by regarding the Sabbath the mind is 
kept in a fresher condition and better fitted for work re- 
quiring attention and carefulness ; that health and Ion- 



286 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



gevity are promoted ; that the improved condition oi 
workmen is shown by a marked reduction in the num- 
ber of accidents ; that continuous labor brings such 
weariness and dullness of mind in the oversight of ma- 
chinery that dangerous and destructive accidents become 
certain. And that which is true of human toilers is true 
also of beasts of draught and burden. Six days of labor 
with one of rest is found to be more productive than 
continuous labor. 

526. Intellectual Benefits. 

The mind is dependent upon the body. Whatever 
unduly wearies and wears out the body, impairs the effi- 
ciency of mental operations. Mental labor without a 
Sabbath becomes monotonous drudgery. The mind 
loses its alertness and vigor. It cannot grapple with 
the problems of business or philosophy. Errors, blun- 
ders, and failures become inevitable. And the Sabbath 
not only brings rest to the jaded mind, but by its relig- 
ious activities wonderfully stirs and stimulates the mind 
to high thought. 

527. Moral and Religious Benefits. 

The supreme benefits of the Sabbath are found in the 
moral and religious training which is secured by its ob- 
servance. Without a Sabbath religion is crowded out 
from man's life ; the higher aspects and elements of life 
drop out of view. Without a Sabbath a busy, toiling 
population are too weary and exhausted to rise above 
the consideration of animal wants. The moral condi- 
tion of a community may be pretty well gauged from 
the manner in which the Sabbath is observed. Without 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 



287 



a religious Sabbath ignorance of religious truth prevails 
and morality decays. The tendency to change the Sab- 
bath from a holy day into a holiday, and to overrun the 
holiday with secular employments, portends nothing but 
evil for the people. For the weary toiler the Sabbath, 
made first a holiday, next becomes a work day ; and 
seven days' labor is less productive than six, and there- 
fore in the final outcome less remunerative. The Sab- 
bath broken down means for the people more work for 
less pay, exhausted vitality, a life of drudgery without 
zest, lower intellectual life, the decay of religion and of 
all the higher welfare of men, and the growth of vice 
and crime. 

528. The Holy Scriptures and the Sabbath. 

The duty of observing the weekly Sabbath as a holy 
day is enjoined in the Scriptures with the greatest posi- 
tiveness. In the Decalogue we find, " Remember the 
Sabbath day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour 
and do all thy work, but the seventh is the Sabbath of 
the Lord, thy God ; in it thou shalt not do any work, 
thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-serv- 
ant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy stranger that is within 
thy gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and 
earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the 
seventh day ; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath 
day and hallowed it." This command is reiterated, ex- 
plained, and enforced almost without end. "Six days 
shalt thou do thy work, and on the seventh thou shalt 
rest ; that thine ox and thine ass may rest, and the son 
of thine hand-maid and the stranger may be refreshed." 
"Verily my Sabbaths ye shall keep ; for it is a sign be- 



288 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

tween me and you throughout your generations." "If 
thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath from doing 
thy pleasure on my holy day and call the Sabbath a de- 
light, the holy of the Lord, honourable, and shalt honour 
him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own 
pleasure, nor speaking thine own w T ords, then shalt thou 
delight thyself in the Lord, and I will cause thee to ride 
upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with 
the heritage of Jacob, thy father ; for the mouth of the 
Lord hath spoken it." No comment upon these in- 
junctions of holy Scripture can add to their impressive- 
ness. 

529. Permitted Work upon the Sabbath. 

Religious services upon the Sabbath require some 
labor. " The priests in the temple profane the Sabbath 
and are blameless " ; that is, in the offering of the sac- 
rifices they must needs do work. Christ taught that the 
Sabbath is not profaned by the healing of the sick, nor 
by that labor which is needful to supply the natural 
wants of man and beast and thus prevent suffering. 
And there are emergencies in life which go far beyond 
the stress of supplying man's common needs. The sav- 
ing of life is the extreme necessity. Reducing these 
illustrations to the form of principles, we find this rule 
concerning permissible work — that works of necessity, 
works of mercy, and works of religious worship, do not 
violate the Sabbat* 

530. All Days not Equally Sacred. 

It is a logical fallacy and a perversion of Christian 
principle to secularize the Sabbath upon the plea of 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 289 

counting all days alike holy. God has commanded that 
every day be spent in righteousness, but he has not set 
apart all days as holy days. Some days are appointed 
for secular concerns. Sacred days and secular days are 
not the extreme of a see-saw ; as the sacred day is lifted 
up, the secular day does not on that account descend, 
nor does the lowering of the holy day lift up other days. 
The high observance of the holy day lifts up all the rest. 

531. The Manner of Keeping the Sabbath. 

The following principles may be laid down as em- 
braced in the command to keep the Sabbath holy. 
First, the day must be kept as a religions day, a day de- 
voted to God, in strong distinction from days devoted to 
secular labor to supply the need of man's physical life. 

Secondly, the Sabbath ought to be so observed that 
it shall remain, as it was appointed to be, a Sabbath, a 
day of rest. If a man toil unremittingly seven days in 
the week in religious work, he does not indeed profane 
the Sabbath, but he loses one of its great benefits. He 
wears himself out prematurely. For the sake of effi- 
ciency in religious work there must be a rest day. But 
for men engaged in secular pursuits, religious activities 
upon the Sabbath, without undue stress or strain, are 
more restful than idleness. The stimulus of high relig- 
ious thought may be the most restful recreation. In 
the third place, the Sabbath must be made a day of wor- 
ship and spiritual culture. This is the positive side 
of the first principle laid down. The Sabbath is for 
" solemn assemblies," for public worship, for instruction 
in the holy Scriptures, for preaching the gospel, for 
nourishing the spiritual life of man. 

T 



29O INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



532. Dedication of Property to God. 

The duty of dedicating property to God is grounded 
in reason, justice, and human nature, as well as in posi- 
tive divine command. The raw material of wealth is 
God's direct gift to men. Through him the forces of 
matter and the agencies of organized nature operate. 
In him we ourselves also "live and move and have our 
being." According to reason and justice some recogni- 
tion of this is due. By consecrating a part to God men 
acknowledge him as the giver of all. This is so reason- 
able that it generally finds a place in the natural relig- 
ions of pagan nations. Much more should the true 
God be so recognized. 

The holy Scriptures strongly enjoin the duty of dedi- 
cating property to God. The withholding of offerings 
is called robbery. "Will a man rob God? Yet ye 
have robbed me, even this whole nation." The people 
ask in reply, "Wherein have we robbed thee?" The 
Lord's answer is, " In tithes and offerings." In Juda- 
ism a certain fixed proportion of every man's income 
was required as a religious offering. The New Testa- 
ment enjoins a dedication of soul, body, and property 
so . complete as to go entirely beyond the tithing of 
income and the dedication of first-fruits. When body, 
soul, spirit, and possessions are all holy to the Lord, 
then that which supports the owner is dedicated as if it 
fed a priest, and that which nourishes his strength for 
pious work is as if it were consumed upon an altar. 

533* Recognizes God's Right. 

The dedication of property to God is the fitting recog- 
nition of his primary right to all the wealth of the world. 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 29 1 



The basis of all wealth is the raw material, which is 
God's gift ; all wealth-producing is the exercise of facul- 
ties which God has given. As it is just "to render to 
Caesar the things that are Caesar's," so it is no less a 
matter of justice " to render to God the things that are 
God's." 

534. Dedication of Property as a Thank Offering. 

The dedication of property to God is a suitable thank 
offering for the divine goodness and mercies. Pagans 
hang up in the temples of their gods their votive offer- 
ings, memorials of great deliverances, and in this they 
show that such gifts of gratitude have a basis in human 
nature. Christian men may well do the same with pro- 
founder thankfulness and a more intelligent faith. And 
no life is without special occasions and experiences which 
call for special gratitude. 

535. Dedication of Property for Public Worship. 

Property is due to be dedicated to God for the sup- 
port of public worship and for the propagation of the 
Christian religion. In the Christian faith lies the hope 
of the human race, and this faith must be propagated by 
labor and the products of labor. Through the dedica- 
tion of property, each generation as it comes must be 
instructed and educated in the Christian religion, and by 
the same means the blessings of Christianity must be 
carried to all nations. 



536. Dedication of Property for Public Needs. 

Property must needs be dedicated to God to meet the 
great intellectual and social wants of men. Among these 



292 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

great wants we may mention the founding and mainte- 
nance of institutions of learning and of scientific re- 
search. It is not the student or the scientific investi- 
gator who does this or who can do it. These wants 
must be met from the accumulations of wealth in the 
hands of the few. This work must not be left to be 
done by the State alone, for this would be to secularize 
all learning, There is a place for secular learning, and 
there is a place also, and a necessity, for learning which 
is distinctively Christian. Learning which at the first is 
merely secular and non-Christian, easily becomes anti- 
Christian. The science which is based solely upon sense- 
perception drifts in this age toward a denial of the un- 
seen and the spiritual. The Christian religion cannot 
afford to suffer all learning and science to pass into the 
exclusive possession of its enemies. Wealth dedicated 
to God must found and support institutions of Christian 
learning. 

537. Dedication of Property to Relieve Suffering. 

Property ought to be dedicated to God for the relief 
of suffering, for the poor and unfortunate. Feeble 
members of the human race, incapable of self-support 
and friendless, are many, and the stress and strain and 
accidents of life are continually adding to the number. 
It belongs to the brotherhood of man and to the love 
which is born of the Christian faith to help these suffer- 
ing members of the human family. However this may 
be done, whether by benevolent institutions or by private 
charity, the work must be done by the dedication of 
property. "The poor ye have always with you, and 
whensoever ye will ye may do them good." 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 



293 



538. The Dedication of Property not for Man's Sake Only. 

The dedication of property must not be understood 
as having as its sole meaning to meet the wants of men ; 
perhaps it finds its deepest significance toward God him- 
self The costly gift of spikenard, complained of by 
Judas but commended by Jesus, relieved no human suf- 
fering. Three hundred denarii, the price of a year's 
labor, exhaled in perfume and was lost upon the air. 
This incident signifies that the expression of faith and 
love toward God is a sufficient reason for the expendi- 
ture of wealth. We expend money upon our friends, 
not to relieve suffering, but to express love. It is fitting 
to do the same toward God. 

539. Actual Service to God. 

Besides the obligation to believe, to love, to worship, 
there remains the duty of rendering actual objective 
service to God. This service consists chiefly in ac- 
knowledging God, in standing for God, in speaking for 
God in the presence of men, and especially in the 
presence of faithless men. 

540. Acknowledging the Unseen. 

The service of testimony which is due from men to 
God is, first of all, a bearing witness to God's existence 
and the reality of the spiritual world and of the life to 
come. Surrounded as men are by that which appeals 
to the physical senses only, in the paralysis of faith 
which so much prevails they drift easily toward a denial 
of the unseen world. Were it not for the testimony of 
men who believe in spiritual things faith would perish 
and the world would recognize nothing but matter. 



294 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

541. Testimony to Revealed Truth. 

"Truth is mighty and will prevail," but truth will not 
prevail without advocates. The holy Scriptures hold 
their place and influence by the testimony of men who 
believe and are willing to stand before the world as be- 
lievers and defenders. The inspired writings have never 
been without bitter foes, and in this generation their 
enemies are pushing the attack all along the line. This 
attack must be met by the testimony of no inferior 
scholarship, and by literary and scientific criticism no 
less acute. This testimony must needs be manifold. 

542. The Testimony of Religious Experience. 

The testimony to revealed religious truth must be 
various. The testimony of scholarship appeals to learn- 
ing and convinces scholarship ; the testimony of faith 
and conviction begets conviction. The word of God, 
when believed, works powerfully in the hearts of men. 
He that believes is "born of God." Faith "works by 
love and purifies the heart." Testimony is needed to 
the reality of this inward transformation. This testi- 
mony must be the expression of personal experience. 
By means of such testimony from those who have been 
born of the Spirit, faith in a supernatural experience is 
kept alive and the experience itself is propagated. 

543. The Duty of Service to God Imperative. 

The duty of standing for God in the presence of 
friends and of enemies is absolutely imperative. To 
live truth and righteousness, to be faithful to the deep- 
est convictions of the soul, is a mandate of conscience. 
The interior life of a man, if it is strong, will assert 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD 



295 



itself and force expression. Before the great council 
Peter said: "We cannot but speak the things we have 
seen and heard.' ' In yet more forcible language the 
prophet Jeremiah declares the impossibility of stifling 
his convictions : " His word," he says, " was in my heart 
as burning fire shut up in my bones, and I was weary 
with forbearing, and I could not withhold." If the 
men who believe in God and in revealed religion shut 
up their convictions, what will become of the human 
race ? 

The duty of testimony is enjoined as a positive com- 
mand of holy Scripture. The great word of Christ is, 
" Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to 
every creature." " Whosoever shall be ashamed of me 
and of my words in this sinful and adulterous genera- 
tion, of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed when 
he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy 
angels.'' 



CHAPTER XIX 



CONCERNING DUTIES HAVING RESPECT TO ONE'S SELF 

544. Obligation Cannot be to Self. 

We must not say duties to ourselves. The notion of 
obligation to one's self and that form of speech which 
implies this are delusive and misleading. They obscure 
the right conception of obligation. This matter has 
been already considered. But toward God and toward 
men we are under obligations which have respect to 
ourselves. The obligation is to the other party ; the 
benefit arising from its fulfillment may accrue to us. As 
touching ourselves these duties may be privileges, or 
they may be rights which we may claim, or ought to 
claim, as requisite for our welfare. As rights they are 
best considered from the opposite view-point, the view- 
point of duties on the part of others. That which I 
have a right to claim for myself it is the duty of another 
to render, and my right is his duty to me, and not my 
duty to myself. 

545. The Duty of Self=preservation. 

This is a duty due first of all to God ; it is also a 
duty generally due to men. All things depend upon 
life. Only by preserving life, and by preserving life in 
good condition, can we fulfill our obligations to our 
Creator or to one another. If a man owe a debt, he is 
morally bound not only to pay the debt if he is able, 
but he is equally bound to do his best to keep himself 
296 



DUTIES HAVING RESPECT TO ONES SELF 297 

or to make himself able to pay the debt. Many pri- 
mary obligations carry with themselves, therefore, the 
secondary obligation to keep ourselves in condition to 
fulfill the first 

546. SeIf=preservation a Duty to God. 

In the first place, God gave life of his own will ; it 
belongs, therefore, to him to take life. To us it belongs 
to nourish and conserve the life which he gave. In 
the second place, to destroy intentionally one's own life 
from stress of grief or anxiety is to repudiate faith in 
God and to refuse submission to his will. The pains of 
life, which we cannot escape, represent the will of God 
for us, the conditions under which it is his will that we 
serve him. Faith accepts these divine appointments as 
wise and good. To take our own lives is to deny this 
faith in God ; it is an act of impiety and rebellion. To 
hide in the grave from the shame of meeting the con- 
sequences of our sins is to cut ourselves off from the 
opportunity of repentance and to flee from the eyes of 
men to meet untimely the judgments of the Creator. 
In the third place, to destroy one's own life is not 
seldom to betray, basely and cowardly betray, the trust 
of those who are nearest and dearest. The suicide 
deserts his family and leaves helpless ones to struggle 
alone with difficulties and necessities. This manner of 
abandoning wife, children, and friends is just as faithless 
as any other. 

547. The Duty of Caring for Health. 

The same considerations which show the duty of pre- 
serving life indicate the duty of caring for health. 



298 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL .PHILOSOPHY 



Health is the necessary condition of rendering the best 
service to God or men. To abuse one's health is to rob 
God and one's friends and society. The woman who 
suffers herself to become sick when she might be well 
and strong, robs her husband and her children. And it 
is hardly needful to say that the best privileges of life 
depend upon the preservation of health. 

548. The Duty of Self=preservation Limited. 

Self-preservation is a duty, but there may be a higher 
obligation than any care for self. The divine will may 
call for self-sacrifice in place of self-saving. Patriots 
and Christian martyrs have not counted personal welfare 
or life itself the chief good, and the world has not 
counted them recreant to duty. There is no heroic 
virtue without self-abnegation. The mother does not 
neglect her sick child, although her own bodily welfare 
may suffer. Fidelity to truth and love outranks self- 
preservation. High services and great emergencies call 
for self-consecration. This self-abnegation may be con- 
centrated into a moment of utmost self-sacrifice ; it may 
stretch through years of toil and suffering till life is 
worn out for the welfare of others ; it may be the sur- 
render of opportunities of self-culture and the accept- 
ance of a narrow life that another life may be made 
richer. The Christian faith gives assurance that such 
self-sacrifice can never bring final loss to those who thus 
forget themselves. 

549. The Duty of Self improvement. 

Self-improvement signifies attention and effort di- 
rected to the cultivation of one's own faculties, man- 



DUTIES HAVING RESPECT TO ONE'S SELF 299 

ners, or character. It ought to embrace the whole ex- 
tent of a man's being and life. Self-improvement is 
stimulus and growth for faculties that are weak ; regu- 
lation and discipline for faculties that are strong ; the 
development of that which is lacking ; the pruning away 
of that which is redundant ; change toward perfection 
in faculty and character. Without further analysis of 
the scope or methods of self-improvement, the duty of 
self-improvement is here emphasized. This duty is espe- 
cially binding upon the young, for whom there are so 
large possibilities of self-cultivation. 

550. Self cultivation a Duty toward God. 

Since God made man in his own likeness, it is plainly 
man's duty to realize as fully as possible that divine 
ideal. This is the sum of man's duty. " Be ye perfect, 
even as your Father in heaven is perfect." Still further, 
every command of God requiring service toward him- 
self or toward men carries with it the duty of fitting 
ourselves as well as possible for that work. No life is 
righteous, much less is it a life of love, which is not a 
life of usefulness to mankind. A selfish life may be full 
of thought and energy ; it may be great with execu- 
tive force, but it can never be worthy ; it cannot fulfill 
the divine will. Every obligation which can bind a man 
to a life of love and usefulness for the Lord's sake calls 
him to seek for perfection of being. 

551. The Duty of Claiming One's Rights. 

Obedience to God often requires the surrender of 
one's rights without contention. The life of Jesus 
Christ was a continual illustration of this. His precepts 



300 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

are a transcript of this element of his life. He com- 
mands men to meet hatred with love ; to wear out injury 
with patient submission. This surrender of one's rights 
does not signify merely the endurance of injury by one 
who by reason of weakness is unable to resist. It is the 
magnanimous self-abnegation of one who will not meet 
wrong with violence or injure another in self-defense. 
But sometimes it becomes a man's duty to claim and 
vindicate his rights. Paul would not suffer himself to 
be pushed out of the apostleship. Every man set in a 
place of trust and responsibility must stand for the 
rights which belong to his position, because not other- 
wise can he meet his obligations. God gives to every 
one some place of trust and responsibility. It belongs, 
therefore, to every man to assert and vindicate his right 
to do his duty and to fit himself for his duties, to make 
life worth something to himself and to others. By 
standing for the rights of conscience men have not 
only maintained their own spiritual integrity, but have 
also gained unmeasured good for the human race. The 
right to do right and the right to determine aright one's 
own immortal destiny must be vindicated at any cost. 
But this assertion of one's rights is often best made by 
the patient endurance of wrong. It is the determined 
fulfillment of all duty in patient passiveness toward all 
injury. The general principle is this : when the asser- 
tion of one's rights is necessary for the fulfillment of im- 
perative obligation, rights must be claimed and vindi- 
cated ; when, however, the assertion of rights is the 
assertion of selfishness, or at best nothing more than the 
assertion of self-love, they may be forborne, and very 
often a man ought to surrender them rather than contend. 



CHAPTER XX 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MEN 

552. Scope of the Discussion. 

Duties of men to men are numberless. The princi- 
ples which underlie them are few, but diversified rela- 
tionships and circumstances cause the applications of 
those principles to ramify without limit. To give an 
exhaustive account of duties is impossible, for an ac- 
count which should be complete to-day, would cease 
to-morrow to be complete ; new conditions would give 
rise to new forms of duty till then unthought of and 
impossible. All that can be attempted here, is to illus- 
trate by certain radical duties the application of moral 
principles to human conduct. 

553. The Duty of Noninterference. 

Perhaps the most generalized form of duty between 
man and man is the duty of non-interference with the 
rights of others. Every human being must be left in 
the full possession and enjoyment of all his natural rights. 
Violations of this principle constitute the crimes of men. 
In the universal brotherhood of the human race, and in 
the unity of relationship to the one Creator, we find an 
immutable basis of equality in respect to natural rights. 
The principle of benevolence forbids interference with 
the rights of another. Every human being is a distinct 
and separate personality, having his own separate and 

301 



302 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



peculiar destiny. Justice requires that this separateness 
of personality be respected. Between man and man 
there is ample place for influence and help, but no place 
for interfering with natural rights. 

554. Interference with the Rights of Property. 

The first form of interference with the rights of men 
which suggests itself is infringements upon the right to 
hold, use, and enjoy property. In its baldest, boldest 
form this interference is theft and robbery. It violates 
in the rudest way the command, "Thou shalt not steal." 
But there are forms of interference with the rights of 
property more subtile than theft and robbery. The 
crafty take advantage of the unwary ; the strong crowd 
the weak to the wall ; selfish men use the necessities of 
others as their opportunity for gain ; a few by cunning 
and by might appropriate advantages for themselves, till 
no place is left for the many, and life becomes for them 
a strain scarce worth the living. Every form of greed 
by which one person appropriates for himself the pro- 
ducts of another man's labor, without due exchange of 
benefits, is violence done to the rights of property. 
Every human being must be allowed a fair, even oppor- 
tunity for livelihood, the best which the Creator has ren- 
dered possible. The principle of universal brotherhood 
demands this. 

555. Interference to Corrupt Character. 

There is one wrong greater than interference with 
rights of property — interference with the free personal- 
ity for corrupting moral character. This is the greatest 
possible evil and injury. Here we find every possible 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MEN 303 

method of spreading moral defilement and of leading 
the will to wrong choices. This unclean and fiendish 
work is begun upon the minds and hearts of the young. 
Their minds are filled with vile pictures of evil ; sin is 
painted as pleasant, beautiful, and good ; every forbid- 
den fruit is made to seem sweet and luscious ; virtue is 
pictured as repulsive and mean. Then follows personal 
solicitation to evil-doing, the pressure of personality 
upon personality. To those who are tempted there be- 
longs indeed the power of choice and the possibility 
of resistance — but little chance have the young in this 
grapple with experienced fiends who seek the life of 
their souls. They run the gauntlet of temptations to 
form the drink habit ; seductive incitements to unchas- 
tity ; invitations to gambling and fraud for the sake of 
gain ; allurements to a life of lawlessness for the pleas- 
ure of its wild freedom. It is the high moral right of 
every human being to meet evil and work out his own 
destiny under the most favorable conditions, with no 
added difficulties beyond those which the Creator has 
appointed. Those who corrupt the young ought to be 
counted and branded and punished as the basest and 
most guilty of mankind. 

556. Interference with the Rights of Reputation. 

Every man has a right to whatever good name he de- 
serves. Nothing can be more absolutely a man's own 
than the good reputation which he has won by a life of 
integrity and goodness. To destroy such a name is rob- 
bery indeed. As a personal damage and affront, few 
wrongs could be greater. If a man is true, honest, and 
able, it is no more than justice to accord to him the 



304 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

recognition of these qualities. The loss of reputation 
may be the loss of livelihood, the loss of social recog- 
nition, the loss of power to do good in the world. All 
this is so manifest that interference with the rights of 
reputation is everywhere recognized as a crime. 

557. Interference with the Rights of Conscience. 

As has already been shown, freedom of conscience is 
the right to determine for one's self one's own attitude 
toward his Creator. It is the right to hold and profess 
such religious belief, and to offer such worship and service 
to God, as shall seem to each one to be true and in har- 
mony with the divine will. Also, as has been shown, this 
freedom of the individual must not be so interpreted as to 
conflict with the equal rights of others. Non-interfer- 
ence with this liberty of the soul is a sacred duty. As 
the brotherhood of man and the equality of natural 
rights have become recognized, governments are learn- 
ing the duty and the good policy of according to all 
men their religious rights. Fines, imprisonments, whip- 
pings, the rack, the stake, are falling into the past. But 
interference with the rights of conscience may be exer- 
cised in other ways ; not only by pains and penalties, but 
by rewards for the profession of some certain faith ; by 
governmental favoritism approximating the establish- 
ment of a State Church ; by an intolerant public senti- 
ment which goes quite beyond a due testimony for the 
truth ; by the ostracism of a minority with an intensity 
of reprobation not deserved by any fault in the unhappy 
victim ; by an extreme exercise of authority in the 
family. This interference may arise from sheer arro- 
gance of disposition, or from mistaken zeal for that 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 305 

which is counted the truth ; but from whatever source it 
springs, it violates natural rights and works evil. To 
draw the line, however, between legitimate testimony 
and influence, in behalf of the truth, on the one side, 
and that undue pressure and authority which trenches 
upon religious freedom, on the other, demands the great- 
est wisdom. 

558. Interference with Personal Liberty. 

Interference with personal liberty constitutes slavery 
in its many grades and forms. That the drift of the 
age is toward the extinction of slavery in all parts of the 
world is to be thankfully recognized. The disappearance 
of African slavery in the United States of America ren- 
ders the discussion of this subject at this time more 
theoretical and less a practical necessity than before 
emancipation. But so bold an interference with natural 
rights, one that has so fortified itself by law and au- 
thority, and has so intrenched itself in indurated custom 
and social organization, and is moreover so slow to pass 
away, demands some notice. 

559. Origin of Slavery. 

With servitude as the just penalty of crime we have 
here nothing to do. Men who use their freedom for 
the injury of others, compel organized society in self- 
defense to restrain that ill-used freedom. Involuntary 
servitude as penalty for crime, if wisely and benevo- 
lently administered, is perhaps the best form of penalty. 
But such servitude is not called slavery. One chief 
source of slavery has been war. Prisoners of war have 

been sold into bondage ; the defenseless population of 

u 



306 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

conquered districts, women and children, have been 
swept into servitude. But the slavery with which 
America has had most to do, had its origin in the mere 
lust of gain. If tribal wars originated slavery on Afri- 
can soil, the foreign trade in slaves stimulated those wars 
to supply the demand for slaves. The spread of slavery 
when once planted on American soil was assured by the 
principle that the child inherits the condition of the 
mother. The Afro-American slave trade stood therefore 
chiefly as man-stealing, and was properly stigmatized by 
the law of the great republic as piracy. There are none 
to defend the justice of the Afro-American slavery in 
respect to its origin. 

560. Grades of Slavery. 

Some forms of slavery originating in war, have been 
little more than enforced change of country, an involun- 
tary colonization. The captives have been incorporated 
into the social life of the captors ; marriage alliances 
have been formed, and the people have blended. Or 
the victors have colonized the conquered country, and 
have held the former possessors as inferior laborers. In 
this case the conquerors and the serfs have at length 
coalesced. In this manner Saxon conquerors and sub- 
ject Britons became one ; Norman rulers and Anglo- 
Saxon serfs were blended. Sometimes, as with Daniel 
and his friends, the captive was advanced to place and 
power. These are the milder forms of bondage. At 
the other extreme the slave is counted an article of mer- 
chandise, to be bought and sold as a beast or a tool, 
without personal rights except as his owner should 
please to grant them, till in turn he should please to 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 307 

take them away. This " chattel slavery" has in it the 
possibility of the utmost cruelty and debasement. 
Whether this opportunity shall be used to the utmost 
depends upon the individual master and upon the senti- 
ments of the people among whom the slavery exists. In 
one place it allows the slave girl to be killed for a can- 
nibal feast ; in another it permits the king to slaughter a 
hundred slaves to mix with blood the cement for his 
palace ; in a third place it may forbid, as a general rule, 
any severity beyond what is deemed needful for the se- 
curity of the system of slavery. With this latter form, 
chattel slavery guarded and limited to a considerable de- 
gree by the kindness of the master and by public 
opinion, America is most familiar. The system admitted 
the utmost abuse and cruelty, but public sentiment con- 
demned wantonness of cruelty, or approved that severity 
only which profit and safety were supposed to require. 

561. Slavery is Robbery. 

Slavery has this invariable element, that the labor of 
the slave is taken without his consent, and of course, 
without due remuneration fixed and accepted by mutual 
agreement. If in the place of labor, we say money or 
the products of labor, it will appear at once that slavery 
signifies robbery. He who exacts by compulsion the 
labor of a lifetime, takes by force the products of a life- 
time of labor. If it be said that the master renders to 
the slave an equivalent for his service, as large a return 
as he could secure by his labor in freedom, this scarcely 
disguises the violence and injustice ; even exchange is 
robbery if enforced upon a man against his will. But 
in fact slavery does not render to the slave a just return 



308 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



for his labor. When slavery ceases to be gainful to the 
master, the system begins to crumble. 

562. The Propagation of Slavery Works no Justification. 

Propagated slavery is based on the principle that the 
child inherits the status of the slave mother. But why 
does the child inherit the status of the mother and not 
that of the father ? Why reverse the current principle 
of free life that the father confers rank ? The original 
enslavement of the mother is man-stealing and piracy ; 
how does it become just to hold her child, the child 
perhaps of unwilling motherhood, in life-long bondage ? 
If it were landed estate of which the mother had been 
despoiled, justice and law would restore it to her heirs, 
though generations had intervened. The mere state- 
ment of the case makes its own appeal to reason and 
conscience. That slavery which begins in violence and 
robbery, is no less robbery in the second generation, 
and in the third, and forever. 

563. Attempted Justification of Slavery. 

In the presence of the Christian religion slavery must 
justify itself, or else stand condemned as the colossal 
wrong and crime of the ages. 

First comes the biblical defense. Slavery is said to 
be the carrying out of the penal purpose of the Creator 
against a people which had fallen under his frown. This 
defense breaks down, because that " Cursed be Canaan," 
whatever it may mean, does not lie against the Negro 
race, but against another branch of the progeny of Ham. 
Still further, a governmental purpose of the Creator 
justifies no evil doing of men. Slavery, like any other 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 309 

human conduct, must stand or fall by the Golden Rule, 
and not by a curse. 

With more audacity, but with less subtlety, African 
slavery has undertaken to justify itself upon the plea 
that the Negro is not a human being. In the presence 
of science and religion this defense has become ashamed 
to declare itself, and needs no consideration. The 
history and achievements of the Cushite race, the prin- 
ciples of psychology, the experiences of the Christian 
faith, the sporadic talent seen here and there even in 
slave life, and the fertile progeny of mixed blood, all 
show the true humanity of the Negro. 

Similar to the preceding defense and yet unlike it, is 
the claim that the Negro race is abject and incapable of 
improvement, fit only for a life in bondage, in fact that 
in subordination to a master the race finds its most con- 
genial life. To this it is sufficient to say that the entire 
history of the race, and especially its history since 
emancipation, disproves the allegation. And most of 
all upon the basis of its own premises, it forgets the 
duty of the strong to help the weak, and not to oppress 
them. It is abhorrent to the principle of human 
brotherhood and to Christian charity, as well as to eter- 
nal justice, to reduce a people to slavery because they 
are feeble. 

564. Pleas for the Continuance of Slavery. 

For the continuance of slavery, as an institution 
already existing, very plausible pleas have been pre- 
sented. These pleas demand a little notice because 
that lamentation is still sometimes heard for the untimely 
extinction of the institution. The wrong of emancipa- 



3IO INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

tion is counted greater than the wrong of the bondage. 
A man inherits the ownership of slaves. By no choice 
of his own the legal mastery of slaves comes to him as 
a legal and a moral responsibility. It is urged that the 
slave was so unfitted for freedom that the gift of free- 
dom was a curse and not a blessing. Admitting servi- 
tude to be an abnormal condition, it is still affirmed that 
under conditions as they existed, it was better that 
slavery continue. The condition of affairs has been 
illustrated by this parable. An eagle swooped and 
snatched a lamb from the fold and was soaring with it 
to his mountain eyrie. But in his flight the eagle began 
to reflect upon the wrong he had done ; he saw that he 
had no right to hold the lamb, no, not for an instant ; he 
therefore let go his hold, and the lamb was dashed in 
pieces upon the rocks below. This parable teaches that 
there may be a condition of slavery such that it is less 
cruel or unjust to continue the old relationship for a 
time, than to thrust out the slave instantly to perish 
without help or kindness. But this does not correctly 
represent the alternative of the parable. The eagle is 
not shut up to the choice between carrying the lamb to 
his bloody eyrie to be devoured and letting him fall 
upon the rocks. He can return him to the fold whence 
he was taken. The parable signifies that the master 
ought to make haste and prepare the slave for free- 
dom. 

565. Duties of the Master. 

A child is not prepared for independence and self- 
support, and for this reason is placed under the author- 
ity of parents. Shall the father therefore hold his child 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 3 I I 

in subjection forever for the sake of gain ? Parental 
authority exists that it may speedily render itself un- 
necessary and come to a natural end. After this 
analogy, if a man finds himself providentially the legal 
owner of a slave unfit for instant manumission, it is 
manifest that three imperative duties rest upon him. 

First, he ought at once to put the slave into the legal 
ownership of himself, and thus guard him against per- 
petual bondage. There is surely no moral objection to 
the instant renunciation of all right of ownership in the 
bodies and souls of men. Secondly, he ought to put 
the slave in training to fit him for freedom, to the end 
that he may assume the responsibilities of a free man as 
soon as possible. And thirdly, it is the master's duty 
to put him into the actual possession of freedom as 
soon and as fast as fitness to use freedom is acquired. 

566. Renunciation of Ownership, not Abandonment. 

To renounce ownership in the slave and to put him 
into the legal ownership of himself, does not signify that 
the master must thrust the slave out of all care and help. 
The gift of legal freedom makes the former master at 
once a trusted friend. As a friend he guides their un- 
practised steps in caring for themselves. He throws 
them step by step, as they are able to bear it, upon their 
own responsibility. Soon the former slave is able to 
walk alone. But to the end of his life he will look to 
the old master as a friend and counselor. If a master 
of slaves should take this course, would it not be just 
and benevolent? Would not this course accord with 
the ethics of the Golden Rule ? Would it not be Christ- 
like ? And that which is Christlike is duty. 



312 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

567. Slavery Nullifies Marriage. 

Having in mind chattel slavery of the American type, 
we find inherent in the system a wonderful combination 
of wrongs and evils. To count the man a thing, to be 
owned and bought and sold, has in itself the possibility 
of all evils. In the first place it nullifies the marriage 
bond and renders stable families and virtuous domestic 
life impossible. In the system lies the legal right to 
sell husband or wife from the other forever ; to sell the 
child from its mother; slaves are " raised" for the mar- 
ket, as sheep and mules are raised. And the marriage 
bond which the master can treat so lightly, becomes in 
the mind of the slave a transient relationship. It is im- 
possible to " raise " slaves as beasts for sale, without 
making marriage bestial. 

568. Slavery Nullifies Parental Obligations. 

It is impossible for slave parents to perform the duties 
which belong to fathers and mothers toward their chil- 
dren. When parents have not so much as the owner- 
ship of their bodies, when they cannot control their 
time, and cannot save the child from the slave trader, 
how can they train their children in virtue, industry, and 
the fear of the Lord ? In the weariness of incessant 
labor, and in the ignorance which slavery requires, the 
parents cannot instruct their children. The mother 
can bring children into the world, but cannot per- 
form the duties of a mother. This condition inheres 
in the system of chattel slavery. The privilege of 
doing well the duties of parents toward their chil- 
dren accorded freely to the slave, would be the death of 
slavery. 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 3 1 3 

569. Slavery and Chastity. 

Slavery renders it impossible for the female slave to 
defend her own virtue. In the destruction of family 
life, esteem for virtue is not nurtured ; the moral bar- 
riers built against sin are slight ; the loss of virtue is 
counted no great matter ; and the female slave in the 
hand of her master, to be tempted, to be punished or 
rewarded, to be sold at his will, could not be expected 
to save herself. That which might be expected to hap- 
pen under such conditions of slave life, has taken place, 
and the record is written in the mixture of races. 

570. Slavery Necessitates Ignorance. 

Slavery compels the master to keep the slave in igno- 
rance. To educate a slave and give him free access to 
the current knowledge of the world is to train him for 
freedom. This would be the suicide of slavery. This 
necessity of ignorance is so imperative that the system 
could not take the risk of allowing individual masters to 
instruct their slaves. Occasional or sporadic intelligence 
even, in a community of slave life is a contagious dis- 
ease — no one can tell to what extent it will spread. 
Intelligence makes an uneasy slave, and uneasy intelli- 
gence with the needful daring, is ready to head a stam- 
pede or a rebellion. 

571. Slavery and Moral Character. 

The cultus of slavery cannot develop moral character 
in the slave. Slavery can secure a habit of seeming 
obedience, a cringing, hypocritical obedience. " De- 
ception is the defense of the weak." The sanctity of 
marriage, the immeasurable value of womanly virtue, 



3 14 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



the rights of property, the sacredness of truth, the 
manly self-respect which belongs to intelligence and 
virtue, cannot be inculcated by that system which tram- 
ples upon them all. How can the conscience be trained 
by that system which violates every principle of obliga- 
tion which conscience recognizes ? High moral charac- 
ter demands freedom to follow one's own convictions of 
duty. Slavery can, in a certain way, develop religious 
sentiment, for in shutting out all earthly hope, it shuts 
up the soul to the one outlook above ; but religious 
sentiment unmixed with intelligence runs to superstition, 
and does not ensure good morals. 

572. Slavery Gives no Place for Aspiration. 

One great advantage of free life is the opportunity 
which it gives for aspiration and personal development ; 
a man is hindered and held down by nothing except by 
the limitations of his own personality. By chattel slav- 
ery the possibility of aspiration and free growth is anni- 
hilated. With whatever largeness of mental gifts the 
slave is born, he is doomed to live and die a slave, to 
pine and perish in ignorance, conscious that he is a man 
and might act the part of a man among men, yet doomed 
to be counted a thing. With whatever possibilities of 
gracious womanhood the female slave may be endowed, 
she is held to ignorant, servile toil, if not humbled for 
vice. What greater wrong can be done than this, to hold 
conscious manhood in a brutish place ? 

573. The Christian Religion and Slavery. 

The New Testament lays down such principles and 
gives such injunctions as, if followed, would bring to the 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 3 I 5 

slave the reality of freedom at once and would speedily 
bring the form. Obedience to the second great com- 
mand, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," and 
to the Golden Rule, would render the holding of men 
in unwilling bondage impossible. Standing together, 
the master and the slave, with uncovered heads before 
their common Master in heaven, the supreme law of 
love in their hearts, it is impossible that they should 
continue the one a master, the other a slave. If the 
names remain they are emptied of meaning. While 
the formal relation of master and slave continues, the 
injunction to the master is, Be just and kind ; to the 
slave, Be obedient and faithful, as unto the Lord. 

574. Caste. 

The word caste is used with great indefiniteness of 
meaning. Its most conspicuous application is to the 
hereditary ranks or grades of Hindu society. In addi- 
tion to the idea of fixed hereditary classes, the word car- 
ries the notion of a certain inherent inferiority, a taint 
of uncleanness in the lower caste. For the higher castes 
it is social rank dependent upon birth and not upon 
merit ; for the lowest it means confinement to menial 
occupations with no possibility of rising above them, 
with the added ban or stigma of social dishonor. A 
Sudra is vile because he is a Sudra, and he is a Sudra 
because his father was a Sudra, and his descendants will 
be Sudras forever. 

575. The Injustice of Caste. 

Caste violates the fundamental principles of equal 
rights before God and of human brotherhood. In its 



3 l6 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

origin it represents the imperious rule of the strong over 
the weak. In its continuance the helpless inferior comes 
to accept his despised inferiority as the necessary con- 
dition of his existence. At length the whole social life 
of the people crystallizes around this principle of social 
grades. The organization then perpetuates itself ; the 
individual is powerless to resist it. If a man of the 
higher class attempts to disregard the principle of caste, 
it is a battle of all against one ; he sinks helpless into 
the most despised class, having accomplished nothing 
except his own degradation. And no individual of the 
lower caste can lift himself; the taint of inferiority and 
uncleanness is upon him forever. The fact that this is 
done by an indurated social custom does not render it 
less unjust to those who suffer. It does render it diffi- 
cult, however, to fix and estimate the individual and per- 
sonal responsibility. 

576. Truthfulness ; Its Nature. 

Truthfulness is intentional conformity in expression or 
affirmation to that which is real. This definition indi- 
cates two elements : first, sincerity or truthfulness in the 
expression of the subjective self; secondly, veracity or 
truthfulness in affirmations touching objective reality. 
These two elements are closely interwoven. Sincerity 
is seen in the expression of one's thoughts, sentiments, 
feelings. The opposite of sincerity is pretense and hy- 
pocrisy — and hypocrisy may be either distinctly inten- 
tional or more or less unconscious. Veracity is truth- 
telling. Truthfulness, as a quality of character, has spe- 
cial reference to the subjective intention. Truthfulness 
is an essential element of moral excellence. 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 



317 



577. Prevalence of Falsehood. 

The prevalence of falsehood is startling and terrible. 
In pagan and in Christian lands alike, among savages 
and among civilized people, this vice greatly prevails. 
In social life and in methods of business insincerity meets 
one everywhere. In business deception is practised for 
gain ; in politics the demagogue cheats the people for 
the sake of office ; in society men and women stalk to 
and fro posing in robes of pretense, expressing senti- 
ments without sincerity and living lives of hollow exag- 
geration. But to this prevalent life of insincerity and 
pretense many exceptions, noble examples of sincerity 
and truth, are found. 

578. Truth and Concealment. 

Truthfulness does not signify the absence of all con- 
cealment, the telling of all that is known, thought, or felt. 
We enter our houses and shut the doors ; we shut out all 
the world from what we do in secret We do not tell ; we 
do not pretend to tell ; there is no obligation to tell. Much 
of every man's subjective life is, and ought to be, a closet 
with door shut and blinds closed. In the houses of our 
friends we see that which we ought to give no sign of 
seeing. We form judgments of our associates in life 
which we ought not to express. Of some things which 
we know, and are known to know and confess that we 
know, we refuse to speak. In these things there is con- 
cealment but no falsehood. 

579. Figures of Speech Not Falsehood. 

Language abounds in figures of speech. There is 
hyperbole beyond all possible reality. There are irony 



3 I 8 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

and sarcasm in which that is affirmed which the words 
deny. There are mockery and banter and jest in which 
the subtle elements of manner and tone and not the 
bare words express the real meaning. This style of 
speech may be wise or it may be foolish, but within due 
limits it is not false. 

580. Mere Evasions Not Falsehoods. 

Mere evasions cannot properly be accounted untruth- 
ful. They are contests of wit against wit, in which there 
is no pretense of affirming or revealing. On the other 
hand, it is understood that all appearances are intended 
to be illusive. Children play "Hide and Seek" ; they 
undertake to mislead one another in their hiding, and 
without this there would be no game. In a way in- 
tensely serious enemies in war make feints and evade ; 
appearances do not profess to be true revealings of the 
situation. This is not counted treachery. In the sphere 
where no false professions or pretensions are made no 
falsehood can be charged. But it is easy to pass be- 
yond the bounds of mere evasion and fall into blank 
lying. 

581. The Obligation to be Truthful Imperative. 

The obligation to speak the truth is full and absolute. 
It is lawful to refuse to speak ; but to speak falsely, to 
clothe the soul with false pretenses and lies, the law of 
God absolutely forbids. This obligation is not based 
upon the right of others to know the truth, for it may 
be that they have no such right. Nor is it based upon 
the paramount worldly advantage which would accrue 
from uniform veracity, for truth-telling often brings dan- 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 319 

ger and the utmost loss. But God is a God of truth. 
There can be no real likeness or harmony with him ex- 
cept by likeness in the element of veracity. The divine 
law commands truthfulness and gives no suggestion of a 
rightful time or place for lying. The soul of man was 
created in deep harmony with truth, and under normal 
conditions feels keenly the shame and degradation of 
falsehood. The welfare of men is based upon truth. 
In believing and " doing the truth" they come to ever- 
lasting good. There is no evil which is not promoted 
by insincerity and falsehood. 

582. Defense of Falsehood. 

The common method of defending falsehood is to 
present imaginary cases in which adherence to truth 
would bring extremest danger from which falsehood 
seems to offer a ready way of escape. For example, a 
patient in critical sickness demands of his physician his 
opinion of his condition. To tell him the simple truth 
would be likely to agitate his mind and diminish the 
chances of his recovery ; to refuse to speak would be 
understood to mean the worst ; an assurance that the 
patient is in no danger will quiet his mind and do him 
good. Or again, enemies are pursuing a man to his 
death. They come to his house and command his wife 
to reveal the place of his concealment. She knows the 
place, but if she reveals it she gives her husband up to 
death ; if she refuses to speak she subjects herself to the 
direst fate. A falsehood will mislead his enemies and 
give him and her an opportunity to escape. The only 
limit to this kind of argument is found in the exhausted 
imagination of the disputant. 



320 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

583. Replies to the Above. 

There is no high virtue which may not cost a man the 
loss of all things. Liberty has been won and must be 
defended with precious blood. There is that which 
high womanhood counts worth more than life. Chris- 
tian martyrs might have saved their lives by giving up 
fidelity. Truthfulness ranks with the highest virtues. 
If the former great virtues must not be surrendered, no 
more must the soul give up her spotless robe of sincer- 
ity and truth. If the principle of veracity were aban- 
doned, the very benefits which falsehood are supposed 
to bring would disappear. The imaginary advantages 
arise from the fact that falsehood is an exception and is 
supposed to be truth. Still further, the same method of 
argument may be used against every other element of 
heroic character. Shall a man hold himself ready to sur- 
render whatever is good and great when danger may be 
escaped thereby? Truthfulness is the very queen of the 
virtues and is worthy of our utmost self-sacrifice. Truth- 
fulness is fidelity to the noblest attributes of the soul and 
to God without respect to consequences. 

584. An Illustration. 

President Robinson says, " One of the older citizens 
of Lawrence, Kansas, said to the writer a few years ago : 
I never in all my life was in so tight a place as when one 
of Quantrell's band in the great raid of 1863, with the 
muzzle of a cocked pistol close to my .head, demanded 
to know if I was an abolitionist. The raiders were 
shooting down my neighbors all about me ; but the 
thought flashed through my mind, if I say No, I shall 
ever afterward be ashamed to look any one in the face ; 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 321 



so I answered, 'Yes.' An officer in command, standing 
near, ' for some reason, I never knew what, shouted, 
'Don't shoot him.' The pistol was removed. I assure 
you I took a long breath of relief, and have ever since 
been thankful that I was enabled to tell the truth." 

This may stand as an illustration, not only of brave 
truthfulness, but also of Divine Providence protecting 
the truth-teller. 

585. Subjective Influence of Sincerity. 

The subjective influences of sincerity are unspeakably 
good. Sincerity tends strongly to dissipate vices of 
thought and sensibility. It tends to a clear self-con- 
sciousness ; the mind beholds itself in clear light without 
disguises. If false thought and vicious sensibilities arise, 
they are not cloaked with excuses and false pretenses, 
but are seen as they are in reality. This leads to a real 
knowledge of one's self, and a just estimate of one's 
own imperfections. Sincere expression of thought and 
feeling tends to the same result. The subjective condi- 
tion is seen in its outward expression. A man sees him- 
self with the same clearness and impartiality as if he 
were beholding another man. In this clear self-knowl- 
edge the conscience acts with power. Thus it comes to 
pass that love of truth is followed by a train of other 
virtues, and whatever faults are found in connection 
with sincerity and truthfulness, it is possible to correct 
them. 

586. Subjective Effects of Falsehood. 

As sincerity and love of truth work mightily to clear 

the soul of faults and to elevate the character, so on the 

v 



322 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



other side, insincerity and falsehood produce the most 
disastrous subjective effects. Hardly any vice brings a 
man into a more hopeless moral state. His mind moves 
in the murky air of pretenses. He sees nothing as it is 
in reality, but everything as cloaked and posed and 
prinked for effect. His mind is always struggling to 
see itself as it undertakes to appear to others. This in- 
sincerity covers his vices of character from his own sight, 
even more than from the eyes of others. Under such 
conditions there can be no sincere effort to cast off im- 
perfections. The mind loses the power of sharp dis- 
crimination between reality and unreality, between truth 
and pretense. The liar comes at length to believe his 
own lie. In this confusion of reality and pretense, con- 
science is stupefied and shows little life. This moral 
condition is almost beyond hope. The moral nature 
has become a bottomless quicksand. And if by any 
means the soul is brought to renounce that life of vicious 
thought and feeling, that apparent change is likely to 
prove only a new posing of insincerity and hypocrisy. 
The soul that cultivates insincerity bids adieu to hope. 

587. Why so Important? 

Why are sincerity and truthfulness so important? In 
what does this unspeakable importance find its ground ? 
They are the chosen harmony of the soul with reality, 
with the realities of the divine nature, with the realities 
of human nature, and with all the realities of the uni- 
verse. All possible welfare is bound up in this harmony 
with reality. By a generic act of the will a man 
makes reality or unreality his choice ; the choice of 
falsehood is therefore the refusal of all good. 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 323 

588. Training Children in Truthfulness. 

The prevalence of insincerity and falsehood is not 
surprising; it would be a marvel indeed if they did not 
abound. The training of children is often little less 
than a careful education in deception. They are teased 
with little bewildering falsehoods and deceitful tricks, 
just for fun. Thus in the very beginning all sense of 
the sacredness of truth is destroyed. When the habit 
of falsehood has been well learned, then it is railed at, 
and perhaps punished ; but this reprobation has no effect 
to reshape the soul in the mold of sincerity. Then the 
hollow forms of social life, and the white lies of society 
continue the education in falsehood. In addition to 
this the opening intelligence of the child is fed on fiction. 
The most popular literature for children is largely com- 
posed of curious and grotesque falsehood, reality and 
unreality curiously blended. It is not strange that the 
line between the true and the false is blurred. From 
the dawn of intelligence reality and sincerity should be 
the child's daily bread. It should hear words of pure 
sincerity, and of nothing else. It should live, move, 
and have its being in an atmosphere of truth. If fiction 
is used in education, it should be used as recognized fic- 
tion, and not at all till the mind is able to distinguish 
between reality and fancy. Sincere forms of social life 
should be inculcated, and that life which is hollow and 
heartless should be entirely rejected. Better be angular 
and sometimes give offense, than be insincere and false. 

589. Duties in Family Relationships. Principles. 

As we have already seen, the family is organized upon 
the informing principles of fidelity, love, and reverence. 



324 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

Such obligations are assumed as involve perfect trust in 
each other, and trust is the correlative of trustworthiness 
and fidelity. 

Love represents community of life and welfare, the 
consecration of one to another and of each to all, to live 
for them, to practise self-denial for them. Reverence 
represents the recognition of the grades or ranks which 
inhere in the family organization. For the children 
there is the joint supremacy of the parents. For the 
entire family there is the headship of the father. And 
the self-consecration of love distinguishes headship in 
the family from mere authority. The duties which 
belong to this family organization must be briefly noticed. 

590. Fidelity. 

The ultimate breach of fidelity between husband and 
wife is the overt violation of the seventh commandment. 
Law, civil and divine, counts this as the actual sunder- 
ing of the marriage bond. When this takes place, it 
remains only for the civil law to declare the termination, 
inflict upon the guilty party whatever penalty the law 
provides, and adjust the relationships of the fragments 
of the sundered family for the future. The first duty 
of husband and wife is fidelity. This must be real, not 
merely formal and outward. It must be that complete 
inward consecration of each to the other, which furnishes 
a sure basis of perfect trust. This means fidelity in all 
the family relationships. The responsibilities of mother- 
hood could not be assumed except in perfect confidence 
that the father would do whatever man can do to pro- 
vide a home and means for the care of mother and chil- 
dren. The responsibilities of building a family could 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 



325 



not be undertaken by the husband, except in confidence 
that the mother would do whatever woman can do to 
make the home a place of happiness and blessing for 
all. Fidelity is the basis of all. 

591. Love. 

Love is the primary informing principle of the family 
organization. This is the vital energy which gives the 
family its being. This does not signify freshness of 
sentimental sensibility ; much less does it mean sexual 
hunger. The self-consecration of life with which hus- 
band and wife gave themselves to each other in the 
beginning, " even as Christ loved the church and gave 
himself for it," to live and to suffer for one another, this 
is the love which is to be maintained. The maintenance 
of this altar-flame of devotion will secure the perform- 
ance of all active duties. 

592. Reverence. 

If family life is to approximate its ideal, the normal 
position of each constituent element must be recognized 
by each and all. The husband holds his own place, 
which cannot be held by another ; the place of the 
wife and mother is unique ; the children have their own 
place and relationships. To the husband the Scriptures 
say, " Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved 
the church and gave himself for it." To the wife the 
divine word is, " Wives, submit yourselves unto your 
own husbands as unto the Lord." " Let the wife see 
that she reverence her husband." To the children the 
command is, " Honour thy father and thy mother." 
" Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is 



326 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

right" It is the duty of each to recognize with respect- 
ful honor the rank and authority of those members of 
the family who hold places of headship and leadership. 
These three principles, love, fidelity, reverence, will be 
seen, when deeply apprehended, to cover the circle of 
family duties. 

593. Bread=winning. 

Bread-winning may stand for every kind of provision 
for the needs of the family. Food, raiment, and shelter, 
means of culture and of enjoyment, must be provided. 
The duty of making this provision rests primarily and 
mainly upon the man, and not upon the woman. When 
the same burden of toil for bread falls on both alike, the 
home must suffer ; when the wife becomes the bread- 
winner, it is by calamity or cruelty. When war drains 
off the strong men and standing armies are filled with 
those who should be workers in field and shop, unnatural 
burdens are thrown upon the mother, and family life is 
largely destroyed. In what is this duty of the man to 
make provision for the family grounded ? In the first 
place, it belongs to the family headship to bear the 
responsibility of making the fortunes of the family. 
Headship is not for the purpose of domineering, but for 
breasting the waves of circumstance and carving out for- 
tune with manly daring. In the second place, the greater 
physical strength of man, the bony frame and heavier 
muscles, determine the duty of man to perform the 
heavier work of the world. In the third place, the 
duties of maternity and all that physical life which per- 
tains thereto render the heavy work of the world impos- 
sible for the woman. Heavy labor destroys the mother 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 



327 



and the child. The finer sensibilities of woman indicate 
that her work is something else than warring with the 
hard, fierce elements of nature. The care of the home 
and the training of children is a burden heavy enough 
without the other burden of winning bread. 

This does not signify more of idleness, frivolity, and 
folly for the woman, nor does it mean that she is a frag- 
ile toy to be educated for ornament and pleasure. But 
if the woman build the house and win the bread, she 
cannot make the home and confer greatness upon the 
generations to come. 

594. The Submission of the Wife. 

The due attitude of the wife toward her husband is 
expressed by such words as subject, submit, reverence, 
obey. These words do not signify servitude. Submis- 
sion is put correlative to love and protecting care, and 
that love is compared to the self-sacrificing and saving 
love of Christ. In the presence of such love servitude 
is impossible. It is a reverent recognition of the head- 
ship of the family. In the oneness of the family life the 
husband is the executive. But if unity should be lack- 
ing no advantage would arise from a divided headship, 
with its inefficiency and endless strife. But the in- 
junctions of holy Scripture have reference to the ideal 
life of the family. 

595. Duties of Parents in Respect to Their Children. 

These duties are important beyond conception. We 
cannot estimate the greatness of this obligation except 
through an outlook upon the life to come. When 
parents have done well their duties toward their chil- 



328 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



dren to give them due preparation for a worthy and 
happy life and for a good destiny, their weightiest obli- 
gation has been met. The great duty of each genera- 
tion is to prepare the next generation for the issues of 
an endless life. Having given existence to their chil- 
dren, with all its tremendous possibilities, they must 
needs be under limitless obligations to do their utmost 
to render that existence a blessing forever. 

596. Obligations Under the Principles of Heredity. 

The principle of heredity is broad and deep and sub- 
tile. Parents give themselves to their children. This 
bequest of themselves includes their physical, their intel- 
lectual, and their moral nature. It includes their modes 
of thought and peculiarities of disposition. Their dis- 
eases and their sins are propagated in a tendency to re- 
peat the same. The first great duty of parents is to 
make themselves, for their children's sake, what their 
children ought to be. In this heritage of natural en- 
dowment the virtues and the sins of the parents come 
to the children through all the generations. This is no 
place for details, but in the deepest sense parents are 
debtors to their children to give them such natural en- 
dowments as shall render all good possible for them. 

597. Care in Childhood 

The duty of parents to provide food, clothing, and 
comforts for their young children is everywhere recog- 
nized. This should continue till the children are able 
without harm or strain to care for themselves. This pro- 
vision should include opportunities for education. In 
strong and strange contrast with this obligation stands 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 329 

the conduct of those parents who count every expen- 
diture for their children as an investment drawing in- 
terest, a debt to be repaid by the labor of their children. 
They force their children in tender years to undertake 
wearisome toil which checks and stunts their growth. 
They exact from their children, instead of doing for 
them. The relationship between parents and children 
is made mercenary. In their old age, when the parents 
cannot pay their way, they go to the almshouse. They 
reap as they sow. No love is wasted on either side. 
Between parent and children, on both sides, love ought 
to stand in the place of money. 

598. Care for the Education of Children. 

Ignorance is a greater evil than hunger. It is the 
duty of parents to prepare their children for self-support, 
for in due time the children must stand alone. This 
ought to include preparation for influence and useful- 
ness in that sphere of life to which the children ought 
to aspire. The rich are almost as likely to neglect this 
training as are the poor. Necessity does not compel 
it ; the children are less willing to drudge in order to 
win skill by patient application. When the care of 
business and property comes to them, it finds them un- 
prepared. They cannot create wealth by skilled labor ; 
they do not understand the making of investments ; 
they cannot even spend money wisely and economically. 
They are candidates for poverty. The trades unions 
have made the colossal blunder of shutting out even 
their own sons from the opportunity of learning trades 
and acquiring their fathers' skill, forcing thus their own 
children into the overcrowded ranks of unskilled labor. 



330 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



Parents should prepare their children to succeed them 
in all the work of the world. 

599. Moral and Religious Training. 

The most important education has reference to char- 
acter and faith. Failures in life, even the failure to win 
bread, arise chiefly from moral causes. Parents should 
train their children to know the right, to choose the 
right, to do the right. To this end it is necessary to 
train children to obedience, to happy obedience, to love 
obedience. To be successful, this training must begin 
early. It cannot begin too early. This is not " break- 
ing the will," but strengthening the will. The erratic, 
wayward will is the weak will. Perhaps the most difficult 
part of moral training is the introduction of the young 
to the knowledge of evil and the touch of temptation, 
without contamination. To hold them in deep seclusion 
from temptation till necessity forces them suddenly un- 
prepared to meet it, is to insure their ruin. To leave 
them to drift without care and untimely into the rushing 
tide of temptation, is ruin on the other side. Little by 
little, under wise guidance, children should be intro- 
duced to the knowledge of evil and trained to reject it, 
voluntarily reject it, and at the same time taught to 
know the good and to choose it. That this training may 
be successful, the spiritual elements of life must be em- 
phasized. Faith must be nurtured to recognize the un- 
seen world and feel its power. 

600. Parental Rights. 

Correlative to parental obligations are the rights of 
parents. Whence the right to give this training and to 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 



331 



require obedience? The fact that children are weak 
and cannot resist, can give no right. The parental rela- 
tionship itself furnishes a ground in human nature for 
parental rights and duties. The life and being of the 
child are of and from the parents. There is in this a 
shadow of the creative acts of "the Father of spirits." 
In the child there is a continuation of the stream of life 
that is in the parents, a new branch in the current of 
being. This relationship of life represents the divine 
will. Within due limits it is the will of God that the 
parental life control the young life, for the purpose of 
preparing the new life for independence. For this new 
life the parents have a measure of responsibility and 
hence a measure of right to govern. The teaching of 
holy Scripture touching the authority and the duty of 
parents to teach and to restrain the child is clear. The 
neglect of this duty is followed by corruption and 
calamities. 

601. Limits of Parental Authority. 

The authority of parents is by no means absolute and 
limitless. In the first place, a limit is set by the rule of 
right. Parents have no right to require that which God 
has made to be wrong. Such requirements are made 
invalid by the constitution of the universe. In the sec- 
ond place, a limit is set by love. Parental government 
is not for the gain of the parent, but for the benefit of 
the child. Any rule or discipline which does not ex- 
press love, is abnormal. In the third place, wisdom sets 
a limit. Whatever ought to be done, ought to be done 
wisely and well. That which is right, if wisely done, 
may be wrong when done unwisely. And there is a 



332 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



limit which is set by the progressive development of the 
child. That government which is suitable and right 
toward the child of five years, becomes wrong toward 
the child of ten. As independent thought and responsi- 
bility are developed, parental government must be con- 
tinually modified. The approximate maturity of the 
child sets a natural bound to parental authority. The 
parental relation has accomplished its purpose ; the child 
has been cared for, guarded, guided, and prepared to 
take up the work of life, and to repeat the benefit for 
the next generation. 

602. The Duties of Children. 

The primary duty of children, as children, toward 
their parents, is obedience. This does not signify a 
yielding to the hard necessity of force, but a willing sub- 
ordination, the real acceptance of the parental will. 
The Scripture injunction says, "Obey your parents in 
the Lord, for this is right." The limits to this obligation 
of obedience, are in respect to general principles essen- 
tially the same as the limitations set to parental con- 
trol. The first is suggested by the phrase, "in the 
Lord." The parental rule may be so wrong and unjust 
that obedience to God shall require disobedience to the 
father. Growth out of childhood gradually puts an end 
to authority and obedience alike. When the son goes 
out from his father's house to become the head of a new 
family, then obedience, as such, must needs terminate. 

603. Honor toward Parents. 

A second more generalized duty of children is ex- 
pressed in the words, "Honour thy father and thy 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MAN 333 

mother." This word "honor" signifies respectful defer- 
ence and reverence. It implies, of course, that the 
parents shall by virtue and worth make honor possible. 
When obedience is a duty, honor includes obedience. 
The duty of honoring is not limited like the duty of 
obeying. If the parents become weak and the children 
strong ; if the parents fall into second childhood, there 
remains still a place for honor. If parents are wicked, 
so that obedience must needs be absolutely refused, 
still that refusal may be made respectfully. The duty 
of honor includes also the care of parents when they 
fall into a condition of need. This duty finds its limita- 
tion in the limit of need on the one side and the limit 
of ability on the other. 

604. Grounds of Filial Duty. 

The obligations of children find their ground, correla- 
tively, like the rights of parents, in the nature of the 
parental relationship. They have derived their being 
from their. parents ; at the first they are dependent upon 
their parents for all things ; from them they receive that 
training which fits them for independent life, and pa- 
rental love follows them to the end. And finally they 
inherit the products of a lifetime of parental toil. These 
relationships and benefits are realities which demand 
filial recognition. They weave a bond which it is a sin 
to break. These things have their ground in the nature 
of man, and the nature of man represents the will of 
God. 



CHAPTER XXI 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT 

605. Taxes. 

Taxes are assessments levied upon persons or upon 
property to defray the expenses of civil government, or 
to carry on public works. Civil government must 
needs cost much money. Public improvements and pro- 
vision for the defense and welfare of all must be made 
at the expense of all. These benefits cannot be gotten 
except by paying for them. There is the same justice 
in levying taxes for the payment of these expenses as in 
any other fair exchange of the products of labor. In 
these studies nothing is attempted beyond the applica- 
tion of certain general moral principles to the levying of 
taxes and their payment. 

606. Justice in Taxation. 

In studying the principles of society, we found justice 
to be the primary formative principle of that civil organ- 
ization which is called the State. In all civil concern- 
ments justice is fundamental. Justice must be lacking 
in nothing. This signifies that taxes must be levied on 
principles of justice. In analyzing this general proposi- 
tion, we find three principles of practical justice : First. 
Taxes should be levied for matters which concern the 
general welfare, and not for merely individual advantage, 
and taxes should not be levied for any purpose so that 
334 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT 335 

the burden of the tax shall be greater than the advan- 
tage to be gained. There is a tendency toward disre- 
garding this principle in both its parts. Secondly. The 
principle of even or fair exchange must be regarded. 
Taxes should be levied in proportion to the benefits to 
be received by the taxpayer. The protection of life 
and personal welfare may be counted as of equal worth 
to ever}' individual ; it is just, therefore, that some as- 
sessment be made upon all. But in the protection of 
property 7 and in the administration of justice touching 
property 7 rights, the difference is immense. One citizen has 
absolutely no property 7 to be protected ; another has his 
humble cottage ; a third has lands, storehouses, and mer- 
chandise, railroads and ships, property 7 scattered over the 
world, and the protection of his interests may require 
diplomacy or war. This principle of taxation in propor- 
tion to benefits received has found no better expression 
than taxation in the ratio of property and of valuable 
franchises. It is just to lay taxes upon property, be- 
cause public expenses are largely for the protection of 
property. The third principle of practical justice is 
that taxes should be laid in proportion to the ability to 
bear them. "It is required of a man according as he 
hath, and not according as he hath not.'' In civil so- 
ciety there is a community of welfare. It is an organ- 
ized body in which the welfare of each is needful for the 
welfare of all. Equality of contribution to the common 
weal is impossible. Equality- of contribution would be 
injustice. Property held in possession commonly signi- 
fies ability to pay, consideration being had of the greater 
or less productiveness of different properties, and excep- 
tions being made to meet special cases. 



336 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



607. Community and Brotherhood in Taxation. 

In the human race there is a brotherhood of individ- 
uals and a community of welfare. In the payment of 
taxes a man cannot say, I will pay for that particular 
benefit which accrues to myself, and for nothing more. 
There is no such particular item and amount of benefit. 
Welfare is to a large extent common. From that com- 
mon welfare each one appropriates that which he is able 
by the largeness of his life to utilize for himself ; and the 
amplitude of the welfare of one does not detract from 
the welfare of the rest, but rather promotes it. With 
all possible emphasis, the doctrine of extreme and iso- 
lated individualism must be denied. The principle of 
brotherhood and community of welfare is fundamental in 
life, and is an element of justice. The individual citizen 
may not be able to isolate and segregate his own par- 
ticular moiety of benefit, but the tax is none the less 
just. But no man can be just and say, I can take care 
of myself, let others take care of themselves ; let those 
who have children support the public schools ; let those 
who sail the sea pay for the lighthouses. Public safety, 
prosperity, and welfare constitute a common good shared 
by all. 

608. Public Charities. 

Christian civilization is strongly distinguished from 
pagan by public charities. The poor and the unfor- 
tunate are cared for ; asylums are established for the re- 
lief of sufferers from almost every kind of infirmity. 
These works of charity are maintained in part by the 
appropriation of public funds. A State which should 
not do this would be counted as little less than barbar- 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT 337 

ous. Upon what principle is this taxation for benevo- 
lence to be justified ? Is it upon the principle of mu- 
tual insurance, that all are liable to come to want and 
that therefore all should share the burden of caring for 
the needy ? Or shall it be said that this is a matter of 
mutual consent and agreement, that apart from this 
consent such taxation would be robbing some to give to 
others ? Moral philosophy permits no such answers. 
Under charity as a right and a duty of the State lies the 
principle of brotherhood and the principle of benevo- 
lence, which is the second formative principle of the 
State. The purpose of civil government is benevolent ; 
it is the welfare of the people ; and the obligation of 
benevolence is as absolute as the obligation of justice. 
In promoting the welfare of the people it is as need- 
ful to care for the infirm and the unfortunate as to open 
avenues for trade or provide for the public defense. 
The principle is clear; the application of the principle 
is difficult. The experience of Christian governments is 
slowly feeling its way between that public charity which 
is truly helpful and that civil aid which weakens the 
sense of individual responsibility and encourages sloth. 

609. Honesty in the Payment of Taxes. 

The duty of dealing honestly with the government in 
the payment of taxes, as an abstract proposition, is 
doubtless generally admitted. But there is a subtile 
temptation and a noteworthy drift in the direction of 
dishonesty. The government is not a person and the loss 
will fall on no one citizen ; the evasion of taxes is com- 
monly made by concealment, by silence instead of per- 
jury ; unequal and unfair valuations and double taxations 

w 



33§ INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



lead men to feel that evasions are right ; such considera- 
tions lead many to feel that dishonesty in the matter of 
taxes is a very pardonable wrong. There are difficult 
questions connected with the subject of taxation, some 
of which belong to public policy and some to casuistry. 
The principle here laid down is that truth and honesty 
must control the citizen in dealing with the government 
no less than in his dealing with his fellow- citizens. He 
has received from the government certain immense 
values ; for these values payment is justly due. And 
that payment which one man unjustly evades must needs 
fall upon others, and probably upon those less able to 
bear the burden. 

610. Obedience to Law. 

The duty of the citizen is not exhausted in the honest 
payment of taxes. If the civil law is legitimate and 
right, personal obedience to the law is a personal obliga- 
tion. A good conscience cannot fail to recognize this 
obligation. Obedience to civil authority is binding and 
necessary for various reasons. In the first place, obedi- 
ence to right civil authority is included in the moral law. 
This is the plain teaching of holy Scripture. " Let 
every soul be subject unto the higher powers ; for there 
is no power but of God ; the powers that be are 
ordained of God." "Wherefore ye must needs be 
subject not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake." 

In the second place, obedience is necessary in order 
to support the government in the work of repressing 
violence and crime and administering justice. There is 
no power in abstract law to administer and enforce itself. 
And the magistrate acting alone, unsupported by good 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT 339 

men, can do nothing. If good men set an example of 
disobedience in things not immoral, it must be expected 
that bad men will despise law in concerns that are crimi- 
nal. In the third place, good men ought to respect civil 
law, because, even if none were vicious, the blessings of 
well-ordered civil society cannot otherwise be secured. 
In the fourth place, respect for authority is a funda- 
mental element in the highest moral character. The 
ultimate principle of virtue is obedience, the obedience 
of love, and good citizenship discredits itself when it 
takes an attitude of disrespect toward civil authority. 

611. Standing with the Magistrate. 

Some men who count themselves good citizens, go as 
far as a man can go, without the commission of crime, 
to render good government impossible. They do this by 
practically covering up the crime which they know to be 
committed. They know, but they will not "tell." They 
seem to count it dishonorable to reveal the lawbreaker. 
They will not "betray" their neighbors. They say, let 
the magistrate himself find out the crime ; that is his 
business. They act as if they counted the magistrate 
the common enemy of all citizens, and that all citizens 
should make common cause against him. They stand 
between the criminal and the law to shield him from 
just punishment. They do not deserve to enjoy the 
protection of well-administered law. In the face of this 
easy public sentiment the magistrate sees no reason for 
sacrificing himself to secure the punishment of crime. 
It is the part of good men to love law and authority. As 
equal partners in a free government, it belongs to every 
good citizen to stand with the magistrate ; to be willing 



34-0 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



to be known as standing on the side of law ; to dare to 
take risks in the performance of civil duty. 

612. Railing at Rulers. 

There is no more potent influence for dishonoring law 
and weakening the moral power of civil authority, than 
the almost universal habit of railing at the civil ruler. 
This mockery begins when the future legislator or magis- 
trate becomes a candidate for the votes of his fellow- 
citizens. His faults are magnified ; his virtues are denied ; 
his motives are maligned ; his reputation is blackened by 
slander. He is held before the eyes of the people as 
little better than a criminal. The direst consequences 
are predicted as the result of his election to office. He 
comes to his official place under this cloud of obloquy. 
This evil-speaking continues with little less of asperity 
after his election. The opposition party undertakes in 
every way to embarrass the administration of the govern- 
ment. They teach the people to dishonor their chosen 
rulers ; they teach the young to do this ; they teach the 
criminal classes to do this, and it is no wonder that the 
lesson is learned. The Scripture injunction is, "Thou 
shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." Be- 
tween railing at the ruler and disobeying law there is 
but a step. When reverence for law ceases, govern- 
ment by the people is ready to crumble, and no man can 
foresee what accident may precipitate the crisis and the 
end. 

613. Responsibility of the Citizen. 

Under governments of absolute despotism the civil 
influence of the citizen is reduced to the minimum. He 



CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT 34 1 

has no vote ; he cannot advise ; he cannot criticise ; he 
may count himself blessed indeed if he is suffered to 
live righteously in silence. Under such conditions the 
responsibility of the citizen for the administration of the 
government is well-nigh extinguished. But in a republic 
it is not so. Every citizen exerts an influence upon the 
government, and no one can escape a measure of respon- 
sibility. By casting his vote or withholding it ; by active 
partisan work or by standing aloof from political.parties ; 
by criticism, by advice, by advocacy with tongue and 
pen, he helps to shape public sentiment, to determine 
legislation and the administration of law. The citizen is 
responsible to God and to men for the right use of his 
civil influence and power. He cannot "wash his hands" 
of duty and responsibility. He cannot sink himself in 
a party and thus escape individual responsibility. His 
duty may be to stand alone and bear testimony against 
an evil which inheres in all parties. Love of country 
and obedience to God may alike demand this. 

614. The Higher Law. 

Having accepted the divine will as the law and 
standard of right, it follows, as a matter of course, that 
the obligation to obey the civil authority is not supreme. 
The civil authority may perhaps stand for rebellion 
against God. It may represent, not a benevolent intent 
for the welfare of the people, but imperious selfishness 
and cruelty. Under such conditions the higher law, the 
law of God, must be counted supreme. Then it belongs 
to him who is willing to suffer for the right, to obey the 
divine law and take the consequences. In the presence 
of God's authority all other authorities fall to the ground. 



CHAPTER XXII 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 

615. Self=defense. General View. 

Self-defense signifies the use of force, by and for one's 
self, to defend one's self from injury in person, property, 
or rights. .SV^f-defense stands over against defense of 
the individual by the officers and the regular processes 
of government and law. Self-defense is liable to many 
abuses. It may be passionate and unreasonable ; it may 
inflict injury beyond the intention ; it may become 
revenge and not merely defense. In its hot haste it may 
inflict injury upon the innocent. But on the other hand, 
in many cases self-defense is the only defense which is 
possible. The individual is assailed when alone. Before 
the law can speak, or the officers of government bring 
help, the injury has been wrought and the injurer has 
fled. Self-defense may be merely opposing force to 
force to ward off injury, or it may involve the utmost 
damage to the injurer. There are diverse opinions 
touching the moral right of self-defense. It belongs to 
moral philosophy to determine the moral principles in- 
volved in the case. 

616. Non resistance in the New Testament. 

The words of Christ which are understood by some as 
forbidding self-defense, are these: "Ye have heard that 
it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth : 
342 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



343 



but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil : but who- 
soever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the 
other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, 
and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. 
And whosoever shall compel thee to go one mile, go 
with him twain." In examining these words, we notice, 
first, that the injunction, " Resist not him that is evil," 
stands opposed to the traditional proverb, "An eye for 
an eye, and a tooth for a tooth ' " and that proverb sig- 
nifies not self-defense, but personal revenge. In the 
second place, we notice that the word smite (rap) indi- 
cates an insult to be resented, rather than an attack to 
be resisted. The injunction as a whole seems directed 
against the lex talionis, the law of revenge, rather than 
against defense against a dangerous assault. The lan- 
guage has an epigrammatic and paradoxical form, and 
signifies in plain words : Put love in place of revenge ; 
meet and overcome insults, injuries, and exactions, with 
patience, kindness, and compliance. The teaching of 
Christ seems, therefore, to touch the subject of self- 
defense in this respect only ; it purifies self-defense of 
the element of revenge, and renders it purely self-pro- 
tective ; all taking vengeance for injuries inflicted is 
forbidden. We are left therefore to consider the ques- 
tion of self-defense upon general principles. 

617. Defense by the Magistrate. 

The right and duty of the magistrate to defend the 
weak and to administer justice is plainly taught in holy 
Scripture. He is " God's minister attending continually 
upon this very thing." It belongs to his duty to meet 
violence with force. "He bears not the sword in vain." 



344 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

His sword is meant for use. This establishes the prin- 
ciple of force against force. In cases where the magis- 
trate can render no help, it would seem that the right of 
defense must revert to the individual. Where officers 
of the law cannot help, if the individual has no right to 
defend himself, the right of defense exists nowhere ; it 
has utterly lapsed. But that the right of resisting vio- 
lence exists nowhere cannot be admitted. 

6 1 8. The Defense of the Helpless. 

If a man has not the right of self-defense, it is not easy 
to find a place for the duty or the right to defend an- 
other, a wife or child, placed in his care. If it is the 
duty of the one to suffer violence without resistance, it 
must be the duty of the other to accept the same suffer- 
ing. Without the right of self-defense a man cannot 
help the weak. A ruffian assails the wife ; the husband 
springs to her defense and with might and main hurls 
him back. The assailant turns from the woman and at- 
tacks the man ; at once the man's arms fall to his side, 
for he has no right to defend himself. The ruffian binds 
him and the wife no longer has a protector. The duty 
of defending another carries with it the right of self- 
defense. 

619. The Element of Justice in Self=defense. 

In order that the case may be one of true self-defense, 
the assault must be more than an insult ; there must be 
an assault by force, for the infliction of serious injury, 
which cannot be resisted except by force. In repelling 
such an assault there is an element of justice. The per- 
son and the life of the innocent party are, at the least, as 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



345 



precious as the person and the life of the assailant. One 
or the other must suffer damage. If the party of defense 
does not disable the assailant, he himself must take the 
injury. When the alternative lies between the guilty 
assailant suffering for his crime and the innocent party 
suffering by the assault, justice is better satisfied by the 
suffering of the guilty. 

620. The Law of Love and Self=defense. 

The Golden Rule is based upon the principle that the 
rights and the welfare of one are as precious as those of 
another, and that every man ought to have the same re- 
gard for the welfare of another man as for his own. This 
is the second great law of love, "Thou shalt love thy 
neighbour as thyself." What relation has this law of 
love to the right of self-defense? In the first place, the 
law of love does not, cannot, abrogate the law of justice, 
and it must not be so interpreted as to antagonize the 
principle of justice. Law and government punish crime, 
and this is not contrary to the principle of love. Pun- 
ishment does not signify malice against the subject of 
punishment. When either the guilty or the innocent 
must suffer, it is not contrary to love to let the injuiy 
fall on the one that deserves it. 

621. Limit of the Injury which may be Inflicted in Self=de= 
fense. 

That self-defense may be justified, it is manifest that 
there must be some reasonable ratio between the injury 
threatened and the damage inflicted in the defense. To 
kill a man, or to inflict serious injury, for an insult can- 
not be justified. That would be revenge. Where there 



346 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

is no danger, there is no place for self-defense. As soon 
as the danger ceases, the demand for self-defense ceases. 
Also to inflict a measureless damage to ward off a slight 
loss, to take life in order to save a dime or a dollar, is 
unjustifiable. A man who duly values human life and 
considers what life and death signify, will not be in haste 
to shed blood for a slight cause. The evil man as well as 
the good is our "neighbor" and comes within the scope 
of the law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." 

622. Denial of the Right of Self=defense. 

The denial of the right of self-defense is followed by 
logical consequences which may well give one pause. If 
the word of the Lord does indeed forbid self-defense, 
consequences must not be considered. But if there is 
no prohibition, then we may look at possible conse- 
quences. First, there comes the logical conclusion that 
the personal immunity of the assailant is more precious 
than that of the good and the innocent. Why otherwise 
should the good man of the house stand and see wrong 
inflicted upon those whom God has put under his care, 
more solicitous not to harm the assailant than to protect 
the helpless. Secondly, the denial of the right of self- 
defense renders assault and robbery safe. This gives the 
thief, the robber, the assassin, the ravisher, to understand 
that he is safe in attempting any crime ; if he fails, he 
simply fails, but runs no risks. Under such conditions 
it is virtue only that is unsafe. 

623. The Instinct of SeIf=preservation. 

The impulse of self-love never sleeps. When danger 
threatens, at the instant call of this instinct, every power 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



347 



springs to action to ward off danger and defend the cita- 
del of life. The movement seems almost independent 
of the will. This indicates that the principle of self- 
defense is grounded in the nature of man, and in the 
physical nature as well as in the spiritual. This instinct 
of self-preservation is so strong and persistent that it 
needs little re-enforcement from reason or argument. 

624. Revenge. 

A clear distinction must be made between revenge on 
the one side and self-defense and penalty on the other. 
Revenge is not a blow for self-protection. Revenge is 
not, like penalty, the testimony of conscience against 
wrong-doing. Revenge expresses hatred ; it gratifies the 
worst passions and awakens the same passions in return. 
Revenge cannot take the place of legal penalties, for it 
represents no authority and makes no appeal to con- 
science. The avenger assumes the place of magistrate, 
judge, and executioner. As toward God, he arrogates 
to himself the prerogatives of the Supreme Judge. Re- 
venge is not one of the natural rights of man. The 
practice of "lynching" is a flagrant example of private 
vengeance. It does not accomplish the high ends of 
penalty and justice ; it is a disgrace to Christian civiliza- 
tion. 

625. War. Classes of Wars. 

We may divide wars into four classes, quite radically 
distinct in principle and motive : 

1. Wars of conquest or subjugation. These wars cor- 
respond to the violence of the robber, the man-stealer, 
and the pirate. Kings and nations send out armies to 



348 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



subdue and despoil weaker nations. That the robbery 
and murder are committed by great aggregations of in- 
dividuals does not change their character nor mitigate 
their wickedness. 

2. Wars of revenge, to pay back insults and injuries. 
These wars correspond to private revenge in respect to 
both motive and consequences. They perpetuate ani- 
mosities, bloodshed, and misery ; they do this on a gigan- 
tic scale on the vast stage of the world on which nations 
play their parts. The immensity of the vengeance does 
not mitigate the enormity of the crime. And yet a war 
waged to avenge a wrong already committed may per- 
haps in some cases partake of the nature of penalty, in- 
flicted in the only way in which penalty can be inflicted 
upon nations, and may prevent aggressions in the future. 

3. Wars of self-defense, to resist spoliation and subju- 
gation, or to achieve independence of a tyranny which 
wrongs, robs, and oppresses the people. Such wars stand 
upon the same basis as individual self-defense, with this 
added element of justification, that nations cannot appeal 
to a government over the nations for protection ; nations 
must defend themselves, or suffer whatever damage other 
and aggressive nations may please to inflict. 

4. Wars waged in behalf of the weak and helpless. 
A strong people may take up arms in defense of another 
nation too weak to resist spoliation, or to help them throw 
off a cruel tyranny. If this be done in very truth from 
justice and benevolence, it stands upon the same ground 
as individual defense of the weak. This principle may 
justify the interference of strong and just governments in 
the affairs of savage tribes or oppressive rulers. The pre- 
tense of benevolence may cloak the purpose of conquest. 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



349 



626. Justification of War. 

The same moral principles underlie the conduct of 
aggregations of men as of individuals. The vast corpo- 
rate body, the nation, may do evil and suffer for it, or 
may work righteousness and be justified. Wars for con- 
quest find their condemnation in the equality of all men 
in respect to natural rights, and in the principles of uni- 
versal brotherhood, and of benevolence and love. War 
for national defense, or for the relief of the oppressed, is 
justified on the same principles as individual self-defense. 

627. War must be Justified by Expediency. 

A justifiable war must needs have a two-fold justifica- 
tion. War, even if right in principle, carries with it such 
unspeakable miseries and horrors, and inflicts suffering 
so promiscuously upon the innocent and the guilty, that 
it is always a grave question whether it is not better for 
a people to bear the ills they have rather than try the 
calamities and the risks of war. That a just war may be 
justified, it must be expedient, and expedient in view of 
the miseries which it will bring as well as in respect to 
the troubles it will relieve, and with respect to the risk 
of defeat as well as the prospect of success. Only a 
good prospect of success can justify a just war. 

628. Dueling. 

As the name indicates, a duel is a combat between 
two persons. The characteristics of the modern duel 
are first, that it is not fought in self-defense, but by 
formal pre-arrangement ; secondly, that it is fought to 
avenge an affront or insult. This avenging has two ele- 
ments, to inflict injury in return for the affront, and to 



35o 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



show one's self to be not a coward, but a brave man, 
spirited, ready to face danger, and one who will not 
bear an insult. Dueling is less common now than 
formerly, but the practice is by no means obsolete, and 
men who advocate and defend it are not lacking. 

629. Dueling not Self=defense. 

The duel cannot be justified on the ground that it is 
of the nature of self-defense. It represents in the begin- 
ning, not an assault, but an affront. The details are care- 
fully pre-arranged. The principal parties do not even 
meet in these preparations ; they are represented by 
their friends. Neither party is in danger, and hence 
there is no place for self-defense. 

630. Dueling Unchristian. 

The spirit from which dueling springs is essentially 
unchristian. The modern duel comes of arrogant, im- 
perious pride, which refuses to brook the appearance of 
an insult, and from a selfish hatred which counts wounded 
honor as healed by revenge. It is a spirit which be- 
longs to savage life. It is the direct negation of meek- 
ness, humility, benevolence, and love. As respects the 
civil law, the challenger assumes to take life without au- 
thority. And the vengeance of the duelist is deeply un- 
just ; for a mere insult he seeks to inflict mortal damage. 
In proportion as the Christian spirit prevails this remnant 
of barbarism disappears. 

631. Suicide. 

There are manifestly certain differences between sui- 
cide and that murder which is chiefly intended by the 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



351 



command, "Thou shalt not kill." In the one case the 
murderer takes the life of an unwilling victim ; the sui- 
cide ends the life of one who is willing to die. The 
murderer commits the supreme robbery ; the suicide 
terminates a life which is chiefly his own. Suicide, there- 
fore, cannot be treated as a case of simple murder. It 
must be judged, and justified or condemned, upon its 
own peculiar elements. Suicide may be considered 
under three aspects : (1) As related to the Creator; (2) 
As related to the friends of the suicide who have an inter- 
est in his life ; (3) As related to the suicide himself. 

632. Suicide as Related to God. 

God is the giver of life. As God only can give life, 
so it belongs to him to terminate it. Every human life 
has a purpose. Only God knows when the supreme 
ends of any life have been accomplished. From this 
point of view a man has no more right over his own life 
to destroy it untimely than to terminate the life of 
another man. To take one's own life expresses lack of 
faith in God, and of submission to his appointments. If 
God appoint trouble and suffering for a man, it is the 
duty of a good man to bear them patiently, in the pro- 
foundest confidence that God's allotments are wise and 
good. There is untold moral and spiritual advantage 
in bearing with cheerful trust that which the Supreme 
Ruler appoints. Under this divine discipline character 
of supreme elevation and strength is nurtured and 
matured. Suicide expresses weakness of moral charac- 
ter. It is faithlessness and unfaithfulness toward the 
Creator. As toward God suicide must then be counted 
impiety and crime. 



352 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

633. Suicide as Related to Men. 

As toward men, suicide is commonly a great wrong 
done, a betrayal of sacred trusts, an unworthy abandon- 
ment of helpless dependents. Suicide is desertion and 
a breach of trust as truly as would be a running away to 
parts unknown. And this is done from lack of faithful- 
ness and fortitude to bear burdens and face adverse 
fortune. 

634. Suicide as Related to the Actor. 

Without pressing the popular notion of former days, 
that by suicide a man dooms his soul forever, it is sure 
that a suicide ends his probation untimely, and cuts him- 
self off from whatever good a longer life and a fuller 
moral discipline might bring. The act of suicide is a 
crime the temptation to which and the tendency to 
which ought to be strenuously resisted. To finish one's 
life in the commission of a great crime is surely a sad 
ending of probation. Sometimes insanity finds its issue 
in suicide. Often, however, the suicide shows no more 
mental aberration than is signified by false views of life, 
by lack of faith or a false faith touching the life to come, 
by discouragement and despondency, or by shame and 
remorse for the commission of crime. 

635. Is it Right by Force to Prevent Suicide? 

Is the commission of suicide a right which a man may 
claim for himself, if he please to exercise it, or have 
other men the right to interfere and prevent the infliction 
of this supreme damage upon himself? Public opinion 
answers without hesitation that the infliction of bodily 
injury upon himself is not one of man's rights. Men 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



353 



count it a duty to save a man by force, if need be, from 
inflicting serious bodily injury upon himself. Is this a 
wanton interference with personal liberty, or is the popu- 
lar sentiment founded upon true principles ? 

636. Individualism in the Extreme. 

The doctrine of individualism is sometimes pushed to 
the extreme of denying any necessary relationship be- 
tween man and man, and hence any right to interfere or 
duty to help. President Wayland says: "If the indi- 
vidual use his powders in such a manner as not to inter- 
fere with the use of the same powers which God has be- 
stowed upon his neighbor, he is, as it respects his 
neighbor, whether that neighbor be an individual or the 
community, to be held guiltless. So long as he uses 
them within this limit he has a right, so far as his fellow- 
men are concerned, to use them in the most unlimited 
sense, suo arbitrio, at his own discretion. His will is his 
sufficient and ultimate reason. He need assign no other 
reason for his conduct than his own free choice. Within 
this limit he is still responsible to God ; but within this 
limit he is not responsible to man, nor is man responsible 
for liim." "A man has an entire right to use his own 
body as he will, provided he does not so use it as to 
interfere with the rights of his neighbor. He may go 
where he will, and stay where he pleases ; he may work 
or be idle ; he may pursue one occupation or another, 
or no occupation at all ; and it is the concern of no one 
else, if he leave inviolate the rights of every one else ; 
that is, if he leave every one else in the undisturbed en- 
joyment of those means of happiness bestowed upon him 

by the Creator." " While the law of reciprocity frees 

x 



354 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



him from the control of society, it discharges society from 
any responsibility for the results of his actions upon him- 
self. I know that society sometimes undertakes to sup- 
port the indigent and helpless, and to relieve men in 
v extreme necessity. This, however, is a conventional ar- 
rangement, into which men who choose have a right to 
enter ; and, having entered into it, they are bound by 
its provisions." 1 This extreme individualism sharply 
contradicts the principles of universal brotherhood and 
benevolence, and all the principles which underlie civil 
society. The duties and responsibilities which pertain 
to the brotherhood of man are not conventional and op- 
tional. If one human being find another human being, 
till that hour a stranger unknown and from that hour 
to be unknown forever, he is under obligation to him. 
If that stranger shall that hour attempt self-destruction, 
it is his duty, if possible, to save him from himself. Self- 
preservation is a primary instinct of human nature, and 
by the fact that a man seeks his own destruction he 
shows that he is not in a normal state. It is according 
to the Golden Rule to save such a man from doing him- 
self damage, in the hope that his better normal state will 
return. When the would-be suicide comes to himself, 
he is grateful for the interference which saved him from 
his reckless purpose. 

637. Licensing Vice and Sin. 

The wisest and best method, under a democratic form 
of government, of dealing with certain vices, is a ques- 
tion of extreme difficulty. This is notably the case with 
the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquors. 

1 "Moral Science," pp. 201, 202, 203. 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



355 



In some communities the same difficulty is found in 
dealing with violations of the seventh commandment. 
On the one side it is true that every man ought, by self- 
control and abstinence, to render civil restraint needless. 
On the other side, the straightforward application of legal 
authority is the unequivocal prohibition of that which is 
evil. But that which ought to be, has not been found 
possible on either side. Those who need the legal re- 
straint, and those who are willing that others should in- 
dulge their vices, are the actual legislators, and without 
their influence prohibitory laws cannot be well adminis- 
tered. But the evils and miseries which unchecked 
drunkenness bring upon society soon force some attempt 
at restraint. Under the conflicting influences legislation 
has chiefly attempted the curtailment of excesses, with- 
out suppressing the use of intoxicants. Or with no ref- 
erence to suppression or curtailment, the drink habit has 
been treated as a source of revenue for the government. 
Permits for the sale of intoxicants have been sold to a 
limited number of persons, and thus the profits of the 
business have been shared between the seller and the 
government. The government assures the sellers a 
monopoly of the business ; the sellers give the govern- 
ment due payment for this monopoly. What are the 
moral principles which underlie this governmental policy 
of dealing with the liquor traffic ? 

638. License and Partial Prohibition. 

License, in this case, signifies a permit to trade granted 
to a limited number, and not to all. The limitation is 
essential to the idea of license. License carries with it 
also the idea of legal approval. For this monopoly and 



356 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



approval a price is paid to the government. There 
may be a partial prohibition which carries with it no 
appearance of approval and no license for that which 
is not prohibited. When the sale of intoxicants is abso- 
lutely prohibited on the Sabbath Day, or upon election 
days, or between the hours of ten p. m. and six A. m., or 
within three hundred feet of a schoolhouse, or in any 
place where one-half the householders in the same block 
protest against it, there is involved in these partial pro- 
hibitions no approval of that which is not prohibited, but 
rather a tacit and suggested disapproval. This distinc- 
tion between license and partial prohibition ought to be 
kept in mind. 

639. License and Taxation. 

A second distinction should be noted, the difference 
between a license and a tax. A license is a permit 
granted to some and not to all. A license creates a legal 
monopoly. If the permit be granted to all who please 
to pay the fee it ceases to be a license and becomes a 
tax ; there is no monopoly. A tax levied upon a 
business, whether the business be good or evil, carries 
with it neither approval nor disapproval.. So far is taxa- 
tion from expressing a tacit approval, that taxation is 
sometimes made burdensome in order to discourage a 
bad business. This distinction between taxation and 
license should be kept in mind. 

640. The Attitude of Civil Law toward Evil. 

Civil law cannot attempt to suppress all wrong-doing. 
There are moral evils which the civil law cannot touch. 
These evils are not matters of " personal liberty," but the 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



357 



law cannot reach them. On the other hand, there is 
wrong-doing which is clearly within the reach of law. 
All the people agree that such evils must be treated for 
extermination. What shall be the attitude of civil law 
toward these two classes of transgressions ? First, 
toward the evils which the law can attempt to suppress, 
the attitude of the law must be total prohibition. Any 
other attitude would be futile as a policy, and morally 
and logically absurd. Secondly, toward those immor- 
alities which under the existing conditions the law cannot 
undertake to eradicate, the attitude of the law must not 
under any circumstances be that of tacit encouragement 
or of indifference. Civil government is an agency of the 
Supreme Ruler for the benefit of mankind. Its ends 
cannot righteously be anything which God disapproves. 
For the government to foster any wrong, to permit it, to 
ally itself with it, is to turn against the power which or- 
dained civil authority. Civil government itself becomes 
then, in this and so far, a power that works against God's 
government, and against which divine providence must 
needs work. The evil which civil law cannot reach it 
may rightly leave for moral agencies to correct, but it 
must not promote or sanction or protect the evil. 

641. Is a License of the Liquor Traffic a Partnership? 

In licensing the sale of intoxicants the government 
guarantees to the licensees, so far as it can, a monopoly 
of the traffic. The license fee is fixed according to 
some ratio with the profits of the business. As the fee 
is increased the monopoly becomes closer and the 
business more profitable. Does this system make the 
government a partner in the liquor traffic ? The govern- 



358 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

ment grants a permit to engage in the business, undertakes 
to make it a practical monopoly, and receives payment 
upon this condition. The government thus becomes a 
silent partner in the business, the moiety of capital which 
it furnishes being the monopoly which it guarantees. 
No element seems to be lacking to render this combina- 
tion a moral partnership. 

642. Evils of the License System. 

Besides and beyond the moral evil, the sin and guilt, 
the license system of dealing with the liquor traffic is 
followed by a train of practical evils. 

In the first place, the monopoly given renders the 
business more profitable, and thus operates to promote 
and not suppress it. It raises up a body of men whose 
business it is to stimulate the drink habit to the utmost, 
a class of skilled tempters of the young, their zeal stimu- 
lated by greed of gain. In the second place, by the 
quasi patronage and protection of the government the 
moral opprobrium which naturally shadows the traffic is 
dissipated, and the force of the protest of good men is 
not a little broken. In the third place, the license fee 
operates as a bribe, and the larger the fee the greater 
the bribe, to induce the voter, the legislator, and the 
magistrate to suffer, to wink at, or to promote the perni- 
cious trade. The result is that the attitude of the govern- 
ment very much weakens the moral agencies which can 
be used against the drink traffic and intemperance. 

643. " Personal Liberty " and Intemperance. 

The most popular plea now made against legislation 
prohibitive of the liquor traffic is urged in the name of 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



359 



"personal liberty." To drink or not to drink is said to 
be a personal matter with which neither the government 
nor one's neighbor has anything to do. Is this appeal 
grounded in right principles, or is it the cry of a dema- 
gogue ? We must hold that the use of intoxicants, and 
consequently the traffic in the same, belongs to public 
welfare and comes well within the governmental con- 
trol. 

644. The Right to Save a Man from Self=destruction. 

The right to interfere to save a man from wantonly 
destroying himself is generally admitted. Men wrench 
from the hands of another the vial of poison, they snatch 
the pistol or knife which the owner turns against himself 
as they would if directed against the life of another man. 
This right is a duty. The brotherhood of man and the 
principle of benevolence require this. The same princi- 
ple applies to self-destruction by the drink habit. To put 
the tempting drink beyond the reach of men too weak to 
resist the temptation is both just and benevolent. 

645. Personal Liberty Subject to Limitations. 

Personal liberty has a certain natural limit. It is ad- 
mitted by all that a man's personal freedom must not be 
so used as to endanger the welfare of others. A person 
affected by a contagious disease is isolated or removed, 
willing or unwilling. In his own yard or in his own 
house a man is not suffered so to use his liberty as to poi- 
son the air and endanger the health of his neighbors. A 
druggist is not permitted to sell poisons except under 
safe restrictions. The adulteration of food is counted a 
fit subject for prohibitive legislation. This principle of 



360 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

limiting personal freedom is well established in law and 
in common sense. 

646. The Drink Habit a Menace to AH. 

The drink habit is, first, destructive to the individual, 
and then a menace and a damage to the entire public. 
Beginning with the family of the drinker, it brings loss, 
burden, and misery upon all, in proportion to the close- 
ness of their relation to him. It stimulates crime and 
lays burdens upon the State. This injury touches most 
potently the generations to come. And no man can tell 
when, how, or where this injury will strike him or his. 
And no man can by the extremest watchfulness guard 
himself securely against this danger. If a man cruelly 
beat his child the law interferes ; if he abuse his horse 
the law steps in to shield the brute. If a man inflict 
upon his family perpetual poverty, disgrace, and brutal- 
ity, has the law no right to give protection ? If the 
stream of life is in danger of being poisoned and polluted 
at the fountain head, is it unlawful interference to under- 
take to purify the stream? 

647. Heredity. 

As already suggested, the drink habit is a menace, 
and a grievous injustice and wrong to the generations 
to come. A hunger for intoxication is planted in the 
nature of the children that are born. It is a copious 
spring of imbecility and idiocy. A deep, dark tendency 
to the commission of crime is propagated. Is there no 
right anywhere to dam or dry up this stream of evil, and 
to turn away this blight and curse from unborn genera- 
tions ? 



CONCERNING RIGHTS 



361 



648. The Drink Traffic a Conspiracy. 

The drink traffic is a conspiracy. This is not a figure 
of speech. The traffic must nurture and propagate the 
drink habit, or it must cease. The supply of patrons 
must somehow be maintained. To do this the business 
uses every allurement and artifice to draw men to the 
habit of drinking. Every saloon becomes, and is pur- 
posely made, a pest-house of temptation. The recruits 
for the army of drunkards must needs come from the 
young ; for them the saloonist spreads his net. 

He sitteth in the lurking places of the villages ; 
In the secret places doth he murder the innocent ; 
His eyes are privily set against the helpless. 
He lurketh in the covert as a lion in his den ; 
He lieth in wait to catch the poor ; 

He doth catch the poor when he draweth him in his net. 
He croucheth, he boweth down, and the helpless fall by his 
strong ones. 

He saith in his heart, God hath forgotten ; he hideth his face ; 
he will never see it. 

Upon whom these seductive temptations shall take 
effect no man can tell. No community is safe. No 
family is safe. Thus the drink traffic is a conspiracy 
against every happy, virtuous household. Surely it be- 
longs to the just and benevolent intent of government 
to afford protection from this ever-present threat and 
danger. 



CHAPTER XXIII 



CONCERNING CASUISTRY 

649. The Nature of Casuistry. 

Casuistry is that department of moral science which 
treats of " cases of conscience" — that is, the solution of 
difficult problems of right and duty. In this better sense 
it is the application of moral principles to difficult cases 
of moral conduct in actual life. But casuistry has been 
so much abused, it has been made so much the consid- 
eration of invented puzzles, and this with jesuitical meth- 
ods of reasoning, that it has acquired an evil odor, and is 
sometimes used to signify mere jesuitical sophistry ap- 
plied to morals. Mere quibbles and puzzles are unworthy 
of moral science. Even with real cases of conscience in 
actual life, moral science can do no more than furnish 
the general principles which underlie the solution. The 
facts in the case and the relationship of the facts to 
which the principles must be applied, must be found 
elsewhere. Indeed, the special difficulties in problems 
of right and duty are found outside this science. 

650. Conflict of Obligation. 

In treating cases of conscience much account is made 
of apparent conflict of duties. But cases are cited in 
this connection which show no real conflict. That is 
counted a duty which has not the nature of obligation, 
or an alternative is found where no alternative exists. 
362 



CONCERNING CASUISTRY 



363 



We may find illustrations of this in Paul Janet's ''Theory 
of Morals" ("La Morale"). He says : "The alternative 
is placed before me whether I will betray the truth, will 
be false to my convictions and my faith, or whether I 
will give up my life." 1 This is presented as a conflict of 
duties. There is in the case no conflict of obligation. 
The alternative lies between doing right and suffering for 
it and doing wrong to escape the consequences of right 
doing. Janet supposes another case. He says: "Let 
us take a more difficult case. Suppose the soul is forced 
to choose between conscience and chastity. This is the 
case with the virgin Theodora in Corneille's tragedy — 
either she must betray her faith, or she must lose her 
honor and her virginity." In this case again there is no 
alternative of obligation and no proper alternative of any 
kind. Between one sin and another sin there is no true 
alternative. The question whether Theodora should be- 
tray her faith stood alone and was to be decided by itself. 
The question of surrendering her chastity stood by itself. 
Two wrongs were presented, both of which were to be 
rejected, the one by the confession of her faith and the 
other as she would resist the violence of a robber. The 
due answer would be to spurn the alternative and refuse 
to do either. 

651. Conflict of Obligation Impossible. 

The notion of a conflict of duties arises from a false 
and confused theory of morals. When the idea of right 
doing is reduced to the notion of seeking for certain 
"goods," and duty is counted as multiform and many as 
there are "goods" to be desired, there must needs seem 



1 P. 246. 



364 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

to be numerous conflicts of duty. And if duty signify 
self-pleasing, there may be diverse and mutually destruc- 
tive gratifications. But obligation is one. The rule of 
duty is the will of God, and the will of God is one, unless 
indeed the will of God is divided against itself. The 
only problem in any case is to determine what is the will 
of God. This is often difficult in the extreme, but the 
difficulty in the case is very unlike the balancing of alter- 
native goods or advantages. The one supreme will of 
God stands as the true alternative of whatsover is incon- 
sistent with that will. 

652. The Chief Difficulty. 

The absolute rule and the unity of moral obligation is 
found in the one divine will. But this divine will lays 
down as a general principle the duty of submission to 
certain subordinate authorities, as the authority of parents 
or of civil government There are also certain rights 
and privileges which God wills that each individual shall 
enjoy. Now it sometimes happens that the lower, hu- 
man authority denies to the individual the rights which 
God has given, or lays down laws contrary to the divine 
law. The lower authority is opposed, or seems to be 
opposed, to the higher and the supreme, and yet the 
divine law enjoins reverent regard for the lower. In this 
conflict of authorities, what is the divine will? Here is 
found the chief difficulty. We find here two more or 
less distinct cases. 

653. The First Case. 

In the first case there is an absolute contradiction be- 
tween the divine will and the human commandment. 



CONCERNING CASUISTRY 



365 



For example, the divine law forbids idolatry; Nebu- 
chadnezzar commands the young Jews — Shadrach, Me- 
shach, and Abed-nego — to fall down and worship his 
colossal image in the presence of all the people. The 
divine law requires worship and the confession of the 
true God ; Darius forbids prayer to any being except 
himself on pain of being thrown instantly into a cage of 
lions. The word of Christ said, "Go ye into all the 
world and preach the gospel to every creature"; the 
Jewish council forbade Peter and John to preach in the 
name of Christ. In these illustrations the conflict of 
authority is sharp and decisive. In this case there is 
no problem of duty. There is merely a question of 
obedience or of disobedience to God under con- 
ditions of strenuous temptation. When the divine will 
is understood beyond a doubt, nothing remains but 
obedience. 

654. The Second Case. 

In the second case the conditions are such that the 
real will of God is a matter of uncertainty. A child has 
become a believer in Christ. He reads the words, "He 
that believeth and is baptized" and desires to make the 
public profession, but an unbelieving father absolutely 
forbids it. Apart from the prohibition of the father, the 
duty of the child would be plain. But the divine com- 
mand says also, "Honour thy father." How far ought 
the will of the father to be taken as defining for the child 
the will of God? The civil law lays its hand upon a 
man and makes him, willing or unwilling, a soldier. The 
one rule of military service is obedience, unquestioning 
obedience, with no responsibility for consequences. 



366 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



Theirs not to make reply, 
Theirs not to reason why, 
Theirs but to do and die. 

It is impossible to commit military affairs to the separate 
judgment of ten thousand private soldiers. The com- 
mand goes from Herod to the keeper of the castle to 
behead his prisoner, John the Baptist. As toward men 
the keeper had no responsibility, he was merely an in- 
strument in the hand of his superior officer. What was 
his responsibility toward God? Pilate bids a centurion 
take a squad of men and crucify Jesus of Nazareth. The 
centurion questioned in his own mind whether Jesus were 
worthy of death. Before the transaction was finished, 
the centurion found reason to cry out, " Truly this man 
was the Son of God." But he could not traverse and 
review the judgment of the Sanhedrin and the order of 
Pilate. What was his obligation and responsibility, under 
the circumstances, toward the Lord? These difficulties 
present themselves in endless variety. It is not a conflict 
of duty, but a problem to determine what is duty for 
persons under such conditions. 

655. A General Answer Impossible. 

Conformity to the will of God is always the right to 
be sought. Right is one, but the ways of doing the right 
and working out righteousness are many. To-day, Elijah 
flouts the authority of Ahab, braves the wrath of Jezebel, 
and slays the priests and prophets of Baal ; the next, he 
flees for his life into the fastnesses of Arabia, and the one 
was doubtless as right as the other. At one time Jesus 
would not teach in Judea because the Jews were intent 
to kill him ; afterward he went up to Jerusalem, though 



CONCERNING CASUISTRY 



367 



he knew that he would be immediately seized and cruci- 
fied. Paul escaped out of Damascus through a window 
in the city wall to avoid capture ; afterward he put him- 
self into the hands of his enemies at Jerusalem, though 
he knew that he was endangering his life. There is no 
rule for all cases. If it is wisely right for the child, above 
referred to, to defer awhile the doing of some duty, 
awaiting a possible change in her father's mind, the next 
year or the next week that duty of waiting may have 
ceased. Individual duty for the moment in man}* con- 
cerns must depend upon questions of objective or sub- 
jective detail. 

656. What do General Principles Determine? 

General principles do not, cannot, determine the de- 
tails of duty, and yet they furnish the outline and frame- 
work of all duty. But what is the exact service of general 
principles and commands ? The general principle of 
justice determines that wherever there is a place for jus- 
tice, justice shall not be lacking, and that nothing shall 
be done at any time or anpvhere contrary to justice. 
The principle of truth and honesty determines that what- 
ever a man shall do, it shall not be contrary to truth. 
The general principle of love affirms that wherever there 
is opportunity for love, love shall be exercised, and that 
nothing shall be done contrary to love. General princi- 
ples determine that whatever the form or the fortunes of 
a man's life, the ultimate spring of that life shall be love 
to God, and hence obedience to him. It is a general 
principle that a secondary, or derivative, obligation can- 
not dominate or negative the primary obligation. Man's 
authority cannot stand against the authority of God. The 



368 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

general principle is the permanent and invariable element 
of moral conduct; the expression of the invariable prin- 
ciple is found in variable elements and circumstances. 

657. A Neglected Element. 

Many cases occur in which a man looks in vain for a 
sure objective clue to the path of duty. The general 
principle is certain, but the exact duty seems hopelessly 
uncertain. The only guiding element appears to be the 
consequences of the chosen course of conduct, and 
these consequences only a prophet can foresee. A poor 
clergyman, under the strain of work and solicitude, finds 
his health broken down. His physician tells him that he 
must give up all mental labor or run the risk of utter 
and final mental prostration. He prescribes change of 
scene and freedom from care for twelve months. To 
follow this advice means for the poor man the loss of his 
daily bread, and he knows of no way of meeting the 
expense. Moreover there is very great doubt whether 
a change of scene and rest will bring permanent ad- 
vantage — and on the other side rest at home may bring 
relief, while he still keeps a hold upon the means of 
livelihood. It seems to be a question of consequences, 
and the consequences can be known only by the experi- 
ment. When the decision has been made and the con- 
sequences have proven disastrous, how can the good 
man help reproaching himself for having done an unwise 
thing? The neglected element, neglected in psychology 
and in philosophy, and commonly neglected in practice, 
is a subjective spiritual guidance which can lead a man 
to the discernment and conviction of absolute right. 
This is a matter of experimental religion, but if it is a fact, 



CONCERNING CASUISTRY 



369 



it is not for this reason the less a matter of science and 
philosopy. There are many persons who believe this 
spiritual guidance to be a fact. They believe that 
through the normal action of their own faculties in 
touch with the divine Spirit, they are led to discern 
what is God's will. This discernment of duty stands in 
their minds, not as a doubtful conjecture concerning con- 
sequences, but as a calm conviction of the divine will, 
whatever the consequences may prove to be. If painful 
consequences follow, the soul remains peaceful under 
the assurance that the divine will has been done. 

658. Considerations to be Noted. 

Touching this neglected element in determining the 
application of general principles to concrete life, two 
considerations need to be noted. First, this subjective 
spiritual guidance has the advantage of bringing calm- 
ness of conviction and tranquillity of mind under the 
most painful experiences, as nothing else can do. 
Secondly, if this subjective guidance be not a reality, 
but the phantom of a diseased mind, then there is no 
method of reaching an absolute right in the application 
of general principles to the details of conduct. In that 
case, if only the general principle be not violated, there 
is no further obligation. With this conclusion men of 
high moral purpose can never be content. 

659. Cases of Conscience. 

As illustrating the application of general principles to 
special cases, we may consider a few imaginary ex- 
amples. 

1. A man is journeying across the country. His 



370 INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 

wagon breaks and he can go no farther. A few nails 
would repair the damage and enable him to resume his 
journey. He goes to a neighboring farmhouse to get 
the needed help. He finds the family absent and the 
house closed. But in the open shed he finds a box of 
nails and a hammer. Is it right, in the absence of the 
owner, to use such nails as he needs ? If the owner 
were present it would be his duty to render the needed 
assistance. On the principles of brotherhood and benev- 
olence this would be his duty. It is just to assume that 
if he were present he would gladly respond to this obli- 
gation. To impute to a worthy man unwillingness to do 
such a kindness would be doing him a great wrong. 
To use needed nails would accord with the Golden 
Rule ; it would be doing as he would wish another to 
do toward him under like conditions. On the other 
side, in the presence of the owner he would offer to 
make remuneration. We say, therefore, let the man 
use such nails as he needs, leaving sufficient payment for 
the same. 

2. A young man and a maiden are betrothed, but after 
a time the young woman comes to see that a great mistake 
has been made. She discovers that the young man is 
not the kind of person whom she in her ignorance, or in 
her fancy, took him to be. She recoils from the prom- 
ised union. She sees that marriage would bring unhap- 
piness to her and to him. But her promise has been 
given, and the man refuses to release her from the 
engagement. Is it right for the young woman to break 
her promise ? We notice, first, that betrothal is not 
marriage ; it carries with it none of the proper obliga- 
tions or rights of marriage. To break a betrothal is not 



CONCERNING CASUISTRY 



371 



a breach of the marriage covenant. In the second 
place, the promise ought not have been made. It was 
made under a misapprehension of the real facts in the 
case, or else the facts upon which the promise was based 
have changed or passed away. The making of the 
promise may have been wrong ; to keep it would be 
adding to the wrong. To keep the promise would per- 
petuate the wrong into the limitless future, and inflict it 
upon a widening circle. Neither party has the right to 
consummate such a wrong, no matter what promises have 
been made. The y cuing woman ought therefore to 
repent of the making of the engagement, and ought not 
to hesitate to annul it. 

This signifies that the substance of a promise may be 
so wrong that to keep the promise would not be right, 
and this may be true, even if the wrong of the promise 
was not understood at the making of it. It signifies 
also that the conditions which underlie a promise may 
be so changed that to fulfill the promise would be wrong. 

3. A father is drunken and cruel ; the mother is vile. 
The daughter has learned the sacred command, "Honour 
thy father and thy mother." Is it possible for the 
daughter to do this ? Is it her duty ? The duty of the 
child is correlative to the parental relationship, and to 
the duties which inhere in parentage. It implies the 
fulfillment of parental obligations, and presupposes the 
character which befits parents. The honor which the 
child is commanded to accord, is plainly intended to be 
the recognition of a relationship and of a character 
worthy of honor. It was not intended to be an unjust 
imposition upon the child, nor a shallow formality on 
the part of the child, the cast skin of a reverence which 



372 



INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



has ceased to be possible in the soul. The command is 
given to sons and daughters of the ripest years, and 
they are not bidden by this to be blind to the realities 
of things. When therefore only the bare fact of the 
parental relation remains, exhausted of all which that 
relationship ought to signify, the fullness of filial honor 
becomes impossible. But if there be no place for honor 
in response to worth and love, the fact of fatherhood 
and motherhood remains, a fact and a reality forever, 
and that must be reverently recognized. Thus the child 
renders the honor which is due. If there is also a per- 
sonal self-sacrificing devotion to worthless and vicious 
parents, this goes beyond the command to honor father 
and mother. The self-sacrifice of supreme love is 
limitless. 



APR 8 1903 



